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Jesus’ resurrection has long been a central tenet of Christian theology, and the focus of 
extensive debate and curiosity. Scholars have defended a physical resurrection; interpreted it 
as metaphor, hallucination, or deception; removed it entirely from the scope of historical 
inquiry; and have denied it outright. However, belying this scholarship is the propensity to 
assume that the language of ‘resurrection’ envisages the reanimation of a corporeal and 
personal body (and then defended, re-interpreted, or denied). Therein lies the problem. This 
thesis argues that the ancient Jewish and Christian notion of resurrection cannot be restricted 
within a re-animated body but includes a broad spectrum of eschatological hope, particularly 
the renewal of relationship with YHWH, the dispensation of justice, and the transformation of 
creation as a whole. Jesus’ resurrection is the fulfilment of these broader eschatological hopes 
and cannot be reduced to the return to life of a personal body. Connected to this is the corollary 
assertion that Jesus’ resurrection is characterised by a unification of elements that bear both 
continuity and discontinuity with empirical reality, echoing the hope for a renewed and 
transformed reality. As a result of its limited understanding of ‘resurrection,’ scholarship has 
often emphasized either the continuity or discontinuity at the expense of the other, where this 
thesis contends that the two must be upheld in a dialectic tension. This reframing of resurrection 
necessitates a re-evaluation of methodology, proposing a ‘Postfoundationalist Constructive 
Realism,’ a framework built upon a dialogue with Wolfhart Pannenberg and N.T. Wright. PCR 
upholds the external event or object, with its inherent meaning, and its subjective interpretation 
by an interpreter who imbues that event with contextually conditioned meaning, according to 
the interpreter’s presupposed categories of understanding. Though this thesis is primarily a 
project within the discipline of systematic theology, it is significantly informed by, and engages 
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1. Re-Framing Recreation: Introductory Remarks 
“It is such a letdown to rise from the dead and have your friends not recognize you.”1 
1.1. Miracles and Bodies: Interpreting the Resurrection 
The above quote from the American pastor Rob Bell humorously illuminates a core 
characteristic of the risen Jesus as depicted in the New Testament corpus, that though it is the 
same Jesus who has returned and has appeared before the disciples, he is yet very different and 
his appearance very unusual. However, Bell’s epigram belies an assumption common to 
discussion on resurrection, that this ‘resurrection’ entails essentially and principally the 
reanimation of the personal body of Jesus. Though something is different, very little has 
actually changed. 
Indeed, the idea of resurrection has been an object of fascination, pervading ancient religious 
customs and contemporary popular culture, from Osiris to Superman, shades to zombies. 
Nothing is quite the perversion of the natural order like the reversal of death. The claim that 
Jesus rose from the dead three days after being buried2 carried no less fascination for the early 
Jesus movement who ascribed considerable theological significance to the event. Paul, for 
example, claims in his response to the Corinthians that “if Christ has not been raised, your faith 
is futile and you are still in your sins” (1 Cor. 15.17). For Paul, the event was pivotal to early 
Christian faith; the early communities of the Jesus movement interpreted the post-mortem 
existence of Jesus as something fundamentally theological that, though difficult to describe in 
a logical or coherent way, signified the dawn of a new eschatological era. 
 
1 Rob Bell, Velvet Elvis: Repainting the Christian Faith (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2005), 156. 
2 Whether the resurrection occurred on the third day (as in Matt. 16.21) or after three days (as in Mark 8.31) is a 
curious discrepancy in the New Testament corpus, which will be addressed in chapter 6. 
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As chapter two will demonstrate, the claim that Jesus rose from the dead has been interpreted 
in a diverse number of ways: from literal readings which envisage the risen Jesus bearing the 
same flesh and blood that he bore prior to his execution,3 to metaphorical readings where the 
resurrection is symbolic of the rise of faith in the disciples, or similar;4 from a physical event 
that can be proved through ordinary historical means,5 to bearing such eschatological character 
that it eludes historical description.6 This scholarship has, however, largely assumed that the 
language of ‘resurrection’ refers to the material reanimation and return to life of a personal, 
corporeal body, and has consequently divided scholarship between those who argue for a literal 
event (Jesus’ resurrection was a return to an embodied existence, albeit one with significant 
adjustments; or if it happened, its inherent eschatological character removes it from the scope 
of historical accessibility), and those who argue for a metaphorical event (Jesus’ resurrection 
surely could not have been a literal reanimation of a corpse, and so must have meant something 
else).7  
From this, a second corollary observation can be made; that interpretations tend to emphasize 
either the continuity or discontinuity between the pre-crucifixion Jesus and post-resurrection 
Jesus, usually at the expense of the other. That is, those theologians who stress a literal, 
 
3 E.g. Tertullian, Augustine, Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, Ulrich Zwingli, Stanley J. Grenz, Molly 
Haws, Norman Geisler. The brief list in this footnote, and the following three footnotes, is certainly not exhaustive 
but indicates some of the primary advocates for each respective position. Chapter two will address specific texts 
and arguments in detail. These few immediate lists do not include those who present an immaterial or ‘spiritual’ 
resurrection, those who focus primarily on the narratological aspect of the Easter stories, those who deny the 
resurrection outright, or those who maintain that the resurrection appearances were hallucinations. These various 
other interpretations are addressed in chapter two.  
4 E.g. David Hume, David Strauss, Ernst Troeltsch, Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich, Joachim Jeremias, John 
Dominic Crossan, Burton Mack, James Dunn, Michael Goulder, Kelly Brown Douglas, Pieter Craffert. 
5 E.g. Charles Spurgeon, Wolfhart Pannenberg, N. T. Wright, William Lane Craig, Gary Habermas, Bruce Milne, 
Michael Licona. 
6 E.g. Martin Kähler, Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, Hans Frei, Edward Schillebeeckx, Willi Marxsen, Jürgen 
Moltmann, Daniel Migliore.  
7 This includes those who argue that the resurrection was a hallucination (such as Lüdemann), a deliberate 
deception, a lie invented by the disciples (such as Hermann Reimarus), or those who outright deny the resurrection 
(such as popular critics like Christopher Hitchens). These will be addressed in chapter two, but we can note here 
that both of these positions retain the assumption that resurrection refers to personal reanimation and are attempts 
at explaining away such a resurrection.  
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historical, physical return to life of the same body emphasize the continuity of the risen Jesus, 
and make only nominal or secondary reference to the transformations of that body or to the 
eschatological significance of the event; whereas those who stress a metaphorical, supra-
historical, or immaterial resurrection emphasize the discontinuity, and either reject or minimize 
the characteristics that the risen Jesus shares with his pre-crucifixion body.  
For example, of those emphasizing continuity, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas were careful to 
note that only those elements of the body which were helpful for a productive life would be 
resurrected and not every length of hair or nail which had been trimmed throughout life.8 The 
popular Baptist preacher Charles Spurgeon insists, “The resurrection of Jesus Christ from the 
dead is one of the best attested facts on record”9 and so, with the modern apologists William 
Lane Craig and Gary Habermas (both of whom employ positivistic historical methodologies to 
the historical question of Jesus’ resurrection10), reduces the resurrection to little more than any 
ordinary contingent event. Similarly, the feminist theologian Molly Haws maintains that the 
resurrection was the reanimation of dead tissue and was a gradual, physical event.11 Of those 
emphasizing discontinuity, the New Testament scholars Rudolf Bultmann and John Dominic 
Crossan, rejecting the possibility of a physical return from death, interpret the resurrection as 
a reference to Jesus’ ongoing presence, alive in a very different way to his pre-crucifixion life.12 
C.J. Cadoux claims that though something certainly happened to Jesus, the resurrection is 
 
8 Enchir. xxiii, 84-93; Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, III. Suppl. Trans. The Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province (Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952), Q. 79, art. 1-2. 
9 Charles H. Spurgeon, “The Resurrection of the Dead,” in The New Street Pulpit, vol 2 (London: Passmore & 
Alabaster, 1856), 108.  
10 William Lane Craig, Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus 
(New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1989), 418; Gary Habermas in Miethe, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? The 
Resurrection Debate, ed. Terry L. Miethe (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 20-25.  
11 Molly Haws, “‘Put Your Finger Here’: Resurrection and the Construction of the Body,” Theology & Sexuality 
13, no. 2 (2007), 191-92.  
12 Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), 150; John Dominic 
Crossan, The Cross that Spoke: The Origins of the Passion Narrative (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988), 16-
17; John Dominic Crossan, The Historical Jesus: The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (New York: 
HarperCollins, 1991), 395-96. For Bultmann, the language of ‘resurrection’ was mythological language, primitive 
expression of a spiritual experience. 
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purely ‘spiritual’ and psychological;13 and for Karl Rahner Jesus’ resurrection is his 
glorification, but this is nevertheless inseparable from and unknowable apart from the faith of 
believers.14 Furthermore, I include those theologians who argue that the resurrection was a 
supra-historical event (that its eschatological character precludes it from historical inquiry) 
among those who emphasize discontinuity, because in doing so these scholars have entirely 
removed the resurrection from contingent history, thereby limiting or removing any sense of 
continuity. Chief among these is Karl Barth, who interprets the resurrection as the 
eternalization of Jesus which transcends ordinary human existence to the extent that it becomes 
entirely inaccessible to historical investigation, despite maintaining an interpretation of the 
resurrection as bodily.15  
The assumption behind these interpretations is that the imagery of ‘resurrection’ primarily 
envisages the personal reanimation of Jesus’s body, interpreted literally or metaphorically, with 
an emphasis on either the continuity or discontinuity of the risen body with the pre-crucifixion 
body. Yet, curiously, the biblical depictions of resurrection are often less concerned with the 
body or bodies and more concerned with the associated theological implications, and when the 
risen Jesus is described, the description is frustratingly ambiguous. Matthew’s Easter narrative 
(28.1-20) is imbued with apocalyptic elements, including the dawning of the first day of the 
week (v.1), an earthquake (v.2), and an angel appearing like lightning and wearing pure white 
clothing (v.3), and with the reference to the disciples worshipping Jesus upon a mountain, 
though some doubt, (vv.16-17). This narrative suggests that whatever happened bore incredible 
eschatological significance that stretched beyond the person of Jesus. In Luke-Acts, the focus 
 
13 C. J. Cadoux, The Life of Jesus (Middlesex: Penguin, 1948), 164-67 
14 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 4, trans. Kevin Smyth (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 
128-29; Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, trans. William V. Dych (London: Darton, Longman & 
Todd, 1978), 267. 
15 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. H. Knight, G. W. Bromiley, J. 
K. S. Reid and R. H. Fuller (Massachusetts: Hendrickson, 1960), vol. 4.1, 283-357, esp. 333-340; Karl Barth, The 
Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (Oxford: OUP, 1933), 30. 
5 
 
is upon the glorification and exaltation of Jesus to a new position of authority within a new 
social order, a new eschatological kingdom (Luke 24.6, 26, 27, 34, 46, 50-53; Acts 2.23-26; 
13.29-30). The descriptions become even more ambiguous in John’s Gospel, with allusions to 
the Genesis creation accounts (19.41; 20.1, 15, 19, 22), Jesus not being recognized (20.14; 
21.4), suddenly appearing within a locked room (20.19), and bearing the wounds of the 
crucifixion (20.20, 27). The risen Jesus is not even present in Mark’s Easter narrative (16.1-
8)!16 In 1 Corinthians 15, Paul seems unable to find a suitable analogy to describe what 
happened at the resurrection, using a variety of illustrations from nature (v.35-54) and using 
the term, σῶμα πνευματικόν (‘spiritual body’) (v.44). Of course, these texts do exhibit some 
concern with Jesus’ body, but this is framed by the principal eschatological concerns which 
transcend Jesus’ personal body. There is far more at stake than the transformation of Jesus; it 
is the inauguration of a new reality, where divine justice is dispensed, a new, 
pneumatologically-conditioned relationship with God is available, and the cosmos itself is 
renewed and transformed. The ambiguity of Jesus’ post-mortem existence, and its ascribed 
eschatological significance, suggests that this event eludes description, transcending ordinary 
categories and frameworks while remaining fully rooted within the contingency of time and 
space. 
A closer examination reveals that Jesus’ post-mortem existence was interpreted through the 
lens of the ancient Jewish eschatological notion of resurrection of the dead, which was, more 
often than not, concerned with the broader hopes and expectations for the eschaton. These 
hopes are echoed in the theological implications attached to the resurrection of Jesus – the 
renewal of relationship, the dispensation of justice, and the transformation and redemption of 
creation as a whole. If we are to take the application of the Jewish notion of resurrection to the 
 
16 It has been suggested, particularly by Bultmann, that the transfiguration (Mark 9.2-13) was a misplaced 
resurrection narrative, which explains why Jesus is not present in ch.16. This is discussed further in §6.4.  
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post-mortem existence of Jesus seriously, we must incorporate these broader eschatological 
motifs, motifs which extend well beyond personal reanimation. This thesis contends that 
resurrection is much bigger than bodies. Resurrection transcends any notion of ‘body’ and 
makes such language inadequate.  
1.2. Resurrecting the Resurrection: The Argument of this Thesis 
The central argument of this thesis is that, first, the underlying notion of the language 
‘resurrection’ cannot be reduced to only, or primarily, the reanimation of a personal, corporeal 
body, but that Jesus’ post-mortem existence is, first and foremost, the fulfilment of the 
eschatological hopes for the dispensation of divine justice, the renewal and transformation of 
creation, and the exaltation of the righteous; and that as such, second, the resurrection 
constitutes the unification of present, empirical reality with the future eschatological reality.  
The original contribution of this thesis is the argument that general scholarship has assumed 
that the imagery of ‘resurrection’ refers to personal reanimation (and has either defended this, 
re-interpreted this as metaphor, a psychological phenomenon, or an immaterial event, or denied 
this altogether) and that this is a fundamental misinterpretation of the notion of resurrection of 
the dead. To be clear, ‘reanimation’ here refers to the return to life of a material and personal 
body, whether or not that body has undergone some form of transformation. Furthermore, the 
degree to which the unification of present, empirical reality with the future eschatological 
reality is upheld in this thesis’ proposal is a secondary original contribution. That the 
resurrection bears eschatological significance, relates to eschatological hopes, and consists of 
a curious and ambiguous transformation of Jesus is not a new idea. However, as will be 
demonstrated in chapter two, scholarship often tends to emphasize either the continuity of the 
risen Jesus and deemphasize the discontinuity, or emphasize the discontinuity and deemphasize 
the continuity, whereas this thesis maintains that both must be upheld without compromise in 
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an uneasy and dialectic tension. Such a tension can only be maintained if we abandon the 
assumption that resurrection means reanimation. We must, as it were, resurrect the original 
meaning of ‘resurrection’ to reframe (and perhaps redefine) this notion to adequately 
acknowledge and incorporate the broad spectrum of eschatological hope that was fulfilled in 
Jesus’ post-mortem existence. Simply put: I will argue there has been too much focus on the 
resurrection of Jesus as a personal reanimation and this thesis offers a corrective.  
A re-evaluation of the notion and definition of resurrection necessitates a re-evaluation of the 
historical and theological methodologies employed to assess the claim that Jesus rose from the 
dead. Methodological concerns thereby occupy two chapters of this thesis. Chapter three 
addresses the epistemological difficulties of discussing an event that transcends ordinary 
epistemological frameworks, arguing that the foundationalism that pervades much discussion 
pertaining to the resurrection is inadequate. Chapter four considers how this epistemology then 
translates to historical method, arguing that the meaning of resurrection is found in the 
interaction between external ‘objective’ event and internal ‘subjective’ interpretation. The 
deficiency of general scholarship to see in Jesus’ post-mortem existence an eschatological 
event that occurred to Jesus that nevertheless extended well beyond Jesus’ body, an event 
which simultaneously and dialectically upholds contrary elements (both continuity and 
discontinuity), is largely due to inadequate methodology, particularly a foundationalist 
epistemology or an empiricist historical method wherein anthropological or communal 
contextuality is not afforded necessary attention. For this reason, a revised methodology is 
proposed in chapter three, a ‘Postfoundationalist Constructive Realism’ (henceforth PCR), a 
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re-evaluation of N.T. Wright’s version of ‘critical realism’17 in light of Wolfhart Pannenberg’s 
epistemology.18 
The framework of PCR and how it relates specifically to the examination of Jesus’ resurrection 
and its utilization in this thesis is explored in chapters three and four and especially §4.4. 
However, a provisional definition is helpful at this point – though this definition is neither 
programmatic nor a prescribed formula, for a core concern of this epistemic framework is a 
rejection of methodologies which claim universal application. PCR upholds the dichotomy of 
object and subject in a mutually conditioning reciprocity, avoiding epistemic foundations 
without collapsing into coherentism. Within this, the constructive and bilateral nature of 
knowledge is maintained; that is, the subjective interpreter imparts meaning upon the external 
event or object while the event bears within itself its own intelligible inherent meaning. 
Knowledge is neither the ‘objective’ reception nor the ‘subjective’ interpretation, but resides 
precisely in the interaction between the two. Such a framework enables the balancing of 
antipodal statements of reality in a dialectic and mutually-conditioning tension, which supports 
the argument that Jesus’ resurrection is characterised by the dialectic unification of continuity 
and discontinuity. 
It is important to note here that the aim of this thesis is not to address the question of the 
historicity of the resurrection in terms of whether it ‘actually happened’ but rather to focus on 
the theological and historical meaning of the proclamation. It is also important to clarify the 
discipline within which this thesis resides. This is primarily a contribution to the field of 
Systematic Theology (and not a comprehensive theological system in and of itself), discussing 
the philosophical and theological nature of knowledge, history, and the significance of what 
 
17 As especially expounded in his The New Testament and the People of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 29-
144. 
18 As discussed throughout many of his publications, especially his earlier publications such as Revelation as 
History, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, Jesus – God and 
Man, and Basic Questions in Theology.  
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the resurrection means. However, its interests often overlap with New Testament scholarship, 
particularly regarding questions of epistemology, historical method, and meaning, and 
especially as this has implications for the study of Jesus’ resurrection. The Christian faith is a 
historical phenomenon and so Systematic Theology benefits from rigorous historical critical 
interventions, even if this occasionally takes one outside of the usual confines of Systematics 
as it is traditionally defined by the use of canonical sources.  
Before moving on to introducing Wolfhart Pannenberg and N.T. Wright and their relevance 
for this research, some definitions of common terminology are in order. Several words and 
phrases are used regularly throughout this thesis, words which might have different meanings 
or connotations for different authors, and so their use in this thesis must be clarified. The first 
is ‘history,’ used to refer to the interaction between the objective, external event, and its 
subjective, internal interpretation and communication. It is referring neither to the brute facts 
of ‘what happened’ nor simply to the communication of those events via written texts, but the 
interaction between both. This understanding of ‘history’ recognizes that an external event has 
meaning in and of itself, but that meaning is imported into that event by those who witness, 
remember, and communicate that event according to their particular perspective, prior 
interpretative frameworks, communal context, and worldviews. By speaking of an event as 
‘historical’ the external reality of that event is affirmed while maintaining that knowledge of 
that event is subjectively-conditioned. When specifically referring to the external event, the 
language of contingency or ‘contingent history’ is used to refer to an event among other events 
within external reality, or as something which ‘occurs within time and space’ to stress the sheer 
facticity of that event.  Hence, when speaking of the ‘historical Jesus,’ a phrase which carries 
diverse and often contrary meanings and connotations within both systematic theology and 
New Testament scholarship, this thesis does not attempt to divorce the ‘Jesus of Nazareth’ from 
the ‘Christ of Faith.’ Rather, it is maintained that what is important for contemporary thought 
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is neither ‘getting behind’ the New Testament texts or dissecting the texts for ‘authentic’ 
history, nor focussing solely on the New Testament texts which present the life and fate of 
Jesus in a theologically significant light – usually in salvific, messianic, or eschatological 
terms. When referring to the ‘Historical Jesus,’ this thesis refers to the interaction between the 
‘what happened’ and how that was interpreted and communicated, recognizing that the two are 
inseparable.19 Furthermore, when referring specifically to the discipline of history, this will 
explicitly be noted. These various notions of history will be discussed further in chapters three 
and four.  
The words ‘theology’ and ‘theological’ are used in a number of ways in this thesis, the meaning 
of which is usually dictated by its context. However, ‘theology’ generally refers to anything 
pertaining to the knowledge, nature, and activity of the God of Christian revelation.20 Hence, 
when speaking of ‘resurrection theology,’ for example, this thesis refers to the way in which 
the interpretation of the proclamation that Jesus rose from the dead relates to the broader 
understanding of the Christian God. The word ‘theological’ is the corresponding adjective to 
this understanding of theology, and so, for example, when using the phrase ‘theological 
significance,’ this thesis is considering how a particular idea carries significance for the broader 
understanding of God, that is, when a notion carries considerable theological significance it 
has a considerable impact upon broader theological conceptions. What that significance is (or 
impact or implications) is then clarified. When speaking specifically of an academic discipline, 
that particular discipline will be noted as such. For example, this thesis uses ‘Systematic 
 
19 My personal understanding of Scripture should here also be noted. Though I would consider my approach to 
Scripture to be, in a broad sense, an Evangelical one – that is, I have a high view of Scripture and ascribe to 
Scripture a significant priority and authority in doctrinal concerns – I do not subscribe to the doctrine of inerrancy 
and consider Scripture to be fundamentally human, reflecting human concerns and human attempts to understand 
the divine. Hence I place a considerable emphasis upon anthropological concerns, the historical and communal 
contexts of the respective authors and their contributions to Scripture.  
20 This is not to say that ‘theology’ is the exclusive domain of the Christian tradition, acknowledging that all 
religious traditions have their unique theologies and understandings of divinity, of the world, and of humanity. 
However, this thesis is concerned principally and specifically with Christian theology, and so ‘theology’ in this 
thesis refers to the Christian conception of God.  
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Theology’ or ‘New Testament studies’ when referring to their respective disciplines, and 
‘scholarship’ refers to the research, arguments, and debates within those disciplines.  
Finally, phrases particular to the present argument include the distinction between ‘continuity’ 
and ‘discontinuity,’ references to Jesus’ ‘post-mortem existence,’ the phrase ‘ancient Jewish 
eschatology,’ and ‘the resurrection of the dead.’ ‘Continuity’ and ‘discontinuity,’ with its 
cognates ‘continuous’ and ‘discontinuous,’ are used in reference to the nature of the risen Jesus. 
This dichotomy distinguishes between those elements which are similar to ordinary 
experienced, or empirical, reality and to the pre-crucifixion Jesus (continuous), and those 
elements which are wholly and significantly different following, and resulting, from the event 
to which was applied the eschatological category of resurrection (discontinuous). For example, 
the claim that Jesus’ resurrection was physical and occurred within time and space is to 
emphasize the continuity of the resurrection with ordinary reality; whereas the claim that Jesus’ 
resurrection was immaterial or exceeds historical inquiry is to emphasize its discontinuity. 
References to Jesus’ ‘post-mortem existence’ are used to highlight the prior theological 
frameworks that were placed upon, and through which formed the interpretive lens for, what 
occurred to Jesus after his death. That is to say, Jesus’ post-mortem existence refers to the 
external event, the ‘what happened’; whereas the theological and eschatologically-charged 
language of resurrection refers to the contextually and communally conditioned interpretation 
of that event. For the present purposes of this thesis, reflecting the definition of history above, 
the interaction between the event itself and its interpretation is what is of primary importance, 
but it is important to clarify how this distinction is discussed.  
The phrase ‘ancient Jewish eschatology’ acknowledges that modern Jewish theology has a 
distinct and unique eschatology, but in this present thesis this phrase refers to the dominant 
eschatological categories in the first-century that informed the New Testament writings. This 
includes the eschatology contained within some of the canonical texts in the Hebrew Bible, as 
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well as the developing eschatological conceptions of Second Temple and extra-biblical Jewish 
literature, with the latest texts analysed in this thesis dating to the second century BCE. 
Furthermore, this thesis is not restricted specifically to ‘apocalyptic’ literature (a genre that will 
be addressed in chapter five). This terminology will be explained further in the course of this 
thesis. A distinction is also made between the broader notion of ‘resurrection of the dead’ and 
Jesus’ post-mortem existence which was described as resurrection. The ‘resurrection of the 
dead’ was the theological category that developed within ancient Jewish eschatology which 
was inseparably connected to the broader hopes for the eschaton, and was the category adopted 
and adapted by the early Jesus movement to describe what they believed occurred to Jesus’ 
post-mortem existence, that is his resurrection, and which developed in light of their experience 
of the risen Jesus. When speaking of the broader range of ideas within Jewish eschatological 
expectations ‘resurrection of the dead’ shall be used, whereas the simple ‘resurrection’ is used 
to describe the application of this broader Jewish notion to Jesus’ post-mortem existence.  
When another author’s use and understandings of these various words and terminology is 
contrary to my own, it will be highlighted and made explicitly clear.  
1.3. Interdisciplinary Dialogue: On Conversing with Pannenberg and Wright 
As noted, and will be demonstrated in chapter two, scholarship has sometimes tended to equate 
the language of ‘resurrection’ as it pertains to Jesus’ post-mortem existence strictly with the 
reanimation of a personal body and subsequently to stress either the continuity or the 
discontinuity of Jesus’ risen nature with his pre-crucifixion body at the expense, or 
minimization, of the other. The present thesis is an attempt to reframe how ‘resurrection’ is 
understood, arguing that resurrection envisages a reality where the language of ‘body’ is 
inadequate. Indeed, the language itself that was available to the early witnesses of Jesus’ post-
mortem existence was limited and restrictive, and the term ‘body’ was the closest 
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approximation of what they experienced. Both the continuous and discontinuous must be 
upheld in dialectic tension, based on an interpretation of the Jewish eschatological category of 
resurrection of the dead. Herein the fulfilment of the broad spectrum of hope for the end of 
history is referred, which includes in particular the reaffirmation of created reality and its 
radical transformation. This is evident in the biblical imagery of the new, unified heavens and 
earth (Isa. 65.17; 2 Pet. 3.12-13; Rev. 21.1), picturing a renewed and transformed reality that 
enables unadulterated relationship between God and creation, which will be addressed in 
chapter five. Much of the methodological proposals of Wolfhart Pannenberg and N. T. Wright 
are appropriate to the task of upholding this dialectic tension within the resurrection, to be 
addressed in subsequent chapters. The following is a condensed survey of their interpretations 
of the resurrection, though major critique is reserved for the following chapters where detailed 
discussion is provided.  
One of Pannenberg’s significant contributions to Jesus research is his methodological proposal 
of Christology ‘from below,’ detailed in his 1964 publication, Jesus – God and Man (discussed 
in §4.3). According to this approach, we must begin with the historical analysis of the particular 
human figure, Jesus of Nazareth, without assuming his supposed divinity.21 Pannenberg 
developed his Christological methodology in his later Systematic Theology, locating 
Christology directly alongside a broader anthropological discussion and proposes a more 
nuanced Christology that attempts to synthesize the ‘from below’ approach with the 
recognition that attempts to ‘get behind’ the New Testament texts are impossible.22 Here he 
maintains the emphasis upon historical research, arguing that the primary source of God’s 
 
21 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus – God and Man, trans. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (London: SCM, 
2002), 17-18 
22 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (London: T&T Clark, 2004), vol. 2, 
277-323. F. LeRon Shults describes Pannenberg’s methodology as a precursor to postfoundationalism, which will 
be explored in depth below (F. LeRon Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology: Wolfhart Pannenberg 
and the New Theological Rationality (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999)).  
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revelation is found in retrospective reflection upon God’s activity within history, the 
resurrection being the major act of God’s self-revelation. This understanding had already been 
outlined in his essay, “Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation” in Revelation as 
History.23 In his 1962 essay, “What is Truth?” Pannenberg argued that all truth must remain 
universal and public.24 Hence, Jesus’ resurrection, if it occurred within contingent history, must 
be able to be analysed like any other event within contingent history. For if it does not belong 
in universal public history, then it cannot be universal truth and so cannot be considered divine 
revelation.  
Pannenberg connects the resurrection to the apocalyptic context of Second Temple Judaism, 
and so, in light of this, claims that in Jesus’ resurrection, the eschaton was fully present and 
verified Jesus’ pre-Easter professions of divinity. Coupled with Pannenberg’s metaphysical 
stance of a future-oriented ontology (discussed in the excursus), the resurrection was both the 
confirmation and determination of Jesus’ divinity, retroactively determining Jesus’ relationship 
with God back into eternity.25  
As will be explored in chapters three and four, two elements of Pannenberg’s project are of 
particular interest to this thesis. The first to be considered are his contributions toward a 
‘postfoundationalist’ epistemology, moving beyond foundationalist empiricism and positivism 
while retaining a belief in the intelligibility of external reality. This postfoundationalism will 
be re-appropriated and extended, and brought into dialogue with recent epistemological 
considerations and will form a significant basis for the methodology of this thesis. The second 
element of interest is Pannenberg’s Christological methodology, which balances a Christology 
 
23 Wolfhart Pannenberg, ed. Revelation as History, trans. David Granskou (London: Macmillan, 1968), 123-158. 
Cf. “Redemptive Event and History,” a lecture Pannenberg gave in 1959, in Wolfhart Pannenberg, Basic 
Questions in Theology, trans. George H. Kelm (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2008), vol. 1, 15-80. 
24 “What is Truth?” in Wolfhart Pannenberg, BQT, vol. 2, 1-27. He maintains this understanding of truth in his 
later Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 1-61.  
25 Pannenberg, JGM; Pannenberg, ST, vol. 2, 277-396.   
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‘from below’ with one ‘from above,’ with neither being considered epistemologically 
foundational and both functioning in a mutually conditioning dynamic. This dynamic extends 
to his understanding of the role of faith, and the nature of truth and knowledge, and is useful 
for the task of highlighting and balancing the dialectic tension between the continuous and 
discontinuous aspects of Jesus’ risen nature.  
N. T. Wright published the first volume of his immense series, Christian Origins and the 
Question of God, entitled The New Testament and the People of God in 1992, which was 
followed by the second volume, Jesus and the Victory of God, in 1996. In these publications, 
Wright insists that historical inquiry is an essential task for the Christian scholar in order to 
avoid defaulting to a form of Deism. Critically appropriating Sanders’ work, he argues that 
locating Jesus within his first century Jewish context is of primary significance.26 Within this 
historical inquiry, the resurrection, he claims, must remain a viable subject of historical 
research, maintaining that if it happened within contingent history, it should be accessible via 
ordinary means of historical inquiry.27  
Wright explores the portrayals of resurrection in general, and of Jesus’ resurrection in 
particular, in considerable detail in the Hebrew Bible, New Testament, and extra-canonical 
texts. He concludes from this study that the early Christians understood this event as a bodily, 
physical event. However, Wright describes the nature of the resurrection as ‘transphysicality,’ 
that is, ‘transformed physicality.’ This term does not claim to describe Jesus’ body in detail, 
but “puts a label on the demonstrable fact that the early Christians envisaged a body which was 
still robustly physical but also significantly different from the present one.”28 The resurrection 
demonstrates God’s creative activity, inaugurating the new kingdom with Jesus as its king. 
 
26 Ibid., 3-81; N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 5.  
27 Wright, RSG, 11-31. Cf. idem., “Theology, History and Jesus: A Response to Maurice Casey and Clive Marsh,” 
JSNT 69, no. 1 (1998), 106; idem., “God’s Way of Acting,” ChrCent 115, no. 35 (1998), 1215. 
28 Wright, RSG, 477-78.  
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Within this new eschatological reality, evil has been dealt with and death – the final weapon of 
Caesar and of Satan – has been defeated.29 
Three features of Wright’s argument to be addressed and reappropriated are, first, his version 
of the epistemological position of ‘critical realism,’ which he presents as being located between 
a naïve realism and a relativistic phenomenalism. That is, knowledge of external reality is 
indeed possible but is mediated by subjective prejudice formed by a personal worldview. I 
argue that Wright has not quite achieved such a model, reverting to a veiled empiricism that 
does not adequately allow for the significant influence of communal categories, but that, in 
particular, his emphasis upon worldview is important. Second, and related to the first, is his 
stress upon locating Jesus within Jewish eschatology. For a comprehensive understanding of 
Jesus’ resurrection it is necessary to understand the ancient Jewish eschatological category of 
‘resurrection of the dead’ which was applied to Jesus’ post-mortem existence by early 
interpreters, albeit with significant development and adjustment. These two features will be 
assessed in chapters five and six, respectively. Third, Wright’s notion of ‘transphysicality’ is, 
I believe, one of the more significant attempts at incorporating both the continuous and 
discontinuous elements of Jesus’ risen nature. While his understanding of resurrection remains 
entrenched within a personal embodiment – and one that stresses physicality – 
‘transphysicality’ begins to move away from this understanding. Wright’s ‘transphysicality’ 
will be addressed in chapter six.  
The appropriateness of comparing these two scholars should also be noted. Pannenberg and 
Wright have distinctly different disciplinary emphases, with Pannenberg focusing on 
systematic theology and the rational comprehensibility of theological language, and Wright 
focusing on history and New Testament interpretation. Furthermore, Wright explicitly spells 
 
29 Ibid., 10, 712-31. Cf. Braaten, “Jesus and the Church,” 66.  
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out his epistemology, whereas Pannenberg’s is dispersed through his various publications. 
However, there are similarities in their work, both critiquing strong “empiricist” epistemologies 
and emphasizing the communally and historically situated individual. I will focus on two 
particular aspects which they have in common, which relate to the wider intellectual shifts of 
their contexts: the stress on the particularity of the communally contextualized nature of 
knowledge, and the recognition of knowledge as dynamic and relational.  
Pannenberg and Wright share the concern of moving away from modernist methodologies 
characterised by the belief in the possibility of objective and value-neutral observation and 
interpretation, especially positivism and its enduring and pervasive influence upon twentieth 
century theological methodology. They both reject the possibility of absolute objectivity on the 
basis that presupposed knowledge invariably influences interpretation, and that observation 
does not occur within a cognitive vacuum. All observation and experience transpires within a 
particular context, from a particular perspective, and thus knowledge is unceasingly partial and 
influenced by one’s community and worldview.30 This is, of course, an oft-repeated 
epistemological stance, but deserves reiteration as it forms the backbone in the development of 
Pannenberg and Wright’s respective epistemologies.31 
Both stress the particularity of context, and the integration of this aspect within their broader 
methodology. The context of the interpreter invariably influences observation and 
interpretation, including the historical situation and the specific language of the interpreter, and 
the inevitably limited access to knowledge. Pannenberg’s later work has a greater emphasis 
upon anthropology,32 and Wright explicitly argues that knowledge is formulated through 
 
30 In particular, see Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, trans. Francis McDonagh 
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1976), 31-56, idem., JGM, 95, Wright, NTPG, 32-34.  
31 E.g. Henry David Thoreau, Walden, or, Life in the Woods (London: OUP, 1906); Jürgen Habermas, On The 
Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jerry A. Stark (Cambridge: Polity, 1988); 
Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: PUP, 1979).  
32 E.g. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1985).  
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individual and communal worldviews,33 signalling their desire to accommodate the 
anthropological and communal elements of epistemology. Regarding the nature of knowledge, 
they both argue that knowledge is dynamic and relational rather than static, stressing its 
conversational characteristic, namely as a to-and-fro between various disciplines and between 
object and observer.34 Consequently, all knowledge is partial and provisional, including the 
knowledge of God, which must remain a public endeavour, as opposed to being isolated as a 
private, subjective task.35  
This thesis seeks to extend Pannenberg and Wright’s shared intention of moving away from 
hard empiricist methodologies when analysing and interpreting the resurrection. Bringing the 
two into dialogue with recent scholarship enables, I believe, the development of a methodology 
which allows for the interpretation of Jesus’ resurrection as the fulfilment of Jewish 
eschatological hopes for the end of contingent history. This moves away from resurrection as 
merely personal reanimation, and bears the characteristics, in dialectic tension, of both the 
reaffirmation of creation and its radical transformation, continuity and discontinuity with 
empirical reality.  
1.4. Reframing Resurrection: The Structure of this Thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters (including introduction and conclusion) and an 
excursus. Following the major literature review of chapter two, chapters three and four 
comprise methodological concerns, with five addressing the broader category of ‘resurrection’ 
in ancient Jewish eschatology which formed the framework through which Jesus’ post-mortem 
existence was interpreted, and six turning directly to Jesus’ resurrection.  
 
33 Wright, NTPG, 43, 122-23.  
34 In particular, see Pannenberg, “What is Truth?”; idem. An Introduction to Systematic Theology (Michigan: 
Eerdmans, 1991), 18; idem. “Insight and Faith,” in BQT, vol. 2, 28-45; Wright, NTPG, 35-45; 63-64; idem. Paul 
and the Faithfulness of God (London: SPCK, 2013), 51.  
35 In particular, see Pannenberg, ST, vol. 1, 47-55; idem. in Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, ix.; 
Wright, PFG, xvii, 25.  
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In chapter two, the major literature on the resurrection is discussed, and it is demonstrated that 
scholarship, from as early as the first century to the present, has assumed that the language of 
‘resurrection’ envisages the material reanimation of a personal, corporeal body (and then 
interpreted either as a literal, physical event, or as metaphor) and that, as a consequence, 
interpretations have emphasized either the continuous or discontinuous elements of the risen 
Jesus. The thesis is predominately concerned with discussions of the resurrection since the 
Enlightenment beginning in the 17th century, as it is particularly here that the divide between 
interpretations that stress either the continuous or discontinuous become especially clear.  
Chapter three addresses epistemological concerns, arguing that, rather than the foundationalism 
so prevalent among interpretations of the resurrection, PCR provides a more appropriate 
epistemological framework for discussing an event which transcends ordinary epistemological 
frameworks and categories and is capable of maintaining a dialectic tension between ordinary 
temporal existence and the future eschatological reality. Within this framework, reciprocity is 
encouraged; that is, rather than a single discipline, category, or experience functioning as 
ultimate arbiter and foundation of knowledge, a coherentist ‘web’ of interacting disciplines, 
categories, and experiences functions as the locus of knowledge and that knowledge is found 
precisely in this very interaction. Knowledge results from the bilateral dialogue between the 
external object or event, which has an inherent meaning in and of itself, and the internal subject, 
which imparts upon that object or event a meaning conditioned by perspective, worldview, and 
communally and contextually conditioned categories of understanding. This framework allows 
and enables Jesus’ post-mortem existence to be understood in terms of the eschatological 
category of resurrection of the dead, as an event which cannot be restricted within Jesus’ 
personal body and transcends ordinary human concepts.  
Chapter four then considers historical methodology in light of this epistemological framework, 
and discusses how historical inquiry interacts with theological and anthropological concerns, 
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with a view to presenting a methodology capable of considering the resurrection as an event 
which occurred within time and space (thereby upholding its continuous characteristics) while 
acknowledging that this event transcends ordinary time and space (thereby upholding its 
discontinuous characteristics). This chapter argues that, on the basis of the irreducibly 
anthropological nature of history, theological concerns cannot be separated from historical 
inquiry and so the resurrection remains a viable subject of historical description. However, this 
description must be rooted in anthropology, noting that the language of resurrection 
encompasses a vast array of eschatological connotations. A Postfoundationalist Constructive 
Realist approach to history analyses the interaction between the external event in question and 
its interpretation, which includes the employment of prior categories of understanding through 
which that event is understood, and the development of the interpretation of the event as it is 
remembered in new contexts, as it interacts with different perspectives and interpretations, and 
as the categories of understanding evolve to accommodate this new event.  
In chapter five, the ancient Jewish eschatological category of ‘resurrection’ is analysed, from 
its earliest usage in the Hebrew Bible through its development in apocalyptic and extra-biblical 
literature to the few occurrences of this category in the New Testament.36 It is here 
demonstrated that the notion of ‘resurrection’ rarely envisaged a personal reanimation, that in 
fact when physical bodies are resurrected this is for the sole purpose of demonstrating God’s 
covenantal faithfulness or for judgment. Speculation of the eternal destiny of material bodies 
is certainly present, but resurrection had primarily to do with a broad spectrum of 
eschatological hopes, including the restoration of relationship, the dispensation of divine 
justice, and the transformation of the cosmos and creation as a whole. The reality envisaged 
within this new resurrected, eschatological world is one where creation is both redeemed and 
 
36 I here use the term ‘category’ somewhat loosely, for there was a diverse array of understandings of resurrection 
and the term was used in a variety of different ways.  
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radically transformed; there is both continuity and discontinuity, in that it is the same world 
and yet significantly different. The imagery of the new heavens and earth, understood as their 
unification, is a helpful analogy for understanding this new resurrected reality, for though the 
earth has not been disbanded, thus preserving continuity, it has been united with heaven  and 
thus also establishing discontinuity.  
Having analysed the eschatological category of resurrection, chapter six argues that, and 
discusses how, this category formed the interpretive framework through which Jesus’ post-
mortem existence was interpreted. A clue to understanding this interpretive framework is the 
recurring reference to Jesus being raised on or after the third day “according to the Scriptures.” 
It is argued that this phrase, which has no specific referent in the Hebrew Bible, is not the 
fulfilment of one specific eschatological promise but was instead the fulfilment of a broad 
spectrum of eschatological hope, echoing the understanding of the category of resurrection 
espoused in chapter five, that is that the language of ‘resurrection’ envisaged an array of 
eschatological themes that extended well beyond personal reanimation. Reflecting PCR, this 
chapter analyses the earliest interpretations of the event of Jesus’ post-mortem existence, 
beginning with the pre-Pauline traditions and the Pauline literature, through the synoptic 
traditions, to the more developed interpretations of the later traditions, especially in the Gospel 
of John. It will be argued that Jesus’ resurrection constitutes the fulfilment of the eschatological 
hopes for the eschaton – not just that it was a part of, or initiated, this fulfilment – and thus 
cannot be restricted to the reanimation of his personal body, and constitutes the unification of 
earth (continuity) and heaven (discontinuity).  
Finally, before the conclusion, a brief excursus considers the difficulty of claiming that the 
promises expected at the end of time have been fulfilled within time, and argues that a moderate 
version of Pannenberg’s future-oriented eschatology is helpful for maintaining and 
understanding this claim.  
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Within the first-century Jewish eschatological notion of ‘resurrection,’ which informed and 
shaped the Christian interpretation of Jesus’ post-mortem existence, personal reanimation is an 
uncommon concept. Rather, the eschatological hope for ‘resurrection’ was inseparably and 
inherently ensconced within a broader spectrum of hope for the eschaton. This includes the 
renewal and reaffirmation of ordinary reality, as well as its radical transformation. It is 
precisely this framework which was applied to Jesus’ post-mortem existence and through 
which this event was interpreted by the early communities of the Jesus movement. This is 
reaffirmed, as will be highlighted throughout this thesis, in the New Testament depictions of 
Jesus’ resurrection: in their heavy reliance upon Jewish eschatological conceptions, the 
ambiguous portrayals of Jesus’ risen nature, and the increasing certainty that Jesus’ post-
mortem existence was, within contingent history, the fulfilment of the hopes for the eschaton.  
Scholarship has generally understood the language of ‘resurrection,’ so far as it pertains to the 
post-mortem existence of Jesus, as primarily envisaging the reanimation of a personal body. 
Of course, interpretations have not entirely ignored the broader eschatological implications of 
this event and have not been exclusively concerned with the material body. However, it is the 
contention of this thesis that these eschatological concerns have been of secondary significance 
in general academia and have been interpreted in light of how the body is understood. This 
scholarship has focussed resurrection talk upon the reanimation of a personal body, but that 
this is an incorrect assumption. The inverse is what is needed, that the language of 
‘resurrection’ concerns the much larger eschatological and even cosmological concerns and 
only then can the nature of the body be properly understood. By assuming that resurrection 
relates chiefly to the reanimation of a personal body, interpretations of the resurrection have 
subsequently emphasized either the continuous or discontinuous elements of the resurrection 
at the expense of the other. This has, unfortunately, resulted in the minimization of the 
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eschatological significance of the event. It is to this long history of scholarship on the 
resurrection that we now turn. 
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2. Tension in Interpretation: of Continuity and Discontinuity 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter comprises a literature review of the predominant scholarship regarding Jesus’ 
resurrection, outlining the general trends and the development of these trends in relation to 
shifts in methodological approaches to historical Jesus research and systematic theology. In 
this review I will demonstrate that scholarship has generally assumed that the language of 
‘resurrection’ envisages a personal reanimation, and has subsequently failed to uphold the 
tension between the continuity and discontinuity in Jesus’ resurrection with empirical reality, 
with scholars emphasizing one or the other, rather than incorporating the broader Jewish 
eschatological hopes into resurrection belief itself. Importantly, I am not arguing that these 
scholars have ignored the eschatological implications of the resurrection but that they have 
focussed so strongly on the body that anything beyond the body is subsequently downplayed 
or relegated to secondary importance. 
Reviewing the major trajectories of interpretations of the claim that Jesus rose from the dead 
is complicated by the diverse array of positions, especially since the Enlightenment era, 
reflected in Willi Marxsen’s statement: “There are almost as many opinions about ‘the 
resurrection of Jesus’ as there are books and essays which have been published on this 
subject.”1 Determining clear demarcations in modern Jesus research and resurrection theology 
is difficult, but it is possible to deduce a few rough and generalized categories of division. The 
first, particularly within New Testament scholarship, are the well-rehearsed ‘quests’ for the 
historical Jesus – a demarcation of Jesus research that is increasingly recognised as deficient.2 
 
1 Willi Marxsen, Jesus and Easter: Did God Raise the Historical Jesus from the Dead? Trans. Victor Paul Furnish 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1990), 39.  
2 This demarcation has been critiqued by Fernando Bermejo Rubio, who insists that it serves the ideological 
concerns of the scholar and it would be preferable to discard the ‘Three Quest’ model (“The Fiction of the ‘Three 
Quests’: An Argument for Dismantling a Dubious Historiographical Paradigm,” JSHJ 7 (2009), esp. 214). Also, 
Robert J. Myles, “The Neoliberal Lives of Jesus,” The Bible and Interpretation, May, 2016, 
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The so-called ‘first-quest’ began with the posthumous work of Reimarus and ended with 
Schweitzer’s Quest for the Historical Jesus; a ‘no quest’ supposedly followed Schweitzer; the 
‘new’ or ‘second’ quest was launched in 1953 with Käsemann’s famous “The Problems of the 
Historical Jesus” lecture; the second then morphed into the ‘third’ quest, so called by Wright.3 
Each quest was marked by various motives and methodologies, epistemologies and 
historiographies, resulting in various pictures of Jesus and diverse views of his resurrection. Of 
course, dividing Jesus research into these various quests is limited, as Dale Allison notes, “It 
obscures more than it illumines,” neglecting the large amount of material produced between 
Schweitzer and Käsemann, and insisting upon an artificial division between the ‘second’ and 
‘third’ quests which does not exist.4 
Gerd Theissen and Annette Merz highlight six ‘phases’ in discussing the resurrection in 
historical Jesus research. First, following Reimarus, the resurrection was understood by the 
likes of Schleiermacher, Hase, Holtzmann, and Klausner to be a deception; Jesus either did not 
really die or he was reburied, and the empty tomb tradition was a fabrication. Second, focus 
shifted to the appearances, understood by Strauss, Holsten, and Wrede as subjective visions 
which inspired the resurrection tradition; the empty tomb was legendary myth. Third, in the 
early twentieth century, focus was then shifted to form criticism, with many, such as Bultmann, 
Dodd, and Kramer, insisting that there is no historical explanation for the resurrection; the 
resurrection is to be understood eschatologically and thus cannot be explained within normal 
scientific or historical frameworks. Fourth, the 1950s witnessed a resurgence in historical 
 
http://bibleinterp.com/opeds/2016/05/myl408025.shtml; Tom Holmén, “A Theologically Disinterested Quest? On 
the Origins of the “Third Quest” for the Historical Jesus,” ST 55, no. 2 (2001), 175-97; Michael F. Bird, “Is There 
Really a ‘Third Quest’ for the Historical Jesus?’ SBET 24, no. 2 (2006): 195-219; Colin Brown, “Historical Jesus, 
Quest of,” in Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels, ed. Joel B. Green, Scot McKnight and I. Howard Marshall 
(Downers Grove: IVP, 1992), 326-41.  
3 The term ‘third quest’ was first used by Wright in Stephen Neill and Tom Wright, The Interpretation of the New 
Testament, 1861-1986, 2nd ed. (Oxford: OUP, 1988), 381.   
4 Dale C. Allison, Resurrecting Jesus: The Earliest Christian Tradition and its Interpreters (New York: T&T 
Clark, 2005), 2-3. Allison includes an extensive bibliography of books on Jesus published between 1907 and 1953 
(i.e. the ‘no quest) (pp.23-25).  
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reconstructions, such as in the work of Hans van Campenhausen and Grass, with debate 
surrounding the priority of either the empty tomb or the appearances. Fifth, since the 1960s the 
role of interpretation has been emphasized by Marxsen, Berger, and Wilckens, insisting that 
history is unimportant or impossible, for all we have access to are interpretations of an event. 
Finally, and concurrent with the fifth phase, discussion has revolved around the plausibility of 
calling the resurrection either an objective or subjective event, with many arguing for either 
the former, such as Pannenberg, or the latter, such as Lüdemann.5 
Within Systematic Theology, another approach is to divide scholarship according to the locus 
of faith in doctrines of the resurrection. David Fergusson proposed three broad positions: 
radical, insisting upon a metaphorical interpretation, wherein resurrection is a reference to the 
rise of faith itself; liberal, similarly metaphorical, asserting the resurrection is myth emerging 
out of faith; and traditional, viewing the resurrection as an event in Jesus’ life, which gave rise 
to faith.6 This division centres scholarly positions around the question of whether the 
resurrection story inspired early Christian faith or whether, rather, it was the early Christian 
faith which inspired the resurrection story. A similar approach is to divide scholarship 
according to the purported nature of the resurrection. George Hunsinger divides the debate into 
three positions: spiritual, historical, or eschatological. Some, such as Schleiermacher and 
Bultmann, argue for a ‘spiritual’ resurrection, where the resurrection was something that 
happened to the disciples rather than to Jesus. Others, such as Pannenberg and Wright, argue 
for a ‘historical’ resurrection, where the resurrection was something that happened to Jesus 
within contingent history. Finally, still others, such as Barth and Frei, argue for an 
‘eschatological’ resurrection, where the resurrection happened to Jesus, but because of the 
 
5 Gerd Theissen and Annete Merz, The Historical Jesus: A Comprehensive Guide, trans. John Bowden (London: 
SCM, 1998), 475-482. 
6 David Fergusson, “Interpreting the Resurrection,” SJT 38, no. 3 (1985), 287-305. Allison presents a similar 
differentiation between several categories of positions on the resurrection (Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 201-13).  
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uniqueness of the event, being sui generis, it transcends ordinary reality and is thus 
inaccessible.7 This approach is somewhat contrived, for Pannenberg and Wright assert a 
thoroughly eschatological resurrection, and Barth certainly does not consider the resurrection 
to be non-historical. Hence it is clear that categorizing interpretations of the resurrection is 
practically impossible without doing harm to the particular positions.  
The most helpful approach to reviewing the various interpretations of the resurrection is 
chronological, highlighting the various methodological developments as they interact with the 
broader trends in historical Jesus research. This review will roughly follow the several so-called 
‘Quests,’ for each quest is characterized by distinctive motivations and methodologies which 
invariably influence interpretation of the resurrection. As noted above, this demarcation is 
limited and ideologically problematic, but points to general (though not universal) trends. For 
the purpose of this thesis, this demarcation is adopted not to indicate definitive eras and the 
theological baggage connected to such a restrictive typology, but merely to signify the general 
trends of historical Jesus research in both New Testament and Systematic Theology contexts 
and how they have impacted the interpretation of Jesus’ resurrection. Though this thesis is 
primarily a Systematic Theological project, the ‘Three Quest’ model, which resides primarily 
within the discipline of New Testament scholarship, is the clearest way to observe the 
interaction between the general trends within scholarship on Jesus and his resurrection.  
Prior to the first quest, and the Enlightenment era in general, the resurrection in systematic 
Christian thought8 is almost unanimously presented as a literal and physical event that occurred 
 
7 George Hunsinger, “The Daybreak of the New Creation: Christ’s Resurrection in Recent Theology,” SJT 57, no. 
2 (2004), 164-65.  
8 It would be possible to survey interpretations of Jesus’ resurrection in other traditions, such as, for example, 
Jewish and Islamic responses to the claim of resurrection, which have themselves developed over the millennia. 
However, such a survey would exceed the scope of this thesis. I will here limit the discussion to Christian theology. 
For Jewish and Islamic interpretations of Jesus’ death and resurrection, cf. David Mishkin, Jewish Scholarship on 
the Resurrection of Jesus (Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2017); Pinchas Lapide, The Resurrection of Jesus: A Jewish 
Perspective. Trans. Wilhelm C. Linss (Oregon: Wipf & Stock, 2002); Mahmoud M. Ayoub, “Towards an Islamic 
Christology, II: The Death of Jesus, Reality or Delusion,” The Muslim World 70, no. 2 (1980), 91-121; Gabriel 
Said Reynolds, “The Muslim Jesus: Dead or Alive?” Bulletin of SOAS 72, no. 2 (2009), 237-58.  
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within ordinary time and space, markedly different to the Enlightenment era first quest, 
characterised by a radically critical perspective, with the majority of interpretations favouring 
a mythical, or in some instances an outright deceitful, resurrection. At the turn of the twentieth 
century, this first historical quest was largely abandoned, and, subsequently, attention turned 
toward a resurrection beyond the confines of historical inquiry, particularly an existential or 
‘supra-historical’ (that is, transcending the ordinary contingency of history) resurrection. The 
second quest sought to affirm the continuity between the ‘historical’ Jesus and the ‘preached’ 
Christ, and so interpretations of the resurrection largely focussed on the kerygmatic aspect of 
the resurrection, that is, the early proclamation and message of the resurrection. Though it is 
unclear at what point the second quest became the third – or whether such a distinction is 
actually appropriate – recent scholarship has emphasized the Jewishness of Jesus and of the 
Gospels, and, as such, also of the resurrection. Most recently, interest in the resurrection has 
waned, largely reserved, though not completely, for apologetic arguments defending, or 
polemic critiquing, a historical (in a thoroughly positivistic sense) resurrection. As noted above, 
such demarcations are artificial and generalized, but developments in trends are evident and 
these trends ultimately impact interpretations of the resurrection.  
The purpose of this review is not to merely outline the developments in resurrection theology, 
nor simply to highlight the diversity, but to demonstrate the way in which the language of 
resurrection was assumed to suggest a personal reanimation. It shall also illuminate the most 
significant division between interpretations, namely the tension between affirming the 
continuity and discontinuity of Jesus’ resurrection with empirical reality, with most 
interpretations generally being characterized by an emphasis upon one or the other, and often 
at the expense – whether intentional or not – of the other. Furthermore, it will become clear 
that the Jewish eschatological category of ‘resurrection of the dead’ (which will be explored in 
detail in chapter four) has not been adequately incorporated. 
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The ancient Jewish eschatological notion of ‘resurrection of the dead’ affirmed empirical 
reality while asserting its radical transformation, incorporating a broad spectrum of Jewish 
hope for the eschaton. Hence, it is of immense significance that this notion was applied to and 
used as the framework through which to interpret Jesus’ post-mortem existence by the early 
interpreters of this event. I contend that if this is taken seriously and incorporated adequately 
into an interpretation of the claim that Jesus rose from the dead, it becomes evident that the 
contemporary interpreter must avoid the assumption that this event only referred to Jesus’ post-
mortem reanimation. Rather, this was an event which first and foremost must be placed within 
a much broader, cosmic context, and only then can the nature of the risen Jesus be understood 
properly. Furthermore, the interpreter must avoid emphasizing either the continuity or 
discontinuity of the risen Jesus with empirical reality, but instead uphold the two in dialectical 
tension.9 
2.2. Pre-Enlightenment: A Fleshly and Physical Resurrection 
The majority position regarding the nature of the resurrection prior to the Enlightenment was 
a literal, physical reading, due largely to a pre-critical hermeneutic. Hence, the continuity of 
Jesus’ resurrected body with his pre-crucifixion body was emphasized. That the risen body 
experienced some sort of transformation is usually affirmed, but the extent of this 
transformation – its difference from the pre-crucifixion body – is bridled, minimized by the 
limited significance attributed to the notion of resurrection and what the category of 
‘resurrection of the dead’ signified in Jewish eschatology.  
A thoroughly physical understanding of resurrection, one which affirms strong continuity with 
empirical reality with very little acknowledgement of the transformation of the risen body, is 
 
9 It should be noted that many of these discussions, particularly the earlier discussions, are largely focussed on the 
future resurrection of believers. However, they model this future resurrection on the resurrection of Jesus. 
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widely attested in early Christian thought after the New Testament. In the early to mid-second 
century, in Clement’s Second Letter to the Corinthians,10 the author urges, “Let none of you 
say that this flesh will not be judged or rise again. …For just as you were called in the flesh, 
you will come in the flesh” (2 Clem. 9.1, 4). Similarly, Justin Martyr expresses this continuity: 
“We look forward to receiving again our own bodies, though they be dead and buried in the 
earth” (1 Apol. xviii, 4). For Tertullian, “nothing rises again but what has already been,” albeit 
a fleshly body incapable of suffering. He does not elaborate on what this would then look like 
(On Resurrection, 53.9-11, 26; 57.50). Augustine does elaborate, and his attempts at describing 
the risen body demonstrate just how physical was his conception of the resurrection. The risen 
body will be composed “of the matter of which it was originally composed,” including hair and 
nails, though he excludes a lifetime’s accumulation of hair and nail trimmings. The righteous 
will be resurrected without deformities; undeveloped foetuses or infants who die shortly after 
childbirth will rise with nothing lacking, and the obese will no longer be obese. This privilege 
is, however, withheld from the wicked, who will indeed be raised in their deformities, but, 
Augustine insists, this is an unimportant issue for they are damned nevertheless (Enchir. xxiii, 
84-93). Hence, there is some transformation, and is an essentially eschatological event,11 but it 
remains a reanimation of a personal body continuous with the present body.12 
 
10 Though, as Paul Parvis observes, this text claims to be neither a letter, nor written by anyone named Clement, 
nor written to the Corinthians (Paul Parvis, “2 Clement and the Meaning of the Christian Homily,” ExpTim 117, 
no. 7 (2006), 266).  
11 Gerald O’Collins notes that Augustine “only occasionally” mentioned this transformation, but in these rare 
occasions Augustine claims that the resurrected body is “the very same body,” albeit “one that was no longer 
constrained by the normal limits of human bodies” (Gerald O’Collins, Saint Augustine on the Resurrection of 
Christ: Teaching, Rhetoric, and Reception (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 8). The emphasis remains very much on the 
body. Cf. Tarmo Toom, “Totus Homo: Augustine on the Resurrection,” in Resurrection & Responsibility: Essays 
on Theology, Scripture, and Ethics in Honor of Thorwald Lorenzen, ed. Keith D. Dyer and David J. Neville 
(Eugene: Pickwick, 2009), 69.  
12 Elsewhere, when discussing the creedal statement, “We believe in the resurrection of the flesh,” Augustine 
discusses at some length Paul’s argument in 1 Cor. 15, highlighting the way in which the corruptible body will 
put on incorruptibility (On Faith and the Creed, 5.11-12). However, seemingly unbeknownst to Augustine, in 1 
Cor. 15.44, when describing the risen body, Paul does not use σὰρξ, but rather σῶμα. For a good historical 
discussion of the introduction of the language of a fleshly resurrection – despite that word never being used in the 
NT to describe the risen body either of Jesus or of his followers– cf. Brian Schmisek, Resurrection of the Flesh 
or Resurrection from the Dead (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2013), 1-48. Unfortunately, though Schmisek 
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This emphasis upon the continuity of the risen body is maintained in the Scholasticism of the 
Medieval period. In the eleventh century, Anselm claims that the righteous man “will be 
restored in the body in which he lives in this life.”13 However, there is transformation, though 
a more appropriate word might be restoration, as the individual human is restored to the body 
which they would have inhabited had they not sinned. If that person had never sinned, they 
would have never died, and would not require resurrection.14 Following Anselm, Thomas 
Aquinas argues that it will indeed be the “selfsame body” that will be resurrected, and will be 
resurrected “identically.”15 Reflecting similar concerns to Augustine, Aquinas discusses the 
problem of hair and nails; as well as blood, whether they will rise the same age as when they 
died, and if the risen body will be the same size.16 This indicates the extent to which the 
resurrected body was considered physical. Aquinas did maintain that Jesus’ risen body was 
very different, discussing Jesus’ resurrection alongside his glorification. In his resurrection, he 
attains immortality (thus distinguishing his resurrection from other accounts of people 
returning from the dead), and that his body was a “glorified body” that “had something else 
which made it incorruptible, and this was not the nature of of a heavenly body, as some 
maintain…but it was glory flowing from a beatified soul.”17 Nevertheless, Aquinas’ attention 
remains fixed on Jesus’ personal body, indeed his very flesh, bones, and blood,18 and maintains 
that “Whatever goes with the nature of a human body, was entirely in the body of Christ when 
he rose again.”19 For both Anselm and Aquinas, despite acknowledging some transformation, 
 
correctly asserts that ‘resurrection’ is a largely metaphorical category and that there is both continuity and 
discontinuity, he seems to swing too far in the opposite direction towards a primarily discontinuous existence, 
concluding, rather ambiguously, that the resurrection refers to the resurrection of the self, the mind, the 
consciousness, of an individual human being (118-19).  
13 Brian Davis and G. R. Evans, eds., Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 317.  
14 Ibid., 315-16.  
15 Aquinas, The Summa Theologica, III. Suppl., Q. 79, art. 1-2. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., III. Q. 53-54. Christ’s body in the resurrection was “of the same nature, but different in glory” (Q. 54, art. 
2).  
18 Ibid., III. Q. 53, art. 1; Q. 54, art. 2.  
19 Ibid., III. Q. 54, art. 2.  
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the resurrected body remains a thoroughly physical re-animated body. This emphasis upon the 
body is affirmed by Caroline Bynum: “Scholastic writing showed an underlying predilection 
for metaphors of reassemblage and immutability to describe the resurrected and glorified 
body.”20 
The Reformation brought a flurry of new ideas, but the resurrection received little development. 
In his commentary on 1 Corinthians 15 Luther argues that God created humanity as it is and 
therefore “everyone’s body will remain as it was created,” despite not eating, drinking, or 
digesting, nor bearing children, keeping house, or governing.21 The use of the body will not be 
the same, but it is yet the same physical body.22 Luther is adamant that when Paul describes 
the risen body as a ‘spiritual body’ this does not indicate that it no longer has flesh and blood, 
for then it would not be a true body.23 That a ‘body’ is fundamentally categorized by its 
constituting flesh and blood seems to be contradicted by Paul himself in this very chapter where 
he states that there are many different bodies, including the astronomical bodies of the sun, 
moon, and stars (1 Cor. 15.40-41). What Luther makes of these is unclear. Ulrich Zwingli 
shares these sentiments when arguing that Jesus’ risen body “is identical with that which was 
crucified,” and that it “is impossible to deny that the flesh and blood which was put to death 
for us ascended up into heaven.” Indeed, if it were not the exact same fleshly body, “the 
resurrection of Christ was in vain.”24 This fleshly resurrection is reinforced in the documents 
that emerged out of the Council of Trent. The Catechism re-affirms the Apostle’s Creed by 
 
20 Caroline Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995), 121.  
21 Interestingly, in the discussions analysed so far, whether or not resurrected humans will have the capacity to 
eat or drink does not seem to be an issue of importance. If so many are so concerned with whether or not bodies 
will bear the same hair, nails, or blood, it surprises me that so few are concerned with whether or not resurrected 
bodies will consist of organs such as stomachs or hearts.  
22 Martin Luther, “1 Corinthians,” in Luther’s Works, Vol. 28: Commentaries on 1 Corinthians 7, 1 Corinthians 
15, Lectures on 1 Timothy, ed. Hilton C. Oswald, trans. Martin H. Bertram (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1973), 171.  
23 Ibid., 189.  
24 Ulrich Zwingli, “On the Lord’s Supper,” in The Library of Christian Classics, Vol. 14: Zwingli and Bullinger, 
trans. G. W. Bromiley (London: SCM, 1953), 232). Zwingli’s focus in this instance was upon the eucharist, 
arguing for a memorialism, that because Jesus’ very body was raised and ascended, he surely cannot be present 
again at the communion table in either a transubstantiation or consubstantiation sense.  
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adopting the language, carnis resurrectionem, that is, resurrection of the flesh. The text does 
acknowledge that Jesus’ resurrection was more than a rising from the dead, for this is not a 
unique claim – others, such as Lazarus, had returned from the dead – and that there is in fact 
substantial change. However, this ‘substantial’ change is simply the same body minus 
corruption, and the text remains concerned with issues of adornment, such as hair. Quoting 
Augustine, anything that is beyond the “proper proportion” of the body is removed.25  
As we can observe, the pre-Enlightenment era was characterised by a pre-critical and reductive 
interpretation of the meaning of resurrection focused on individual and corporeal reanimation, 
rather than its relation to the Jewish eschatological category of ‘resurrection of the dead,’ which 
signifies the fulfilment of the broad spectrum of hope for the end of history. The assumption 
that resurrection refers to a return to the exact same cartesian, atomized body inhibits the 
theologian from recognizing the elements of Jesus’ resurrection which bear radical 
discontinuity with his pre-crucifixion body and with empirical reality. We see that 
commentators prior to the Enlightenment, though noting the eschatological significance of the 
resurrection, emphasize the continuous nature of the resurrection at the expense of its 
discontinuity.  
2.3. Reimarus to Troeltsch: A Mythical Resurrection 
With the dawn of the Enlightenment and the development of critical rationalism, the acceptance 
of miracles – in which the resurrection was situated – gradually became understood as contrary 
to reason. Beginning in the eighteenth century with the posthumous publication of Reimarus’ 
critical polemic against miracles, and lasting until Schweitzer’s criticism of nineteenth-century 
historical reconstructions of Jesus, this period is characterised by the stripping of the biblical 
 
25 Catechism of the Council of Trent, trans. John A. McHugh and Charles J. Callan (New York: Joseph F. Wagner, 
1934), 125-27.  
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narratives anything that was interpreted as inventions of the early church, retaining only that 
which stands up to historical criticism. This criticism invariably excluded any event that stands 
beyond the realm of normal human experience of contingent history, thereby negating the 
resurrection, which was understood purely as myth and religious storytelling. For the present 
discussion, what is illuminating is what is being rejected, namely an event within ordinary 
history, measured against ordinary historical events. In other words, these interpretations of the 
resurrection assume that the language of resurrection refers to an individual reanimation 
continuous with the old, and it is this that is being rejected on the basis that humans ordinarily 
do not return from the dead, and therefore the resurrection narratives are either intentionally 
deceitful, mythological, or metaphorical. What is being ignored is the application of the broader 
Jewish eschatological category of resurrection to Jesus’ post-mortem existence, which cannot 
be reduced to the mere reanimation of a personal body. 
The assumption that resurrection refers to no more than a return to the same atomized body of 
flesh and blood, and its subsequent rejection is especially evident in the work of David Hume. 
Hume insisted that the correlation between cause and effect cannot in any way be demonstrated, 
but rather a cause can come to be expected, based on regular and repeated experience. Hence, 
human testimony, without contemporary analogy, is inadequate for establishing the occurrence 
of miracles and because no contemporary analogy of the resurrection of Jesus exists, the claim 
that Jesus rose from the dead cannot today be understood as fact.27 He argues, 
When anyone tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with 
myself, whether it be more probable, that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or 
that the fact, which he relates, should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the 
other; and according to the superiority, which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always 
reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous, than the 
event which he relates; then, and not till then, can he pretend to command my belief or 
opinion.28 
 
27 David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Eric Steinberg, 2nd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1977), 72-90. Cf. Robert C. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins, A Passion for Wisdom: A Very Brief History of 
Philosophy (New York: OUP, 1997), 82-83. 
28 Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 77. 
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Hume’s polemic against miracles (which he defines as “a violation of the laws of nature”29) is 
methodological, but it is evident from this quote what Hume was rejecting: the return to life of 
a thoroughly natural body. It is precisely this understanding that is the assumption belying 
many interpretations of the resurrection. Gotthold Lessing extended this position, arguing that 
contingent and accidental historical events cannot determine universal truths of reason; there 
is an irreconcilable gap between historical and rational truth. Lessing referred to this as the 
“ugly great ditch” and on this basis argued that miracles simply cannot be said to have happened 
and must be acknowledged as mere reports. Faith cannot rest upon the testimony of other 
people, but only our own experience.30 The requirement of contemporary analogy for the 
assertion of an event’s historical reliability will be addressed in §3.2, and the “ugly great ditch” 
in §4.2, two arguments which have come under serious scrutiny in recent scholarship. For now 
we might observe that in both instances the notion of resurrection is being compared to, or 
considered in relation to, other ordinary contingent historical events. By doing so, the 
continuous nature of the resurrection is assumed.   
The thought of Hume and Lessing characterized this first quest, which began, posthumously, 
with the work of Hermann Reimarus. Reimarus attacked the supernaturalism in the Gospels in 
a text that was later published by Lessing. Insisting that it was possible and necessary to “go 
behind” the New Testament texts to discover the human Jesus, he claimed that the disciples 
stole Jesus’ corpse, who replaced Jesus’ political vision with a spiritual salvation. He argued 
that had Jesus truly taught the disciples about his expected resurrection, they would neither 
have been as scared at his death nor surprised at his return.31 However, it was not Jesus’ return 
 
29 Ibid., 76.  
30 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, “On the Proof of Spirit and Power,” in The Christian Theology Reader, ed. Alister 
E. McGrath, 4th ed. (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 249-50; Alister E. McGrath, Christian Theology: An 
Introduction, 5th ed. (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 296-99, 309-10.  
31 Hermann Samuel Reimarus, “Concerning the Intention of Jesus and his Teaching,” in Fragments, ed. Charles 
H. Talbert. Trans. Ralph S. Fraser (London: SCM, 1971), 132. Cf. McGrath, Christian Theology, 299-301. 
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per se which surprised the disciples – the Gospels recount, after all, their witnessing several 
other corpses returning to life – but it was the sheer immensity of what they believed to have 
occurred which engendered their shock: not a return to life, but in fact the resurrection of the 
dead. Following Reimarus’ anti-supernaturalism, Friedrich Schleiermacher similarly doubted 
the historicity of the resurrection account, questioning why Jesus would only reveal himself to 
a select handful of followers, and asserted the view that the resurrection was a kerygmatic tool 
arising out of the disciples’ faith.32  
Various other biographies of Jesus emerged within this quest, but especially significant is the 
work of David Strauss. Continuing the legacy of Hume, Reimarus, Lessing, and 
Schleiermacher, Strauss carried the a priori conviction that miracle accounts cannot be 
considered historically factual and insisted that the New Testament accounts be 
‘demythologized.’ The supernatural elements in the Gospels were myth, primitive expressions 
of spiritual ideas. Mythical language expressed what the primitive community could not fully 
comprehend, and contemporary scholarship requires the determination and removal of these 
mythical expressions to ascertain what really happened. Maintaining that no historical evidence 
exists for the resurrection, he insisted that it was a projection of an intense memory into the 
living presence of the disciples. To be more precise then, there is no evidence, according to 
Strauss, of the reanimation of a physical body. Hence, Strauss assumes the same understanding 
of resurrection as other scholars in this era, one which stresses its continuity with empirical 
reality. That is, the resurrection that is being rejected is the thoroughly material return to life 
of Jesus’ physical body. Where Reimarus claims that the resurrection was an intentional 
deception, Strauss argues that the disciples, as a result of intense emotion, imagined Jesus 
revived, and the resurrection accounts were an interpretation of these imaginings, which were 
 
32 Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 
1968), 418. Cf. Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Life of Jesus, ed. Jack C. Verheyden. Trans. S. Maclean Gilmour 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 392-465.  
37 
 
unexplainable in their primitive context.33 Strauss’ application of myth later developed into 
form criticism, and would in particular influence Bultmann. However, I contend, contrary to 
Strauss, that the early Christians believed that they did know what had happened, at least to a 
certain extent, and so applied the eschatological category of resurrection, which provided 
meaning to this event within a Jewish eschatological framework (which will be explored in 
depth in chapter four). 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the historical Jesus had been, by and large, stripped of all 
‘primitive’ notions of miracles and divinity.34 However, some others retained the belief in a 
physical resurrection. The Reformed preacher Charles Spurgeon responded to those who reject 
a physical body:  
If ye were Christians as ye profess to be, ye would believe that every mortal man who ever existed 
shall not only live by the immortality of his soul, but his body shall live again, that the very flesh in 
which he now walks the earth is as eternal as the soul, and shall exist for ever.35 
All the more strongly, he claims, “The resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead is one of the 
best attested facts on record,” and “we cannot and we dare not doubt that Jesus rose from the 
dead.”36 We should bear in mind that the sermons or writings of popular preachers have little 
influence on academic theology, but Spurgeon’s views highlight the general attitude toward 
the resurrection in conservative and evangelical circles. He reaffirms the pre-Enlightenment 
views on resurrection where many others rejected it. However, both arguments presuppose an 
understanding of resurrection that does not adequately grasp the significance of this Jewish 
eschatological notion. Resurrection is treated as comparable to other events within history, to 
be dismissed or affirmed, and its discontinuous characteristics are minimized.  
 
33 David Strauss, “Reimarus and his Apology,” in Fragments, ed. Talbert, 52-55. Cf. McGrath, Christian 
Theology, 310. 
34 Cf. James K. Beilby and Paul Rhodes Eddy, eds., The Historical Jesus: Five Views (Downers Grove: IVP, 
2009), 16-19. 
35 Charles H. Spurgeon, “The Resurrection of the Dead,” in The New Street Pulpit, vol 2 (London: Passmore & 
Alabaster, 1856), 98.  
36 Ibid., 108.  
38 
 
The first ‘quest’ ultimately ended with the criticisms of William Wrede and Albert Schweitzer. 
The former argued that much of Mark was post-Easter theological reflection imposed upon the 
history of Jesus and thus not historically reliable,37 which had a substantial impact upon the 
first quest’s desire to strip the historical Jesus of theological embellishment, for the Markan 
framework upon which many of the questers relied was disrupted.38 This was further, and 
perhaps fatally, impacted by the latter’s 1906 publication of The Quest of the Historical Jesus, 
which stressed the Jewish apocalyptic elements of the Gospels and their eschatological 
portrayal of Jesus.39 Wright highlights the distinction between Wrede and Schweitzer as two 
significant ‘highways’ of thought in the later twentieth century – the ‘Wredebahn’ and 
‘Schweitzerstrasse.’ The former, a ‘thoroughgoing scepticism,’ presents a non-eschatological 
portrayal of Jesus as a wise Galilean teacher who was executed, and the latter, a ‘thoroughgoing 
eschatology,’ presents a Jesus who anticipated and preached the end of history.40 We might 
note for now how those in line with Wrede are more likely to interpret the resurrection 
metaphorically, and those in line with Schweitzer in light of Jewish eschatology. I contend that 
the Jewish category of resurrection of the dead is far too significant for this event to be 
described in purely metaphorical language (though it should be mentioned that metaphor does 
not necessarily deny historicity). 
Before moving onto the next era, the period of the supposed (but overstated) ‘no quest,’ 
attention should be given to Ernst Troeltsch, whose views regarding history and miracles, 
although appearing after Schweitzer’s critique, are similar to those of the so-called first quest 
and thus can be considered alongside this work.41 Troeltsch claimed that Christianity, as a 
 
37 William Wrede, The Messianic Secret, trans. J. C. G. Greig (Cambridge: J. Clarke, 1971), 115-49.   
38 Beilby and Eddy, eds. The Historical Jesus, 19-20. 
39 Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, trans. W. Montgomery, J. R. Coates, Susan Cupitt and 
John Bowden (London: SCM, 2000), 370-71, 478-86. Cf. Beilby and Eddy, eds., The Historical Jesus, 20. 
Schweitzer insisted that Jesus’ message of love is to be celebrated and that a relationship with Jesus is possible, 
though not one founded upon historical research. 
40 N.T. Wright, Jesus and the Victory of God (London: SPCK, 1996), 18-21. 
41 And constitutes another example of the inadequacy of the Three Quest model.  
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historical phenomenon, should be “investigated…by the universal, verified methods of 
historical research.”42 He argued, similar to Hume, for the homogeneity of history, where 
despite the unique particularity of historical events, these events remain universally similar and 
valid. Therefore, the principle of analogy must be employed. In other words, the historical 
event in question can only be considered probable to have happened if it can be considered 
probable to happen today.43 Regarding the resurrection, he maintains that historical research 
can provide nothing except the affirmation that the disciples were convinced that Jesus lived. 
However, resurrections are not experienced today, and so Jesus’ resurrection would disrupt the 
homogeneity of history. Therefore, the claim that Jesus rose from the dead must be considered 
historically improbable and can only be explained as the significant personal impact of Jesus 
upon his disciples.44 
The predominant position on the resurrection in the Enlightenment era is sharply antithetical 
to the pre-Enlightenment position. Where the resurrection was initially interpreted as a physical 
event within time and space, albeit with some transformation, ambiguous as that may be, the 
major scholarship of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly drawing from 
Hume’s scepticism, rejected this notion, instead interpreting the resurrection as either metaphor 
and myth, or deception. However, in both instances, the notion of ‘resurrection’ has not 
adequately recognized or incorporated the immense eschatological significance of the 
‘resurrection of the dead’ within its Jewish apocalyptic context, and subsequently presuppose 
a mere individual reanimation. Hence, the continuous aspects of the resurrected reality has been 
stressed, at the expense of the discontinuous. In the twentieth century, this begins to swing to 
the other extreme, as we will now see. 
 
42 Ernst Troeltsch, The Absoluteness of Christianity, trans. David Reid (London: SCM, 1972), 85. 
43 Ernst Troeltsch, “Historical and Dogmatic Method in Theology,” in Religion in History, trans. James Luther 
Adams and Walter F. Bense (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 13-14. 
44 Ernst Troeltsch, The Christian Faith, trans. Garrett E. Paul (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 75-96; Troeltsch, The 
Absoluteness of Christianity, 106-12. Cf. McGrath, Christian Theology, 313. 
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2.4. Kähler to Rahner: A Supra-Historical Resurrection 
Following Schweitzer, historical Jesus research entered into a new era, one with far less interest 
in the historical nature of Jesus Christ, to the extent that many have called it the ‘no quest’ 
era.45 This is an undeserving title, and labelling it as such is a misnomer, for historical studies 
on Jesus were indeed produced, albeit at a reduced rate.46 Apart from these studies, however, a 
new theological emphasis developed, where historical research was deemed largely (though 
not entirely) unnecessary. This trend began with Martin Kähler in 1892 who, prior to Wrede 
and Schweitzer, began to question the quest for the historical Jesus in his publication The So-
Called Historical Jesus and the Historic Biblical Christ. He argued that the quest was 
essentially unnecessary, for the ‘historical’ Jesus concealed the ‘living’ Christ; it is, in fact, 
impossible to separate the two. Faith cannot depend upon historical research, and the only 
Christ academics should be interested in is the one preached through the ages. The 
proclamation about Jesus by the church should be our starting point, for the vast influence of 
Jesus supersedes historical research, and it is precisely in the biblical proclamation of Jesus as 
the Christ that we can encounter Jesus and have faith in him in the present.47 Ultimately, many 
of the interpretations of the resurrection tended towards nonhistorical perspectives, such that 
historical questions were regarded as either impossible to answer or altogether unnecessary. A 
supra-historical perspective emerged, exemplified in Barth, where the eschatological nature of 
 
45 John Reumann, “Jesus and Christology,” in The New Testament and Its Modern Interpreters, ed. Eldon Jay Epp 
and George W. MacRae (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989), 502; Wright, JVG, 21. Cf. Theissen and Merz, The 
Historical Jesus, 5-7.  
46 Cf. Beilby and Eddy, eds., The Historical Jesus, 21. Furthermore, the quest was, in no small part, co-opted by 
Nazi ideology in German scholarship (particularly the work of Walter Grundmann) to portray an Aryan Jesus 
stripped of any Jewish characteristics. Cf. Peter Head, “The Nazi Quest for an Aryan Jesus,” JSHJ 2 (2004), 56-
90; Alan T. Davies, “Aryan Christ: A Motif in Christian Anti-Semitism,” JES 12, no. 4 (1975), 569-79; Marshall 
D. Johnson, “Power Politics and New Testament Scholarship in the National Socialist Period,” JES 23, no. 1 
(1986), 1-24; Doris L. Bergen, Twisted Cross: The German Christian Movement in the Third Reich (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 21-43; Arnold Jacob Wolf, “Jesus as an Historical Jew,” Judaism 
46, no. 3 (1997), 375-80; Wright, JVG, 3-124.  
47 Martin Kähler, The So-Called Historical Jesus and the Historic Biblical Christ, trans. Carl E. Braaten 
(Philadelphia: Fortress, 1964), 65. Cf. Ben Witherington III, The Jesus Quest: The Third Search for the Jew of 
Nazareth (Downers Grove: IVP, 1997), 2-8; Beilby and Eddy, eds., The Historical Jesus, 22-23.  
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the resurrection removed it from ordinary historical contingency, which, in the process, 
emphasized its discontinuous nature at the expense of the continuous.  
This ahistorical tendency is characteristic of Rudolf Bultmann, Karl Barth, and Emil Brunner. 
With Karl Schmidt and Martin Dibelius, Bultmann developed form criticism – especially in his 
influential 1921 publication, The History of the Synoptic Tradition – which focusses on the pre-
Gospel oral traditions and their formulations. This form criticism enabled him to conclude, 
reflecting Strauss, that an impenetrable layer of myth separated the historical Jesus from 
modern historical research. 
I do indeed think we can know almost nothing concerning the life and personality of Jesus, since the 
early Christian sources show no interest in either, are moreover fragmentary and often legendary; and 
other sources about Jesus do not exist.
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The significance of Jesus and his life is the divine act, not the historical phenomenon. The 
Gospel proclamation (the kerygma) is not concerned with historical fact, but with leading the 
individual to an existential encounter with Christ in the present. For Bultmann, it is this Christ 
and Lord who is preached, not the historical Jesus.49  
Regarding the resurrection, Bultmann argues, “The resurrection of Jesus, Pentecost and the 
parousia of Jesus are one and the same event, and those who believe have already eternal 
life.”50 Modern humanity no longer perceives the world through the mythological lens of the 
first century and so must surely understand that the disciples could not have been speaking of 
a physical and personal reanimation. Rather, it was a metaphor, the subjective experience and 
elevation of Jesus as Lord in the minds of the disciples. The redemptive and salvific 
significance of Jesus’ death and resurrection developed later. Jesus did not speak about his 
death and resurrection as carrying a redemptive nature, but sayings were later attributed to 
 
48 Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), 14.  
49 Beilby and Eddy, eds., The Historical Jesus, 22; McGrath, Christian Theology, 305; Stanley J. Grenz and Roger 
E. Olson, 20th Century Theology (Downers Grove: IVP, 1992), 95.  
50 Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, 33.  
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Jesus, originating in the early church’s faith. The resurrection is not something that happened 
and can be isolated in history, but is connected to the resurrection of believers and is thus 
something that is realized, existentially, in the individual.51 
Barth’s theology began, prior to the first world war, as a thoroughly liberal theology.52 
Appointed to a church in Geneva in 1909, he taught the resurrection as a metaphorical reference 
to the rise of faith in the disciples, an event that happens within believers where Jesus is 
recognized as Lord and the believer orients their life to follow him. However, Barth became 
disillusioned with liberal theology upon seeing many German scholars, including some he 
venerated, support the war policy of 1914. Consequently, he abandoned liberal theology.53 He 
retained, however, the belief that the resurrection was the eternalization of Jesus. The 
resurrection transcends ordinary human existence, knowledge, and history, operating as the 
unification of God’s essence and human essence. Jesus is given immortality so that he, and the 
salvation that was achieved on the cross and confirmed at the resurrection, is available pro 
nobis, that is, for all his followers at all times. Rather than an event similar to any other 
historical event, the resurrection is the transition of Jesus Christ into the transtemporal realm 
of the universal Church.54 
Furthermore, Barth affirms a bodily resurrection, an event in the life of Jesus and one that 
involves an empty tomb, on the basis that in the incarnation God’s essence was united with 
 
51 Ibid., 150; Jaspert and Bromiley, Karl Barth – Rudolf Bultmann Letters, 94. Cf. McGrath, Christian Theology, 
311. 
52 That is, connected to the nineteenth and early twentieth century movement coming out of German 
Enlightenment philosophy that reacted to dogmatic and authoritarian hermeneutics and engaged with modern 
scientific and philosophical methodologies. This movement follows from Schleiermacher and includes Hegel, 
Ritschl, von Harnack, and Tillich.  
53 Nathan Hitchcock, Karl Barth and the Resurrection of the Flesh: The Loss of the Body in Participatory 
Eschatology (Eugene: Pickwick, 2013), 31-32. Cf. Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, trans. John Newton Thomas 
and Thomas Wieser (London: Collins, 1961).  
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humanity and thus, rejecting any separation between spirit and body or divine and human, the 
whole Jesus Christ died and was resurrected. In Jesus Christ, divinity was united with humanity, 
and the resurrection was not something that happened to either one or the other, but happened 
to the whole Jesus, and therefore involves both the divine and human nature of Jesus, and 
therefore involves Jesus’ human body. The empty tomb tradition suggests that the resurrection 
event was not merely a subjective event, but something that happened within time and space. 
However, Barth asserts the impossibility of subjecting the resurrection to historical scrutiny, 
for this event, though occurring within contingent history, is unlike any other historical event. 
In his 1918 commentary on Romans, Barth contends, “In the resurrection the new world of the 
Holy Spirit touches the old world of the flesh, but touches it as a tangent touches a circle, that 
is, without touching it.”55 Paul, the evangelists, and the other apostles were seeking a decision 
of faith, not historical inquiry. Faith is never legitimized by historical investigation, nor is it 
ever a response to an empty tomb; rather, faith is a response to the living Christ.56 He argues: 
As the New Testament sees it the man Jesus who was given up to death is identical with the Lord now 
living and reigning in the community, and that this Lord again is the One whose universally visible 
return is for the community the sum of their future and of that of the world. He has overcome death in 
suffering it. He has risen again from the dead. And it is in this totality that He is “for men.”
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Hence, the resurrection was an eschatological event, a sovereign act of God’s free grace, which 
“reveals Himself as the One He is – the genuine, true and righteous man,” and “crowns [Jesus’ 
ministry] as its disclosure.”58 It was primarily an event which happened within the 
anthropological realm, a subjective manifestation of Jesus as the Christ, which nevertheless 
happened within time and space, but is inaccessible without faith.59 It would of course be 
possible to spend a much greater amount of time assessing Barth’s interpretation of the 
 
55 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (Oxford: OUP, 1933), 30. 
56 Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 3.2, 452; Hitchcock, Karl Barth and the Resurrection of the Flesh, 128. Cf. 
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57 Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 3.2, 214. 
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59 Cf. Hitchcock, Karl Barth and the Resurrection of the Flesh, 127; Paul D. Molnar, Incarnation & Resurrection: 
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resurrection, but this would exceed the scope this thesis. His view of the resurrection is part of 
what the thesis is offering a corrective to. 
Similarly, Brunner argued that Christian history is entirely different to any other sort of history. 
The Christ event was “something super-historical, unique, absolutely decisive,” and we should 
allow our relationship with Jesus to be, first and foremost, the determinative factor for how we 
establish our relationship with history. To do otherwise would “mean thinking in terms of 
universal religion, of general revelation.”60 Faith should not be established upon “anything so 
unsafe as historical science…for such building is indeed a glaring example of building one’s 
house upon the sand.”61 For Brunner, historical knowledge of Jesus – especially including the 
incarnation and resurrection – cannot lead to faith, rather faith alone can lead to a right 
historical knowledge of Jesus. Though the apostles regarded Jesus’ resurrection as a contingent 
historical event, the significance of the resurrection lay primarily with regard to Jesus’ ongoing 
presence, as the revealed Lord of the new age. It is the inbreaking of God’s eternity into 
temporality, and thus can be neither understood nor described, incomprehensible to humanity, 
and thus inaccessible without faith.62 
Kähler, Bultmann, Barth, and Brunner argued that historical research was unimportant, if not 
inappropriate, for a correct understanding of Jesus and impetus and grounding of faith in him 
as Christ. Rather, faith is grounded upon the existential experience of Christ as Lord in the 
present, faith which equips the believer to understand the resurrection. This sentiment was 
similarly expressed by Charles Dodd, who claimed that the Gospels “do not…set out to gratify 
a purely historical curiosity about past events, but they do set out to nurture faith upon the 
testimony to such events.”63 Likewise, James Robinson’s 1959 publication A New Quest of the 
 
60 Emil Brunner, The Mediator, trans. Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth, 1942), 153. 
61 Ibid., 156. 
62 Emil Brunner, Eternal Hope, trans. Harold Knight (London: Lutterworth, 1954), 142-45; Brunner, The 
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Historical Jesus argued that inadequate information about Jesus exists and thus we cannot 
establish the historical reality. For Robinson, reflecting the earlier work of philosopher and 
historian Robin Collingwood,64 the emphasis of historical research must lie in anthropology – 
as opposed to the natural sciences – and the determination of the intent, commitment, and 
meaning of the event for the participants of the historical event. In so determining, the historian 
connects with the historical person. Thus determining the historical ‘facts’ of Jesus’ life is 
impossible, and trying to do so is unhelpful, unless the historian understands the meaning and 
intention behind the event and thereby connect, existentially, with Jesus.65 
Paul Tillich, viewing the historical quest of the previous century as a failure, argued in similar 
fashion to Kähler, that the only available picture of Jesus is the one portrayed by the evangelists, 
who perceived Jesus as their Christ. Christianity is therefore built upon witness to Jesus’ 
messianic nature, not historical biography. It is not surprising, therefore, that Tillich views the 
resurrection, like Bultmann, as an existential event. The resurrection is not something that 
happened, or that will happen, but is something that happens. It is victory over death of the 
old, to make room for the “New Creation,” the central Christian message that in Jesus, a new 
reality has appeared. Resurrection, along with ‘reconciliation’ and ‘reunion,’ is a mark of this 
New Creation – God’s creative activity in the world – and is not to be understood physically 
as something that happened to Jesus’ body, but existentially as the realization of Jesus as Christ 
in the minds of the disciples. For Tillich, “Resurrection is not an event that might happen in 
some remote future, but it is the power of the New Being to create life out of death,” and 
“Where there is a New Being, there is resurrection.”66 
 
64 Cf. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (London: OUP, 1976).  
65 James M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus (London: SCM, 1959), 67-68. 
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However, there were some, such as Cecil Cadoux and Karl Rahner, who held similar positions 
regarding history, but who viewed the resurrection as an event that happened to Jesus, yet as a 
purely spiritual event. In contrast to those who insisted that the resurrection was something that 
happened within the disciples, the resurrection indeed happened to Jesus, as well as to the 
disciples. Cadoux, for instance, argued that the disciples had visions of the living Jesus, and, 
The least difficult explanation of these appearances seems to me to regard them as real manifestations 
given to his followers by Jesus himself, not by means of the presence of his physical body resuscitated 
from the empty tomb, but by way of those strange processes sufficiently attested to us by psychical 
research, but as yet very imperfectly understood.
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The disciples witnessed something real, given to them by Jesus himself, but was entirely, in 
some indiscernible sense, psychological. He believed this understanding of the resurrection 
ensures the understanding that Jesus had defeated death, explains the inconsistencies in the 
Gospels, relieves us of the inexorably difficult task of explaining or defending the empty tomb, 
and relieves us of the problem of a physical ascension.68 
Holding a similar view was Rahner who, intimately connecting the cross and resurrection, 
argued that “the resurrection is the manifestation of what happened in the death of Christ,”69 
the redemption and validation of Jesus’ life which was given up in obedience.70 For Rahner, 
the resurrection is “the event in which God irrevocably adopts the creature as his own reality,”71 
whereby in Jesus, who represents all of creation, is glorified and transformed. Put differently, 
rather than being an event within temporal history, Jesus’ resurrection refers to his glorification. 
If we are to understand ‘historical’ as a reference to that which “belongs to the realm of our 
normal, empirical world of time and space as a phenomenon which occurs frequently,” we 
 
67 C. J. Cadoux, The Life of Jesus (Middlesex: Penguin, 1948), 165. 
68 Ibid., 164-67. 
69 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 4, trans. Kevin Smyth (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 
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70 Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, trans. William V. Dych (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 
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71 Rahner, Theological Investigations, vol. 4, 128-29.  
47 
 
cannot understand Jesus’ resurrection as a ‘historical event’ like any other.72 However, he 
affirms that the resurrection is simultaneously the cause of the disciples’ faith, and an event 
within, or as a result, of their faith. The disciples believed they experienced the risen spirit of 
Jesus, which inspired their faith, though faith is needed to believe and understand Jesus as risen. 
Rahner insists: 
If the resurrection of Jesus is the permanent validity of his person and his cause, and if this person and 
cause together do not mean the survival of just any person and his history, but mean victoriousness of 




There is a mutually conditional relationship between faith in, and experience of, Jesus’ 
resurrection; between subject and object. The risen Lord does not exist within the same world 
of experience as us, and thus it is impossible to experience him as we do any other thing, and 
hence for Rahner, Jesus was “risen into the faith of his disciples,” and into our own. It is only 
by faith that the resurrection can be understood, for it is God’s eschatological victory, but faith 
is a constitutive element of the resurrection itself.74 Furthermore, Jesus’ resurrection is the 
consummation of the incarnation, and thus, “The risen and exalted Lord must be the permanent 
and ever-access to God,” and the resurrection is the “consummation of the world which gives 
access to God.”75 For Rahner, the resurrection is the consummation of Jesus’ life and ministry, 
the beginning of God’s transformative work in the world. The resurrection event and faith in 
that event are mutually conditioning, but ultimately grants us access to God.76 
The stress upon anthropology present in much of the methodology of this era is laudable and 
will be defended with regard to both epistemology and historiography in chapters three and 
four respectively, but the insistence that the resurrection be deemed beyond the scope of 
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historical research has swung too far toward an emphasis upon the discontinuous elements of 
the resurrection. Retaining the assumption that resurrection entails the reanimation of a 
personal body, this is re-interpreted eschatologically and divorced from ordinary temporal 
reality. Whereas many interpretations prior to the twentieth century emphasized the continuity 
of Jesus’ resurrection with his pre-crucifixion nature, arguing either for or rejecting its 
physicality and historicity, resurrection theology shifted in this era to present the resurrection 
as something entirely separate from historical contingency. By doing so, there is very little 
about the resurrection that bears continuity with present created reality, with Jesus’ pre-
crucifixion body. This, I believe, is a fatal misunderstanding of the Jewish eschatological 
notion of resurrection of the dead, which emphatically reaffirms creation and history; to avow 
a supra-historical resurrection thereby disconnects this new reality (as embodied in the risen 
Jesus) from creation and history. Those in the pre-Enlightenment and the first quest eras 
overemphasized the continuous nature of the resurrection; while those in the first half of the 
twentieth century overemphasized the discontinuous. I contend that both must be upheld in 
dialectical tension.  
2.5. Käsemann to Moltmann: A Kerygmatic Resurrection 
Rather than accepting the resurrection narratives uncritically, or attempting to ‘get behind’ the 
narratives themselves to discern demythologized, ‘genuine’ history, or avoiding historical 
questions altogether, scholarship in the mid-twentieth century is characterised by the argument 
that it is indeed possible to discern from these texts knowledge of events that occurred within 
contingent history, despite being framed by theological concerns. However, the majority 
position in this era repeats the flaws of the preceding era, reducing the resurrection to kerygma. 
This reductionism took the following form: though a resurrection (understood as Jesus’ re-
animated body) might have happened, which inspired its retelling, it is only important to the 
modern scholar as a kerygmatic tool, or, we might say, a narratological device, and so whether 
49 
 
or not it happened within contingent history is unimportant. This approach once again 
overemphasized the discontinuous aspects of the resurrection and failed to incorporate the 
hopes for a reaffirmation of empirical reality present in the Jewish eschatological framework 
of resurrection of the dead. Put differently, the extent to which Jesus’ resurrection was a part 
of, or impacted upon, contingent history is marginal and of secondary importance.  
The 1950s saw a resurgence in historical Jesus research following a lecture in 1953 by, 
ironically, one of Bultmann’s students, Ernst Käsemann, who argued that ignoring the 
historical Jesus would cause modern theology to collapse into Docetism. This ‘New’ or 
‘Second’ quest was largely characterized by the attempt – in direct contrast to Reimarus – to 
demonstrate the continuity between the ‘Jesus of history’ and the ‘Christ of faith’ (i.e. the man 
Jesus of Nazareth within temporal time and space, and the later messianic and theological 
interpretations of that man). This sentiment was particularly expressed by Raymond Brown: 
“If the purpose of the old quest was to get behind the kerygmatic Christ to the historical Jesus, 
the new quest may be characterized as an attempt to show that the kerygmatic portrait is a 
faithful representation of the historical Jesus.”77 Brown notes that the new questers, in an 
obvious shift away from Bultmann, largely viewed the kerygma as based upon the Jesus of 
contingent history. However, he argued that the sources should not be viewed as detached 
repositories of pure fact or biographical reports, but, no longer seeing history as an objective 
science (as Troeltsch had claimed), what is called for is not a mere recognition of the bruta 
facta of the historical events, but the existential relation between historian and historical 
event.78 
 
77 Raymond Edward Brown, “After Bultmann, What: An Introduction to the Post-Bultmannians,” CBQ 26:1 
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Käsemann, with many of the second questers, reaffirmed the thought of the Bultmann school 
by asserting that the Gospels were primarily theological which ultimately influenced the 
shaping of the text, expressed in historical form. However, he also argued that the evangelists 
nevertheless had access to historical information concerning Jesus, and the Gospels should 
therefore be considered as both kerygma and historical narrative. It is therefore necessary to 
explore the continuity between what Jesus preached and what was preached about Jesus. On 
the disparate status of historical Jesus research, Käsemann laments: 
Anyone who has followed the debate about the historical Jesus…must have been astonished or even 
horrified to observe how, as in a volcanic area, the earth was suddenly everywhere spewing forth fire, 
smoke and differently-sized masses of lava, where, for a generation past, pleasant gardens had been 
planted on the slopes of ancient craters.
79
 
He argued that the significant problem for historical research into the life of Jesus was “not 
how to give faith an historical foundation,” but “how to use the critical method to separate the 
true message from falsifications of it.”80 In other words, the primary concern of Jesus research 
should be determining the original intended message of the life of Jesus, rather than 
ascertaining historical facts. He argued that separating the Jesus of history from the Christ of 
faith creates a false dichotomy. We only have access to the historical Jesus through the 
narratives and texts about Jesus, all of which were concerned, not with the brute, ‘objective’ 
facts of Jesus, but with the proclamation that Jesus is Lord. Facts on their own can never lead 
to faith, and the New Testament authors knew this. Therefore, they didn’t attempt to present 
Jesus as a purely historical figure. For Käsemann, “The historical Jesus meets us in the New 
Testament, our only real and original documentation of him, not as he was in himself, not as 
an isolated individual, but as the Lord of the community which believes in him.”81 Regarding 
the resurrection, he skirts the question of its historicity, but maintains that the early church 
recognized Jesus as the risen Lord. Though “primitive Christianity was in any event not 
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primarily interested in the bruta facta of the past as such,”82 the resurrection was understood 
as the impetus and essence of recognizing Jesus as Lord.83 
For Günther Bornkamm, all the information we have about Jesus is embedded within the beliefs 
of the believing community, but Christian faith is rooted in a particular historical context and 
thus historical research is indeed necessary for understanding this faith. The Gospel narratives, 
written on the other side of Jesus’ resurrection, are invariably rooted in the belief that Jesus 
rose from the dead. Because of this, “The search after the bare facts of history [becomes] 
difficult and to a large extent futile.”84 Historical research should neither be the ground of faith, 
nor be rejected as unimportant, but should rather be seen as a guide for knowledge and faith in 
Jesus. The resurrection cannot be understood as a normal event, but Bornkamm seems to imply 
that it was something that happened within temporal space and time. The disciples experienced 
the risen Jesus, and the appearances gave rise to their faith – as opposed to the resurrection 
being a reference to faith itself. Notwithstanding this claim, what is significant for historical 
research is the message of the narratives of Jesus, not the definitive historical facts. He argues: 
The event of Christ’s resurrection from the dead, his life and his eternal reign, are things removed from 
historical scholarship. History cannot ascertain and establish conclusively the facts about them as it can 




And it is this faith which is of primary concern for us today. These disciples, moreover, were 
concerned with proclaiming Jesus not as who he was, but as who he is. The resurrection 
demonstrated God’s commitment to the world, in that it was the reversal of the verdict given 
to Jesus by his Jewish opponents and the Roman occupying power. In his end was a new 
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beginning, a “final and absolute act of God for the salvation of the world.”86 Similarly, 
Berkouwer refuses to choose between a ‘pneumatic’ and a ‘historic’ position, connecting the 
resurrection with glorification, and asserting that it “is a historical reality which itself becomes 
the sign, the pledge of our absolute victory over death in the resurrection of the body.”87 
Hans Frei held a similar position to Käsemann and Bornkamm, arguing that the task of the 
interpreter is “to observe the story itself – its structure, the shape of its movement, and its 
crucial transitions,” rather than attempting to ascertain the absolute historical facts.88 In his 
seminal text, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, Frei argued that methodologies of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were mistreating the Bible by ignoring its central narrative 
structure. The biblical narrative was being read by conservatives attempting to prove, and 
liberals and sceptics attempting to disprove, the factuality and historicity of the events. 
Consequently, its essential narrative form was neglected. The truth and meaning of the Bible 
does not lie externally in history or in any understanding of ‘myth,’ but internally, within its 
own narrative. Jesus is neither a mythological symbol, nor a figure to be proved and examined. 
Indeed, “Whether or not we know much or anything about the ‘historical’ Jesus is probably a 
well nigh insoluble question.”89 
For Frei, the resurrection is where Jesus is identified as Christ, and the significance of the 
resurrection has to do with his continuing presence among his believers. This is the primary 
message of the resurrection, and any attempt to determine whether the early Christians saw it 
as literal or metaphorical, or to prove it was a bodily resurrection, or to ascertain historical 
‘fact,’ is a distraction, for modernistic and reductionist attempts such as these are of no help to 
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our faith. They will distract us from the message of Christ’s living presence. He affirms the 
historicity of a bodily resurrection, but that it can neither be confined within, nor confirmed by, 
historical research. Furthermore, he insists upon the importance of the temporality of Christ’s 
presence, and thus affirms the helpfulness of historical research for Christian theology, but 
maintains that this cannot be the foundation of faith in Christ’s living presence. Frei argued, 
“The personal dignity of Jesus Christ as redeemer is known quite apart from the occurrence or 
nonoccurrence of the resurrection,”90 and because direct access to the resurrection does not 
exist, ascertaining the historical factuality of the claim of Jesus’ resurrection is unnecessary.91 
Käsemann, Bornkamm, and Frei provide valuable contributions toward latter twentieth century 
Jesus research, namely highlighting the role of narrative. Yet reducing the resurrection to no 
more than narrative, stripping it of its historical nature – its elements that bear continuity with 
empirical reality – divorces the resurrection from one of the central tenets of its eschatological 
framework: the reaffirmation of creation and the redemption of history itself.  
Edward Schillebeeckx argues: 
Historical study of Jesus is extremely important, it gives a concrete content to faith; but it can never be 
a verification of the faith. A historically reconstructed picture of Jesus can never do more than allow 




Historical research and its findings cannot function as foundation for faith, but it is certainly 
not a negative task. Schillebeeckx in fact states, “A Christianity or kerygma minus the historical 
Jesus of Nazareth is ultimately vacuous – not Christianity at all.”93 However, the resurrection 
eludes historical research, functioning as Jesus’ glorification. The empty tomb tradition did not 
lead to the belief in the resurrection, rather God exalted Jesus to the heavenly places after his 
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death. Some of the early Christians reflected upon Jesus’ life, death, and resurrection within an 
apocalyptic context, leading them to the conclusion that Jesus lived on in God, and hence the 
resurrection referred to this exaltation. Through this ‘resurrection’ and exaltation, God has 
ushered in the “eschatological times” by accomplishing his “definitive saving action” in Jesus, 
who God has now identified himself with and who now is himself the rule of God.94  
Similarly connecting the resurrection with Jesus’ exaltation and glorification was Joachim 
Jeremias. He argues that “there is nothing comparable to the resurrection of Jesus anywhere in 
Jewish literature,” and that nowhere is resurrection, or a resurrection to glory, an anticipated 
event within history. Rather, resurrection “always and without exception means the dawn of 
God’s new creation.” The disciples, therefore, interpreted the appearances of the risen Jesus 
eschatologically, believing they were witnessing the dawn of a new age. Indeed, they were 
witnessing the eschaton. Jeremias claims that this understanding explains the raising of many 
others in Matthew 27, and the earthquakes of Mark 13.8. The resurrection was not an event in 
the course of contingent history, but a reference to Jesus’ entry into glory.95 The stress upon 
the resurrection as heralding a new eschatological age is indeed true, yet to deny it a place 
within history is a step too far for, as will be seen in chapter five, the resurrection of the dead 
signalled not simply the beginning of a new age, but the redemption of the old. Schillebeeckx 
and Jeremias have accentuated the former and ignored the latter, have emphasized the 
discontinuous at the expense of the continuous.  
It should be noted here that the reason many of these scholars avoid the language of ‘body’ and 
present the resurrection as some sort of disembodied glorification is because they are 
responding to the critical hermeneutics of previous eras. Their understanding of Jesus’ 
resurrection is, like those in the ‘No Quest’ era, largely a response to the critical scrutinization 
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of the historical Jesus, refusing to subject the resurrection claim to the same historical inquiry 
that demanded the strict application of the principle of analogy. The assumption hence remains 
that that the main emphasis of ‘resurrection’ envisages little more than the reanimation of a 
personal body, despite it being re-interpreted in a metaphorical fashion.  
Another of the post-Bultmann ‘New’ questers was Willi Marxsen, who sceptically suggested 
that attempts to reach the historical Jesus have failed and will continue to fail. With Käsemann, 
he insists upon the continuity between the historical Jesus of Nazareth and the Christ of faith. 
However, we can know very little about the historical Jesus because all that is available to us 
are interpretations of him. It is, in fact, impossible to access the historical Jesus because it is 
impossible to bypass these interpretations. This does not mean that these events are not 
historical, but the historian can never go further than the person telling the story about Jesus. 
Marxsen, with Frei and Schillebeeckx, contend that the resurrection eludes historical research 
because it was a miracle. Claiming that there were no eyewitnesses to the resurrection, the 
resurrection tradition arose as “an inference derived from personal faith.”96 More specifically, 
the miracle was not the resurrection of Jesus, but the birth and finding of faith. This miracle of 
faith was expressed in the declaration that Jesus was risen. Hence, the claim of the resurrection 
was not understood as an event that happened to Jesus, but was the disciples’ faith in the 
continuing cause of Jesus after his death, now taken up by the disciples.97 I argue in chapter 
four that though it is very true that it is impossible to bypass interpretations of events, this does 
not make this any less historical. Furthermore, as with others before him, the negation of the 
historical with regard to the resurrection is to ignore the continuous aspects of the resurrected 
reality. 
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The systematic theologian Jürgen Moltmann engaged with many of the same questions 
regarding the historical Jesus of Nazareth. With Pannenberg, Moltmann was involved in the 
theological movement, the ‘Theology of Hope,’ where eschatological perspectives were 
intertwined into their entire theological project, rather than being relegated to the end of a 
systematic theology. Moltmann fits comfortably in this movement, as seen particularly in his 
book, Theology of Hope, in which he argues: 
Eschatology means the doctrine of the Christian hope, which embraces both the object hoped for and 
also the hope inspired by it. From first to last, and not merely in the epilogue, Christianity is 
eschatology, is hope, forward looking and forward moving, and therefore also revolutionizing and 
transforming the present. …A proper theology would therefore have to be constructed in the light of its 
future goal. Eschatology should not be its end, but its beginning.
98
 
Specifically, the Christian hope is “resurrection hope,” for in Jesus’ resurrection the future of 
creation is revealed, especially in contrast with the cross; rather than death, God now offers 
life. This hope thereby enables and equips faith in the present, not as escapism, but as a 
commission: “Those who hope in Christ can no longer put up with reality as it is, but begin to 
suffer under it, to contradict it,” and attempt to bring about change.99 
Although he viewed the resurrection as an event that happened within temporal history, and 
argued that the disciples were recipients of appearances of the risen Jesus and that the tomb 
was in fact empty, he did not want to put the resurrection under the scrutiny of historical 
research. The proper way to approach the resurrection is not via any modern scientific 
methodology, but to connect it to the future eschatological hope. The resurrection happened 
within eschatological history and is thus neither accessible nor demonstrable by historical 
investigation. For Moltmann, Jesus’ death upon the cross was a human action, whereas the 
resurrection was God’s action. Furthermore, “The cross of Christ stands in the time of this 
present world of violence and sin – the risen Christ lives in the time of the coming world of the 
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new creation in justice and righteousness.”100 The resurrection is the promise of new creation, 
the foundation of faith in Christ, and a “theological symbol for faith in the victory of God’s 
righteousness and justice at the end of history.”101 He argues: 
In his death on the cross Christ has vicariously anticipated the final judgment of God for all the 
Godless and the unjust, so that as a result his raising from this death manifests to everyone the 
righteousness and justice of God which puts everything to rights and makes the unjust just. His own 
raising from the dead was not a raising for judgment, such as Daniel 12 envisages for all the dead; it 
was a raising into the glory of God and eternal life.
102
 
For Moltmann, the resurrection is connected to the inseparability of God’s justice and the 
glorification of Jesus as Lord. It therefore is not a matter of ‘fact,’ something to be proved, but 
means participating in the anticipated eschatological power of God, awaiting for and hoping in 
the elimination of death at the eschaton. Knowing that God raised Christ from the dead, we can 
trust that this promise is certain.103 
The differences between this renewed, second ‘quest’ and its preceding ‘no’ quest era are 
curiously mixed. With regard to Jesus research, scholars following Käsemann re-affirmed the 
need for the historical research that their forebears minimized, and yet, with regard to the 
resurrection itself, there is very little change. The eschatological nature of the resurrection is 
fortuitously retained, though so is the emphasis upon its discontinuous nature to the extent that 
it is inappropriate to consider it an event within contingent history, despite nominal assertions 
that it might well have happened within ordinary time and space. What is of primary importance 
is the kerygmatic message of the resurrection, which may have been based on contingent 
events, but is now accessible to the modern historian and theologian as narrative and interpreted 
metaphorically, thus stripping it of any significant impact it might have had upon history and 
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reality itself. These movements continue to fail to grasp the importance of balancing both the 
continuity and discontinuity of the resurrection with ordinary reality. 
2.6. Vermes to Habermas: A Jewish Apocalyptic Resurrection 
The gradual transition from the second to third quest is extremely arbitrary, and whether such 
a distinction is even necessary is unlikely.104 However, within the last forty years or so, 
historical Jesus research has increasingly emphasized the Jewish historical context of the early 
church, and a distinct new trend emerged that focused on first century Judaism. The origins of 
this trend are often credited to either Geza Vermes’ 1973 Jesus the Jew, Ben Meyer’s 1979 The 
Aims of Jesus, E. P. Sanders’ 1985 Jesus and Judaism, or the launch of the Jesus Seminar, also 
in 1985. However, it was likely a gradual evolution.105 N. T. Wright coined the term, ‘Third 
Quest,’ in an early article,106 and although it has been met with some recent resistance, the term 
remains in common parlance, and generally refers to an increased interest in the so-called 
“Jewish context” of the first-century world of the historical Jesus.107 Characteristic of this third 
quest is a political and subversive Jesus, a revolutionary who challenged societal norms, and 
the resurrection is largely understood as either his vindication or the continuation of his 
political and religious movement by his followers.108 Despite this, however, Jesus’ resurrection 
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has not adequately been interpreted in the light of the broader Jewish eschatological notion of 
resurrection of the dead, the language of resurrection being reduced to a physical and personal 
reanimation. Note again that this is not to say that these scholars have ignored the 
eschatological, but that they have been so primarily focussed on the body that the Jewish 
eschatological expectations have been read only in light of what is believed to have happened 
to Jesus’ personal body and existence.109 
This interest in the Jewish context is especially evident in the work of Geza Vermes and E. P. 
Sanders, particularly Jesus the Jew and Jesus and Judaism, respectively. Vermes argues against 
a physical resurrection, insisting that the evidence is “confused and fragile.” Since no one 
would have been expecting a resurrection, there was no purpose in the disciples faking a 
resurrection, hence the ‘resurrection’ was a later tradition, and Jesus’ predictions of 
resurrection were prophecy after the event.110 For Sanders, Jesus was a prophetic figure who 
envisaged an eschatological restoration of the Jewish people. The resurrection was the 
culmination of Jesus’ work which launched, and was the foundation of, the Christian 
movement; but he admits, “I have no special explanation or rationalization of the resurrection 
experiences of the disciples.”111 The resurrection was a story that attempted to portray an event 
that the authors did not understand, and thus will remain a mystery. All that can be said with 
certainty is that the disciples believed they experienced a risen Jesus.112 However, Vermes and 
Sanders have both mistaken the notion of resurrection, again assuming that such a reference 
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referred to a mere personal reanimation continuous with the old. When unable to find 
compelling evidence of a physical, historical resurrection, Vermes concludes that it must 
simply be later tradition, insisting that the only historically certain fact is that the disciples 
believed they experienced a risen Jesus. Sanders has limited the resurrection to the person of 
Jesus. In both cases, the eschatological significance of the category of ‘resurrection of the 
dead,’ which incorporates the broad spectrum of Jewish eschatological hope, has been reduced.  
A major movement in this era of Jesus research was the public-oriented ‘Jesus Seminar’ group, 
headed by Robert Funk and launched in 1985. This group consisted of over one hundred 
scholars who voted on the authenticity and historicity of Jesus’ sayings and deeds, including 
notable scholars John Dominic Crossan, Marcus Borg, and Burton Mack. Their findings are 
somewhat infamous for their sensationalism and rejection of many sayings and deeds 
traditionally attributed to Jesus, recorded in their publications, The Five Gospels and The Acts 
of Jesus. In The Five Gospels, all accounts of the resurrection and any sayings of Jesus post-
resurrection are declared invented narratives added to the texts at much later dates.113 The Jesus 
Seminar received criticism – with Wright being one major detractor – and its influence has 
significantly diminished in recent decades.114  
However, some of its prominent members remain widely-cited New Testament voices, such as 
John Dominic Crossan. For Crossan, Jesus was a revolutionary, a poor peasant who sought to 
challenge the power structures and break down social conventions. Adopting a rigorous source 
criticism, Crossan argues for a hypothetical ‘Cross Gospel,’ an early stratum of the Gospel of 
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Peter, which informed Mark and then the other Gospel narratives. However, none of the 
Gospels accepted the resurrection account of the Cross Gospel, which combined the 
resurrection, visions, and ascension. The burial, and consequently the empty tomb, was fiction 
invented by Mark, as was Joseph of Arimathea. Crossan is more concerned with the meaning 
of the resurrection and our response to it than determining the historicity of the supposed event, 
but insists that the resurrection represents Jesus’ ongoing presence and rejects a literal and 
physical return from the dead.115  
Crossan notes that apart from many historical sources depicting crucifixions, archaeological 
evidence for this form of execution is minimal. Those who were crucified were either left as 
carrion, or given a shallow or communal grave, in both cases usually becoming food for 
scavengers. Burial was a privilege of the wealthy and influential, the sort of people who were 
not crucified. The tale of burial in the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea was a redacted and evolved 
tradition, reflecting early Christian hope. Regarding the eventual location of Jesus’ body, “By 
Easter Sunday morning, those who cared did not know where it was, and those who knew did 
not care.”116 The early Jesus movement knew very little about Jesus’ crucifixion, death or 
burial, and the Passion narratives developed over many years to explain the continued 
experience of Jesus’ presence and the eschatological arrival of the new kingdom of God; 
physical resurrection from the dead was unnecessary, for faith existed prior to Jesus’ death. 
Furthermore, these resurrection accounts, particularly those including named persons, are 
primarily linked with power relationships within the early Christian communities, to give 
certain people – such as Peter – authority within the infant church. The death, burial, and 
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resurrection of Jesus are not “history remembered,” but “prophecy historicized,” a retrospective 
re-reading of the Hebrew Scriptures. However, it should be noted that resurrection was only 
one way of expressing Christian faith, and the appearances are only one way of expressing 
Christian experience, and thus these descriptions, especially Paul’s understanding of 
resurrection, should not be taken as normative for all early Christians.117 
The methodology of both the Seminar in general and Crossan have been heavily scrutinized. 
Crossan’s Cross Gospel hypothesis has not received a significant following and the non-
canonical Gospel of Peter is generally considered a later second century text. Its short 
resurrection narrative will be discussed in chapter five, which seems to draw heavily from, and 
expand upon, Mark’s narrative. The search for an ‘authentic’ history is largely criticized, and 
an emergent alternative – ‘social memory theory’ – will be addressed in §4.3 and incorporated 
into the methodology of this thesis. The Seminar’s insistence that only this ‘authentic’ history 
is important is short-sighted. The development of early Christian tradition and theology as it 
interacts with the memory of Jesus and prior theological categories should not be downplayed. 
Furthermore, Crossan has overly stressed the discontinuous elements of Jesus’ resurrection, 
that is, his continued existence and presence in the lives of the disciples, arguing that the 
reanimation of a personal, corporal body is unnecessary.  
Similarly for Marcus Borg Jesus was something of a revolutionary, albeit seeking a religious 
‘spiritual’ revolution, by challenging the Jerusalem Temple elite to renew Judaism. Jesus was 
a sage, but Borg insisted that “every story and word of Jesus has been shaped by the eyes and 
hands of the early church.”118 In other words, it is impossible to access the ‘historical’ Jesus 
apart from the kerygmatic proclamation of Jesus as the Christ. Contemporary historical studies 
have resulted in divergent portrayals of Jesus, which reinforces, on the one hand, the belief that 
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very little can in fact be known about Jesus, and on the other hand, that it is possible to construct 
whatever portrayal the historian desires. However, it is possible to ascertain historical 
knowledge about Jesus, indeed as much as any other ancient historical figure. Despite the fact 
that the Gospels are not “straightforward historical documents” and that the biblical portrait of 
Jesus was formed by the early church, we can be relatively certain about who Jesus was and 
what he would have taught. When it comes to the resurrection, however, we simply cannot 
know what actually happened or if something happened to Jesus’ body. Again the question has 
to do with a re-animated body. However, we can know that it was not believed to be a mere 
resuscitation, and thus it means transformation rather than return to a previous state of 
existence. The disciples experienced Jesus as a living reality in an entirely new way, who was 
said to have been “raised to God’s right hand.”119 Borg is certainly correct in asserting that 
resurrection meant far more than resuscitation, and acknowledges its transformative 
implications; but he entirely disregards any element which may bear continuity with ordinary 
reality. For Borg, Jesus’ resurrection meant his transformation into a new reality which is 
completely discontinuous with his pre-crucifixion body.  
Another significant voice in the Jesus Seminar was Burton Mack, who, similar to Borg, argued 
that Jesus was a sage seeking societal renewal. Mack insists that the New Testament portrayal 
be ignored when seeking the historical Jesus, for Mark purportedly wrote his Gospel after the 
first Jewish-Roman war, which ultimately skewed any historical portrayal of Jesus. Rather, Q 
source was the earliest written record of the Jewish movement, which recorded the advance of 
a community who, over time, attributed more and more sayings to Jesus. A grand mythology 
thus developed surrounding the teacher Jesus. No account of Jesus’ death and resurrection were 
included in Q,120 but the Gospels developed this idea around a martyr mythology and upon the 
 
119 Ibid., 9-15, 185. Cf. McGrath, Christian Theology, 308.  
120 This, I believe, is an overstatement. A good argument could be made that though Q does not explicitly discuss 
Jesus’ resurrection, it could possibly presuppose it. I will return to this in chapter five.  
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belief that whatever happened to Jesus happened “for us,” as reflected in Greek hero 
mythology. Jesus’ death was seen as a martyrdom for the Christian cause, and the resurrection 
developed as a result of recognizing God’s involvement, despite the negative and unclean 
connotations of the idea of resurrection of the body in both Greek mythology and Jewish 
theology. Mack argues, “It was that need to imagine God’s involvement in an otherwise 
implausible martyrdom for a very problematic cause that resulted in the odd and grotesque 
notion of God raising Jesus from the dead.”121 Resurrection was initially unnecessary for the 
early Christians, for whom the sayings Gospel – Q – was enough to sustain faith. They did not 
need a divine or resurrected Jesus to recognise him as a wise teacher and sage, and to live 
according to his teachings. However, Q was eventually lost to antiquity, replaced by the popular 
Gospels.122 As with the others in the Jesus Seminar, Mack mistakenly searches for a Jesus 
separated from the early tradition that built around him; where Crossan highlights the Gospel 
of Peter, Mack makes almost exclusive use of Q and re-constructs it to outright dismiss the 
resurrection. The resurrection he dismisses, however, is one of personal reanimation.  
Others, such as James Dunn and Luke Timothy Johnson, proffered a metaphorical 
interpretation of the resurrection, not dissimilar to those of the first quest era. This is not to say 
that they have ignored historical questions, have not engaged in historical research, and have 
necessarily denied the resurrection. On the contrary, many, having engaged with the historical 
issues of the resurrection, insist that the only way to adequately talk about the resurrection is 
to do so metaphorically. Yet the assumption that the language of resurrection envisages 
personal reanimation remains. Unlike many before him, Dunn insists that historical research 
must not stop at Jesus’ death, believing that Christianity would simply not exist without the 
resurrection of Jesus. He affirms that the early Christians spoke of a bodily resurrection, rather 
 
121 Burton Mack, Who Wrote the New Testament? (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 83-84.  
122 Ibid., 47, 133; Burton Mack, The Lost Gospel: The Book of Q and Christian Origins (New York: HarperCollins, 
1993), 2-3, 71-102, 216-17. Cf. McGrath, Christian Theology, 308.  
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than any variety of ‘spiritual’ resurrection, and that this was at the heart of Christian faith and 
“the fulcrum point on which all faith and hope turned.”123 However, the resurrection was 
accompanied by the glorification and exaltation of Jesus, and the resurrected body is not a body 
of flesh and blood, despite being continuous with, and analogous to, the pre-Passion body. 
Essentially, Jesus’ resurrected body was something entirely other, animated not by corporeal 
physicality, but by the Spirit. All other explanations, such as hallucinations or deceit, fail to 
account for all the historical data. Despite this, the resurrection goes beyond historical 
description, for the historical data is limited, and must therefore be understood as metaphor, 
symbolising God’s transformative work.124  
Similarly, Luke Timothy Johnson engages with the historical data but concludes that the 
resurrection eludes historical reconstruction. Christian faith cannot be based upon historical 
portrayals of Jesus, but rather upon the ongoing presence and power of Jesus. He claims: 
If the resurrection means…the passage of the human Jesus into the power of God, then by definition it 
is not “historical” as regards Jesus, in the sense of a “human event in time and space.” By definition, 
the resurrection elevates Jesus beyond the merely human; he is no longer defined by time and space – 
although available to human beings in time and space! The Christian claim concerning the resurrection 
in the strong sense is simply not “historical.”
125
 
The resurrection comprised neither hallucinations, nor mere resuscitation, but was an 
“experience of [Jesus’] powerful presence.” He did not appear in passing to a few before 
disappearing, but was truly alive and appeared, in his full self, to his disciples. For Johnson, 
“the resurrection experience which gave birth to the Christian movement was the experience 
 
123 James D. G. Dunn, “How are the Dead Raised? With What Body do they Come?: Reflections on 1 Corinthians 
15,” SwJT 45, no. 1 (2002), 5.  
124 Ibid., 5-18; James D. G. Dunn, The Evidence for Jesus (London: SCM, 1985), 68-76; James D. G. Dunn, Jesus 
Remembered (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 826-878. 
125 Luke Timothy Johnson, The Real Jesus: The Misguided Quest for the Historical Jesus and the Truth of the 
Traditional Gospels (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), 136. Johnson later argues that the resurrection is the 
perspective from which the evangelists composed their Gospel narratives, and therefore produces extremely 
biased accounts of Jesus. It was not simply the shaping of the stories, but the very selection of the stories, that was 
heavily influenced by the belief in Jesus’ resurrection and his ongoing presence. Therefore, it is impossible to get 
behind the New Testament texts, for this resurrection perspective cannot be bypassed (Luke Timothy Johnson, 
“Learning the Human Jesus: Historical Criticism and Literary Criticism” in The Historical Jesus: Five Views, ed. 
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of the continuing presence of a personal, transcendent, and transforming power within the 
community.”126 It is impossible to ascertain what this meant for Jesus’ physical body or in what 
form he appeared, but whatever happened was something utterly new, with Jesus sharing God’s 
life. The significance of the resurrection lies in the commissioning and empowerment of the 
early Christian community. The religious experience of the living and powerful Jesus – as Lord 
– engendered action and was subsequently the cause of the Christian movement. This is seen 
in the empowerment of the disciples and apostles, especially connected with the outpouring of 
the Holy Spirit (John 20.21-23; Luke 24.47-49; Acts 2.1-33; Rom. 8.11; Gal. 3.3-5; 1 Thess. 
1.5; Joel 2.28-32).127  
Thus far there is a vast array of differing interpretations of the resurrection in the second half 
of the twentieth century, yet I contend that none have fully grasped the significance of the 
Jewish category of resurrection of the dead, and methodologies which retain an insistence upon 
deciphering a historical Jesus divorced from communal and theological reflection and 
development are inadequate for the task. Mack, Dunn, and Johnson demonstrate the full 
spectrum of diverse opinions – Mack prioritizing Q material, thereby disregarding the 
resurrection entirely; Dunn proposing an immaterial resurrected reality; Johnson maintaining 
that resurrection as beyond normal history. Each have again assumed that resurrection entails 
a re-animated personal, corporeal body and stressed either the continuity or discontinuity of 
the resurrection with ordinary reality at the expense of the other.  
Where Mack, Dunn, and Johnson interpret the resurrection as bearing theological significance, 
though avoiding or denying a resurrection within contingent history, some claimed the 
resurrection was purely psychological. The appearances of the risen Jesus were merely 
 
126 Luke Timothy Johnson, The Writings of the New Testament, revised edition (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 
114. His later 3rd edition of this text, published in 2010 maintains this same conviction.  
127 Ibid. 113-17; Johnson, The Real Jesus, 133-44.  
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hallucinations, and these hallucinations inspired the resurrection tradition. For example, 
Michael Goulder insists that Peter experienced hallucinations out of guilt, who then 
communicated this to the other disciples, who subsequently experienced some sort of corporate 
hallucination.  Paul had intense emotional stress and doubts about Judaism,128 which 
culminated in a hallucination of the risen Jesus on the road to persecute the church in 
Damascus. During the time between Jesus’ death and the writing of the Gospels, the story 
became increasingly legendary, and many aspects – particularly the empty tomb – were 
embellishments. Mark has little to no developed tradition of the resurrection, compared to the 
later John. Goulder contends that the original view was that Jesus’ resurrection was immaterial 
and spiritual.129 This position is evidently very similar to Strauss, and Goulder has similarly 
presupposed an interpretation of resurrection as personal physical reanimation. Furthermore, 
later developments in the resurrection tradition are not necessarily unhistorical and, as with 
those seeking an ‘authentic’ historical Jesus, have ignored the interaction of communal memory 
of an event with prior theological categories, thereby downplaying the significance of the 
development of the Jewish category of resurrection in light of Jesus’ post-mortem existence.  
Another who argues against the historicity of the resurrection is Gerd Lüdemann, who insists 
that it is impossible to know anything at all, historically, about the tomb and fate of Jesus’ 
body. He questions the ascension, believing it impossible for Jesus to have ascended physically 
into heaven, and having then excluded a physical ascension, he claims that it is nonsense to 
think that a decaying corpse – “which is already cold and without blood in its brain” – could 
once again be alive.130 Therefore, the resurrection can no longer be understood as a literal event, 
 
128 E.g. Rom. 8.15; Gal. 5.1; Phil. 3.5.  
129 Michael Goulder, “The Empty Tomb,” Theology 79, no. 670 (1976), 206-14; Licona, The Resurrection of 
Jesus, 479-82. Cf. Habermas, “The Late Twentieth-Century Resurgence of Naturalistic Responses to Jesus’ 
Resurrection,” 12.  
130 Gerd Lüdemann in Jesus’ Resurrection: Fact or Figment? ed. Paul Copan and Ronald K. Tacelli (Downers 
Grove: IVP, 2000), 45.  
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in a “bloody way” – even though the crucifixion can – and the tomb was not empty, but full; 
modern science has made it impossible to regard the resurrection as a literal, historical event. 
Similar to Goulder, Lüdemann insists that Peter hallucinated out of guilt and sorrow, 
envisioning a risen Jesus to ease his anguish. Being a part of the lower intellectual culture, the 
disciples shared hallucinations of a risen Jesus when Peter told them of his, which then led to 
further mass hallucinations. Furthermore, the resurrection adds nothing substantial to faith, for 
the words and deeds of Jesus prior to his death were enough to inspire faith in the disciples and 
early apostles. Rather, resurrection referred to the disciples’ belief that Jesus had been exalted 
and united with God.131 Lüdemann’s mistake is the same oft-repeated presupposition shared 
by many of those preceding him, that resurrection meant a mere physical and historical personal 
reanimation of the historical Jesus of Nazareth. It is hence no surprise that he struggled with 
this idea of resurrection and he correctly notes that it would be ridiculous to posit a physical, 
fleshly ascension. However, this is a misinterpretation of resurrection, as is its reduction to 
Jesus’ exaltation, which is, admittedly, an essential and central part of resurrection, but is not 
the sole purpose of resurrection. In rejecting a resurrection characterised by continuity with 
ordinary reality, Lüdemann presents resurrection as an entirely discontinuous event. Neither 
extreme respects the Jewish eschatological hope for the simultaneous reaffirmation of creation 
and its radical transformation; both continuity and discontinuity must be balanced in dialectic 
tension.  
In the latter period of the twentieth century, there were many who maintained a literal and 
physical interpretation of Jesus’ resurrection. Here, a personal reanimation is defended. For 
example, the Baptist theologian Stanley Grenz argues for the historical nature of the 
resurrection by arguing for the validity of both the empty tomb and the appearances. For the 
 
131 Ibid., 40-45; Gerd Lüdemann, The Resurrection of Jesus, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM, 1994), 180-83; 
Gerd Lüdemann, What Really Happened to Jesus: A Historiographical Approach to the Resurrection, trans. John 
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former, he insists that it is extremely unlikely that (a) the tomb would be mistaken, for it is 
unlikely that so many would make the same mistake, (b) the disciples stole the body, for they 
were later willing to die for their belief in the resurrection, and (c) Jewish authorities stole the 
body, for it would have been easy for them to later squelch the Christian movement by 
producing the body, which they did not. He also argues that the ‘swoon’ theory – that Jesus 
was removed from the cross before he died – has been refuted many times and that it is 
extremely unlikely that Jesus could have survived crucifixion. For the latter, he suggests they 
may be considered events that occurred within contingent history because so many claimed to 
have witnessed Jesus alive, and that it is unlikely that the appearances were either (a) 
fabrications, for many of the witnesses are named, or (b) hallucinations, for hallucinations do 
not occur in situations described in the New Testament, especially mass hallucinations. The 
resurrection, connected to Jesus’ earlier claims, functions as confirmation and the grounding 
of his divinity, giving hope to the early disciples and to us, and through the resurrection, God 
is establishing his kingdom on earth.132 
William Lane Craig, a popular philosopher and theologian, has been a prominent and vocal 
apologist and supporter of a literal and physical understanding of the resurrection. Arguing that 
rejecting the resurrection based on an a priori conviction that miracles do not happen – citing 
Lüdemann in particular – is a logical fallacy, Craig employs several rigid tests commonly used 
by historians to determine the best explanation for the historical data. These tests include 
‘explanatory scope,’ testing the hypothesis according to its ability to explain as much of the 
data as possible; ‘explanatory power,’ testing the hypothesis according to its ability to explain 
the data as effectively as possible; ‘plausibility,’ testing the hypothesis according to the 
likelihood of the event happening within its particular context; ‘not ad hoc or contrived,’ testing 
 
132 Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 256-60; Stanley J. 




the hypothesis according to the number of additional hypotheses required; and ‘outstripping 
rival theories,’ testing the hypothesis according to the likelihood of alternative hypotheses. He 
insists that an understanding of the resurrection as a physical re-animated body fulfils each of 
these tests, namely that it explains the empty tomb, the appearances, and the birth of 
Christianity, it explains why the body was gone, and why multiple experiences of the 
resurrected Jesus were reported, that it is plausible within its religiously charged context, that 
only one other hypothesis is required – that God exists133 – and that all other alternative 
theories, such as hallucinations, deliberate deception, etc. fail to fulfil these tests. He claims, 
“The most reasonable historical explanation for the facts of the empty tomb, the resurrection 
appearances, and the origin of the Christian Way would therefore seem to be that Jesus rose 
from the dead.”134 
Similar to Craig, and adopting almost identical arguments, is Gary Habermas. Habermas 
singularly focuses on the historical question of Jesus’ resurrection,135 arguing that naturalistic 
theories fail to explain away the resurrection: “The historical Resurrection becomes the best 
explanation for the facts, especially because the alternative theories have failed. Therefore, it 
may be concluded that the Resurrection is a probable historical fact.”136 Despite this, 
naturalistic hypotheses have experienced a revival recently after being criticised for most of 
the twentieth century. Here he cites Lüdemann, Goulder, and Marxsen. However, none of these 
naturalistic theories have been successful, and their continued dismantling only serves to 
strengthen the historical argument. He further rejects the notion that the resurrection was a later 
 
133 This single hypothesis obviously poses serious and significant challenges and difficulties in itself, but Craig’s 
central point is that there is only one additional hypothesis required. Cf. Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 337-44, 
where this issue is dealt with in some detail.  
134 William Lane Craig, Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus 
(New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1989), 418. Cf. William Lane Craig in Copan and Tacelli, Jesus’ 
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development, claiming that it is possible to trace early belief in resurrection back to the 
disciples, and insists that the best understanding of Jesus’ resurrected body is that it was indeed 
bodily, but a radically changed body.137 
These defences of a physical and historical resurrection have some credibility as well as some 
significant methodological problems (methodology will be discussed in chapters three and 
four), but the more serious theological issue with their arguments is their minimizing the truly 
miraculous in the resurrection, clinically dissecting it apart from its communal and theological 
context. They each assume that the language of ‘resurrection’ refers to little more than the 
reanimation of a personal body, rather than comprehensively understanding resurrection within 
its broader Jewish eschatological context. Those who take the resurrection as metaphor or who 
have denied it outright have done so because they have rejected the possibility of the 
reanimation of a personal body; this assumed meaning has conditioned their criticism. Vermes 
rejects a physical resurrection on the basis of limited evidence; Crossan argues that victims of 
crucifixion were left for carrion or buried in a shallow communal grave and so no one would 
have known or cared for the whereabouts of Jesus’ body; though Borg’s risen Jesus is of an 
entirely discontinuous existence, it is still primarily focussed on the reanimation of Jesus’ 
personal body, transformed or otherwise; Dunn’s resurrection is similar, in that it was Jesus’ 
body that was glorified, but animated by the Spirit; Mack highlights the unclean connotations 
of a reanimated corpse; Lüdemann questions the validity of the ascension on account of the 
impossibility of a physical ascension and rejects the notion that a decaying corpse could come 
alive again. Hence, they have sometimes over-emphasized the continuous nature of the 
resurrection at the expense of the discontinuous. 
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2.7. Twenty-First Century: Resurrection at All? 
As historical Jesus scholarship has gradually evolved, interpretations of the resurrection seem 
to have dwindled, old arguments becoming repetitious and stale, debates becoming somewhat 
lethargic, and interest seemingly lessening. As will be seen particularly in chapter four, the 
search for a history divorced from theological embellishment and the influence of the early 
church has been heavily criticized. Its accompanying methodological criteria, reflecting a 
positivistic historiography, has fallen out of favour, while an alternative emphasis upon 
communal reflection and social memory has emerged. This social memory theory will be 
discussed further in chapter four, but it should be noted that many of the social memory 
theorists, such as Chris Keith and Anthony le Donne, have said little about the resurrection. 
Much of the discussion regarding the resurrection has been reserved for the debates between 
sceptics and apologists, though most of the arguments are not particularly new, and in the area 
of systematic theology nothing especially new or ground-breaking has been said. Despite this, 
some contributions have been made which are worth discussion. 
One of the more significant popular sceptical voices in recent polemic against the Christian 
faith is that of Christopher Hitchens, who is highly critical of the claim of a historical 
resurrection.138 However, as with many of the other sceptics analysed so far, he has merely 
succeeded in critiquing a caricature, a resurrection that is strictly physical and entirely 
continuous with the pre-crucifixion body. Doubting the validity of the NT as an appropriate 
source of evidence for the resurrection, Hitchens repeats the untenably positivistic adage, 
“Exceptional claims demand exceptional evidence.”139 Precisely what constitutes ‘exceptional’ 
is unclear and probably impossible to determine; it is a methodological scapegoat for those 
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139 Christopher Hitchens, God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (London: Atlantic, 2007), 43.  
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with an a priori prejudice against whatever it is that is in question, in this instance a 
resurrection. This evidence, he insists, does not exist for the resurrection. Instead, referencing 
the raising of Lazarus and Jairus’ daughter, he argues that resurrections were essentially 
commonplace. Furthermore, the resurrection stands on ethically dubious grounds, that though 
one might consider a voluntary death on behalf of others an honourable act, a resurrection is 
not really dying, thereby making Jesus’ sacrifice “tricky and meretricious.”140 Being 
intentionally inflammatory, he then reassures his readers that “we are finally entitled to say that 
we have a right, if not an obligation, to respect ourselves enough to disbelieve the whole 
thing.”141 The resurrection that Hitchens is critiquing is one that was no more than a personal 
reanimation and has not considered the immense eschatological significance that the early 
Jesus movement applied to the resurrection.  
On the other hand, many apologists have equally assumed such an interpretation, and have 
sought to defend this position, reflecting the arguments of Craig and Habermas in particular. 
Norman Geisler goes so far as to say that the risen Jesus returned “in the same material body 
of flesh and bones that had been crucified,”142 and insists that the resurrection “has 
overwhelming historical reliability.”143 The ‘overwhelming’ proof of Jesus’ return from the 
dead is the appearance tradition, that according to the Apostle Paul and the Gospels, he 
appeared to over five hundred people, was seen and touched, and even ate food with his 
disciples. Therefore, he maintains, the evidence “conclusively shows that only resurrection can 
explain all the facts.”144 Geisler’s argument is naïve, but his most serious fallacy is the 
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assumption that resurrection refers to such an indisputably material event, citing instances in 
the Gospels of continuity while ignoring examples of radical transformation (which will be 
addressed in chapter six). The nature of Jesus’ resurrection, for Geisler, is a personal re-
animated body that bears continuity with his pre-crucifixion body, bearing even the same 
human flesh.145 He concedes that there are differences, citing Jesus’ sudden appearing and 
disappearing, and his ascension; but rather than stressing the significance of Jesus’ resurrection 
he merely minimizes the other accounts of returning from death, stressing that these people – 
Lazarus and Jairus’ daughter, for example – died again at a later stage. While the distinction 
between these accounts and Jesus’ resurrection is an important observation, he has minimized 
the significant eschatological implications of the application of the category of resurrection of 
the dead, which meant far more than Geisler allows, to the person of Jesus. Geisler has stressed 
the continuity of resurrection and has completely disregarded the discontinuous elements.  
Bruce Milne, in his theological endeavour, similarly engages in the apologetic task of asserting 
the historicity of the resurrection, arguing that the empty tomb, appearances, and the 
transformation of the disciples, as evidence, simply refuses to go away: “The evidence for the 
resurrection of Jesus is as irrefutable as…the bricks and mortar of the nearest church 
building.”146Such hyperbole is not uncommon in apologetic arguments, but Milne seems to 
place the entire Christian faith and indeed the existence of God on the historicity of a physical 
and personal resurrection that seemingly bears no distinction to any other historical event.147 
Milne does indeed note the Jewish theological background, but quotes Isaiah 26.19, Ezekiel 
37.1-14, and Daniel 12.2 only to prove the possibility of resurrections, simply assuming that 
resurrection refers to a personal reanimation, despite stressing how different Jesus’ resurrection 
was from the Jewish notion, namely that resurrections were expected at the end of history and 
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was to be a corporate – not individual – event.148 He fails to acknowledge the much broader 
eschatological significance of the resurrection, and that those passages cited – as demonstrated 
in chapter five – are largely metaphorical descriptions of the eschatological hopes for 
redemption, judgment, and transformation. He notes that Jesus’ resurrection was not 
“concerned with mere restoration of physical life,”149 but then does not expand on this, or on 
the enormous theological implications of such an assertion. Milne has succeeded only in 
joining the long line of advocates for a merely continuous resurrection, downplaying the 
elements of transformation and upheaval inherent in the notion of resurrection of the dead.  
Michael Licona argues likewise, presenting what he calls a ‘new historiographical approach,’ 
which is little more than a reframing of a positivistic method, including the reaffirmation of 
many of the criteria of authenticity, in light of recent postmodern thought. Though he affirms 
the influence of an individual’s ‘horizon’ upon their historical investigation, and commendably 
affirms his own desire for a historical resurrection, nevertheless he succumbs to a modernist 
empiricism.150 He admits that not everyone will interpret the ‘facts’ as he does, but nevertheless 
presents the evidence, arguing for their authenticity and reliability, in such a way as to imply 
that any reasonable person would surely agree with him. Furthermore, in what is rather 
surprising considering the present trends in historical Jesus research, he has only marginally 
examined the notion of resurrection in Jewish literature, for if he did so I am convinced he 
would be far less optimistic of the possibility of ascertaining the brute historicity of this event.  
Licona also worked with Habermas on the 2004 publication The Case for the Resurrection of 
Jesus, where they argue for a thoroughly physical resurrection, that the Synoptics “portray a 
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bodily resurrection of Jesus in the plainest of terms,”151 a body of flesh and bones, that could 
be touched, and that could eat. This is clearly an exaggeration, for there is much in the 
Synoptics – let alone John – which would suggest that nothing is described in “the plainest of 
terms.” Yes, there are instances in the Synoptics which would imply a physicality (Matt. 28.9, 
13; Luke 24.37-43), but there is much to suggest otherwise, such as his not being recognized 
(Matt. 28.17; Luke 24.41) and his ability to appear and disappear (Luke 24.31). Furthermore, 
contrary to Licona and Habermas, the empty tomb does not necessarily imply a physical 
resurrection. After all, if this was the purpose of the inclusion of the empty tomb tradition in 
Mark, it is surprising that Jesus is absent; if Mark was arguing for a bodily resurrection, why 
is there no body? They defer to Jesus’ newly imbued immortality as explanation for the 
differences in his body, differences which “may explain a degree of uncertainty.”152 This seems 
rather simplistic and doesn’t adequately explain the differences. A continuous re-animated 
body has again been overemphasized with the discontinuity receiving only a marginal mention.  
Another scholar who rejects the resurrection as an event that happened to Jesus is Pieter 
Craffert. Viewing the methodologies of much of the earlier quests as positivistic and 
modernistic, he proposes a social-scientific, post-modern approach to historical research, 
which he labels as ‘cultural bundubashing.’153 He defines cultural bundubashing 
as an interpretive and interdisciplinary approach to historiography, [deviating from alternative 
approaches] in being explicitly culturally sensitive. This applies to the social type analysis as well as to 
those elements which are described as either supernatural events or mythical creations. …This 
[approach] takes its clues from the way in which anthropologists (specifically historical 
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This cultural bundubashing views language as essentially cultural and is thereby limited in its 
descriptive scope. The interpreter must therefore incorporate meanings imported by the 
particular cultural context in question. This is a reaction to modernistic tendencies to apply 
modernist criteria to the Gospel narratives. The Gospels include many events which modern 
readers find extraordinary that were considered acceptable to first century readers, such as the 
miracles of Jesus. The evangelists “did not find it necessary to explain to their readers that 
there is a difference between the actual historical person and the kind of figure that they are 
describing.”155 
When applying this methodology to the resurrection, Craffert can conclude that the resurrection 
was understood as a literal event, but one that was framed within the present cultural categories 
of the time. That is, resurrection was a fundamentally cultural event, one that could be taken 
literally then, but not necessarily today.156 Furthermore, resurrection was only one of many 
afterlife possibilities.157 Visions and apparitions were common in the Mediterranean world and 
were regarded then as literal and real, and thus described as such. However, we must be careful 
not to read modern metaphysical notions of reality into these historical narratives. For a 
contemporary audience we need not assume the resurrection was a literal bodily event, but this 
does not prevent us from interpreting the resurrection, within a first century Jewish context, as 
such, as a cultural phenomenon. The early disciples, in a moment of ecstasy, likely shared a 
collective hallucination.158 Craffert has, however, misunderstood what resurrection meant in 
ancient Jewish eschatology, and has simply assumed that it means an individual re-animated 
body, just one of the many afterlife options. I agree with his insistence upon placing the 
 
155 Ibid., 361-62. Cf. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 557-65.  
156 Craffert, The Life of a Galilean Shaman, 407.  
157 Ibid., 419.  
158 Pieter F. Craffert, “‘Seeing’ a Body into Being: Reflections on Scholarly Interpretations of the Nature and 
Reality of Jesus’ Resurrected Body,” Religion & Theology 10, no. 3 (2003), 90-103; Craffert, “Mapping Current 
South African Jesus Research,” 361-69.  
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historical event within the contextual categories of understanding, rather than applying modern 
categories upon a historical event, but Craffert has largely interpreted the resurrection within 
the wrong context, that is, a Hellenistic one. We will see in chapter five (§5.2) that Hellenistic 
ideas of the afterlife were influential upon certain pockets of Jewish theology, and there is a 
great deal of diversity, but that the category of ‘resurrection of the dead’ through which Jesus’ 
post-mortem existence was interpreted is Jewish eschatology and bore considerable 
significance within this context. Resurrection cannot be reduced to a mere personal 
reanimation, comparable to any one of many afterlife options, but that within its ancient Jewish 
eschatological context, signalled the fulfilment of the broad spectrum of hope for the end of 
history, including both the reaffirmation of creation and its radical transformation, a dialectic 
tension between continuity and discontinuity with empirical reality. Daniel Migliore gets 
somewhat closer: 
As attested in Scripture, the resurrection of Christ is an event that cannot be captured within the limits 
of a purely historical or a purely private perspective. “Resurrection” in the biblical sense of the word 
belongs to late Jewish and early Christian apocalyptic hope. It points to the event in which, despite the 
suffering and persecution of God’s people, the final fulfillment of God’s covenant promises has begun. 
God’s raising of the crucified Jesus to new life is God’s concrete confirmation of the promise that evil 
will finally be defeated and justice will reign throughout God’s creation.159 
Unfortunately he says little more than this, and doesn’t seem to explicitly connect resurrection 
with the fulfilment of these promises, rather that this event signals their imminent fulfilment. 
My argument is that resurrection is this fulfilment, the entirety of eschatological hope for the 
end of history is bound up within this category of resurrection of the dead. Hence, when the 
early Christians applied this to Jesus’ post-mortem existence, they are declaring something 
much larger than Jesus coming alive again. Michael Bird gets even closer in his assertion that 
“God does for Jesus in the middle of history precisely what many Jews thought he would do 
for all Israel at the end of history,”160 but limits his understanding of resurrection to “a metaphor 
 
159 Daniel L. Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology, 3rd edition (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 199.  




for Israel’s political restoration.”161 This is certainly part of it, but the Jewish hope for the end 
of history went well beyond politics and incorporated the transformation of the entire cosmos. 
A significant movement in historical Jesus research in recent years, and which clearly 
distinguishes this era from the ‘third’ quest, is the emphasis upon social and communal 
memory, a response to the methodology of dissecting the NT texts to ascertain ‘authentic’ 
history, and that the recording of history is heavily dependent upon memory and the communal 
retelling and reflection on this event, which in turn is heavily influenced by the specific 
situation of the one doing the recording.162 Hence, it is impossible to wrench the history of 
Jesus and the early church away from its theology, or the historical Jesus of Nazareth from the 
preached Christ of faith. Memory becomes intertwined with ideology and the categories of 
understanding of the time. This will be further addressed in chapter four, but we should note 
that this movement has said little about the resurrection, with the exception of Dale Allison, 
whose book Resurrecting Jesus includes an extensive section discussing the various 
interpretations of resurrection and the biblical material. His discussion is refreshingly 
restrained, free from the hyperbole that so often accompanies texts on the resurrection and 
exhibits careful discussion of the diversity of opinions without coming to a definitive answer. 
Ultimately he concludes that though there may be good historical support for the empty tomb 
and the appearances of Jesus, the presence of alternative hypotheses denies the possibility of 
absolute historical certitude. For those who deny the existence of a God who intervenes within 
time, it is easier to believe, as outlandish as it might seem, that aliens re-animated Jesus’ 
corpse.163 
 
161 Ibid., 126.  
162 Advocates for social memory include Dale Allison, Chris Keith, Anthony Le Donne, and Rafael Rodríguez, 
whose work will be addressed in §4.3.  
163 Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 331-340.  
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Allison considers several first-hand accounts of hallucinations, including some that he himself 
has experienced –  which he assures were extremely life like – including instances within recent 
history that have involved physical touch, as well as mass hallucinations.164 Though he refuses 
to come to a conclusion regarding whether or not the resurrection occurred within contingent 
history, and despite claiming that arguments for an empty tomb are slightly more probable than 
alternatives, he seems to support the so-called ‘hallucination hypothesis,’ namely, that the 
disciples, perhaps out of extreme stress, hallucinated the risen Jesus. However, he concedes 
that if we accept the hallucination hypothesis, “we are still left with the question why a 
hallucination led a first-century Jew to confess that Jesus had been ‘raised from the dead.’”165 
This, I believe, is a very pertinent question.  
Allison’s restrained considerations, his reluctance to either fully accept or deny the possibility 
of a literal and physical resurrection, and his straightforward admission of personal bias,166 is 
admirable. However, I am not convinced that hallucination is an adequate explanation for the 
application of the eschatological notion of resurrection of the dead to Jesus’ post-mortem 
existence. Though opinions regarding the afterlife were diverse in first century Jewish 
theology, the notion of resurrection rarely spoke of the reanimation of a personal, corporeal 
body but was almost always connected to the broader expectations for the end of history. On 
this basis, I maintain that a vision or theophany – neither of which are uncommon in Jewish 
tradition – would not compel the author to adopt the eschatologically-charged language of 
‘resurrection of the dead.’  
We must acknowledge that there are different ways of classifying visions, which Allison has 
done, and some kinds of visions might well have inspired eschatological speculation. Indeed, 
 
164 Ibid., 275-97.  
165 Ibid., 243.  
166 Which is not uncommon – Licona, for example, admits his own prejudices – but this tactic of being upfront 
about personal bias is, I find, often little more than an attempt at being perceived as objective.  
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if one were to have a vision of a rejuvenated Jesus, particularly as a result of extreme emotional 
stress, this would have a marked effect upon one’s psyche. As this encounter is told and re-told 
(and is perhaps embellished over time) and others start having similar experiences, it would 
not be surprising if the belief that Jesus had come back to life would spread and become 
entrenched within the community of those who had been personally affected by Jesus. 
However, I am not convinced that this would have been enough to generate the resurrection 
beliefs that are present in the New Testament corpus. Visions, as noted, were not an uncommon 
phenomenon, and present within the New Testament itself are accounts of people returning 
from the dead, but Jesus’ post-mortem existence was described in significantly different 
fashions and with significantly greater eschatological connotations. Only something especially 
profound and extraordinary could convince the early Jesus movement to not only reappropriate, 
but develop and transform, this Jewish eschatological category.  
Allison elsewhere discusses the Jewish roots of the resurrection of the dead,167 but only goes 
so far as to locate Jesus’ resurrection within the hope for the general resurrection, and with that 
the expectation of the events of the end of history. However, I contend that the notion of 
resurrection was connected to the broader eschatological hopes in such an inseparable way that 
the category of resurrection came to refer, in a metonymic sense , to a broad spectrum of Jewish 
eschatological hope. There is a subtle, but vitally important, distinction here: resurrection does 
not simply refer to the return to life of human beings which would then usher in the end of 
history, but that it refers, in actuality, to the end – fulfilment and culmination – of history itself 
and all that is associated with it, including the transformation of the cosmos, the dispensation 
of justice, and the establishment of a divine kingdom.  
 
167 Cf. Dale C. Allison, The End of the Ages Has Come: An Early Interpretation of the Passion and Resurrection 
of Jesus (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 1985).  
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The mistaken assumption that resurrection envisages primarily a personal reanimation is 
present also in recent feminist scholarship, particularly in gender and sexual ethics, and studies 
in power structures. Many feminist theologians have tended to avoid miracles, either because 
of a rejection of a literalist interpretation of the Bible which demands the submission of women, 
or due to a naturalistic scientific worldview.168 When the resurrection is addressed, such as by 
Heather Reichgott, a re-animated body is presupposed. Arguing against the ‘natural law’ 
understanding of sexuality (i.e., that human sexuality remains within the domain of 
heterosexuality on the basis that male and female genitals function complementarily and that 
the woman is biologically equipped to birth and feed children), Reichgott insists that 
resurrection inverts ordinary natural processes: “In the resurrection God takes a natural process 
and subverts it completely. As people of the resurrection, Christian women may be confident 
that God has completely subverted the ‘natural’ rules of gender once and for all.”169 This 
interpretation gestures toward a transformation that extends beyond Jesus’ body, but it is still 
primarily concerned with the body.170 As is the understanding of the theologian Kathryn 
Tanner, who claims that the resurrection was the “natural consequence of the incarnation,”171 
and that Jesus’ divinity is manifest “in the whole of his flesh resurrected – as the eternal life of 
his full, finished humanity, complete with all its wounds.”172 This physicality is graphically re-
affirmed by Molly Haws, who argues that the body of the risen Jesus gradually transforms 
during the time between his prohibition of Mary holding onto him (John 20.17) and instructing 
 
168 Heather W. Reichgott, “Resurrection and Natural Law: A Feminist Position,” Voices of Sophia, April, 2009, 
https://voicesofsophia.wordpress.com/2009/04/09/resurrection-and-natural-law-a-feminist-perspective.  
169 Ibid. Cf. Kelly Brown Douglas, “Crucifixion, Resurrection, and the Reversal of Power,” Feminism and 
Religion, April, 2014, https://feminismandreligion.com/2014/04/15/crucifixion-resurrection-and-the-reversal-of-
power-by-kelly-brown-douglas.  
170 Cf. Beth Felker Jones, Marks of His Wounds: Gender Politics and Bodily Resurrection (Oxford: OUP, 2007). 
Cf. Pheme Perkins, Resurrection: New Testament Witness and Contemporary Reflection (New York: Doubleday 
& Company, 1984), 163, 222, 299-300, 319.  
171 Kathryn Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 
29.  
172 Kathryn Tanner, Christ the King (Cambridge: CUP, 2010), 301. Furthermore, it is the same body that is 
resurrected: “It is the crucified body that is glorified” (Tanner, Jesus, Humanity and the Trinity, 118).  
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Thomas to touch the wound in his side (John 20.27). This transformation included the 
“restoration of circulation to tissue that had been deprived of it” and the “reanimation of dead 
tissue,” a process which “would have to be an experience more painful than anything most of 
us are able to comprehend.”173 
2.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the major literature on the resurrection. Evidently, this is an 
expansive field, but certain shifts in general historical Jesus research have influenced the 
various interpretations of the resurrection. This is particularly seen in the shifts between 
significant eras. Prior to the Enlightenment, the resurrection was interpreted as a thoroughly 
literal and physical resurrection, concerned with issues of physicality and the flesh, such as 
clipped nails and cut hair, but accompanying the emergence of the critical methodologies of 
the Enlightenment was a radical criticism and scepticism in interpretations of the resurrection. 
Miracles were largely dismissed and the resurrection was no more than mythological language 
and metaphor, as scholars sought to strip the New Testament of its theological embellishment 
to ascertain ‘what happened’ within temporal time and space. With Wrede and Schweitzer, this 
was largely abandoned, to be followed by an era labelled by some as the ‘No Quest’ era (which 
we saw was a misnomer). Within this period, the focus shifted away from historical research 
to a stress upon viewing the resurrection as ‘supra-historical,’ transcending ordinary history 
and evading historical inquiry. The existential nature of the resurrection was emphasized; what 
matters most is not what happened then, but the experience of the living Jesus now. Following 
Käsemann’s critique of Bultmann’s reticence toward history, the ‘Second Quest’ was birthed, 
emphasizing a continuity between the preached message of Christ and the historical person 
Jesus. The stress was upon a kerygmatic interpretation of the resurrection, which was ultimately 
 
173 Haws, “‘Put Your Finger Here’,” 191-92.  
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viewed as a metaphor (and not quite escaping the clutches of the supra-historical tendencies 
preceding this period). It is not quite clear at what point this quest became the third, or even 
whether such a distinction is necessary, but Jesus research gradually became increasingly 
interested in the Jewish context of Jesus and the early church. The early Christian movement 
was interpreted in terms of political revolution, and, read in the literary context of Jewish 
apocalyptic, the resurrection was seen as vindication of Jesus’ political efforts and as metaphor 
for the continuation of his work and presence. Within the last decade or so, interest in the 
resurrection has waned, seeming to have run out of steam. The debate rages between 
evangelistic atheists and apologists, though both continuing the arguments of previous 
generations.  
This review has demonstrated that through all this time, the assumption has remained that the 
primary focus of the language of ‘resurrection’ refers to personal reanimation, and though the 
eschatological significance of this event is considered, it takes on a secondary, and indeed 
neglected, role. Rather than the body being read in light of the eschatological implications of 
the claim that Jesus was resurrected, these implications are generally read only in light of, or 
to support, the conclusions regarding the risen body. I will argue, particularly in chapter five, 
that this is a misunderstanding of the ancient Jewish eschatological notion of ‘resurrection of 
the dead,’ which so often views the nature of the risen body – when the issue is actually even 
addressed – as a peripheral concern. The real concern was of a much broader eschatological 
event. Hence, scholarship has failed to adequately uphold both the continuous and 
discontinuous elements of Jesus’ resurrection, which I contend must be held in dialectical 
tension, reflecting the Jewish hope for both the renewal and transformation of creation, and 
which explains the ambiguous descriptions of the risen Jesus in the New Testament. In the 
following two chapters, I will utilize the arguments of Pannenberg and Wright to present PCR, 
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which is a re-appropriation of Wright’s critical realism in light of the postfoundationalism of 




3. Tension in Knowledge: of Objectivity and Subjectivity 
3.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter traced the general trends in resurrection scholarship, arguing that 
interpretations have assumed that the language of ‘resurrection’ envisages the reanimation of 
a personal, corporeal body, and have subsequently failed to uphold both the continuous and 
discontinuous elements of Jesus’ resurrection. This chapter argues that a reason for the failure 
of much of this scholarship to incorporate both elements, and thus for a more complete 
historical and theological conception of the resurrection, is due to a presupposed 
‘foundationalism’ which inhibits the adequate incorporation of the contextual categories of 
understanding, in this case the Jewish eschatological category of resurrection (which will be 
explored in chapter five). Section one argues that this presupposed foundationalism is deficient 
for the task of interpreting the resurrection. Instead, the epistemological framework of 
‘postfoundationalism’ is preferred, which seeks to balance the positive contributions of 
foundationalism and ‘coherentism’. This is drawn largely from Pannenberg’s epistemology, in 
dialogue with recent epistemologists, such as Shults and van Huyssteen. This framework is 
built largely on the notion of mutually conditioning reciprocity. That is, various disciplines or 
experiences do not function as an epistemic foundation, but balance in a dynamic, dialectic 
tension. This framework is defended against two other alternatives to foundationalism, namely, 
coherentism and ‘theo-foundationalism,’ which is explored in section two.  
From Pannenberg I draw the epistemological notion of postfoundationalism; from Wright I 
draw the hermeneutical model of critical realism, a mediating position between positivism and 
phenomenalism. This notion of critical realism was adopted by Wright and is an attempt to 
balance the belief in an external objective reality with the internal subjective interpretation of 
that reality. However, it is argued in section three that Wright’s version of critical realism often 
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reverts to a foundationalist empiricism. His critical realism is not critical enough, in that it does 
not allow for the ‘critical’ counterpoint to a naïve realism to be fully integrated into his 
methodology. In particular, though he stresses the role of worldviews in experiencing and 
interpreting reality, he fails to acknowledge the full extent to which the communal context of 
the author impacts how an event is interpreted and communicated. However, it is then argued 
that an adjusted version of critical realism is a more useful model as it aligns to the proposed 
postfoundationalism. This approach incorporates the contributions of recent developments 
within the school of critical realism – particularly the critique of a universal methodology.  
Hence this chapter proposes PCR (Postfoundationalist Constructive Realism), which upholds 
the tension between the external and internal, the object and subject, the individual and 
community, in reciprocity. This PCR engages also with recent social memory theories, as they 
have become increasingly important in historical Jesus research, and which view history as the 
preservation of memory, memory which evolves in new contexts and is shaped by the 
subjective prejudices, desires, and prior frameworks of the one remembering. PCR is better 
suited to interpreting the resurrection as bearing both continuity and discontinuity in dialectic 
tension because it acknowledges both the external event and the historically and communally 
conditioned categories through which it was understood.  
3.2. The Problem: The Prevalence of Foundationalist Empiricism 
In the previous chapter, a historical survey of the general trends of interpretation of the 
resurrection revealed that these interpretations understand resurrection as the reanimation of a 
personal body and tended to emphasize either the continuous or discontinuous aspects of Jesus’ 
risen nature at the expense of the other. This first section argues that this is due to a presupposed 
foundationalist methodology and the hard empiricism that emerged as a result obscured the 
significance of the social construction of the Jewish category of ‘resurrection of the dead.’ 
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Consequently, the language of resurrection was assumed to be a reference to personal 
reanimation, whether this was then interpreted literally, metaphorically, as myth, or as supra-
history, rather than seeing within this category a reference to the broader eschatological hopes. 
In each case, a foundationalist methodology is presupposed. This is problematic, however, as 
foundationalism is itself problematic. Accompanied by an analysis of Pannenberg’s critique of 
modernist epistemology and Wright’s theoretical rejection of objective historiography – with 
both demonstrating a particular concern for moving away from positivism – a critique of 
foundationalism is developed in this section. As we will observe, this epistemological 
framework has several deficiencies, and the interpretations of the resurrection that have relied 
upon such a framework require reworking.  
The first part of this section addresses the framework of foundationalism, and argues that its 
main deficiency is an inherent and insoluble infinite regress. Moreover, I show how much 
resurrection scholarship has presupposed such a framework. Following this, I make note of 
Pannenberg and Wright’s respective arguments against hard empirical methodologies to 
establish their reasoning for developing alternative epistemological frameworks. An 
interpretation of the resurrection that upholds both its continuous and discontinuous elements 
as a reflection of the Jewish eschatological category of resurrection of the dead requires a 
rethinking of these epistemological underpinnings, especially with regard to escaping the 
trappings of a hard foundationalist empiricism. 
Foundationalism and the Resurrection 
Epistemic foundationalism is a framework in which a belief is justified by the justification of 
the belief upon which it relies. Knowledge is essentially linear, with each known ‘fact’ built 
upon another. For example, I know that a by putting a carton of milk in a refrigerator, that milk 
will remain cold and drinkable, and I know this because b refrigerators are built in such a way 
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so as to retain a constant cold temperature, and I know this because c when I open the 
refrigerator door and put my hand inside the fridge, my hand becomes cold and d I have 
previously left milk inside a refrigerator before and it has in fact remained cold. This trivial 
example serves to demonstrate the chain of justification: a is true because of b which in turn is 
true because of c and d. This chain is then grounded by ‘basic beliefs,’ non-inferential beliefs 
which are not justifiable by any other beliefs. This classical foundationalism is characterised 
by the belief in the possibility of absolute objectivity and universality, for basic beliefs are 
indisputable and universal, not informed by communal context, and a chain of beliefs built 
upon such a basic belief is thereby sheltered from personal prejudice.1 This is the basis for both 
empiricism and rationalism, the former founding knowledge upon sense experience and the 
latter upon reason. Foundationalism – stretching back to Descartes’ cogito ergo sum – has 
formed the predominant epistemological framework for modernist movements, until the 
emergence of coherentist or nonfoundationalist frameworks in the second half of the twentieth 
century, which will be discussed in the following section.2 
The pre-eminent problem with foundationalism is the determination of what constitutes a basic 
belief. According to foundationalism, a belief is justified by the justification of the belief upon 
which it relies, which is justified by the belief upon which it relies, and so on ad infinitum. This 
is the problem of infinite regress, that is, for someone to hold a justified belief about anything, 
that person is required, within their finite minds, to understand, maintain, and be aware of this 
infinite chain of beliefs. This is obviously absurd. The notion of non-inferential basic beliefs is 
the foundationalist solution to this regress.3 A basic belief is a belief which requires no 
justification upon which subsequent justified beliefs might be built. Yet what constitutes this 
 
1 Cf. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Alone in the World? Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2006), 3.  
2 For an introduction on foundationalism, cf. Dan O’Brien, An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 61-76; Richard Fumerton, Epistemology (Malden: Blackwell, 2006), 53-99.  
3 Fumerton, Epistemology, 41; O’Brien, An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 61-76. 
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basic belief is unshakably ambiguous and arbitrary, as argued in particular by Peter Klein. 
These beliefs which are not inferred from other beliefs and are supposedly universal are 
ultimately no more than subjective speculation.4 The inevitable and unavoidable impact of 
communal contextuality and personal prejudice upon the formulation of knowledge has played 
no role in a hard foundationalist’s epistemological framework, and minimal impact in a soft 
foundationalism, such as Wright’s. Foundationalism is incapable of establishing coherent rules 
for determining what counts as self-evident, non-inferential, universal beliefs.5 
The failure of the interpretations of the resurrection, since the Enlightenment, to acknowledge 
and uphold both the continuity and discontinuity of Jesus’ risen nature with empirical reality 
is due in part to a presupposed foundationalist epistemology. Characteristic of the first ‘quest 
for the historical Jesus’ is an appeal to analogy; history is homogenous, therefore anything that 
is not analogous to contemporary experience must be deemed impossible, and therefore, 
because we have no experience of resurrections occurring today, we cannot know whether or 
not they occurred before. The basic, presumed universal, belief that history is homogenous 
justifies the belief in the need for analogy, which in turn justifies the belief that resurrections 
in general are impossible, justifying the belief that Jesus’ resurrection did not happen. By 
demanding a contemporary analogy, proponents of this view, such as Hume, Strauss, and 
Troeltsch, have stressed the continuity of the resurrection with ordinary reality and have left 
no space for the discontinuous. Those responding to this general view, who argue instead for 
the historicity and physicality of the resurrection, such as Spurgeon, Habermas, Craig, Grenz, 
Licona, Geisler, and Milne, adopt a hard empiricist historical method, mustering as much 
evidence as possible (albeit predominately circumstantial) on the belief that when considered 
 
4 Peter Klein, “What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is that it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem,” 
PPR 68, no. 1 (2004), 166-71. Cf. Ted Poston, “Basic Reason and First Philosophy: A Coherentist View of 
Reasons,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 50, no. 1 (2012), 76-77. 
5 Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 31-38.  
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objectively and free from personal bias even the most sceptical of doubters will be convinced. 
Much polemic has been produced against this response, present for example in the works of 
Reimarus and Hitchens, believing that the weight of evidence will instead be interpreted in 
such a way that the most hopeful believer will renounce their faith. Others, such as Crossan, 
Wrede, Käsemann, and Dunn maintain a similar historiography, though interpreting it as 
metaphor or myth. The problem with each of these positions is that they each presuppose 
empiricism (itself a foundationalist model, empiricism is the theory that knowledge is based on 
sense experience, on data that is measurable, repeatable, and testable)6 and the belief in 
universal objectivity, and have compared the resurrection to other ordinary events, testing it 
according to the ordinary methods of testing ordinary objects, and have, subsequently, stripped 
the resurrection of any trace of the extraordinary, the discontinuous.  
Contrarily, those whose interpretation of the resurrection places it in the category of ‘supra-
historical,’ such as Bultmann, Barth, Rahner, and Moltmann, maintain that by its eschatological 
nature the resurrection transcends ordinary experience and so cannot be empirically judged or 
tested and is, therefore, entirely inaccessible and relegated to the realm of faith. Again, 
empirical sense experience is foundational, but they declare the resurrection to be so 
discontinuous that it cannot be experienced, at least not according to the senses, and leave no 
room for the continuous. In other words, if we cannot say anything empirical about the 
resurrection on account of it transcending normal experience, then it cannot be treated as an 
event within ordinary contingency. Related to this is the argument that necessary truths cannot 
be founded upon contingent historical events, reflecting Lessing’s ‘ugly great ditch,’ as seen in 
Kähler, Bornkamm, Schillebeeckx, and Johnson. According to this position, knowledge of the 
past is partial and provisional, the antithesis to what theological knowledge should be. Hence, 
 




an eschatological event such as Jesus’ resurrection invariably eludes empirical historical 
reconstruction and so the important issue is not the question of the historicity and nature of the 
resurrection but rather its kerygmatic message. These scholars are asserting the need for a 
foundation upon which to base a ‘historical’ resurrection and when unable to find one in 
historical enquiry conclude that the kerygmatic, rather than its historical, nature is what is 
important. In diminishing its importance as an event that occurred within contingent history, 
the continuity of the resurrection within ordinary history has subsequently similarly been 
diminished.  
Before moving on, it should be noted that this thesis is not an outright rejection of 
foundationalism, but simply highlighting its weaknesses. Obviously, there are stronger and 
weaker forms of foundationalism. Ultimately, all versions have some weaknesses that are 
difficult to overcome, such as those discussed in this section. On the other hand, though the 
problems of foundationalism are significant, there are significant problems with its counterpart, 
coherentism (to which we will return below, but is the notion that a belief is justified only by 
how well it coheres with other beliefs). As will be seen in §3.2, I will advocate a version of 
post-foundationalism that seeks to incorporate the strengths of both frameworks, as well as the 
strengths of both poles of the recent epistemological debate of internalist or externalist 
justification, in a careful dialectic. Neither Pannenberg nor Wright fit neatly within either the 
hard foundationalist or coherentist camp, though despite his critical realist proposal, Wright 
could possibly be described as a soft foundationalist on account of his reversion to a form of 
empiricism. However, in light of recent discussion, their methodologies are underdeveloped, 
which will be demonstrated in the following sections.  
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Pannenberg and Logical Positivism 
Methodology was a particular concern for Pannenberg, especially his critique of the underlying 
foundationalist assumptions of much post-Enlightenment thought. His later publications 
presuppose his earlier work, largely preoccupied with the relation between theology and 
philosophy,7 and especially in demonstrating the compatibility of theological discourse with 
all knowledge, insisting that the “Christian faith manifestly cannot withdraw from every kind 
of cooperation with rational thought.”8 Hence, Pannenberg engages with a diverse range of 
disciplines, particularly the philosophy of science. In his 1973 publication Theology and the 
Philosophy of Science, he expressed a concern with what he believed had become the default 
epistemological presupposition of the natural sciences, logical positivism, and included an 
extended polemic against this position, in which a central argument was the impossibility of 
‘objective’ or value-neutral observation.9 Here Pannenberg’s intention to move away from 
epistemic foundationalism becomes evident.  
Pannenberg viewed positivism’s emphasis upon empirical observation and its intention to 
demonstrate metaphysical propositions as meaningless as insurmountably problematic. He 
took issue with the reliance upon anything that resembled “a matter of convention,” which 
includes concepts and language that is preconceived knowledge.10 Furthermore, he suggests 
 
7 E.g. Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, and Metaphysics and the Idea 
of God only briefly address methodological issues, usually referring to earlier works, such as Jesus – God and 
Man, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, and essays published in the Basic Questions in Theology volumes. 
Cf. Christiaan Mostert, God and the Future: Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Eschatological Doctrine of God (London: 
T&T Clark, 2002), 55.  
8 Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Faith and Reason,” in BQT, vol. 2, 46. Pannenberg is here responding to the modernist 
stress upon reason that viewed, in sceptical thinkers such as Hume and proponents of the Death of God Theology, 
religious faith as ultimately irrational. David Ray Griffin was similarly concerned with the relation between 
theology and other disciplines considered more ‘scientific’ and thus considered more intellectual. With the 
dawning of a postmodern age, however, and with it a lack of confidence in materialism, a postmodern theology 
may become acceptable. He argues that such a theology would be a naturalistic theism, which is not too dissimilar 
to Pannenberg’s theology of history, which we will analyse in the following chapter (David Ray Griffin, 
“Introduction,” in God & Religion in the Postmodern World, ed. David Ray Griffin (Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 1989), 2-3.  
9 Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science.  
10 Ibid., 55. 
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observation “takes place not within a framework of theoretically neutral observations, but 
normally as part of a process,”11 and not in a cognitive vacuum. Accordingly, there is no such 
thing as unadulterated reception, and observation alone cannot solely justify beliefs. 
Consequently, any proposition which might exceed the usual criteria of empirical observation, 
such as metaphysical and theological statements, should not be disallowed; “there is no longer 
any conclusive reason for excluding the concept of God in advance from the range of 
permissible utterances.”12  
A similar argument is found in his early Christological work, Jesus – God and Man, where he 
disputes positivist arguments against the possibility of Jesus’ resurrection on the basis of the a 
priori belief that resurrections do not happen, and thus we cannot say they ever have. Against 
the argument that the need for analogy precludes the possibility of events which may seem 
miraculous in their apparent violation of the laws of nature, he argues that the natural sciences 
cannot make definite judgments about the possibility or impossibility of an individual event, 
regardless of the probability of that event, because our knowledge of the natural world is only 
ever partial.13 Pannenberg’s understanding of history and of the resurrection will be explored 
in subsequent chapters, but it is helpful at this point to highlight his observation that knowledge 
is indeed perpetually partial, in that we simply do not know all that there is to know about 
nature, and therefore it is hubris to predetermine what can or cannot be said to be ‘natural’ 
based on an a priori understanding of reality. This partiality of knowledge is an essential 
element of Pannenberg’s epistemology, demonstrating his reticence to accept the 
foundationalist belief in universal or absolute basic beliefs. This epistemic humility will be 
reappropriated in the development of PCR in the following sections of this chapter. 
 
11 Ibid., 56.  
12 Ibid., 55.  
13 Pannenberg, JGM, 95.  
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This places Pannenberg within the general movement away from strong empirical models of 
epistemology, various formulations of a rejection of scientism and objectivism (and its 
underlying foundationalism), a diverse conglomeration often categorized as postmodernism. 
Writing from a Marxist perspective that is ambivalent about the merits of so-called 
‘postmodernism,’ Terry Eagleton suggests that, as a movement, it is characterized by a 
suspicion “of classical notions of truth, reason, identity and objectivity, of the idea of universal 
progress or emancipation, of single frameworks, grand narratives or ultimate grounds of 
explanation.”14 Millard Erickson lists the central tenets of modernism as naturalism, humanism, 
the scientific method, reductionism, progress, nature as dynamic and growing, certainty of 
knowledge, determinism, individualism, and anti-authoritarianism, contrasted with the central 
tenets of postmodernism in its hardest form: rejection of objective knowledge, uncertainty of 
knowledge, impossibility of all-inclusive systems of explanation, the inherent goodness of 
knowledge is challenged, progress is rejected, the emphasis on the individual has shifted to the 
community, and the scientific method as the principal method of inquiry is challenged.15 
Pannenberg has not engaged explicitly with postmodern ideas or authors,16 but he is 
nonetheless concerned with similar or equivalent questions.17 We will see, throughout this 
chapter and the next, that Pannenberg engages with each of those issues highlighted by 
Eagleton and Erickson. He was, however, particularly concerned with the scientism which may 
bar any or all theological discussion.  
The Catholic theologian, Hans Küng, similarly argued against models of empiricism which 
negate the possibility of metaphysical statements, that positivism was plagued by unresolvable 
 
14 Terry Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), vii.  
15 Millard J. Erickson, Postmodernizing the Faith: Evangelical Responses to the Challenge of Postmodernism 
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 16-19.  
16 Shults takes Pannenberg to task on this issue in The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 248-49.  
17 This is especially true when one takes into consideration the ambiguity and lack of specific definition of what 
constitutes something as postmodern. If the contours of postmodernism are so vague, it becomes very difficult to 
pinpoint precisely which authors to insist Pannenberg engage with.  
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internal conflicts and that the homogeneity of scientific language had been shown to be an 
illusion.18 He later argued such a strict empiricism was incapable of determining meaning and 
therefore positivism’s claim that metaphysics is meaningless is inherently self-contradictory. 
Reductionistic epistemologies which stress objectivity and verification are wholly 
inadequate.19 David Ray Griffin and David Bohm have observed that this reductionistic 
scientific worldview had already been challenged from within, by the scientific community 
itself, especially in the field of quantum physics. Against the mechanistic Newtonian 
worldview, quantum physicists are increasingly finding that molecules, on the quantum level, 
do not act so deterministically or predictively, and there is a much greater mutual connection 
between mind and body. The previously supposed dualisms and causality, and the modernist 
belief in a knowable order to the universe have been challenged significantly by those rejecting 
hard foundationalist methodologies.20 This will be examined further below when discussing 
the developments of the epistemological model of critical realism, but for now I note the way 
in which recent developments in the physical sciences have challenged the long held 
suppositions of a mechanistic universe built upon a foundationalist belief in universal laws.21 
 
18 Hans Küng, Does God Exist? An Answer for Today (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1980), 99-100. David 
Ray Griffin sought a Christology which avoids this sort of mechanistic materialism (David Ray Griffin, “Essential 
Elements of a Contemporary Christology,” Encounter 33, no. 2 (1972), 170-84.  
19 Idem., The Beginning of All Things: Science and Religion. Trans. John Bowden (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2007), 24-31. Paul Tillich had also argued along similar lines in Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 90-92. Cf. Rahner, 
Foundations of Christian Faith, 14-17; A. N. Williams, The Architecture of Theology: Structure, System, and 
Ratio (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 98-105.  
20 David Ray Griffin, “Introduction,” in The Reenchantment of Science, ed. David Ray Griffin (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1988), 13-17; David Bohm, “Postmodern Science and a Postmodern World,” in 
The Reenchantment of Science, ed. David Ray Griffin (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 58-
60. Cf. David Ray Griffin, “New Vision of Nature,” Encounter 35, no. 2 (1974), 96-98.  
21 The physicist John Polkinghorne, for example, notes that quarks and gluons are essentially unobservable despite 
forming the basis of our understanding of reality. A hard foundationalist empiricism, especially an internalist 
version (as will be seen in §3.2), is limited in its ability to describe these phenomena (John Polkinghorne, Scientists 
as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne (London: 
SPCK, 1996), 11-14). Heikki Patomäki highlights the developments within the theory of gravity, that it is no 
longer understood as a universal force between two objects, but having to do with spacetime itself, and the 
interaction between subatomic particles is governed by hypothetical and unobservable ‘gravitons’ (Heikki 
Patomäki, “After Critical Realism?” Journal of Critical Realism 9, no. 1 (2010), 67-68). We might further consider 
the dualistic nature of light as both particle and wave as another challenge to a hard foundationalist scientism. 
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Individual experience and observation, Pannenberg argues, “can never mediate absolute, 
unconditional certainty.” He writes: 
The conditionality of all subjective certainty is part of the finitude of human experience. To claim 
unconditional, independent certainty is forcibly to make oneself, the believing I, the locus of absolute 
truth. Any occurrence of this phenomenon, among Christians or others, is justifiably regarded as 
irrational fanaticism. It allows only of psychological, not rational, exploration.
22
  
Here he puts it rather bluntly: anyone who claims absolute objectivity is guilty of ‘irrational 
fanaticism.’ Strong empirical methodologies, such as positivism, are irreconcilably restrictive, 
for they cannot acknowledge the anthropocentric nature of knowledge, that all knowledge is 
embedded with subjective value and interpretation; universal, objective knowledge is 
impossible. A hard foundationalism relies on the possibility of universal and self-evident truths, 
and thus, in arguing against the possibility of universalism, Pannenberg distances himself from 
foundationalism. His solution to foundationalism is, I believe, a significant tool for interpreting 
the resurrection within its communal context and upholding its continuous and discontinuous 
characteristics in dialectic tension. Before moving to this, we will address the concerns that 
Wright has with the objectivism he alleges is present in historical Jesus scholarship. 
Wright and the Impossibility of Objective History 
Wright’s epistemology is largely spelled out in his The New Testament and the People of God 
but his basic epistemic position remains largely unchanged, advocating for the earlier 
developed critical realism in his recent work.23 He argues for the necessity of developing and 
outlining epistemology in methodology prior to approaching the question of the historical Jesus 
and the origins of Christianity, on the basis of the well-rehearsed acknowledgement that 
historians are not immune to the pervasive influence of personal bias which disrupts and 
 
22 Pannenberg, ST, vol. 1, 47. Furthermore, individual experience “can offer no more than a certainty which needs 
clarification and confirmation in an ongoing process of experience,” (Pannenberg, ST, vol. 1, 47). Cf. Wolfhart 
Pannenberg, Metaphysics and the Idea of God, trans. Philip Clayton (Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 199), 23. 
23 See, e.g. Wright, PFG, xvii.  
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distorts absolute objectivity.24 Approaching Jesus and early Christianity invariably involves 
literature, history, and theology, all of which he insists are inseparable and share this essential 
‘problem’ of knowledge, namely the objectivity/subjectivity dichotomy.25 This division, he 
argues, “must be abandoned as useless.”26 
This objectivity/subjectivity dichotomy is reflected in what he sees as the two major 
epistemological positions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – positivism and 
phenomenalism. He explains: 
The positivist believes that there are some things at least about which we can have definite knowledge. 
There are some things that are simply ‘objectively’ true, that is, some things about which we can have, 
and actually do have, solid and unquestionable knowledge. These are things which can be tested 
‘empirically’, that is, by observing, measuring, etc. within the physical world.
27
  
Anything that cannot be tested in this way cannot be considered reasonable. Positivism, he 
argues, has enjoyed enduring influence since the Enlightenment and arguably remains 
prevalent in the discipline of New Testament studies today. The belief that it is possible to 
“simply look objectively at things that are there” and “know things ‘straight,’” he labels as 
“naïve realism.”28 He contrasts positivism with phenomenalism which focuses primarily on 
individual sense-data and relies upon subjective and individual experience, thereby 
approaching historical research with a “history-as-writing-about-events” mentality, rather than 
the “history-as-events” mentality of positivism.29 The former stresses the possibility of 
objectivity and the latter the impossibility of escaping subjectivity. 
 
24 Cf. John H. Nota, Phenomenology and History, trans. Louis Grooten and John H. Nota (Chicago: Loyola 
University Press, 1967), 8; James E. Bradley and Richard A. Muller, Church History: An Introduction to 
Research, Reference Works, and Methods (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 35.  
25 Wright, NTPG, 31.  
26 Ibid., 44. He states elsewhere, in one of his more popular-level books, that “it is the Western culture of the last 
two hundred years which has tried to separate out ‘facts’ from ‘values’, ‘events’ from ‘interpretations,’” and that 
this “is the myth of ‘objectivity’, the idea of a ‘neutral’ observer who is a mere fly on the wall.” Furthermore, 
“The fact is (!) that you can’t write about anything from a ‘neutral’ point of view. There is no such thing. Every 
telling of every event involves selection; and when you select you interpret” (N. T. Wright, Who Was Jesus? 
(London: SPCK, 1992), 44-46). The force of his argument against objectivity is weakened somewhat by his strong 
insistence that the claim that objectivity is impossible is itself an objective ‘fact.’ 
27 Wright, NTPG., 32-33.  
28 Ibid., 33.  
29 Ibid., 34.  
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Wright’s epistemological interest is in finding a third mediating position between positivism 
and phenomenalism, and so he adopts ‘critical realism,’ which will be assessed in the following 
section. However, his arguments against positivism and phenomenalism are, as will be 
observed, sometimes ambiguous and sparse. Granted, Wright is writing primarily as a biblical 
scholar and not a philosopher, but these deficiencies with his methodology are important given 
how some of the more controversial claims he makes in subsequent volumes, particularly with 
regards to the resurrection, rest upon the assertions made in his first volume. 
It is actually unclear why Wright considers positivism naïve, mounting only a minor argument 
against positivism, simply referencing various philosophers and sociologists rather than 
engaging with their arguments,30 and making the broad claim that “this view has been largely 
abandoned by philosophers.”31 However, his rejection of positivism is due to his broader 
rejection of what we might call ‘optimistic objectivism’, and this rejection requires 
qualification. Similarly, his argument against phenomenalism is minimal, simply providing the 
vague statement, “The well-known problems with this view have not stopped it from having 
enormous influence.”32 What these problems are and what in particular this has influenced is 
unclear. It should be noted that phenomenalism does not necessarily fall into the category of 
coherentism or nonfoundationalism, and so Wright’s methodology is not necessarily an attempt 
to move away from foundationalism. However, he does indicate a move away from a strong 
rationalistic empiricism, and his solution for the positivism/phenomenalism dichotomy – 
critical realism – is worth exploring given its potential to the building of an alternative 
epistemology for interrogating the resurrection capable of balancing the continuous and the 
 
30 Including Nicola Abbagnano, Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann, Ian Barbour, and Michael Polanyi. 
31 Wright, NTPG, 33. 
32 Ibid., 34.  
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discontinuous elements of the resurrection and interpreting it as event that escapes the 
limitations of a personal reanimation.  
This initial section of this chapter on epistemology has argued that the majority of resurrection 
scholarship has relied upon a foundationalism which has expressed itself in various ways. As 
an epistemic framework, foundationalism has received significant criticism in the past half 
century or so, especially the problem of the infinite regress and its proposed solution of basic 
beliefs. Foundationalism maintains a belief in universal and absolute foundations, divorced 
from their communal contexts, upon which knowledge can be built. Pannenberg and Wright 
have both critiqued this form of objectivism, especially the model of positivism, though 
Wright’s critiques are light and less comprehensive than Pannenberg’s. I contend that the most 
significant problem with a foundationalist methodology for interpreting the resurrection is 
twofold: its failure to acknowledge the inevitable influence of communal context upon 
experience and the interpretation and communication of that experience, and its failure to 
uphold both the continuous and discontinuous elements of Jesus’ resurrection. Having 
examined Pannenberg and Wright’s respective reasons for rethinking epistemological 
frameworks, the next section assesses and re-appropriates their solution to the need of moving 
beyond a foundationalist reading of the resurrection. It should also be highlighted here, as 
demonstrated in the following section, that though Wright has attempted to move away from 
foundationalism, he ultimately reverts to a softer version.   
3.3. The Solution: Postfoundationalism and Reciprocity 
Foundationalism, with its inherent belief in the possibility of attaining objective and universal 
foundational truths, is terminally problematic, and so the interpretations of the resurrection 
which presuppose this epistemic framework require reconsideration. Two possible alternatives 
have been proposed, which will be assessed in the first part of this section. The first, proposed 
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by scholars such as Rorty and Grenz, is coherentism, which asserts that beliefs are justified by 
how well they cohere with other prior beliefs. The second, proposed by Reformed thinkers such 
as Barth and Plantinga, is what has been labelled theo-foundationalism, which suggests that 
the basic, universal belief, upon which all other beliefs can be founded, is the belief in God. 
The first part of this section analyses these proposals to demonstrate that neither are satisfactory 
epistemological frameworks, in general and for the task of interpreting the resurrection. An 
alternative framework will then be proposed, a reappropriation of the postfoundationalism 
presented in particular by Shults and van Huyssteen, with consideration of Pannenberg’s 
contributions toward this framework. I argue that postfoundationalism upholds the epistemic 
tensions of the objective and subjective, internal and external, individual and communal, and 
universal and particular in a much more satisfying way than these alternatives, and will thus be 
more suited to an interpretation of the resurrection which adequately considers the communal 
Jewish eschatological category of resurrection and balances its continuous and discontinuous 
elements. Central to this is the notion of reciprocity, especially in the balancing of multiple 
tensions without allowing one particular type of knowledge or experience to function in a 
foundationalist sense. This will be given attention before addressing a recent epistemological 
debate, that of internalist and externalist justification, where it will be argued that the majority 
of resurrection interpretations are not only foundationalist but also internalist, and that 
postfoundationalism, has more in common with externalism, for the problems with internalism 
are probably, like foundationalism, coherentism, and theo-foundationalism, insoluble. 
Postfoundationalism, I contend, is the most helpful epistemic framework for adequately 
understanding the resurrection.  
Two Possible Solutions: Coherentism and Theo-Foundationalism 
As criticisms of foundationalism increased, and its claim to universal basic beliefs was 
challenged, alternative frameworks were introduced, which recognized the contextuality and 
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fallibility of truth claims.33 The first alternative to be addressed here is that of coherentism, 
which has also been known as non- or antifoundationalism. Largely a negative movement, a 
critical reaction to foundationalism, coherentism insists that a belief is justified only by how 
well it coheres with other beliefs, rejecting unjustifiable basic beliefs. Rather than a linear chain 
of beliefs, the coherentist envisages a ‘web’ of beliefs, within which beliefs are considered 
credible if they fit within this web.34 Fumerton’s image of a puzzle is helpful. Consider a person 
who attempts to complete a jigsaw puzzle despite the picture of the puzzle being lost. That 
person fits the pieces together based on how well the shapes and colours work together, 
eventually managing to put each piece into place and revealing a picture of a beautiful 
landscape. Without the picture, it is impossible to know whether that was the intended solution, 
but it is highly probable that it was indeed the solution because each piece fits together to create 
a coherent whole. If someone were to ask why a particular piece was placed where it was, the 
response might simply be, ‘because it fits,’ and could hardly be criticized for saying so.35 
Coherentism sees within the foundationalist notion of basic beliefs a dualism between the 
human subject and the external object of that human’s perception. Truth claims are valid only 
as far as they accurately represent this external reality. Coherentism rejects this dualism, 
arguing that subject and object are inseparable. Knowledge thus intertwines with the 
subjectivity of the human knower, impacted by bias and prejudice, perspective and worldviews, 
prior beliefs and context.36 This is evident in Richard Rorty’s argument that “people change 
their beliefs in such a way as to achieve coherence with their other beliefs, to bring their beliefs 
and desires into some sort of equilibrium – and…that is about all there is to be said about the 
 
33 Cf. Paul Healy, “Rationality, Dialogue, and Critical Inquiry: Toward a Viable Postfoundationalist Stance,” 
Cosmos and History 3, no. 1 (2007), 135.  
34 Fumerton, Epistemology, 43; Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 31-38; O’Brien, An 
Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 77-86. 
35 Fumerton, Epistemology, 43. Cf. Ted Poston, “Basic Reason and First Philosophy: A Coherentist View of 
Reasons,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 50, no. 1 (2012), 75-93.  
36 Michael Slott, “An Alternative to Critical Postmodernist Antifoundationalism,” Rethinking Marxism 17, no. 1 
(2005), 303.  
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quest for knowledge.”37 For Rorty, as with Pannenberg, language is not a medium that merely 
reflects external reality, describing this reality in universal and absolute terms, an 
understanding of language which presupposes the subject/object dualism. Rather, language 
constitutes knowledge in a much more intensive way; when this dualism is rejected, language 
constitutes reality itself.38 Michel Foucault similarly claimed that knowledge is produced 
according to societal power structures.39 Foundationalism could assert the universality of basic 
beliefs by maintaining the distinction between subject and object, and the possibility of the 
unadulterated reception of the latter by the former. In contrast, coherentism rejects this 
distinction, claiming that knowledge is inescapably intertwined with subjective presupposed 
beliefs, thereby rejecting the possibility of universal and absolute basic beliefs.  
Perhaps the best example of coherentism in theological methodology is that of Stanley Grenz. 
Rather than foundationalism, which sought “a set of incontestable beliefs or unassailable first 
principles on the basis of which the pursuit of knowledge can proceed”40 and which came to 
be dominant within theology,41 Grenz argues for a nonfoundationalism which insists that 
theology is local and specific, the “conversation of a particular group in a particular moment 
of their ongoing existence in the world.”42 Justification for a belief is determined by whether it 
 
37 Richard Rorty, “Worlds or Words Apart? The Consequences of Pragmatism for Literary Studies: An Interview 
with Richard Rorty,” Philosophy and Literature 26, no. 2 (2002), 369. Cf. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, 
and Solidarity (Cambridge: CUP, 1989); idem., Truth and Progress: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: CUP, 
1998). 
38 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 10-11; Slott, “An Alternative to Critical Postmodernist 
Antifoundationalism,” 303. 
39 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-77 (New York: Pantheon, 
1980), 133. Slott contends, “Since the object of knowledge (i.e., reality) cannot be separated from the subject, 
what we call the “truth” is relative to the specific ways in which the subject constitutes reality. Reality does not 
exist, so to speak, on its own, but only as a human construction. The content of this construction and the manner 
in which human beings constitute reality is based on the specific interests and perspectives of human beings” 
(Slott, “An Alternative to Critical Postmodernist Antifoundationalism,” 303).  
40 Stanley J. Grenz and John R. Franke, Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a Postmodern Context 
(Louisville: WJK, 2001), 23. 
41 He argues, “The traditional evangelical commitment to objectivism and rational propositionalism has worked 
against an adequate understanding of the relationship between theology and culture even among those, such as 
Erickson, who have called for contextualization as a part of the theological process. One of the significant results 
of this failure has been the relatively uncritical acceptance of modernist assumptions by most evangelical 
theologians,” (Grenz and Franke, Beyond Foundationalism, 15).  
42 Ibid., 25.  
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‘fits’ with other beliefs without contradiction, interconnected to form an “integrated whole” 
carrying “explanatory power.” Beliefs are supported, not by other beliefs in a foundationalist 
sense, but by their connection to these other beliefs which form a network or mosaic. Hence, 
“Constructive theology is the attempt to present a unified, coherent declaration of the Christian 
belief-mosaic within a particular, contemporary context.”43 
Rorty could be described as a strong nonfoundationalist, for he argues that there are no rules 
that determine how or why beliefs change,44 and Grenz as a weak nonfoundationalist,45 for he 
insists that there are, in fact, rules that govern how beliefs are integrated or changed, namely 
that they do not contradict other beliefs and that they retain explanatory power. However, there 
are significant problems with this particular alternative to foundationalism. Coherentism has 
been criticized for committing the self-exempting fallacy, that is, advocates of coherentism 
have argued as a universal, objective fact that universal, objective facts are impossible.46 There 
is some warrant for this objection, but I am not entirely convinced, for coherentism and anti- 
or nonfoundationalism are not precise, defined epistemological positions, functioning largely 
as responses to and criticisms of foundationalism. Dan O’Brien highlights two problems with 
coherentism that are more challenging. The first is that it loses contact with the world since 
justification concerns only relations between beliefs, internal to our belief systems. There is no 
way to judge whether reality is described correctly. The second is that coherentism allows for 
alternative, contradictory belief systems. Communities in different contexts will produce 
different descriptions of reality, despite being internally consistent. Again, there is no way to 
 
43 Stanley J. Grenz, “Jesus as the Imago Dei: Image-of-God Christology and the Non-Linear Linearity of 
Theology,” JETS 47, no. 4 (2004), 627. 
44 Rorty, “Worlds or Words Apart?” 369.  
45 Grenz never particularly makes a case for nonfoundationalism, rather against foundationalism, and some have 
thus labelled him a soft-foundationalist (e.g. Jason S. Sexton, The Trinitarian Theology of Stanley J. Grenz 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 35-36). However, a coherentist view of knowledge is a particular characteristic of 
nonfoundationalism, and thus I choose to label Grenz a nonfoundationalist, albeit a weak nonfoundationalist.  
46 Cf. Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 31-38, 140; Matthew Thomas Johnson, “Towards the 
Development of Objective, Universal Criteria of Cultural Evaluation: The Challenges Posed by Anti-
Foundationalism, Culturalism and Romanticism,” Social Indicators Research 102, no. 2 (2011), 283.  
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judge which description is the most accurate.47 I agree with Slott that although “it is correct to 
say that human beings have no nonlinguistic access to reality, it is equally true that we have no 
nonperceptual access to reality, either.”48 That is, language, or other preconceived constructs, 
have significant impact upon how we interpret reality, but how we interpret reality is 
significantly impacted by how we experience it. As will be argued below, knowledge is a 
dynamic tension between the objective external reality and the subjective internal procedure of 
interpretation.  
Another alternative to foundationalism is theo-foundationalism, which places God as the 
foundation, the basic belief upon which all other knowledge is built. This is particularly evident 
in Reformed epistemology, such as Barth and Plantinga. Barth’s central concern – seen 
especially in the first section of his Church Dogmatics – is to ensure that knowledge of God 
was not grounded on any fallible, insecure human foundation, stressing the otherness of God 
and the need for him to reveal himself to humanity. Faith precedes formulaic understandings 
of God: 
If we say that dogmatics presupposes faith, or the determination of human action by hearing and as 
obedience to the being of the Church, we say that at every step and with every statement it presupposes 
the free grace of God which may at any time be given or refused as the object and meaning of this 
human action. It always rests with God and not with us whether our hearing is real hearing and our 
obedience real obedience, whether our dogmatics is blessed and sanctified as knowledge of the true 
content of Christian utterance or whether it is idle speculation.
49
 
For Barth, God cannot be imagined or determined by human intelligence. Theological 
knowledge is “always and definitively initiated by God who makes himself known in his 
 
47 O’Brien, An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 80-82. Fumerton argues that it is not immediately clear 
why beliefs need to be coherent, by using an analogy of 1000 people entering the lottery and claiming that it 
justifiable to believe of each participant that they will lose, but it is also justifiable to believe that not everyone 
will lose (Fumerton, Epistemology, 45). I would argue that it is not justifiable to believe of each participant that 
they will lose, but rather that each participant will probably lose. This is not inconsistent to the second belief, and 
so I do not find his objection to coherentism compelling.  
48 Slott, “An Alternative to Critical Postmodernist Antifoundationalism,” 306-07.  
49 Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 1.1, 18.  
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revelation,” and its “foundation is secured in and by the very object of theology himself.”50 
The gracious gift of faith in God comes from God alone and is the only possible secure 
foundation for theological knowledge. 
Alvin Plantinga argues similarly, claiming that belief in God is a properly basic belief, adopting 
John Calvin’s notion of sensus divinitatis, that perception of the existence of God arises within 
the self inconspicuously and seemingly without warning. In his seminal Warranted Christian 
Belief, he argues: 
It isn’t just that the believer in God is within her epistemic rights in accepting theistic belief in the basic 
way. That is indeed so; more than that, however, this belief can have warrant for the person in question, 
warrant that is often sufficient for knowledge. The sensus divinitatis is a belief-producing faculty (or 
power, or mechanism) that under the right conditions produced belief that isn’t evidentially based on 
other beliefs. On this model, our cognitive faculties have been designed and created by God. …The 
purpose of the sensus divinitatis is to enable us to have true beliefs about God; when it functions properly, 
it ordinarily does produce true beliefs about God. These beliefs therefore meet the conditions for warrant; 
if the beliefs produced are strong enough, then they constitute knowledge.
51
 
The source of the inspiration of Christian belief is the Holy Spirit, and thus this belief “can 
have warrant even if there aren’t any good arguments for it from premises that get their warrant 
from other sources. If all this is so, then if Christian belief is in fact true, it is or can be properly 
basic.”52 In other words, belief in God is, for Plantinga, self-justifying and can thus function as 
an epistemic foundation for theological knowledge.  
Kevin Diller has recently defended this Reformed theo-foundationalism, arguing that 
Pannenberg misinterpreted Barth. For Pannenberg, the disassociation of anything remotely 
human in the grounding of theological knowledge is insolubly subjectivist and fideistic. It is a 
retreat into a faith that requires no external justification. However, Diller argues that this is 
only so if faith is “an arbitrary human choice,” rather than God’s gracious self-revelation in 
 
50 Kevin Diller, “Does Contemporary Theology Require a Postfoundationalist Way of Knowing?” SJT 60, no. 3 
(2007), 273-75. Cf. idem., Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma: How Karl Barth and Alvin Plantinga Provide 
a Unified Response (Downers Grove: IVP, 2014), 70.  
51 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: OUP, 2000), 178-79.  
52 Alvin Plantinga, “On ‘Proper Basicality,’” PPR 75, no. 3 (2007), 616. Cf. James F. Sennet, The Analytic Theist: 
An Alvin Plantinga Reader (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 97-98.  
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Jesus Christ, of which there is no sturdier or sure foundation.53 Theology is neither a classical 
foundationalism nor a nonfoundationalism nor a postfoundationalism. Rather, it is a theo-
foundationalism, that is, theology is grounded in the self-justifying self-revelation of God 
himself, and theological knowledge is built upon this foundation.  
The stress in theo-foundationalism is upon the divine initiative of God. Faith is a human 
response to God’s self-revelation; the nature of God prohibits the attainment of theological 
knowledge by any human endeavour. However, the central issue that I have with this 
epistemological framework lies in its limitation of the human cognitive faculties. Yes, 
knowledge of God is God’s initiative, but this knowledge remains irreducibly human 
knowledge. In the response to God’s self-revelation, there is always an interpretation, and 
different people will respond to God’s revelation in different ways. Something may cause us 
to make a decision of faith but that decision is never made outside of ourselves. The goal of 
theo-foundationalism of having a foundation purely and solely in God – seen most lucidly in 
Diller’s statement, “The Christian idea of God does not constitute a self-justifying foundation; 
God himself is the one and only self-justifying foundation for the knowledge of God,”54 – is an 
impossible goal, for this knowledge of God invariably involves human response and 
engagement. This might not be acceptable to Diller (or, for that matter, any other theo-
foundationalist) but, with Pannenberg and Wright (as discussed in §3.2), I am convinced that 
we cannot have any sort of pure knowledge of anything, including God (cf. 1 Cor. 13.12). 
Knowledge is not knowledge if the human cognitive faculty is bypassed in any way. God’s 
self-revelation requires engagement by the human mind and that invariably involves 
interpretation. For this reason, any knowledge – even knowledge of God – remains perpetually 
human.  
 
53 Diller, Theology’s Epistemological Dilemma, 72-73. 
54 Diller, “Does Contemporary Theology Require a Postfoundationalist Way of Knowing?” 289.  
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The postfoundationalism that will be defended in the following sub-section allows for this 
tension between the divine initiative and human response, neither of which is foundational. 
There is a perpetual dialectic tension between the divine and human, as seen in Pannenberg’s 
early statement: 
I have asserted that the essence of faith must come to harm precisely if in the long run rational 
conviction about its basis fails to appear. Faith then is easily perverted into blind credulity toward the 
authority-claim of the preached message; into superstition, owing to its seeming wrought work of faith. 
Therefore, it is precisely for the sake of the purity of faith that the importance of rational knowledge of 
its basis has to be emphasized. Naturally, this is not a matter of grounding faith in man instead of in 
God. That faith must be understood as something effected by God himself is not to be doubted.
55
  
This is also seen, more recently, in André van Oudtshoorn’s argument: 
Faith, by definition, precludes epistemological certainty: while it confesses certain truths as final truths, 
those truths are always open to be doubted in the light of the way things are (ontology). The way faith 
operates in the biblical text thus reaches beyond the confines of faith itself to engage with what ‘is’ in 
such a way that this reality may contradict faith’s claims and interpretation of it. In this way a 
theological understanding of faith overcomes the triumphalism and relativism of both foundationalism 
and fideism without giving up on either the interpretive or realist dimensions of knowledge.
56
 
The relationship between faith and reason in these two quotes demonstrates a mutually-
conditioning reciprocity that is central to postfoundationalism, upholding and celebrating the 
tensions between disciplines or types of knowledge or experience, rather than insisting upon 
one functioning as foundational for the others to build upon. Indeed we can uphold the divine 
initiative, but this should be held in epistemic and dialectic tension with human cognition; one 
might occur first, but this does not make it an epistemic foundation. It is to this 
postfoundationalism that we now turn.  
Healing the Divide: A Postfoundationalist Framework 
Neither coherentism nor theo-foundationalism are satisfactory alternatives to foundationalism. 
Regarding the resurrection, foundationalism, with its emphasis upon universal and absolute 
basic beliefs, removes the resurrection from its Jewish eschatological context and restricts the 
 
55 Pannenberg, “Insight and Faith,” in BQT, vol. 2, 28. 
56 André van Oudtshoorn, “Theological Epistemology and Non-Foundational Theological Education,” Journal of 
Adult Theological Education 10, no. 1 (2013), 65.  
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resurrection to being understood either as, or in relation to, other ordinary historical events. Its 
counterpart, coherentism, is incapable of interpreting the resurrection as anything apart from 
the social categories which frame its interpretation, and restrict it from being understood as a 
historical event that challenges these preconceived social categories. Neither extreme allows 
the interpreter to uphold, in dialectic tension, both the continuous and discontinuous elements 
of Jesus’ resurrection. A mediating position is available, that of postfoundationalism, especially 
as proposed by F. LeRon Shults, which attempts to integrate the strengths of both the 
foundationalist and coherentist frameworks, and which I will here present as a suitable option. 
An engagement with the epistemic contributions of Pannenberg is fruitful toward defending 
this position, whose thought has ultimately shaped many of the epistemological debates in 
theological circles in recent years.  
In a detailed engagement with Pannenberg’s epistemology, Shults, in The Postfoundationalist 
Task of Theology, utilizes Pannenberg to propose a theological methodology that moves 
beyond foundationalism without falling into a coherentism, and can balance four conceptual 
pairs: new experience and prior belief, objective truth and plurality of knowledge, neutral 
individuality and historical and contextual community, and universal explanation and 
understanding of the particular. Neither foundationalism nor coherentism is capable of 
balancing these couplets, instead privileging one half over the other, thereby missing their 
dynamic relational unity. 57 He proposes a postfoundationalist task of theology:  
To engage in interdisciplinary dialogue within our postmodern culture while both maintaining a 
commitment to intersubjective, transcommunal theological argumentation for the truth of Christian 
faith, and recognizing the provisionality of our historically embedded understandings and culturally 




57 Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 28.  
58 Ibid., 18.  
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Shults’ postfoundationalism is an attempt to find a middle ground between these two antipodal 
positions. He argues for four couplets of an ideal postfoundationalism:59 
1. Interpreted experience engenders and nourishes all beliefs, and a network of beliefs 
informs the interpretation of experience.  
2. The objective unity of truth is a necessary condition for the intelligible search for 
knowledge, and the subjective multiplicity of knowledge indicates the fallibility of 
truth claims.  
3. Rational judgment is an activity of socially situated individuals, and the cultural 
community indeterminately mediates the criteria of rationality.  
4. Explanation aims for universal, transcontextual understanding, and understanding 
derives from particular contextualized explanations.  
Where foundationalism searches for knowledge based on self-evident or a priori propositions, 
and nonfoundationalism on coherence within a particular context or ‘web,’ 
postfoundationalism “aims to develop a plausible model of theological rationality that charts a 
course…between the Scylla of foundationalist dogmatism and the Charybdis of 
nonfoundationalist relativism.”60 This is not simply to find a mediating position, but to 
accommodate and integrate the positive concerns of both, without falling into either extreme.61 
Challenging the role of epistemic foundations need not lead to an outright rejection of 
foundationalism, but rather a reframing of the debate, which Shults’ postfoundationalism 
begins to achieve.62  
 
59 Ibid., 43. 
60 Ibid., 26. Cf. Mostert, God and the Future, 59. Furthermore, foundationalism emphasizes “experience as the 
basis of belief, the unity of truth, reason…and the universality of explanation,” and nonfoundationalism 
emphasizes “the web of beliefs as conditioning experience, the plurality of knowledge, the rationality of the 
community, and the particularity of knowledge,” (Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 42).  
61 Ibid., 42, 79.  
62 Cf. Meyer, “An Evangelical Analysis of the Critical Realism and Corollary Hermeneutics of Bernard Lonergan 
with Application for Evangelical Hermeneutics,” 43; Healy, “Rationality, Dialogue, and Critical Inquiry,” 135. 
This sentiment is reflected in the work of Joseph Margolis, who highlights the tension between foundationalism 
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Pannenberg confirmed Shults’ estimation that Pannenberg has a great deal in common with 
this postfoundationalist framework,63 stating that Shults “is correct in placing me neither in the 
foundationalist camp nor among certain forms of nonfoundationalism that surrender the 
rational quest for truth,” and that he is “sympathetic with the position he describes as 
postfoundationalist.”64 In particular, Shults highlights four ways Pannenberg contributes 
towards the four couplets of an ideal postfoundationalism. Importantly, these four points 
demonstrate how Pannenberg attempts to hold multiple tensions in unison and it is precisely 
this which separates his epistemology from foundationalist tendencies while still retaining a 
form of realism.  
First, regarding the relationship between interpreted experience and a network of beliefs, 
Pannenberg argues that theological statements are not self-evident (basic) and do not follow 
from self-evident beliefs.65 Rather, beliefs are justified, to an extent, if they cohere with other 
beliefs. However, we must not be quick to label him a coherentist, for, though he occasionally 
uses language similar to that of coherentism,66 he insists upon criteria for justification that are 
external to the set of presupposed beliefs.67  
Second, regarding the relationship between objective truth and the plurality of knowledge, 
Pannenberg argues for the provisionality of knowledge and the need for theological statements 
 
and coherentism when he claims, “We cannot seriously believe that science utterly misrepresents the way the 
world is; and we cannot accurately determine the fit between the two” (Joseph Margolis, Pragmatism Without 
Foundations: Reconciling Realism and Relativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 2, 165), and van Huyssteen 
who laments, “The extremes of both an objectivist foundationalism and a relativist or subjectivist non-
foundationalism reflect the inability of our intellectual culture to unite personal experience and personal 
conviction with some form of rational justification,” (van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 14). 
63 Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 20.  
64 Pannenberg in Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, ix. Since this publication, Pannenberg is rarely 
interpreted otherwise, most agreeing with Shults’ assessment, including Grenz, Christiaan Mostert, John 
McClean, Iain Taylor, Timothy Bradshaw, John R. Franke, and Jason Sexton, many of whom explicitly reference 
Shults. Cf. Moster, God and the Future, 59.  
65 Pannenberg, ST, 1, 56.  
66 E.g. “web of life” (Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1985), 512).  
67 Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 112-121.  
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to be framed as hypotheses. However, Pannenberg allows for the possibility of the ideal of 
objectivity, especially in his commitment to ‘intelligibility’: “How can theology make the 
primacy of God and his revelation in Jesus Christ intelligible, and validate its truth claim, in an 
age when all talk about God is reduced to subjectivity?”68 He maintains that there can be only 
one truth,69 while also affirming that our knowledge is perpetually “subjectively 
conditioned.”70  
Third, regarding the relationship between the individual and the community, Pannenberg 
acknowledges that both influence interpretation, affirming the recognition of the subjectively 
conditioned nature of knowledge. He argues, “While the identity of individuals is not to be 
conceived as the product of a subject that already exists with its own identity, neither is it to be 
understood as a simple internalization of social appraisals and expectations.”71 In other words, 
the individual is neither a simple appropriation of societal norms and expectations, nor a being 
whose identity is formed apart from community. Shults here laments Pannenberg’s reticence 
in addressing the “effect of participation within a community on the standards of rationality 
held by the individual,”72 and he is probably correct in this assessment for this is something 
Pannenberg deals with only minimally.73 I will suggest below that a constructive understanding 
of knowledge can function, in part, as a supplement to this.  
Fourth, regarding the relationship between contextualised explanation and universal 
understanding, Pannenberg again holds the two in tension, affirming the importance of both 
 
68 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 1, 128.  
69 Seen especially in his essay, “What is Truth?” There is a universal truth, but this truth develops within history 
and is recognized partially and provisionally.  
70 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, 1, 52.  
71 Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, 225. 
72 Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 137.  
73 Though Pannenberg begins to note the significant connection between the individual and the community, he 
seems to retain the modernist assumption of the universal autonomy of the individual. It should be observed that 
this is a relatively recent idea, that prior to the Enlightenment the notion of the ‘individual,’ free and equal citizens 
of society, was very uncommon. Cf. Larry Siedentop, Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism 
(London: Penguin, 2014).  
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while privileging neither. The two are the categories, respectively, of the ‘part’ and the ‘whole.’ 
This is an example of Pannenberg’s interdisciplinary methodology, for none of the individual 
and separate parts constitute anything more than merely that, a part, the meaning of which is 
made clear as it finds its place in the broader ensemble, which in turn depends on the individual 
parts for its meaning. For Pannenberg, these parts include reason, history, and tradition, among 
others, which find their meaning within the anticipated whole: God’s eschatological future, 
proleptically, albeit provisionally, revealed in the history of Jesus.74 Related to this is the notion 
of sub ratione Dei, which will be discussed below, but by this notion, Pannenberg argues that 
all things come together in relation to God.75 
Pannenberg argues in the foreword to Shults’ work: 
There is no a priori warrant of truth if one only bases one’s argument on the proper foundation, be it 
sense perception or principles of reason. Even theological arguments cannot be convincingly derived 
from some pure source of revealed truth. It has first to be established by argument what can be 
considered as God’s revelation. Even in the case of Scripture there is no a priori guarantee, since 
Scripture is also human and historical, though Christians hear the Word of God from it. Theological 
reconstruction itself remains tentative like the hypothetic reasoning in other disciplines.
76
  
This quote functions as a good summary of Pannenberg’s epistemology and theological 
methodology, for he here reinforces the historical and provisional nature of knowledge, the 
need for interdisciplinary dialogue, the subjective influence of the individual, and renounces 
self-evident truths.77  
 
74 This will be expanded upon in the excursus. Cf. Pannenberg, “On Historical and Theological Hermeneutic,” in 
BQT, vol. 1, 137-181; “Theology and the Categories “Part” and “Whole,” in MIG, 130-152; Pannenberg, JGM, 
406.  
75 Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 140-153.  
76 Ibid. 
77 This includes renunciation of the foundational character of Scripture, which he explores in his early 1962 essay, 
“The Crisis of the Scripture Principle,” in which he argued that in the attempt to understand Scripture, the reader 
is “led back to the question of the events they report about, and of the meaning that belongs to them,” which is 
not self-evident from the text alone (Wolfhart Pannenberg, “The Crisis of the Scripture Principle,” in BQT, vol. 
1, 12). 
Pannenberg occasionally retains some foundationalist or rationalist language, despite his intention to move away 
from foundationalism. In his early Revelation as History, Pannenberg spoke of the “events in which God 
demonstrates his deity are self-evident,” which sounds remarkably foundationalist (Wolfhart Pannenberg, 
“Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of Revelation,” in Revelation as History, ed. Wolfhart Pannenberg, trans. 
David Granskou (London: Macmillan, 1968). He elsewhere insists that “Christian theology in the modern age 
must provide itself with a foundation in general anthropological studies” (Pannenberg, Theology and the 
114 
 
Another significant proponent of postfoundationalism in theological methodology is J. Wentzel 
van Huyssteen, who argues that the two most significant strengths of postfoundationalism lie 
in its understanding of contextuality and of experience. Van Huyssteen claims that 
postfoundationalism 
fully acknowledges contextuality, the epistemically crucial role of interpreted experience, and the way 
that tradition shapes the epistemic and nonepistemic values that inform our reflection about God and 
what some of us believe to be God’s presence in this world. At the same time, however, a 
postfoundationalist notion of rationality in theological reflection claims to point creatively beyond the 




Context and tradition shape how experience is interpreted, but it is possible to breach contextual 
confines. Rationality, he continues, is always “evaluated against the standards of a community 
of inquiry,” standards which “are never independent of our specific social and cultural 
contexts.”79 In similar vein to Wright, he argues that the distinction between ‘objective’ and 
‘subjective’ is no longer helpful.80 Furthermore, these communities are not isolated from one 
another; intersubjective, cross-disciplinary and transcommunal dialogue – borrowing Shults’ 
terms – is thus vital.81 
Dan Stiver, searching for an explicitly postmodern theological methodology, argues that it is 
possible to reach beyond personal experience and context.82 He argues that human beings are 
essentially hermeneutical beings, that the paradigm for interpreting texts, hermeneutics, is the 
paradigm for interpreting all knowledge. Though one’s own ‘horizon’ – presupposed 
 
Philosophy of Science, 15). This should not warrant, however, the conclusion that Pannenberg is foundationalist, 
but the inherent baggage of this language must be adjusted in any contemporary methodology. 
78 van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 4.  
79 J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, “Postfoundationalism in Theology and Science: Beyond Conflict and Consonance,” 
in Rethinking Theology and Science: Six Models for the Current Debate, edited by Niels Henrik Gergersen and J. 
Wentzel van Huyssteen (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 29.  
80 Ibid., 29.  
81 Ibid., 32. 
82 As does Sung Kyu Park, who argues, “Postfoundational rationality is based on our own experience, but is 
capable of reaching beyond. It starts with an individual and extends to community. It acknowledges personal 
commitments; identifies the shared resources of rationality in different reasoning strategies; and reaches beyond 
the boundaries of our own epistemic communities in cross-disciplinary conversation,” (Sung Kyu Park, “A 
Postfoundationalist Research Paradigm of Practical Theology,” HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies 66, 
no. 2 (2010), 2.  
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knowledge and prejudices – can impede understanding, it is entirely indispensable for a 
comprehensive understanding. Therefore, “Every act of understanding then is one of a fusion 
of one’s own horizon with that of another.”83 He calls this the ‘incarnational’ aspect of 
interpretation, the dynamic fusion of horizons: 
We are not trapped in our horizons; rather, they are capable of being expanded and fused with others. A 
fusion does not mean at all, however, an equal synthesis between the two. In order to understand 




It is impossible to achieve absolute consensus, but this transcommunal dialogue is a necessary 
corrective to the inevitable situatedness of theology. This context should be recognized as a 
strength, but “we have an obligation to dialogue with theologies written from other 
perspectives,” which “can only be strengthened by the attempt to do justice to other 
perspectives.”85 We can take from this the simultaneous recognition of the inescapable 
historical and communal contextuality of the interpreter, and the possibility of reaching beyond 
this contextuality. 
For Van Huyssteen, the second strength of postfoundationalism is that one type of experience 
is not elevated at the expense of another. He observes that “we relate to our world epistemically 
only through the mediation of interpreted experience,” and that this invariably means 
knowledge of reality is limited.86 Religious experience is no different, in that it claims to be an 
experience of reality and is, therefore, interpretation.87 It is, however, a different sort of 
experience; it is emphatically non-empirical and stands distinct from the natural sciences. The 
strength of postfoundationalism, however, avoids establishing dualisms that would pit the 
‘natural’ against the ‘supernatural’ and require one to function as ultimate arbiter.88 We could 
 
83 Dan R Stiver, “Theological Method,” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, edited by Kevin 
J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge: CUP, 2003), 178-79.  
84 Ibid., 179.  
85 Ibid., 181.  
86 van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 20.  
87 Cf. Alister E. McGrath, Inventing the Universe (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2015), 65-68.  
88 van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 28.  
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extend this to the various social sciences, recognizing that history, for example, functions 
beyond the confines of an empirically testable scientific methodology.  
Postfoundationalism as an epistemological framework balances the contrasting emphases of 
foundationalism and coherentism, expressed most clearly in the four couplets of Shults’ ideal 
postfoundationalism. The postfoundationalism that inhabits Pannenberg’s methodology and 
was then reappropriated and developed by Shults and van Huyssteen is helpful for the task of 
interpreting the resurrection as bearing both continuity and discontinuity with empirical reality 
– reflecting the Jewish eschatological hope for the reaffirmation of creation as well as its radical 
transformation. On the one hand, postfoundationalism does not yield to the foundationalist 
emphases upon universal basic beliefs, divorced from communal context, and empirical 
justification, divorced from subjective interpretation. Postfoundationalism does not, on the 
other hand, yield to the coherentist emphases upon contextually constituted social categories 
and the interaction with preconceived beliefs, divorced from observation and experience of 
external reality. Instead, postfoundationalism takes seriously the belief in an intelligible 
external reality without ignoring the inevitable impact of personal presuppositions and 
prejudices, and communal categories of knowledge (including language itself). There is a 
reciprocity between object and subject, the external and internal, and before presenting a 
postfoundationalist model in dialogue with Wright’s critical realism, the following will further 
detail this mutuality, as this is important for moving beyond foundationalist beliefs. 
Reciprocity: Postfoundationalism and Dialectic Tension 
A key principle in Pannenberg’s epistemology for upholding the contrasting epistemic facets 
of interpreted experience and a network of prior beliefs, the objective unity of truth and the 
subjective multiplicity of knowledge, individual rational judgment and communally mediated 
criteria of rationality, and universal understanding and contextualised explanation, is that of 
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sub ratione Dei, which for Pannenberg is the insistence that all things should be understood 
and explained “under the aspect of the relation to God” (sub ratione Dei).89 For Pannenberg’s 
methodology, there is no individual key concept, or basic belief, such as history or reason, but 
rather that all things come together in relation to the whole. It is this perspective which prevents 
the dialectic tensions inherent within postfoundationalism, especially the relation between the 
individual and the community, and the object and subject, from collapsing in on itself.  
Pannenberg appeals to Thomas Aquinas’ notion of sub ratione Dei in most of his major works. 
Reiterating his argument that theology should incorporate all reality in its inquiry, Pannenberg 
argues in Theology and the Philosophy of Science that all aspects of theology – such as history, 
philosophy, and anthropology – should be studied “in particular relation to the reality of 
God.”90 In his later Metaphysics and the Idea of God, he argued similarly, stating that 
everything within theology “can become a theme for the theologian only ‘in relation to God,’ 
as Thomas Aquinas put it: sub ratione Dei,”91 and then in his magnum opus Systematic 
Theology: 
Christian doctrine includes many things which, as created reality, are distinct from God. Thomas 
stressed that these things enter into theological discussion only inasmuch as they are related to God 
(sub ratione Dei…). To this extent God is the unifying point of reference for all the objects and themes 
of theology, and in this sense he is its absolute subject.
92
  
God is the all-determining reality and as such is related to all things. In demonstrating the truth 
about God, theology must therefore incorporate all human knowledge; “The investigation of 
God as the all-determining reality involves all reality.”93 Hence, Grenz and Franke interpreted 
his methodology as coherentist.94 Pannenberg seeks the integration of all truth; the question of 
 
89 Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 83.  
90 Pannenberg, TPS, 296.  
91 Pannenberg, MIG, 12.  
92 Pannenberg, ST, 1, 5.  
93 Pannenberg, TPS, 296. Cf. Adam Parish Hartley, “A Critical Analysis of Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Justification 
of Religious Knowledge,” PhD Dissertation, Mid-America Baptist Theological Seminary (2002), 1.  
94 Grenz and Franke, Beyond Foundationalism, 44. Cf. “For Pannenberg, the goal of theology is to demonstrate 
the unity of truth in God, that is, to bring all human knowledge together in our affirmation of God. Or stated in 
another way, theology seeks to show how the postulate of God illumines all human knowledge” (Grenz and 
Franke, Beyond Foundationalism, 44).  
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God must be brought into dialogue with all other areas of knowledge, and all other areas of 
knowledge must be understood in relation to one another, and in relation to the unifying locus 
of truth, God. Some presupposed belief in the authority of Scripture, or of church tradition, or 
of personal, subjective experience is not enough to assert the truthfulness of Christianity, 
though these are inescapable and necessary components within this broader, coherent 
theology.95 The point here is that no particular element should be elevated above the other, or 
function in a foundationalist manner, but that they cohere and come together sub ratione Dei. 
Put differently, God is the centre of a coherent theological web, not as foundation, but as its 
point of focus.96  
We saw above that postfoundationalism revels in dialectic tension between various types of 
knowledge and experience. In the following, we will consider how this is expressed with regard 
to the dialogue between theology and the natural sciences, for this reveals how a reciprocity 
might be expressed with regard to the questions of history (to be explored in chapter three) and 
the relationship between subject and object, and personal experience and contextually mediated 
categories of understanding.  
Pannenberg’s insistence that all things cohere in mutual agreement under their relation to the 
whole and to God necessitates the interaction of theology with all areas of human knowledge.97 
Theology cannot remain a private or individual enterprise but should remain public and 
accountable to these other disciplines.98 In his 1963 essay, “Insight and Faith,” grappling with 
 
95 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 52.  
96 In his analysis of Pannenberg’s influence upon Stanley Grenz, Jason Sexton notes that Pannenberg’s vision 
“consists of a search for the integration of all truth whatever, bringing together the particular and the universal 
into a coherent whole, leaving theology open to the contributions of other disciplines” (Sexton, The Trinitarian 
Theology of Stanley J. Grenz (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 35). It is important to note, however, that though he 
argues that truth must cohere, Pannenberg should not be labelled a coherentist, or at least not a strong coherentist. 
Coherence is an essential category, but is not an exclusive category. For him to be categorised within coherentism, 
he would have to view coherence as an exclusive or sufficient arbiter of truth, something closer to the 
nonfoundationalism of Richard Rorty. This is why it is better suited to label Pannenberg a postfoundationalist. 
97 Pannenberg, ST, 1, 21-22.  
98 See Mostert, God and the Future, 58; Grenz and Franke, Beyond Foundationalism, 43. Ted Peters comments, 
“Pannenberg wants to liberate our faith in God from the ghetto of subjectivity. To do so, he places our knowledge 
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the relationship between faith and reason, Pannenberg argues against the conviction that 
“rational insight into the ground and content of faith is not only denied us as a matter of fact, 
but is even injurious to the essence of faith,” instead insisting that faith requires “rational 
conviction about its basis.”99 Without this, faith is perverted and transformed into superstition. 
Indeed, he claims that “it is precisely for the sake of the purity of faith that the importance of 
rational knowledge of its basis has to be emphasized.”100 He maintains that faith divorced from 
rational knowledge becomes a ‘work’ in and of itself.101 It should be noted that though his 
language of rational conviction and of the ground and basis of faith may sound foundationalist, 
he is not arguing for rational knowledge to function as the basis of faith, but rather that faith 
should not be separated from rational conviction. Pannenberg’s postfoundationalism is 
expressed in an interdisciplinarity, drawing theology into dialogue with all other disciplines in 
a mutually conditioning sense. Neither faith nor science functions as epistemic foundation but 
they interact reciprocally.102 This reciprocity is an important feature of postfoundationalism 
that will be utilized in my PCR framework, discussed in the following section. 
This mutual conditionality and reciprocity is a core feature of postfoundationalism that is 
demonstrated in its engagement with the science-theology debate. The relationship between 
 
of God both as creator and redeemer into the objective sphere, the sphere where secular historians and scientists 
feel at home” (Ted Peters, “In Memoriam: Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-2014),” Dialog 53, no. 4 (2014), 366-8. 
Cf. Mostert, God and the Future, 62).  
99 Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Insight and Faith,” in Basic Questions in Theology, vol. 2, 28.  
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. Also, Wolfhart Pannenberg, The Apostles’ Creed in the Light of Today’s Questions, trans. Margaret Kohl 
(London: SCM Press, 1972), 10. 
102 In fact, Pannenberg argues that theology be given the status of ‘science,’ seen particularly in chapter five of 
Theology and the Philosophy of Science, entitled “Theology and the Science of God.” As the ‘science of God,’ 
theology examines the validity of the thesis of faith, making statements about reality in the form of hypotheses, 
that remain susceptible to the same degree of verification as other theoretical statements. However, these 
statements remain provisional, awaiting verification in the future. It is important to recognize, however, that the 
German Wissenschaft is not directly equivalent to the English understanding of natural sciences as a distinct and 
isolated discipline, but has more to do with a general scholarly enquiry (Pannenberg, TPS, 296; idem., An 
Introduction to Systematic Theology, 7. Cf. Iain Taylor, Pannenberg on the Triune God (London: T&T Clark, 
2007), 3; John McClean, From the Future: Getting to Grips with Pannenberg’s Thought (Milton Keynes: 
Paternoster, 2013), 11). This has been criticized by Daniel R. Alvarez, “A Critique of Wolfhart Pannenberg’s 
Scientific Theology,” Theology and Science 11, no. 3 (2013), 224-50.  
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these two disciplines has been an area of contention for some time, both vying for the role of 
ultimate arbiter of the knowledge of reality.103 This contention is due to foundationalist 
presuppositions, and when one is forced to choose one particular type of experience or 
perspective as foundation of our understanding of reality, unnecessary dualisms appear. 
Postfoundationalism refuses to allow one to become foundational, rather opting for a 
methodology that incorporates all types of experience as mutually conditioning. A 
postfoundationalist theological method allows science and theology to function cooperatively, 
with both disciplines offering alternative – but not competing or conflicting – interpretations 
of our experience of reality, and van Huyssteen praises Pannenberg for incorporating precisely 
this into his methodology.104 Pannenberg not only calls the theologian to listen to the scientist, 
but the scientist to listen to the theologian: “There could be no genuine dialogue between 
scientists and theologians if only the theologians were expected to listen to the scientists, while 
these would have no reason to be concerned for what theology might have to say on the 
requirements of an interpretation of nature as God’s creation.”105 In Philip Hefner’s appraisal 
of Pannenberg’s understanding of science – described by Pannenberg as a “lucid and brilliant 
presentation”106 – this mutually conditioning dynamic of incorporating multiple disciplines is 
highlighted; theology contributes to our understanding of natural phenomena, and science 
contributes to our understanding of theology.107  
I have here outlined the way in which postfoundationalism, as an attempt to balance the 
dichotomous elements of knowledge, drawing the strengths of foundationalism and 
coherentism together, has at its core a mutually conditioning reciprocity. That is, rather than 
 
103 For helpful introductions to the science-theology debates, see Robert John Russell, Cosmology: From Alpha 
to Omega (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2008); McGrath, Inventing the Universe. 
104 van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 15, 54.  
105 Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Response to John Polkinghorne,” Zygon 36, no. 4 (2001), 799-800. Cf. idem., “God as 
Spirit – And Natural Science,” Zygon 36, no. 4 (2001): 783-94.  
106 Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Theological Appropriation of Scientific Understandings: Response to Hefner, Wicken, 
Eaves, and Tipler,” Zygon 24, no. 2 (1989), 255.  
107 Philip Hefner, “The Role of Science in Pannenberg’s Theological Thinking,” Zygon 24, no. 2 (1989), 135-50.  
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allowing one experience or belief to function as an epistemic foundation for other experiences 
or beliefs and without divorcing oneself from external reality, these experiences and beliefs 
function in reciprocal coherence, a continuous dynamic tension between the objective and 
subjective, external and internal, personal and communal, universal and contextual, experience 
of reality and prior belief. Pannenberg stabilizes this tension by introducing the notion of sub 
ratione Dei, that all these differing parts come together into a divine whole, expressed in the 
relationship between faith and reason, and science and theology, neither aspect taking priority. 
I contend that such a framework is a much more satisfying solution to the problem of the 
requirement for an epistemic foundation than coherentism or theo-foundationalism. We will 
see that a postfoundationalist interpretation of the resurrection satisfies both conditions of 
locating the resurrection within its Jewish eschatological context and balancing the dialectic 
tension between continuity and discontinuity. There is one final epistemic issue to address, to 
do with the justification of beliefs, which will reinforce this reciprocity and be incorporated 
into PCR in §3.3.  
On True Belief: Internalist and Externalist Justification  
A recent debate in the field of epistemology has to do with the justification of ‘true beliefs.’ 
Foundationalism and coherentism are frameworks to describe how one might justify the 
formulation of beliefs in relation to other prior beliefs (for the foundationalist, beliefs are 
justified according to the justification of the beliefs upon which it is founded; for the 
coherentist, beliefs are justified according to how well that belief fits, or coheres, within the 
broader web of preconceived beliefs). However, this does not necessarily reflect the objective 
truth of reality. The question, then, is how one might justify one’s beliefs according to reality. 
In the following, I briefly summarise the debate between the epistemic positions of internalism 
and externalism. I maintain that most scholarship on the resurrection is not only foundationalist, 
but also internalist, and that postfoundationalism has more in common with a reliabilist version 
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of externalism, for which I am an advocate, and provide some ways in which this externalism 
can contribute toward a more comprehensive postfoundationalist framework, specifically with 
the task of interpreting the resurrection in mind.   
Internalists emphasize the subjective, the experience and reception of external stimuli, or the 
factors that are internal to the agent, whereas externalists emphasize the objective, the 
reliability of our thinking process, factors external to the mind which may not be accessible.108 
Put differently, an internalist experiences external reality and formulates a belief about reality 
based on this experience and its relation to other prior beliefs (whether in a foundationalist or 
coherentist sense), but an externalist might claim that this is not necessarily true of reality. For 
example, if I were to wake up in the early hours of the morning and see that no light is coming 
in through my bedroom windows, I might conclude that it is still dark outside and not yet time 
to get out of bed. However, unbeknownst to me, someone has boarded up the windows while I 
slept, and I did not notice. It is indeed night outside, and so my belief is true, but my justification 
is faulty; it is dark primarily because the windows are boarded up, and it would still be dark 
even if the sun had already risen. We might consider this an example of a Gettier problem, a 
type of problem presented by Edmund Gettier in his 1963 article, “Is Justified True Belief 
Knowledge?”109 Another example is that of a person looking at a clock to see that the time is 
12.20, unaware that the clock is broken and permanently stuck on the time 12.20, but just lucky 
enough to be looking at the clock when it is, in reality, 12.20. This person’s belief that it is 
12.20 is a true belief, but it is not justified knowledge. Essentially, the debate can be reduced 
to the central issue of avoiding luck in the formulation of knowledge about reality.110 
 
108 O’Brien, An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 87; Stanley E. Porter and Andrew W. Pitts, “Critical 
Realism in Context: N. T. Wright’s Historical Method and Analytic Epistemology,” JSHJ 13 (2015), 290.  
109 Edmund L. Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23, no. 6 (1963), 121-23. 
110 O’Brien, An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 95.  
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According to the internalist, epistemic justifiers are within the subject, the subject’s perspective 
or are directly accessible. A belief is then justified by virtue of the subject believing it, in 
accordance with the other justified beliefs. The requirement for justification is that beliefs are 
acquired by direct and deliberate choice.111 According to internalism, I would be justified in 
my belief that it is not yet time to get out of bed because of my observation that there is no light 
coming in through my windows, which accords with my other beliefs that windows would 
normally allow light to come through if there was light, that I am not dreaming but am awake, 
and that my observation skills are functioning accurately. William Alston observes that 
according to internalism, “Whether my belief is justified is a function of how things appear in 
my perspective rather than of how they are in actual fact.”112 Where internalism fails is with 
regard to the factors which alter my perception that I am unaware of. Internalism is incapable 
of incorporating these unknown factors, highlighted by the Gettier problems, such as that of 
the windows being boarded up and the clock being broken. Alston, Plantinga, and Alvin 
Goldman argue that no version of internalism has been proposed that satisfies these problems, 
and that these beliefs, true though they may be, cannot be considered justified knowledge 
because they were true by accident.113 Other problems with internalism include the problem of 
forgotten evidence – evidence for justified beliefs can be forgotten – and the problem of 
concurrent retrieval – all necessary justifiers and stored beliefs may not be able to be retrieved 
and reflected upon concurrently, thereby making a belief unjustified.114 It should be noted that 
internalism is not universally rejected, and, as with foundationalism, I am not here outright 
rejecting it but instead highlighting its weaknesses. 
 
111 William P. Alston, “Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology,” Philosophical Topics 14, no. 1 (1986), 
179-97.  
112 Ibid., 198.  
113 Alvin I. Goldman, “Internalism Exposed,” The Journal of Philosophy 96, no. 6 (1999), 293; Alvin Plantinga, 
Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: OUP, 1993), 33. Cf. Porter and Pitts, “Critical Realism in Context,” 293-
94.  
114 Goldman, “Internalism Exposed,” 280-82.  
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To solve the problem of justification, following Gettier’s article, externalism was proposed, 
the most common version of which is reliabilism. According to this position, a belief can be 
considered justified if it results from a reliable method. In other words, a belief is justified 
because the belief-forming process usually results in true beliefs.115 A key difference between 
internalism and externalism is the acknowledgement that knowledge is partial and provisional; 
where the former justifies beliefs by appealing to direct observation of external reality, the 
latter justifies beliefs by appealing to a reliable process, recognizing that there might be 
inaccessible factors which might alter my belief.116 The internalist relies on direct access to 
reality and prior beliefs, and the externalist relies on a reliable cognitive process of forming 
beliefs. For Porter and Pitts, the strength of externalism is its introduction of a mechanism for 
being critical: the notion of defeaters, something which undermines or contradicts a belief. 
Justification may be maintained in the absence of defeaters or lost in the presence of 
defeaters.117  
Though I hesitate to label Pannenberg an externalist, it might be appropriate to label him a 
proto-externalist, based on his argument against positivism, insisting that we simply do not 
know everything, or at least enough, to make absolute claims. However, most of the 
interpretations of the resurrection surveyed in chapter one are not only foundationalist, but 
internalist. Those defending a historical, physical resurrection do so by basing their arguments 
on the directly accessible evidence, be that a pre-critical reading of the New Testament  
narratives or compiling as much historical evidence as possible utilizing a positivistic 
historiography or (in the case, as will be seen, in Wright) a hypothesis-verification method. 
Those rejecting this position argue similarly, but claim that there is either not directly accessible 
evidence, or that there are alternative explanations to the very little evidence that is available. 
 
115 William P. Alston, “How to Think about Reliability,” Philosophical Topics 23, no. 1 (1995), 1-27.  
116 O’Brien, An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 96.  
117 Porter and Pitts, “Critical Realism is Context,” 301.  
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We especially see this internalism in those appealing to analogy or who hold a supra-historical 
interpretation. The former insists that no contemporary analogy exists and so any directly 
accessible experience of resurrection is impossible, while the latter claims that though we might 
have faith in a historical resurrection, the evidence transcends ordinary experience and so is 
not directly accessible. In both cases, it is impossible to assert a resurrection that occurred 
within contingent history. The methodologies of each of these positions cannot satisfy the 
challenges posed by externalism. That is, we cannot justify our belief in the possibility or 
impossibility of a historical or physical resurrection based solely on the evidence or experience 
that is or is not directly accessible; according to externalism, this does not satisfy the conditions 
of justification.  
The postfoundationalism proposed in this section relies on reciprocity, balancing in dialectic 
tension the objective and subjective, internal and external, individual and communal, and 
universal and particular. This has much more in common with an externalist reliabilism than 
foundationalism or coherentism (though it should be noted that there are internalist and 
externalist forms of both foundationalism and coherentism), for it does not base its justification 
of beliefs upon simply that which is directly accessible but tempers the intelligibility of external 
reality with contextually mediated personal prejudice, bias, and prior belief. The ‘constructive 
realism’ presented in the following section is a postfoundationalist model that is better 
equipped for an interpretation of the resurrection that adequately incorporates the Jewish 
eschatological category of resurrection, maintaining the tension between the continuous and 
discontinuous, and is not restricted to a personal reanimation.118 
 
118 It might be possible to advocate a form of ‘constructive realism’ without addressing the issues of 
foundationalism, or of externalism and internalism. However, the form of constructive realism that I am 
advocating is one that has at its essential core a postfoundationalist epistemology. Hence the issues raised in this 
chapter are vital for understanding PCR, as they deal specifically with these tensions that PCR wishes to uphold 
in a dialectic balance.  
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3.4. The Praxis: Toward Postfoundationalist Constructive Realism 
This chapter has argued that the presupposed foundationalist epistemologies in much research 
on the resurrection has resulted in an inability of scholars to adequately incorporate the 
contextual communal categories of understanding (the Jewish eschatological category of 
resurrection) and to uphold both the continuous and discontinuous elements of Jesus’ risen 
nature. I have defended an alternative position that has arisen out of Pannenberg’s 
epistemology, labelled by van Huyssteen and Shults as postfoundationalism, and the following 
section presents constructive realism as the postfoundationalist model which will be adopted 
in this thesis. Constructive realism is a postfoundationalist re-appropriation of Wright’s version 
of critical realism that remedies several deficiencies by stressing the relational and communally 
conditioned nature of knowledge in a reciprocal dialectical tension with the acknowledgement 
of the intelligibility of external reality.  
‘Critical realism’ is an epistemic position employed by a number of philosophers, theologians, 
and sociologists,119 and has been developed and applied within the contexts of the philosophy 
of science, biblical hermeneutics, and the philosophy of perception and sociology, though the 
three rarely interact. Wright’s version of critical realism has more in common with that 
developed within the philosophy of science, even though he primarily references critical 
realists within the hermeneutical tradition. This is not necessarily problematic, though a fuller 
engagement with the broader field of critical realism would have probably helped to make his 
proposal more comprehensive and avoid some of the deficiencies I detect below. However, the 
significant issue with Wright’s use of critical realism is that, as an epistemological model, it is 
 
119 Although it is a rather variegated term. Andreas Losch argues that ‘critical realism’ is an equivocal term, its 
ambiguity largely due to its being reinvented so often (Andreas Losch, “On the Relationship of Ian Barbour’s and 
Roy Bhaskar’s Critical Realism,” Journal of Critical Realism 16, no. 1 (2017), 70.) 
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not critical enough, conceptualizing knowledge as essentially unilateral, where I instead argue 
it be approached bilaterally.  
Wright’s Critical Realism 
It was shown in the previous section that Wright rejects both positivism and phenomenalism 
as satisfactory epistemological frameworks. Though his reasoning for this rejection is minimal, 
the alternative that he proposes bears similarities with the postfoundationalism that I have 
defended, and van Huyssteen has even gone so far as to categorize this alternative position of 
critical realism as postfoundationalist.120 This is questionable as the positivism-phenomenalism 
dichotomy is not analogous to the foundationalist-coherentist dichotomy, but there are certainly 
similarities which are elucidated below. This first part outlines Wright’s definition of critical 
realism, including those he has drawn from, namely Ben Meyer and Bernard Lonergan, before 
discussing a particular aspect that he stresses in his methodology, which I believe to be a 
strength of his proposal, namely, an emphasis upon the narrative form of knowledge and the 
influence of worldviews upon the formulation of this knowledge.  
Responding to positivism and phenomenalism, Wright proposes critical realism as a third 
option that seeks to mediate these two: 
I propose a form of critical realism. This is a way of describing the process of ‘knowing’ that 
acknowledges the reality of the thing known, as something other than the knower (hence ‘realism’), while 
also fully acknowledging that the only access we have to this reality lies along the spiralling path of 
appropriate dialogue or conversation between the knower and the thing known (hence ‘critical’). This 
path leads to critical reflection on the products of our enquiry into ‘reality’, so that our assertions about 
‘reality’ acknowledge their own provisionality. Knowledge, in other words, although in principle 
concerning realities independent of the knower, is never itself independent of the knower.
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This critical realism, on the one hand, acknowledges the existence and intelligibility of an 
external reality beyond the self, and on the other hand, recognizes that knowledge of this reality 
is never separate from the subjectivity of the knower. Knowledge is a dynamic interaction 
 
120 van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 40-41 
121 Wright, NTPG, 35.  
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between the subject and the object. In other words, the interpretation of the experience of the 
object is influenced by the subject’s presuppositions, bias, and perspective, or one’s 
‘worldview.’ There is no such thing as a ‘god’s-eye view,’ nor does the detached and entirely 
objective observer exist, and so, the provisionality of statements about reality must be 
acknowledged.122  
I will return to Wright momentarily, but it is helpful to understand the scholars from whom he 
draws this model, namely Ben Meyer and Bernard Lonergan, who have developed versions of 
critical realism specifically in the context of biblical hermeneutics. Lonergan responds to what 
he calls the ‘Principle of the Empty Head,’ which he defines as the belief in the possibility of 
ridding oneself of subjective influence and “attend simply to the text, see all that is there and 
nothing that is not there, let the author speak for himself, let the author interpret himself,” and 
“the less one knows, the better an exegete one will be.”123 Though the intentions are good, the 
remedy is wrong. It is a mistake to assume that all the reader must do is look at a text and 
simply see what is there. This myth – “that knowing is like looking, that objectivity is seeing 
what is there to be seen and not seeing what is not there, and that the real is what is out there 
now to be looked at” – ignores value-judgments and the inescapability of subjective 
interpretation. He insists, on the contrary, that the presence of value judgments and personal 
interpretations is to be celebrated, not ignored or side-stepped, for it is precisely these value 
judgements that orient someone toward the things worth knowing.124 
 
122 Ibid., 32-37. Wright maintains this in his later Paul and the Faithfulness of God, defining it as, “A self-critical 
epistemology which, in rejecting the naïve realism which simply imagines that we are looking at the material with 
a God’s-eye view, rejects also the narcissistic reductionism of imagining that all apparent perception is in fact 
projection, that everything is really going on inside our own heads. Critical realism engages determinedly in a 
many-sided conversation, both with the data itself and with others (including scholars) who are also engaging 
with it. This conversation aims, not of course at an unattainable ‘objectivity’, but at truth none the less, the truth 
in which the words we use and the stories we tell increasingly approximate to the reality of another world, in the 
historian’s case the world of the past” (Wright, PFG, 51).  
123 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1971), 157. This, he argues, “rests 
on a naïve intuitionism,” (p. 157).  
124 Ibid., 238. 
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Lonergan proposes four levels of knowledge. The first is the empirical experience of external 
reality, where the knower takes in sense-data. The second is that of understanding, of analysing, 
integrating, questioning, and formulating hypotheses as a response to this sense-data. The third 
is judgment, where rational arguments are formed, evidence is assembled, and judgments are 
made. The fourth is that of belief, reflecting upon these judgments and determining possible 
actions.125 Timothy Walker notes that it is these third and fourth levels which place Lonergan 
within the critical realism school.126  
Ben Meyer builds upon Lonergan, quoting him regularly.127 Like Lonergan, he acknowledges 
the inevitable presence of what he labels ‘horizons,’ namely “the bounds [of] one’s field of 
vision,”128 and argues that this subjectivity is to be embraced. However, he takes the explicit 
step beyond Lonergan by insisting that it is through subjectivity that objectivity can be 
achieved, so long as this subjectivity is exercised “attentively, intelligently, reasonably, and 
responsibly.”129 Meyer sought to find a mediating position between objectivity and 
subjectivity, specifically between the positivist’s belief in the possibility of perception as 
unadulterated reception and the phenomenalist’s belief that perception is mere projection. 
Against these two, Meyer insists that a critical realist approach to reading insists that a better 
reading comes as the result of greater presupposed understanding, provided that the text is read 
properly and responsibly. The critical realist can “measure up to the challenge of the text,”130 
and can, in fact, understand the meaning that the author was attempting to express: 
It is perfectly true that the reader’s hold on the meaning of the text is mediated by the reader’s own 
experience, intelligence, and judgment; but, when the reader is competent and his reading accurate, the 
 
125 Ibid. 
126 Timothy Walker, “Approaches to Critical Realism: Bhaskar and Lonergan,” Journal of Critical Realism 16, 
no. 2 (2017), 114-15. 
127 E.g. regarding ‘horizons,’ especially Lonergan’s insistence upon the role of selection in interpretation (p. 50) 
and regarding Lonergan’s ‘Principle of the Empty Head,’ (pp. 61-62).  
128 Ben F. Meyer, Reality and Illusion in New Testament Scholarship: A Primer in Critical Realist Hermeneutics 
(Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1994), 49.  
129 Ibid., 4.  
130 Ibid., 89.  
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And he argues that a successful reading is 
the accurate recovery of whatever meaning the writer has managed to objectify in words. That meaning 
is mediated, communicated, recovered, only if the reader reads well, only if he or she attends to an exact 
decoding of signs, to the particularities of the word-sequence that emerges, to how every element in it 
works with every other.
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He elsewhere claims that knowledge of reality is attained “through the act of true judgment, by 
which reflective intelligence climaxes the discursive and often laborious process of trying to 
find out what is true.”133 Meyer, I suggest, veers precipitously toward that which Lonergan was 
reacting against, the principle of the Empty Head. He is overly confident in the ability of the 
reader to attain the precise message intended by the author.134 Meyer, I believe, has therefore 
been largely unsuccessful.  
Wright demonstrates far less optimism than Meyer in the reader’s ability to “accurately 
recover” the intended meaning of the author. For Wright, determining what the author was 
attempting to say – and why – is the ideal to which the reader strives to grasp, but will forever 
remain out of reach, recognizing the likely existence of multiple meanings and interpretations, 
many peculiar to that particular reader. This is a more satisfying alternative to a positivistic 
optimism in objectivity and to an idealist or phenomenalist emphasis upon subjectivity. For 
Wright, knowledge is thoroughly relational. The act of knowing is not detached and 
uninvolved, rather it has “to do with the interrelation of humans and the created world.”135 This 
interrelation suggests dynamism, something essentially relational. Knowledge is a 
 
131 Ibid., 2-3.  
132 Ibid., 3.  
133 Ben F. Meyer, “Critical Realism and Biblical Theology,” RelStTh 6, no. 3 (1986), 41.  
134 He thus ignores the significant issues raised by Wimsatt and Beardsley’s ‘Intentional Fallacy,’ assuming that 
if one correctly reads the text, one understands the author, ignoring the possibility of meanings other than what 
the author may have intended, (W. K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” STRev 54, no. 3 
(1946): 468-88).  
135 Wright, NTPG, 45.  
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conversation of sorts, a back-and-forth dialogue between the perceiver and that being 
perceived.136 
The broader framework of this relational dynamic of knowledge is that of narrative and 
worldview. These narratives comprise the “basis of the observer’s way of being in relation to 
the world,” and the particular aspects of knowledge occur within this broader framework.137 
Wright is challenging the inductive reasoning inherent within logical positivism, instead 
advocating a form of abductive reasoning, a model of hypothesis and verification: “We make 
a hypothesis about what is true, and we go about verifying it by further experimentation.”138 
As it stands, this would be utterly positivistic, but within Wright’s broader critical realism the 
hypothesis is formed not merely out of sense data and experience, but from one’s larger 
framework of presupposed knowledge. Experience is filtered and interpreted according to prior 
understanding, a hypothesis – or narrative – is formulated, and this hypothesis is then analysed 
and verified according to further data, including comparison to other narratives.139 A 
comprehensive narrative consists of, “Simplicity of outline, elegance in handling the details 
within it, the inclusion of all the parts of the story, and the ability of the story to make sense 
beyond its immediate subject-matter,” and when a hypothesis fails to meet the criteria, the 
prevailing narrative is confirmed.140 
 
136 Ibid., 63-64.  
137 Ibid., 37.  
138 Ibid.  
139 Ibid., 37-44. To illustrate this, Wright uses the example of experiencing a shudder whilst driving a car. The 
driver, drawing upon prior knowledge, immediately formulates possible stories to explain the shudder: the road 
is rough; the car has a flat tyre; something is wrong with the suspension. These hypotheses are then tested against 
further data: the car behind is flashing its lights and the driver is pointing to one of the tyres. The second story 
seems most likely, so the driver pulls over, checks the tyre and sees that it is, indeed, flat. The road could well 
have been subpar, and there may in fact be something wrong with the suspension, but the simplest explanation for 
the shudder is a flat tyre. 
140 Ibid., 42-43. Cf. Christopher McMahon, “The Relevance of Historical Inquiry for the Christian Faith: A 
Comparative Study of the Historical Methodologies of J. P. Meier and N. T. Wright,” Ph.D dissertation (The 
Catholic University of America, 2003), 158.  
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The framework for knowledge is thus narrative. Human nature is essentially “grounded in and 
constituted by the implicit or explicit stories which humans tell themselves and one another,” 
stories which “are a basic constituent of human life.”141 Furthermore: 
When, therefore, we perceive external reality, we do so within a prior framework. That framework 
consists, most fundamentally, of a worldview; and worldviews, as we have emphasized, are characterized 
by, among other things, certain types of stories.
142
 
Stories frame our understanding and experience of reality and are an essential part of a 
worldview, which Wright understands as that which forms the interpretive grid through which 
one interprets and relates to the world, functioning as “the presuppositional, pre-cognitive stage 
of a culture or society,” embracing “all deep-level human perceptions of reality.”143 It is 
through and from these worldviews that stories are produced which provide the tools to enable 
humans to answer, or least engage with, the basic questions of human existence.144  
Along with stories, a worldview is comprised of sets of beliefs and aims, and demonstrated 
through symbols, events, and artefacts. Accompanying these symbols is a visible praxis. In a 
Christian worldview, theology provides Christians with vocation and direction and so a 
worldview, as expressed through stories and symbols, proffers direction and orientation.145 A 
person is most likely to act in accordance with their worldview and that of their cultural context. 
Furthermore, worldviews are expressed in literature – the articulation of stories, beliefs, and 
aims. Literature is “the telling of stories which bring worldviews into articulation,”146 and so it 
is important to recognize that this worldview is different to that of the reader, who should be 
sympathetic toward this different worldview.147 
 
141 Ibid., 38.  
142 Ibid., 43.  
143 Ibid., 122-23.  
144 Cf. McMahon, “The Relevance of Historical Inquiry for the Christian faith,” 154; Meyer, “An Evangelical 
Analysis,” 151.  
145 Wright, NTPG, 125-34.  
146 Ibid., 65. Cf. M. I. Finley, Ancient History: Evidence and Models (London: Penguin, 1985), 105.  
147 Wright, NTPG, 67. Worldview is rather similar in nature to ideology. Where the former is, in general, referring 
to one’s broader perspective of reality, I interpret the latter as an application of that worldview upon social life, 
particularly politics and economics. Of course, as noted by Eagleton, there is (much like critical realism, as will 
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There is in Wright’s critical realism a leaning toward an anthropocentric epistemology in his 
stress upon worldview. I similarly argue that knowledge has a perpetually contextual and 
communal nature. However, Wright remains reliant upon the criteria of authenticity in the 
study of the historical Jesus, especially that of dissimilarity, which states that an early saying 
attributed to Jesus is considered authentic if it is dissimilar to the Judaism of the time or the 
traditions of the early Christian church.148 This is a central part of his argument for the 
authenticity of the resurrection.149 Of course, Wright’s thought developed at a time when the 
criteria of authenticity were in vogue. However, as will be discussed in the next chapter, these 
criteria have been heavily critiqued in recent New Testament scholarship, and Wright’s 
methodology should adapt accordingly.150 Wright’s use of these criteria gestures towards a 
reliance upon objectivism. However, his placing the locus of knowledge within the realm of a 
contextually conditioned worldview is especially useful for the current thesis. 
Wright’s critical realism acknowledges the intelligibility of an external reality beyond the self 
while recognizing that knowledge of this reality is never separate from the subjectivity of the 
knower. Knowledge is thus fundamentally relational and conditioned by individual 
presuppositions and a communally contextualized worldview. Wright’s epistemology begins 
 
be seen) no universally accepted definition of ideology, and the distinction between worldview and ideology is 
difficult to discern. For the purpose of this thesis, I will primarily adopt the language of worldview, especially 
Wright’s definition as the interpretive grid through which one interprets and relates to the world, as it encompasses 
a broad range of human experience. Cf. Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), esp. 
pp. 1-31; Jan Rehmann, Theories of Ideology: The Powers of Alienation and Subjection (Chicago: Haymarket, 
2014). 
148 See, e.g. Wright, JVG, 132.  
149 Wright, RSG, 685-718.  
150 Reflecting the desire to discern a ‘genuine’ history, entirely divorced from historical or communal elaboration, 
a variety of criteria have been introduced to aid the determination of which aspects of Jesus’ life and teaching are 
to be considered authentic. For example, according to the criterion of embarrassment, anything that was said of 
Jesus that may have been perceived as embarrassing for a fledgling church to have included is likely authentic, 
and according to the criterion of multiple attestation, a story that has been recorded in multiple sources might also 
be considered authentic. Though there is some value in considering these elements of a story, the use of these 
various criteria presupposes the possibility of separating what ‘actually happened’ from how that was interpreted 
and retold. Chapter three argues that this is impossible. It is also interesting to note how easy it is to argue that a 
saying either fits or does not fit a particular criterion; it is impossible to know for certain what the early church 




to move away from the hard foundationalism that has disrupted an adequate interpretation of 
the resurrection. As it is, however, this epistemology remains insufficient for addressing the 
principal task of interpreting the resurrection – one which comprehensively incorporates the 
Jewish eschatological category of resurrection (Wright does, of course, connect the resurrection 
to ancient Jewish eschatology, but not adequately) and balances both its continuous and 
discontinuous characteristics. There are several significant, though not insoluble, problems 
with his version of critical realism, which will be highlighted following a discussion of the 
broader context of the notion of critical realism to locate Wright within this ongoing discussion 
and developing model. 
The Diversity of Critical Realism 
In a collaborative publication reflecting on Wright’s Jesus and the Victory of God, Alister 
McGrath recounts his appreciation of Wright’s contribution to recent hermeneutics. Where the 
Enlightenment’s desire for an absolute and objective rationality failed, “Wright does more than 
make helpful suggestions concerning the epistemological status of theological statements; he 
indicates the role of the early Christian community in shaping the manner in which reality 
would be represented.”151 However, within the broader field of critical realisms Wright’s 
version is somewhat confused, sharing many similarities with Meyer and Lonergan, from 
whom he primarily draws, but his definition is much closer to the critical realisms within the 
philosophy of science. The problem has to do with how ‘realism’ is understood, and there 
seems to be some conflict between Wright’s definition and implementation of critical realism. 
To illustrate this, I will briefly discuss the development of critical realism within these other 
disciplines, especially that of the philosophy of science. Furthermore, I highlight aspects from 
 
151 Alister E. McGrath, “Reality, Symbol & History: Theological Reflections on N. T. Wright’s Portrayal of 
Jesus,” in Jesus & the Restoration of Israel: A Critical Assessment of N. T. Wright’s Jesus and the Victory of God, 
ed. Carey C. Newman (Downers Grove: IVP, 1999), 166-67.  
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these other versions of critical realism that aid in the development of a more critical, 
constructive realism. 
The notion of critical realism has developed in various disciplines and often independently of 
one another, and so while there is no single definition there are similarities between them.152 
Its origins possibly trace back to Kant,153 but it primarily emerged in twentieth-century 
American philosophy of perception, particularly in the works of Roy Wood Sellars and Durant 
Drake, who respectively argued for the existence of an intelligible external reality despite 
perception of this reality remaining partial with interpretations never being identical.154 
Neither, however, are referenced by the later versions of critical realism in the philosophy of 
science, despite the language being adopted. The main twentieth century proponents in this 
discipline are Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne, and Roy Bhaskar, who each 
respond to positivism or scientific dogmatism on the one hand, and idealism or subjective 
realism on the other.155 
A commonality between these four variations of critical realism is the aim, as Peacocke puts 
it, “to tell as true a story as possible” about reality, acknowledging that knowledge is partial, 
 
152 Timothy Walker laments the lack of interaction between the various branches, claiming that this is a weakness 
in the development of the use of the term ‘critical realism,’ (Timothy Walker, “Approaches to Critical Realism: 
Bhaskar and Lonergan,” Journal of Critical Realism 16, no. 2 (2017), 113).  
153 Andreas Losch connects critical realism with Kant’s ‘empirical realism,’ which affirms the reality of an 
external object, though it is not in and of itself perceptible (Andreas Losch, “On the Origins of Critical Realism,” 
Theology and Science 7, no. 1 (2009), 85-87). Losch also notes that a characteristic belief of this German school 
was that a form of critical realism has been the predominant, albeit implicit, philosophy of most of history. 
Peacocke makes a similar claim, that critical realism has been the default philosophy of science and most scientists 
“who aim to depict reality but know only too well their fallibility in doing so” (Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a 
Scientific Age, 2nd ed. (London: SCM, 1993), 11). Cf. John Wilson, A Physicist Examines Hope in the 
Resurrection: Examination of the Significance of the Work of John C. Polkinghorne for the Mission of the Church 
(Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2016), 33.  
154 Roy Wood Sellars, Critical Realism: A Study of the Nature and Conditions of Knowledge (New York: Russell 
& Russell, 1969), 20; Durant Drake, “The Approach to Critical Realism,” in Essays in Critical Realism: A Co-
Operative Study of the Problem of Knowledge, ed. Durant Drake, Arthur O. Lovejoy, et al. (New York: Gordian 
press, 1968), 3-32. Cf. James Bissett Pratt, “Critical Realism and the Possibility of Knowledge,” in Essays in 
Critical Realism: A Co-Operative Study of the Problem of Knowledge, ed. Durant Drake, Arthur O. Lovejoy, et 
al. (New York: Gordian press, 1968), 85-113; Losch, “On the Origins of Critical Realism,” 87.  
155 Cf. Jonathan Bernier, The Quest for the Historical Jesus After the Demise of Authenticity: Toward a Critical 
Realist Philosophy of History in Jesus Studies (London: T&T Clark, 2016), 21-37.  
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mediated through subjective experience, and statements about reality remain hypothetical and 
provisional.156 Barbour’s critical realism stresses that “no theory is an exact description of the 
world,” for the creativity and imagination of the human mind bears significant influence upon 
the formation of theories.157 Polkinghorne suggests descriptions of reality are 
verisimilitudinous in nature, and never absolute or objective, but notes that knowledge of 
reality becomes increasingly accurate. For Polkinghorne, it is possible to affirm the 
intertwining of experience and interpretations (hence critical) alongside acknowledging a 
process of discovery (realism).158 For Bhaskar, on the one hand, positivists are right to stress 
the existence of laws and mechanism, but incorrect in asserting the universality of empiricism; 
and, on the other hand, anti-naturalism is correct to stress the existence of pre-interpreted 
reality, but is incorrect in its failure to provide the adequate possibility and means for rational 
criticism. A critical naturalism upholds the intuitions of both positions by affirming the 
existence of structures which exceed empirical testing (such as social structures), and can 
uphold the intransitivity of beliefs and meaning,159 while insisting that these structures and 
beliefs are susceptible to critique, recognizing that the world is structured, differentiated, and 
changing.160 
 
156 Arthur Peacocke, The Palace of God’s Glory: God’s World and Science (Adelaide: ATF, 2005), 2. Original 
emphasis. 
157 Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (London: SCM, 1966), 172. Cf. Losch, “On the Origins of 
Critical Realism,” 172.  
158 John Polkinghorne, One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology (London: SPCK, 1986), 17. He 
elsewhere states, “A critical realist cannot claim the attainment of absolute truth, but rather an increasing 
verisimilitude – the construction of better and better maps of physical reality,” (Polkinghorne, Scientists as 
Theologians, 16-17). Cf. John Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian 
Barbour, Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne (London: SPCK, 1996).  
159 By which he means that beliefs and meaning are not necessarily conditional upon experience. 
160 Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences 
(Sussex: Harvester, 1979), 27-28; idem., Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy 
(London: Verso, 1989), 2.  
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Wright shares with these philosophers of science the concern to find an intermediate position 
between a naïve realism and idealism, though he only makes two brief references to Barbour.161 
This overall lack of engagement is surprising considering how similar his proposal is to these 
philosophy of science versions, particularly those of Barbour and Polkinghorne. The former 
notes that his critical realism “affirms the role of mental construction and imaginative activity 
in the formation of theories, and it asserts that some constructs agree with observations better 
than others only because events have an objective pattern.”162 For the latter, “Our 
understanding of the physical world will never be total but it can become progressively more 
accurate.”163 However, Wright’s primary source is Meyer, and is thus within the context of 
Lonergan’s critical realism. They appear to have a different understanding of ‘realism’ to 
Wright, seen especially in Meyer’s definition as that which is “intelligently grasped and 
reasonably affirmed.”164 Whereas Barbour and Polkinghorne’s understanding of realism is 
thoroughly scientific, Lonergan and Meyer’s is Kantian.165 Put differently, the philosophy of 
science version of critical realism understands ‘realism’ as objective external reality, whereas 
Lonergan and Meyer understand it as that which is merely grasped. Considering there exists 
no normative definition of critical realism, there is no need for Wright’s version to align to 
anyone else’s. However, there is some confusion within his method. It is not particularly clear, 
for instance, what he means by ‘realism,’ as his definition seems closer to that of the philosophy 
of science, with which he does not engage; but the implementation of this reflects Meyer and 
Lonergan, who seem to presuppose an entirely different understanding of realism from his own. 
Losch has argued that Wright merely equated Meyer’s critical realism with that of Barbour, 
 
161 Wright, NTPG, 33, 37. Of course, one should not be criticized for failing to refer to every single other scholar 
who has ever existed, but in this instance it is worth noting as these are the primary contributors toward the 
development of critical realism.  
162 Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, 172.  
163 Polkinghorne, One World, 17.  
164 Meyer, Reality and Illusion in New Testament Scholarship, 68.  
165 Cf. Andreas Losch, “Wright’s Version of Critical Realism,” in God and the Faithfulness of Paul, ed. 
Christopher Heilig, J. Thomas Hewitt and Michael F. Bird (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017), 102-04.  
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overlooking the diversity of understandings of critical realism.166 Wright has responded to 
Losch, acknowledging the various strands of critical realism and the need for him to clarify his 
own, but insists that he did in fact read Meyer’s work much earlier than Losch supposes, and 
before reading Barbour. It was Meyer’s earlier works which were particularly influential, but 
in The New Testament and the People of God Wright emphasized Meyer’s later works which 
dealt with method much more significantly.167 I suggest that Wright’s critical realism would 
be more comprehensive with further explicit dialogue with the broader field of critical realism, 
and if he had done so in The New Testament and the People of God his understanding of 
‘realism’ might have been clarified.  
Moreover, as an epistemic model, critical realism has developed since Wright first proposed 
his version of critical realism in 1992. In particular, there has been a much greater stress upon 
the stratified and multifaceted nature of reality, and upon the role of science. For Kees van 
Kooten Niekerk, who affirms the core aspiration of critical realism – a recognition, on the one 
hand, of the intelligibility of external reality beyond the human mind, and, on the other, that 
knowledge of this external reality is interpreted through the critical reflection of experience168 
– knowledge is a distillation of the real from the mental, and thus has a particular interest in 
science, for “it is first and foremost there that we meet a successful critical treatment of the 
world of our experience.”169 However, theology – the critical reflection on Christian belief – 
has its own peculiar concerns distinct from science, involving ethical valuations, such as the 
determination of ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ ‘worth,’ and what one ‘ought’ to do.170 Niekerk stresses the 
 
166 Ibid., 105, 109-10. 
167 N. T. Wright, “The Challenge of Dialogue: A Partial and Preliminary Response,” in God and the Faithfulness 
of Paul, edited by Christopher Heilig, J. Thomas Hewitt and Michael F. Bird (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017), 718-
19. 
168 Kees van Kooten Niekerk, “A Critical Realist Perspective on the Dialogue between Theology and Science,” in 
Rethinking Theology and Science: Six Models for the Current Debate, ed. Niels Henrik Gregersen and J. Wentzel 
van Huyssteen (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 51.  
169 Ibid., 57-58.  
170 Ibid., 71.  
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natural sciences without jettisoning the social, thereby recognizing the impossibility of a 
normative, universal methodology.  
McGrath took this engagement with natural sciences a step further in A Scientific Theology, 
arguing that the success of the natural sciences demonstrates the efficacy of realism, and that a 
postmodern anti-realism is a superfluous over-reaction. However, he is suspicious of any 
realism which ignores the role of human reflection, and describes reality within a critical realist 
epistemology as being “apprehended by the human mind which attempts to express and 
accommodate that reality as best it can with the tools at its disposal.”171 McGrath builds upon 
Bhaskar’s critical realism, commending Bhaskar in particular for the recognition of the 
stratified and diverse nature of reality. Bhaskar refutes reductionism, refusing to allow 
everything to be reduced to certain categories, such as social categories or the laws of physics. 
‘Natural’ reality is entirely different to ‘social’ reality and both adopt different methodologies 
respective of their particular subject matter. Hence, McGrath argues for a diversity of 
methodologies, which are determined by ontology; methodology cannot be determined a 
priori, but rather a posteriori. Furthermore, he encourages a ‘connectivist’ approach to avoid 
reality being reduced to any one level or area, a position similar to Grenz’s coherentism, where 
the correlations between the various areas are explored.172 
With Niekerk and McGrath, Heikki Patomäki urges any epistemic model to incorporate 
significant engagement with science, claiming that many critical realists have failed to pay it 
sufficient attention. The aspects of science which Bhaskar engaged with, namely within a 
linear, Newtonian science, have developed since his proposal of critical realism. Specifically, 
developments within the general theory of relativity and quantum mechanics have rendered 
 
171 Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 195.  
172 Ibid., 213-40. Cf. Raymond Meyer, who argued, “From the critical realist perspective, all knowledge claims 
stand equally before one another for examination and critical scrutiny,” (Meyer, “An Evangelical Analysis,” 68). 
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Bhaskar’s critical realism misleading.173 These advances, which invariably exceed normal 
human experience and are seemingly contradictory, “have re-opened in exciting ways old 
questions about causality, temporality and the origins and nature of the universe,”174 and 
challenge the underlying critical realist understanding of laws in terms of mechanisms which 
produce certain effects, albeit unobservable mechanisms. For Patomäki, critical realism needs 
to develop and move beyond the “classical notion of causal mechanisms operating within 
unidirectional time.”175 The present point to take from this is that knowledge is not simply a 
matter of interpreting an intelligible reality through critical reflection upon experience of this 
reality, for there is no guarantee that this experience will indeed be intelligible. Of course, this 
is not to conclude that knowledge of reality is thereby impossible, but to affirm at least the 
possibility that the laws that govern both our experience and interpretation may be incorrect or 
incomplete. The twentieth century critical realisms which presuppose a Newtonian 
understanding of experience, and its subsequent interpretation, of reality are thus now outdated 
as science shifts away from Newtonian mechanics.  
The critical realism put forward by Andrew Wright similarly advocates a more complex view 
of the interpretation of reality, also recognizing a stratified and multi-faceted view of reality. 
“Human beings are simultaneously physical, chemical, biological, psychological, social, 
moral, aesthetic and spiritual creatures. Accounts of each level make unique contributions to 
our understanding of the whole person.”176 He therefore argues for a ‘connectivist’ approach 
with McGrath, while maintaining that there is no universal methodology, but rather that the 
 
173 For example, in general relativity, the cause of gravity is now recognized as having to do with the curvature of 
spacetime, rather than a force of attraction between two objects, and in quantum mechanics, hypothetical particles 
called gravitons mediate the gravitational interaction of subatomic particles, and yet they are strictly hypothetical 
as they cannot be observed according to the usual understanding of gravitation as a force (Heikki Patomäki, “After 
Critical Realism?” Journal of Critical Realism 9, no. 1 (2010), 67-68).  
174 Ibid., 62.  
175 Ibid., 69.  
176 Andrew Wright, “In Praise of the Spiritual Turn,” Journal of Critical Realism 10, no. 3 (2011), 352. 
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particular methodology be oriented to its specific subject matter.177 Furthermore, he reaffirms 
one of the central characteristics of critical realism, that knowledge is inseparably associated 
with our experience of reality.178  
The point to be taken from these more recent versions of critical realism is the recognition that 
critical realism increasingly insists upon the impossibility of a universal methodology and of 
reducing reality to a mechanistic materialism. With this has come an emphasis upon 
reciprocity, and in this regard a similarity with postfoundationalism. The PCR advanced here 
is a reappropriation of Wright’s critical realism in light of the postfoundationalism outlined 
above, and acknowledges this diversity of methodology, highlighting the way in which this 
reflects a postfoundationalist stress upon the reciprocity between epistemic tensions. However, 
two issues remain with this critical realism, which will be addressed immediately below.  
Postfoundationalist Constructive Realism 
Aside from Wright’s limited engagement with the broader field of critical realism, two 
problems remain. The first is that Wright’s critical realism is not critical enough. By this I 
mean that the ‘critical’ aspect of his critical realism is not comprehensive enough, having not 
engaged adequately those in the phenomenalist camp. The second is that any contemporary re-
appropriation of this model must respond to the challenges presented by externalism. As it is, 
Wright’s critical realism remains internalist, relying on the reception, interpretation, and 
reflection of the direct experience of external reality. Both of these issues will be discussed 
below. Ultimately, Wright’s critical realism reverts to a foundationalist and internalist 
empiricism. However, these issues are not fatal, and I argue that an adjusted version of critical 
realism, which incorporates the reciprocity inherent in postfoundationalism, the observations 
 
177 Ibid., 352-53.  
178 Ibid., 352. Cf. Kenneth A. Reynhout, who states that “to be a critical realist is to be an interpreter of reality,” 
(“Interdisciplinary Interpretation: Paul Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of Theology and Science” (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Princeton Theological Seminary, 2012), 25); Also, Margolis, Pragmatism Without Foundations, 175.  
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of recent critical realist proposals, and an externalist understanding of justification, is an 
appropriate model for proceeding. This adjusted critical realism is labelled ‘constructive 
realism,’ for it acknowledges the significant impact of the subject’s prior beliefs, prejudices, 
and worldview upon the interpretation of the external object.  
Wright’s critical realism has not adequately considered the arguments of those in the 
phenomenalist camp, such as the coherentism presented by Rorty and Grenz. This does not 
mean that his epistemology is not critical at all, but rather that it could be developed further. 
He states that knowledge is “never itself independent of the knower,”179 and acknowledges the 
impossibility of absolute objectivity, but he does not incorporate the inevitable subjectivity of 
the individual into his methodology. He makes note of the to-and-fro, conversational dynamic 
of knowledge, suggesting the possibility that knowledge is bilateral, but the emphasis remains 
on how close one can get to knowing the objective truth of the object, and leans precariously 
towards a foundationalist, empirical realism and away from something particularly critical. It 
appears Wright has not adequately allowed room for the idealist or phenomenalist (critical) 
counterpoint to the naïve realism he denounces to influence his epistemology. Further, as 
highlighted by Porter and Pitts, Wright’s critical realism presupposes an internalist theory of 
justification. Wright adopts, with very little variation, the critical realism of Lonergan, who is 
pre-Gettier. Porter and Pitts claim that Lonergan’s critical realism is “classic internalism” due 
to his epistemic formulation of data, understanding, judgment, insight, and decision. Wright’s 
critical realism continues this internalist self-reflective feature.180 Any re-appropriation of this 
critical realism must be considered in light of externalism. Both of these issues are remedied 
 
179 Wright, NTPG, 35.  
180 Porter and Pitts, “Critical Realism in Context,” 290-91. See Jonathan Bernier’s response to Porter and Pitts, 
who argues that they have not adequately engaged with Lonergan’s thought, declaring him an internalist and then 
arguing against internalism. For Bernier, this is not a substantial critique of Lonergan, but merely “guilt by 
association” (Jonathan Bernier, “A Response to Porter and Pitts’ ‘Wright’s Critical Realism in Context,’” JSHJ 
14 (2016), 186-89.  
143 
 
in a postfoundationalist reformulation by balancing the object with the subject, the individual 
with the communal, the universal with the particular in a reciprocal dialectic tension. As will 
be seen, the socially constituted categories of understanding significantly impact the formation 
of knowledge, that knowledge is bilateral (that is, knowledge is never mere reception of 
external reality, but the prior beliefs, prejudices, perspective, and worldview of the subject 
distorts this reception), and this is acknowledged in PCR.  
Critical realism has much in common with postfoundationalism. Three aspects in particular 
within these recent developments of critical realism are especially valuable for the development 
of a postfoundationalist model: the recognition that knowledge is inherently connected to the 
experience of reality, the multifaceted nature of reality – and thus maintaining the importance 
of an interdisciplinary methodology – and that this reality, due to the possibility of its being 
experienced, is intelligible, albeit an intelligibility that refuses to be reduced to a particular set 
of categories or rules. This qualified understanding of the intelligibility of an inherently 
variegated and diverse reality implies that knowledge is not simply about perceiving ‘what is 
there,’ a point I will return to below. Van Huyssteen has explicitly presented critical realism as 
a postfoundationalist model for theological methodology.181 He argues: 
A postfoundationalist theological program can, by means of a fallibilist, experiential epistemology, 
properly aim for justified beliefs and for a tentative and provisional knowledge of what Christians have 
come to call God. What is retrieved here is not only a more nuanced way of dealing with the cognitive 
claims of religious and theological reflection, but also the important insight that rationality can never be 
reduced to natural scientific rationality. As a broader, holist approach a fallibilist, experiential program 
of postfoundationalist critical realism can, however, again link theology, philosophy of religion, and the 
sciences in their common search for intelligibility.
182
 
The key observation is that knowledge is fallible, experiential, provisional, holistic, and 
interdisciplinary, traits common to both postfoundationalism and critical realism.  
 
181 “I believe a plausible, and very helpful, postfoundationalist model for theistic belief can be found in a carefully 
constructed critical realism," (van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology, 40-41).  
182 Ibid., 52.  
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It is not surprising, therefore, that critical realism has much in common with Pannenberg’s 
approach. James Page argues precisely this, highlighting several similarities, including the 
nature of history and the philosophy of science. The central similarity for Page is that both 
critical realism and Pannenberg’s thought assert the existence and intelligibility of external 
reality, but that knowledge of this reality is perpetually incomplete, and thus provisional, and 
should therefore remain interdisciplinary and be open to falsification. Within this schema, the 
existence of God and the resurrection of Jesus remain a possibility, not excluded as a priori 
impossibilities.183  
However, postfoundationalism and critical realism are not immediately compatible, despite 
having much in common. The critical aspect of critical realism does not take seriously enough 
the challenges posed by nonfoundationalism, particularly the way interpretation is influenced 
by a prior network of beliefs and the historically situated context of the interpreter. A 
constructive realism, to borrow Losch’s term,184 is a better postfoundationalist reappropriation 
of the goals of critical realism. A postfoundationalist model must incorporate both sides of each 
of the four pairs and couplets of Shults’ ideal postfoundationalism, as seen above.185 
Polkinghorne’s argument that knowledge is only ever a verisimilitudinous representation of 
reality is a step in the right direction and a good example of the admirable humility within 
critical realist epistemologies, but it arguably does not go far enough. Knowledge is not simply 
a representation of what is there, but as the knower brings something to the interpretation of 
reality that interpretation is distorted beyond what is simply there. Experience and 
interpretation do not occur in a unilateral direction. Indeed, this observation is central to the 
critical realist proposal, but where critical realism has not gone far enough is in the way in 
 
183 James Smith Page, “Critical Realism and the Theological Science of Wolfhart Pannenberg: Exploring the 
Commonalities,” Bridges: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, Theology, History and Science 10 (2003), 
74-79.  
184 Losch, “Critical Realism – A Sustainable Bridge,” 406.  
185 Cf. Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 43-77.  
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which what the knower brings to the interpretation constructs knowledge. It is not a matter of 
seeing ‘what is there,’ regardless of how incomplete this seeing is. Rather, there is an element 
of interpretation that is constructed not from observation, but from the worldviews, 
presupposed knowledge and a priori beliefs, and the historical and communal context of the 
observer.  
Though all critical realists make particular note of the fact that observation is not value-neutral 
and is influenced by a variety of internal factors, they generally treat interpretation as though 
it is unilateral, object to observer, albeit observation that is partial and distorted. As a result, 
the constructive aspect of interpretation is not taken seriously enough. This is similar to 
Kenneth Reynhout’s criticism of critical realism as not adequately offering a solution to the 
fact that interpreters with different worldviews will invariably come to different conclusions, 
and that “there is no such thing as an isolated explanation that does not presume and anticipate 
understanding.”186 The idealist or phenomenalist counterpoint to the naïve realism or 
positivism is not given due respect; critical realism is not critical enough.  
Instead, a constructive realism that balances the objective-subjective dichotomy, recognizing 
the bilateral direction of knowledge and interpretation, that is, an individual will always bring 
something to the observation of an external, intelligible, object, is a more comprehensive 
epistemological model. The four couplets of Shults’ postfoundationalism – interpreted 
experience and a network of beliefs; objective unity of truth and the subjective multiplicity of 
knowledge; individual rational judgement and culturally determined criteria of rationality; 
universal understanding and contextualized explanations – are better represented in a version 
of critical realism which takes seriously the constructive aspect of knowledge.  
 
186 Reynhout, “Interdisciplinary Interpretation,” 36-37.  
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I hesitate to give PCR a definitive definition, for central to this framework is the rejection of 
universal methodologies. Rather, it might be more faithful to the central values of PCR to treat 
it as more of a guide, providing general epistemic contours. The central concern of this 
framework is to balance the external object and its subjective interpretation without prioritizing 
one or the other, and to approach the external object as a dynamic tension between the two. 
Multiple disciplines and experiences are balanced in a mutually conditioning reciprocity. It 
also acknowledges the significant impact that the socially and historically mediated categories 
of understanding and worldviews have upon the interpretation of the event; knowledge is 
bilateral, not just the reception of the experience of the external object but its interpretation 
which is fundamentally shaped by the subjectivity of the individual. Hence the adoption of the 
term ‘constructive realism,’ for knowledge is both experience of the intelligible external reality 
and the constructive nature of the subjectively held prior frameworks of understanding.  
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has proposed the epistemological framework of Postfoundationalist Constructive 
Realism as an alternative to the foundationalist and empiricist epistemic underpinnings of the 
majority of scholarship which has assumed the language of resurrection refers to the 
reanimation of a personal, corporeal body. This epistemic foundationalism was found to be 
deficient due to its belief in the possibility of determining universal basic beliefs upon which 
all of knowledge can be founded. Pannenberg and Wright argue against objectivism and have 
provided alternatives to this foundationalist empiricism. Rather than either coherentism or 
theo-foundationalism, the former distancing itself from external reality and the latter 
minimizing human involvement in theological knowledge, postfoundationalism, which thrives 
on a mutually conditioning reciprocity and dialectic tension between the external and internal, 
community and individual, object and subject, between various disciplines and different 
experiences, has been defended in this chapter. Wright’s version of critical realism expresses 
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similar (though not identical) concerns, similarly seeking to balance objectivity and 
subjectivity, particularly the helpful contributions of positivism and phenomenalism. However, 
this model falls short, reverting to a veiled foundationalist empiricism. Rather a constructive 
realism is an adjusted version of this critical realism which is a model that better reflects the 
concerns of postfoundationalism, and so PCR is proposed.  
The following chapter explores how this is applied to the discipline of history, where again 
communal categories are stressed without denying the possibility of the event in question as an 
event within contingent history. This PCR approach is better suited to interpreting the claim 
that Jesus rose from the dead within its ancient Jewish eschatological context than the 
methodologies of the scholars discussed in chapter two, capable of maintaining a dialectical 
tension between the continuous and discontinuous elements of the resurrection without running 




4. Tension in History: of Communities and Memories 
4.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss methodological concerns regarding the consideration 
of Jesus’ resurrection as a historical event (that is, as an event that occurred within contingent 
history and as it was interpreted and communicated) in light of the PCR framework proposed 
in the preceding chapter, understanding the event within its communal context and avoiding 
either reducing the event to a personal re-animated body or emphasizing either its continuous 
or discontinuous elements. This involves considering how the resurrection may be understood 
as an event within contingent history without reducing it to an event comparable with any other 
ordinary event. This chapter does not attempt to ‘prove’ the resurrection as such, or to present 
a detailed historical method that could, but rather to argue for the possibility of treating the 
resurrection as an event within contingent history. A PCR approach to historical inquiry does 
not present a specific, universal historiography, but guidelines for approaching history, paying 
particular attention to the interaction between the external event and the communal and 
historical categories which impacted the interpretation of that event.  
In approaching the resurrection, it is necessary to look at the theological categories that were 
utilized to interpret Jesus’ post-mortem existence, and so it is also necessary to consider the 
relationship between the theological claim of the resurrection and the nature of history. This is 
necessary because, as I demonstrated in chapter one, many scholars (such as Lessing, Kähler, 
Bultmann, Troeltsch, Barth, Brunner, Tillich, Bornkamm, Marxsen, and Schillebeeckx) insist 
on the separation between the disciplines of theology and history (i.e. what can be said about 
God, and what can be said about past events), relegating the resurrection to the realm of faith 
and not of historical inquiry. This relationship between history and theology is explored in 
section one, where it is argued that such a separation is based on a foundationalist empiricism 
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and is prohibited within PCR on account of the anthropocentric and constructive nature of 
knowledge. Here Pannenberg and Wright’s arguments are considered, the former insisting that 
history is the locus for divine revelation and the latter stressing the impact of worldviews upon 
the interpretation and communication of historical events. Though both provide helpful 
contributions that will be adopted within a PCR understanding of history, neither have fully 
acknowledged the significance of the theological presuppositions of the historian, particularly 
regarding the determination of which parts of history are to be considered revelatory. PCR 
neither removes the resurrection from history nor treats it as an ordinary historical event, but 
acknowledges the presupposed beliefs and communally-conditioned categories of 
understanding of the author and historian. 
Having argued in the first part of the chapter that, with respect to the resurrection, history and 
theology should not be separated, due to the anthropocentric and constructive nature of 
knowledge, the second part of this chapter turns its attention more specifically to this 
anthropocentricity. This involves an analysis of Pannenberg’s Christological method, his 
earlier Christology ‘from below’ seeking to ‘get behind’ the NT text to discover the Jesus of 
Nazareth as he was within contingent history devoid of later theological interpretation, and 
from there moving to theological considerations of Jesus’ relationship with God. This 
Christology then later developed as Pannenberg attempted to balance this with a ‘from above’ 
approach, recognizing that ‘getting behind’ the text is methodologically impossible and that 
personal presuppositions perpetually influence interpretation. Indeed, everyone speaks and 
interprets within a particular communal context. In this regard, Wright stresses the role of 
worldviews, the presupposed understandings of reality through which experience is interpreted. 
A PCR approach to history appropriates Wright’s stress upon the narrative characteristic of 
history in the interpretation of the resurrection, focussing upon the theological category of 
‘resurrection of the dead’ and how this category was utilized and developed by the early 
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witnesses of Jesus’ resurrection. This also incorporates the contributions of recent New 
Testament scholarship on the role of memory in the preservation and interpretation of historical 
events. History is both preserved in and distorted by memory, and how one remembers the past 
is dependent upon the present, and is further preserved within a community. As with the 
insistence that theology cannot be divorced from history, neither can the New Testament texts 
be divided into ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ material, but rather the accounts of Jesus’ life and 
fate, within a PCR framework, are a dynamic balance, a dialectical tension, between the 
objective event and its subjective interpretation, interpretation which is re-interpreted as it is 
remembered in new and changing contexts.  
4.2. Theology Within History 
The first section of this chapter considers the challenge levelled against the notion of a 
historical resurrection on the grounds that the disciplines of history and theology must remain 
methodologically distinct. Theological questions transcend historical inquiry, and so the 
resurrection cannot be a matter of history. This separation reduces history to objectivity and 
theology to subjectivity; theological notions such as resurrection are consigned to the realm of 
faith. In removing the resurrection from historical consideration it no longer bears continuity 
with empirical reality, but to emphasize its historical nature and compare it to ordinary events 
its discontinuous elements are minimized. The tension here is clear: to stress the continuous is 
to minimize the discontinuous, and to stress the discontinuous is to minimize the continuous; 
yet both must be upheld. Within a PCR framework, history and theology are balanced in a 
reciprocal tension, prioritizing neither.  
In the following I analyse the historical and philosophical roots of this separation between 
history and theology, followed by the attempts of Pannenberg and Wright to reconcile these 
disciplines, the former claiming that history is the locus of divine revelation and Wright 
151 
 
maintaining that history informs theology. In both cases, the anthropocentric nature of the 
interpretation and communication of history is stressed, both arguing that God acts within 
contingent history. The resurrection, they claim, is a matter of public opinion and debate. 
Despite their valuable contributions, they ultimately prioritize history, ignoring the theological 
presuppositions of the historian. However, I believe that they have mounted a compelling case 
against those who would separate theological questions from historical inquiry. The PCR that 
I am advocating as an appropriate framework for acknowledging the dialectical tension within 
the resurrection between the continuous and discontinuous as a reflection of the Jewish 
eschatological hope for the renewal and transformation of creation (an event that exceeds the 
scope of personal reanimation) benefits from an engagement with Panneneberg and Wright’s 
arguments, though they have not gone far enough. As in the postfoundationalist stress upon the 
reciprocal balance between the external and internal, PCR balances theology and history, that 
the interpretation and communication of events – by the original witnesses and contemporary 
historian today – is influenced, and to a degree constructed, by the prior beliefs, worldview, 
and contextually conditioned categories of understanding. 
Resurrection and the Realm of Faith 
For almost as long as critical methods have been applied to the question of the resurrection has 
the resurrection been removed from the intellectual category, or realm, of history. Chapter one 
highlighted how many scholars sought to separate the discipline of history from theology, that 
the task of history remain wholly ‘objective,’ whereas theology and faith are relegated to the 
purely subjective. Since Lessing’s ‘ugly great ditch,’ which divorced historical events from 
universal truths, it became almost universal to assert that Jesus’ resurrection was a matter of 
faith and not of contingent history. Theological claims and religious faith cannot rest upon an 
event such as the resurrection that cannot be verified historically. In the following I will 
demonstrate that within a PCR framework, such a separation is unneeded and methodologically 
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impossible, for one cannot remove the accounts of historical events from the socially 
conditioned worldview of the one recounting said events. As Wright put it, history is the 
“meaningful narrative of events.”1 Furthermore, this division between history and theology is 
essentially foundationalist, presupposing the need for faith to have a single, universal 
foundation.  
Removing the resurrection from the realm of contingent history and isolating it to the 
ambiguous realm of faith has been exceedingly common in the past few centuries. As noted in 
chapter one, following Lessing, Strauss insisted that the resurrection was a religious experience 
couched in mythological language, reflected by Kähler and Bultmann’s insistence that the 
historical Jesus is beyond the historian’s grasp, shrouded within an impenetrable fog of myth. 
The task of the historian, then, is to ‘demythologize’ the narratives to determine precisely what 
happened. For Troeltsch, history is homogenous and everything that does not have a 
contemporary analogy becomes simply a matter of faith; and for Barth, the New Testament 
authors were concerned with a decision of faith, not of historical knowledge. For Brunner, the 
resurrection is inaccessible without faith, for faith cannot be established upon “anything so 
unsafe as historical science.”2 The separation is still clearly evident, for it implies that the 
resurrection is un-historical. This is further seen in Tillich, Bornkamm, and Marxsen, who 
stressed the existential experience of the resurrection and that the evangelists were primarily 
witnessing to Jesus’ messianic nature, as opposed to presenting historical biography. 
Schillebeeckx summarizes these concerns best, when he claims, “Historical study of Jesus is 
extremely important, it gives a concrete content of faith, but it can never be a verification of 
 
1 Wright, NTPG, 82 (original emphasis).  
2 Brunner, The Mediator, 156.  
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the faith.” 3 In each case, the historical value of the resurrection is diminished, its continuous 
nature discarded, the gap between theology and history solidifying.  
As argued in chapter two, the presupposed epistemic foundationalism is the cause of this 
division, seen explicitly in this instance in those, like Brunner and Schillebeeckx, who refuse 
to allow history to become a foundation for faith. It is impossible to separate the objective and 
subjective; history is never so simple as pure objective observation. Within a PCR framework, 
history, as will be developed further throughout this chapter, is a dynamic tension between the 
external event and its interpretation, recollection, and communication. It does not seek a single 
foundation upon which to justify faith or theology, and so does not segregate the resurrection 
from historical research on the basis that it is a matter solely of faith. Socially conditioned 
worldviews, prior beliefs, and categories of understanding (including language itself) cannot 
be wrenched from the retelling of an event, and so theology cannot be divorced from history. 
If the resurrection does indeed bear a dialectic tension between the continuous and 
discontinuous; it must in some sense have occurred within time and space, but this can only be 
understood within the contextually mediated categories through which it was interpreted. I 
return to this in §4.3 when discussing method, but for now I note that the resurrection cannot 
be compartmentalized to either history or theology, or be relegated to the realm of faith. 
Resurrection and the Third Millennium  
David Bruce has observed a movement in recent historical Jesus research toward reconciling 
this division. The scholars within this movement he labels as ‘Third Millennials,’ who have 
challenged the seclusion of the resurrection from historical research, a movement “that does 
not firewall history off from philosophy and theology.”4 One of these Third Millennials is Alan 
 
3 Schillebeeckx, Jesus, 73-74. 
4 David Bruce, The Resurrection of History: History, Theology, and the Resurrection of Jesus (Eugene: Wipf and 
Stock, 2014), 110.  
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Padgett, who published an essay in an interdisciplinary symposium addressing the resurrection 
entitled “Advice for Religious Historians: On the Myth of the Purely Historical Jesus.” In this 
essay he argues that there is no such thing as a purely objective approach to historical studies 
for there is no such thing as value-neutral methodology. He cites Habermas and Marxsen as 
examples of some who have attempted to overcome personal prejudice and bias for a neutral 
scientific method. However, they both arrive at entirely opposite conclusions regarding the 
resurrection (as we saw in chapter two), indicating that such neutrality is in fact impossible. 
This further illustrates the difficulties of foundationalism, in its belief in universal observation, 
whereas, as seen in Habermas and Marxsen, different people regularly interpret the same 
evidence in different ways. While reaffirming the possibility of the historian dealing with 
external reality, Padgett recognizes the influence of personal prejudice and asserts the need to 
embrace subjectivity, rather than attempting absolute objectivity.5 This evidently accords with 
the postfoundationalist tension between subject and object, which we will see is also reflected 
in other scholars, including Pieter Craffert and biblical scholars employing social memory 
theory such as Dale Allison and Chris Keith.  
Bruce includes Wright within this broader movement, for whom a central goal has been to 
reconcile the disciplines of history and theology. This has become more explicit in recent 
publications, but he states in Paul and the Faithfulness of God, regarding all the volumes of 
his Christian Origins and the Question of God series, “The volumes are designed to form 
neither a ‘New Testament Theology’ nor a ‘New Testament History’, but a kind of dialogue 
between the two.”6 The two, he argues, “do not stand alone.”7 This is not merely to say that 
they complement one another, that through understanding the theology of the past we can have 
 
5 Allan G. Padgett, “Advice for Religious Historians: On the Myth of the Purely Historical Jesus,” in The 
Resurrection: ed. Davis, 287-307. 
6 Wright, PFG, xvii.  
7 Ibid., 25.  
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a fuller historical picture. This is true, but the two have a much more intimate connection. He 
argues that we can glean some knowledge of God from contingent historical research. God, he 
insists, intervened – and intervenes – in contingent history, in the world, and so history is, 
therefore, intimately connected to revelation;8 “Christian faith is public truth. Christianity 
appeals to history; to history it must go.”9 
Wright expressly attempts to avoid collapsing either history or theology into the other, but has 
“tried to avoid history becoming a slave of theology or vice versa.”10 To separate the two is to 
lead toward either a form of Deism on the one hand, or a supernaturalism where God bypasses 
history on the other. They must instead go together.11 Despite this, however, historical research 
can never result in proving God. God continues to act within history, but historical research 
will never fully reveal God. Rather, history can only partially point to a ‘rumour.’12 Of course, 
this presupposes the existence of God and his activity within temporality, a presupposition 
which must be acknowledged – and a PCR framework stresses the role of personal 
presuppositions, rather than attempting to sidestep them. In the context of this particular thesis, 
a systematic theological project – and hence one in dialogue with theologians (particularly with 
those with an interest in history) and not historians per se – the existence of God is presupposed.  
For Wright, a significant reason why theology can never be divorced from history is because 
of the anthropocentric nature of history. History is not a neutral, objective task. This neutrality 
“was itself an Enlightenment fiction, generating the spurious belief that one might approach 
the New Testament through a supposedly neutral ‘history’, and then, when the ‘facts’ or at least 
 
8 Neill and Wright, The Interpretation of the New Testament, 1861-1986, 311-12. Wright elsewhere proclaims, 
“History prevents faith from becoming fantasy. Faith prevents history becoming antiquarianism” (Marcus J. Borg 
and N. T. Wright, The Meaning of Jesus: Two Visions (New York: HarperOne, 1999), 26).  
9 Wright, “Whence and Whither Historical Jesus Studies in the Life of the Church?”, 127. Original emphasis.  
10 Wright, PFG, 67.  
11 Wright, RSG, 5. Cf. N. T. Wright, “The Resurrection and the Postmodern Dilemma,” STRev 41, no. 2 (1998), 
141-56. Also cf. L. W. Hurtado, “The Resurrection of the Son of God: Christian Origins and the Question of God, 
Volume Three, by N. T. Wright,” ExpTim 115, no. 3 (2003), 83; Heilig and Heilig, “Historical Methodology,” 
115.  
12 Wright, RSG, 11.  
156 
 
the ‘data’ have been cleaned up historically, venture upon the further task of a ‘theological’ 
reading.”13 Historical research is interested not just in the ‘what’ but the ‘why’ of historical 
events, which involves understanding the people and their worldviews, and in order to 
understand these, it is vital to understanding their aims and beliefs, their presuppositions, 
prejudices, and biases. Furthermore, the primary source for Christian origins is the New 
Testament, which is a largely theological collection of texts. A central purpose for the writing 
of the New Testament was to communicate something that was seen to be theologically 
significant.14 
Wright could be charged with not developing a theological methodology comprehensively 
enough, for although he wishes to draw the two together, theology seems to be of diminished 
importance, functioning merely as foil to the discipline of history. Of course, this might be due 
to him being a New Testament scholar and historian rather than systematic theologian, but if 
he wishes to draw the two together more comprehensively he needs to develop a sophisticated 
theological methodology, and explicitly denote how this relates to history and to our 
understanding of God today, rather than a limited investigation into what the early Christians 
thought about God. His concern for doing history is, after all, fundamentally theological, to 
ensure Christianity is “not based on a mistake.”15 
Samuel Adams has recently criticized Wright on this relationship between theology and 
history. He argues that Wright has dichotomized history and theology and has insisted upon 
the priority of history. I agree that Wright methodologically prioritizes history, but it seems 
 
13 Wright, PFG, 55.  
14 Wright, NTPG, 95-96, 139.  
15 N. T. Wright, “The Historical Jesus and Christian Theology,” STRev 39, no. 4 (1996), 404. In PFG, Wright 
argues that part 3, chapters 9 – 11, on theology, form the climax of the book, again demonstrating his desire to 
connect theology with history. Cf. Sven Ensminger, who similarly argues that Wright’s methodology stumbles 
with regard to theology, that Wright is holding biblical studies and theology at arm’s length, and has thus been 
forced to determine certain categories to focus upon, namely monotheism, election, and eschatology. He has 
invariably excluded multiple other possible categories and divine attributes, such as the theme of grace (Sven 
Ensminger, “Barth, Wright, and Theology,” in God and the Faithfulness of Paul, ed. Christopher Heilig, J. 
Thomas Hewitt and Michael F. Bird (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017), 646-47).  
157 
 
Adams has not grasped Wright’s attempt to draw history and theology together. For Adams, 
Wright’s fundamental error is in his epistemological formulation of critical realism, 
particularly the assertion that Christian truth is public truth. He states, “Christian theology, 
according to Wright, is determined as a discipline according to the epistemological 
commitments of [critical realism], commitments that are not derived theologically. Rather, they 
are based upon an account of the general way in which humans know things.”16 Wright’s 
emphasis upon worldviews and stories leads Adams to the conclusion that for Wright all history 
and theology is merely talk about talk. All we know is what other people have said and thus, 
“No theology can ever claim first-order status since it is always caught within the complexities 
of worldviews.”17 He acknowledges Wright’s attempt to reconcile theology and history, but 
insists that in practice Wright’s “historical method overtakes his theological commitment.”18 
Adams claims the contrary, that theology has logical and chronological priority over history. 
He argues that what theologians do best is “allow the reality of God to determine their method 
and attempt to conform their formulations and systems as best they can to this reality,” and that 
to do otherwise is “to conform God to human formulations and limits.”19 A proper methodology 
“begins with the material content of revelation and orders an epistemology around that content, 
especially the divine object of knowledge.”20 Knowledge of God cannot be dissected out of 
history; we cannot work our way up, if you will, to God, but require God to come to us. This 
concern is shared by Sven Ensminger, who implores Wright to learn from Barth’s doctrine of 
revelation, which stresses divine initiative, arguing that Wright reduces religion to a purely 
historical dimension.21 Furthermore, “While these ‘human’ concerns” – the historical 
 
16 Samuel V. Adams, The Reality of God and Historical Method: Apocalyptic Theology in Conversation with N. 
T. Wright (Downers Grove: IVP, 2015), 55.  
17 Ibid., 56. He further argues, “Wright’s account of theology is an account that is primarily concerned with human 
discourse regarding human discourse” (p. 57).  
18 Ibid., 65.  
19 Ibid., 17.  
20 Ibid., 66.  
21 Ensminger, “Barth, Wright, and Theology,” 655.  
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examination of worldviews – “are not in and of themselves unimportant, if they are the sole 
point of emphasis, the result is something that resembles theology yet does not have God at its 
center.”22 
I agree with Adams’ assessment that, as noted, Wright has not connected theology and history 
sufficiently, and that his main focus is history. It is not particularly clear how Wright then 
moves from history to theology. He affirms that history informs theology, revealing the broader 
narrative of Israel’s relationship with her God, but how precisely history is a medium of 
revelation is unclear. For Wright, Christian truth is public truth, but – and this too is a problem 
for Pannenberg, as will be observed – how does one determine which parts of history are 
Christian? The point is that those who stress an emphasis upon historical research face the 
difficult task of determining which parts of history are revelatory. Wright does not claim that 
all of history is revelatory, just that some parts are, but he does not make it clear how one 
determines which parts. This is the strength of the third millennials, such as Padgett and 
Craffert, and an example of where Wright’s critical realism is not critical enough: history may 
indeed inform theology, but theology informs history. Put differently, the determination of the 
significance of particular contingent historical events depends upon the prior theological 
convictions of the historian. Furthermore, Adams’ concern that method correspond with the 
particular object of inquiry reflects the critical realism of McGrath and Andrew Wright, for a 
universal methodology is impossible and a fleeting foundationalist hope.  
However, I take issue with a few of Adams’ points. I am not convinced that Adams has allowed 
for Wright’s critical realism, that Wright is attempting to find a mediating position between 
external object and internal interpretation, which translates to his historical methodology as 
taking seriously the worldviews which frame interpretation. History and theology cannot, for 
 
22 Ibid., 656.  
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Wright, be reduced to talk about talk, and I cannot agree that this anthropocentricity invariably 
removes God from the equation. Historical events, including any perceived divine activity, is 
mediated through this talk. Adams’ alternative, to prioritize knowledge of God, beginning with 
revelation and then moving to history, arguably swings too far to the other extreme, capitulating 
to the theo-foundationalism discussed in §3.3, which I argued was ultimately impossible.  A 
PCR approach must acknowledge these concerns, balancing the tension between history and 
theology without prioritizing either. How this is done will become clearer throughout this 
chapter.  
Resurrection and Universal History 
Pannenberg might be categorized within this third millennialism in that he, even more strongly 
than Wright, attempts to connect history with theology in his understanding of revelation. What 
prevents this categorization, however, is Pannenberg’s reversion to a foundationalist 
universalism in his argument, explored below, that historical revelation “has universal 
character.”23 Wright’s problem, in asserting that Christian truth is public, is in distinguishing 
universal history from redemptive history. This problem is even more significant in 
Pannenberg’s thought, for he connects revelation and history much more intensively. We 
examined Pannenberg’s epistemology in the previous chapter, where he argued for a 
postfoundationalism that maintains a balance between the external and internal and is 
characterised by a reciprocity between multiple factors, as opposed to founding knowledge on 
a single belief, or prioritizing a particular experience or discipline. It is vital to recognize that 
this epistemology developed over the course of his academic career, and some of his earlier 
propositions do not consistently maintain this balance. His doctrine of revelation is one such 
instance, as is his early proposal of a Christology from below, which will be discussed in §4.3.  
 
23 Pannenberg, RAH, 135-39.  
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Pannenberg’s understanding of history is inseparable from his doctrine of revelation, which he 
argues is an indirect self-revelation of God within history. Indeed, history is revelation. God is 
discerned not from a direct revelation – perhaps an explicit, face-to-face encounter with God, 
or treating the words of Scripture as coming directly from God’s mouth – or a subjective 
encounter with the Holy Spirit, but through retrospection, observing God’s involvement in 
human history, particularly regarding his making and fulfilling promises. Knowledge of God 
is not hidden, provided to a privileged few, but is public and open to anyone. A brief 
examination of his understanding of history and revelation is fruitful for developing a PCR 
integration of history and theology.  
The first issue for Pannenberg was the reaffirmation of the nature of revelation as the self-
revelation of God’s being, reiterating Barth’s argument that knowledge of God is impossible 
unless it comes from God himself, for God ontologically transcends creation.24 This revelation 
is, Barth maintains, found primarily in the person of Jesus who by his inherent divinity is the 
“objective reality of divine revelation.”25 Pannenberg argues in Systematic Theology: 
Human knowledge of God can be a true knowledge that corresponds to the divine reality only if it 
originates in the deity itself. God can be known only if he gives himself to be known. …If the 
knowledge of God be understood in such a way that in our own strength we can wrest from deity the 
secret of its nature, deity is lacking from the very outset. This kind of knowledge would not be 
knowledge of God, for it would contradict the concept of God.26 
However, he lamented that this self-revelation had become so “strictly understood that it is no 
longer permissible to think of a medium of revelation that is distinct from God himself.”27 
Instead, his interpretation of the Old Testament portrayal of Israel’s relationship with God is 
one that stresses the historical activity of God. The recognition of YHWH’s lordship and 
Israel’s commitment to obeying YHWH “was effected by the evidence of historical facts that 
 
24 Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. 2.1, 182-83.  
25 Ibid., vol. 1.2, 25. 
26 Pannenberg, ST, vol. 1, 189.  
27 Pannenberg, RAH, 4-5.  
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brought about salvation.”28 This is especially evident in the references to the Exodus, such as 
Deuteronomy 4.37-40, wherein after the Israelites were reminded that they were brought out 
of Egypt ‘with his own presence’ and ‘by his great power,’ they are commanded to obey 
‘today.’ For Pannenberg, this demonstrates that God’s authority is grounded in the historical 
action of vindicating his people.29 
The two most significant expositions of his understanding of revelation of God as indirectly 
imparted via history are found in his 1959 essay, ‘Redemptive Event and History,’ and the 
collection of essays he edited in 1961, including his own ‘Dogmatic Theses on the Doctrine of 
Revelation,’ in Revelation as History.30 In the former he claimed, “History is the most 
comprehensive horizon of Christian theology,” and that all theological statements be framed 
by the historical relationship between God and humanity.31 This stress on history was taken up 
in the latter, where he proposed seven theses regarding the historical nature of revelation. It is 
not necessary to discuss each of these seven theses, for the focus of the present section is upon 
the nature of history rather than the theological doctrine of revelation, but I highlight the third 
thesis, which states, “In distinction from special manifestations of the deity, the historical 
revelation is open to anyone who has eyes to see. It has universal character.”32 Pannenberg 
argues in this thesis that a revelation divorced from natural knowledge distorts historical 
revelation. If knowledge of God is available only to some, and not to all, this knowledge 
becomes a secret knowledge and the “church becomes a gnostic community.”33 This does not 
mean that knowledge of God comes through human reason, which he adamantly denies, but 
that knowledge of God cannot be separated from natural knowledge. We here see the 
 
28 Ibid., 126. 
29 Ibid.  
30 The former first appeared in English in 1963, and the latter in 1968.  
31 Pannenberg, “Redemptive Event and History,” 15.  
32 Pannenberg, RAH, 135-39. The first thesis has already been addressed, dealing with the indirectness of God’s 
self-revelation mediated through history.  
33 Ibid., 137.  
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postfoundationalist dialectic that we noted in §3.3, a reciprocal tension between human reason 
and God’s self-revelation. However, is this postfoundationalism consistent in his argument? 
Carl Braaten notes that this particular thesis received the most criticism. Lothar Steiger’s early 
criticism is one such example, who argues that Pannenberg has rationalized faith, stating that 
faith “cannot be partners with a certainty arising from revelation-history,” and that “the element 
of knowing which faith has in itself cannot be separated from faith and moved over into the 
realm of rational intelligibility.”34 This reflects the arguments of a theo-foundationalism, and 
has misunderstood Pannenberg, who expressly states that “no one comes to the knowledge of 
God by his own reason or strength.”35 Braaten correctly maintains that for Pannenberg reason 
does not replace faith, or that faith can be manufactured apart from God, but that Pannenberg’s 
emphasis is upon the medium of the knowledge of God being indirect, and thus consequently 
cannot be private.36  
However, the more significant issue for Pannenberg is that he makes no explicit distinction 
between universal history and what constitutes revelatory history. He implies that there is, in 
fact, no distinction, and that all of history is indeed revelatory. In his ‘Redemptive Event and 
History,’ he posits, “The symphony of all human life” witnesses to God,37 and that “redemptive 
history…essentially includes all events.”38 This is a tough pill to swallow. One could read from 
this that God doesn’t necessarily reveal himself in each individual moment or event, but that, 
in a perhaps panentheistic sense or reflecting his Hegelian influence (though he would reject 
panentheism and Hegelianism), God draws all things (sub ratione Dei) together in a broader 
 
34 Lothar Steiger, “Revelation-History and Theological Reason: A Critique of the Theology of Wolfhart 
Pannenberg,” in History and Hermeneutic, ed. Robert W. Funk, trans. Joseph C. Weber (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 
1967), 105. Laurence Wood similarly argued at a later date that Pannenberg had made the Bible simply a historical 
resource instead of a kerygmatic tool (Laurence W. Wood, “History and Hermeneutic: A Pannenbergian 
Perspective,” Wesleyan Theological Journal 16, no. 1 (1981), 12).  
35 Pannenberg, RAH, 137.  
36 Carl E. Braaten, “The Current Controversy on Revelation: Pannenberg and his Critics,” JR 45, no. 3 (1965), 
228.  
37 Pannenberg, “Redemptive Event and History,” 38. My emphasis.  
38 Ibid., 32. My emphasis. Cf. Pannenberg, ST, vol. 1, 193ff. and vol. 3, 642ff.  
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mosaic to reveal his deity. That is, the word ‘all’ does not mean ‘every,’ but is used in a 
cumulative sense, as in ‘totality.’ This might be agreeable, but I do not think that Pannenberg 
makes this clear, and from these quotes, he seems to suggest that each individual event in 
history could be revelatory. The problem with this (apart from the ethical considerations of 
whether or not God could be revealed in the atrocities of history), has to do with the universal 
nature of this revelation. On the one hand, I agree that revelation cannot be private, but to claim 
that it is ‘open to anyone who has eyes to see’ and has universal character sounds untenably 
positivistic and foundationalist. He seems to imply that anyone who looks at the evidence will 
come to the same interpretation of the data. His later Systematic Theology unfortunately did 
not address this problem, simply reiterating the indirectness and historically-situated nature of 
revelation.39  
A PCR consideration of the resurrection neither removes the resurrection from history nor 
treats it as an ordinary historical event, neither relies on faith to interpret the resurrection nor 
approaches it apart from recognizing the presupposed beliefs and communally-conditioned 
categories of understanding of either the ones interpreting and communicating the event, or the 
contemporary historian approaching these accounts. Wright and Pannenberg have attempted to 
bridge the gap between history and theology, a gap which presupposes a foundationalist 
epistemology. A PCR framework recognizes the inevitable and inherent anthropocentricity of 
history, that events are experienced and communicated by people within particular historical 
and communal contexts, and interpreted by historians in equally, yet entirely different, socially 
conditioned contexts. Any interpretation of the resurrection must therefore recognize this 
dynamic, prioritizing neither theology nor history, but balancing them in a reciprocal, dialectic 
tension. Furthermore, the resurrection cannot be relegated to the realm of faith, and so the 
arguments against its historicity fall short. To be clear, however, it is not my intention to 
 
39 Pannenberg, ST, vol. 1, 230.  
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attempt to prove the resurrection as a historical event, but to at least argue for its possibility, 
for to deny its historicity is to deny its continuity with empirical reality. Precisely how, then, 
to approach the resurrection as a historical event without reducing it only to a historical event 
is the topic of the next section.  
4.3. History Within Memory 
This chapter has so far considered the relationship between the disciplines of history and 
theology, maintaining that the two cannot be separated due to the personal presuppositions of 
the respective scholars which ultimately shape how they interpret external phenomena. The 
following section is related, examining how the interpretation of an event is framed and 
influenced by the personal presuppositions of the original witnesses.  
First, an analysis of Pannenberg’s Christological methodology – Christology ‘from below’ – 
provides valuable observations about the nature of history and the theological presuppositions 
which influence the communication and interpretations of events within contingent history. 
This approach attempts to discover the brute facts of the historical Jesus as he existed within 
contingent history before moving to theological considerations, especially regarding his unique 
relationship to God. However, Pannenberg quickly recognized the impossibility of such a 
method and sought to balance the theological presuppositions of the historian with the historical 
inquiry itself. When applied to the resurrection, we can recognize that the theological 
presuppositions of the early witnesses to the resurrection and the early Christians who 
proclaimed the event significantly impacted how this event was interpreted. Second, this 
section considers the significance of communal context, arguing that the constructive nature of 
knowledge shapes the interpretation and communication of contingent historical events and 
that, subsequently, history is a human construction. Therefore, history bears a significant 
anthropological character. Finally, a PCR approach to history is presented: methodological 
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guidelines for interpreting the resurrection as a contingent historical event within its communal 
context and how it was remembered and re-interpreted within different and developing 
contexts.  
Christology from Below 
Pannenberg’s historical method is shaped by what is categorized as a Christology ‘from below,’ 
a response to Christologies which presuppose either soteriological concerns or the divinity of 
Jesus. For Pannenberg, these theological concerns should follow the historical study of Jesus 
of Nazareth, not precede it. In his early work, he insists on ‘getting behind’ the New Testament 
texts to discover the historical Jesus. However, this quickly developed as he became aware of 
the impossibility of such an endeavour. He retained a historical emphasis, but his methodology 
developed to being somewhere in between ‘from below’ and ‘from above,’ balancing the two 
and thus reflecting his postfoundationalist epistemology. Where his doctrine of revelation did 
not adequately develop in line with this postfoundationalism, his Christological method, to 
some extent, did, acknowledging the impossibility of separating the historical from the 
theological in the New Testament texts. As will be seen, with a variety of similarly minded 
scholars, this is an essential part of PCR, and will be explored here.  
Pannenberg’s early Christological method is expounded in Jesus – God and Man, which has 
as its central concern the developing of a methodology suited to the justification of Jesus’ 
divinity.40 His turn to Christology and historical inquiry was motivated by a dissatisfaction 
with how Jesus’ divinity had previously been discussed and formulated, particularly in 
existential Christologies which focussed on soteriology, Christologies which merely 
presupposed Jesus’ divinity, approaching the task ‘from above,’ and Christologies which 
 
40 The translation of the title is perhaps something of a misnomer, implying that the main concern of the book had 
to do solely with the incarnation, whereas the original German title, Grundzüge der Christologie, suggests a 
greater emphasis upon methodological concerns. The divinity of Christ certainly has a central position in the book, 
but its core concern is how one can discuss or determine this divinity.  
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presupposed a Chalcedonian model.41 For Pannenberg, who Jesus was in his contingent 
historical and communal context is the presupposition for his significance for us, and thus we 
must first discern the historical Jesus.42 He states: 
Jesus possesses significance ‘for us’ only to the extent that this significance is inherent in himself, in 
his history, and in his person constituted by this history. Only when this can be shown may we be sure 
that we are not merely attaching our questions, wishes, and thoughts to his figure. …Soteriology must 
follow from Christology, not vice versa.43 
Hence, “Christology must start from Jesus of Nazareth, not from his significance for us,” and 
only then can we adequately approach soteriological, or any other theological, concerns.44  
For Pannenberg, determining who this Jesus of Nazareth was requires a Christology ‘from 
below,’ as opposed to a ‘from above’ approach which presupposes Jesus’ divinity. For 
Pannenberg, the essential task of Christology is to determine who Christ was and the nature of 
his relationship with God – this cannot be presupposed. Rather than a Christology ‘from 
above,’ exemplified by Barth, which centralizes the incarnation as the core concern (and, for 
Pannenberg, the core difficulty), a Christology ‘from below’ rises “from the historical man 
Jesus to the recognition of his divinity, [and] is concerned first of all with Jesus’ message and 
fate and arrives at the end at the concept of the incarnation.”45 How the divine Logos assumes 
human form in the incarnation is, he argues, an irreconcilable difficulty in a Christology ‘from 
above,’ which became the primary difficulty of a Christology presupposing a Chalcedonian 
formula, which I will address below. He provides three arguments against a Christology ‘from 
 
41 We should also note that his stress upon historical Jesus research was also driven by his theology of history and 
revelation. When we understand his argument that history is the primary locus for theological knowledge, we 
understand more readily why he maintained a focus upon the historical Jesus.  
42 Pannenberg, JGM, 21. Timothy Bradshaw explains, “Pannenberg again concludes that we must focus on the 
person of Jesus himself, the historical figure, rather than his effects on us. …Objective fact with meaning must 
precede our subjective experiences of this content of faith for theology. He turns to Jesus through historical 
scholarship, but with a wide philosophical lens which takes in the relationship of Jesus with God; this must be 
discussed first, before any claim to his fulfilling human existence in general can be considered” (Bradshaw, 
Pannenberg, 69).  
43 Pannenberg, JGM, 33.  
44 Ibid., 34-35.  
45 Ibid., 15. Cf. McClean, From the Future, 91. However, this sounds remarkably as though he is presupposing 
Jesus’ divinity.  
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above’: it presupposes Jesus’ divinity, it minimizes and obscures the particularity of the human 
Jesus in his historical context, and requires “standing in the position of God himself in order to 
follow the way of God’s Son into the world.”46 
Pannenberg particularly criticized Chalcedonian Christology for its ambiguous presentation of 
Jesus’ divinity, and its enduring influence upon modern theologians who have assumed a 
similar position. The fifth century council at Chalcedon affirmed a two-nature doctrine, that 
there exists within Christ a divine and human nature united in the one person (hypostasis). 
These two natures are unmixed and unchanged; undivided and inseparable.47 For Pannenberg, 
this formula was little more than a compromise between the opposing Alexandrian and 
Antiochian Christologies, the former tending to emphasize the divinity and the latter the 
humanity of Jesus.48 The Chalcedonian formula did not, however, solve the dilemma of the 
incarnation, and indeed any Christology which presupposes Jesus’ divinity and assumes a two-
nature doctrine faces insurmountable anthropological, theological, and philosophical 
challenges when addressing the incarnation. For Pannenberg, “two substances coming together 
to emerge as one individual is problematic,”49 and thus “either the two will be mixed to form a 
third or the individuality, Jesus’ concrete living unity, will be ruptured.”50 How can the two 
natures become one person without either creating a third person or compromising one of those 
two natures?  The ambiguity in such a formulation and the appeal to mystery is excessively 
fideistic. If Jesus existed, it is indisputable that he was human, and therefore, insists 
 
46 Pannenberg, JMG, 18. Elizabeth Johnson notes, “Despite the dominance which this approach has enjoyed, 
Pannenberg brings it under fire mainly because it presupposes the divinity of Jesus Christ which it is the very task 
of Christology to substantiate” (Elizabeth A. Johnson, “The Ongoing Christology of Wolfhart Pannenberg,” 
Horizons 9, no. 2 (1982), 242).  
47 James Leo Garrett Jr., “Reappraisal of Chalcedon,” Review & Expositor 71, no. 1 (1974), 37; Harry R. Boer, A 
Short History of the Early Church (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1976), 171-72. 
48 Pannenberg, JGM, 324.  
49 Ibid., 321. 
50 Ibid., 323-24. 
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Pannenberg, his humanity must be the starting point, and only when one has considered this 
human Jesus in his historical context can the question of his divinity be addressed.51 
Pannenberg argued that the Chalcedonian formula, and Christologies ‘from above’ which 
followed it, lean toward either a semblance of Nestorianism on the one hand, or Docetism on 
the other, and that, as McClean explains, “if the human nature of Christ has a personal 
experience only in union with the divine person then the free humanity of Jesus will never be 
properly affirmed.”52 Pannenberg therefore concludes, “The dilemma…is insoluble so long as 
Christology is developed from the concept of the incarnation, instead of culminating in the 
assertion of the incarnation as its concluding statement.”53 Instead, Christology must begin 
‘from below,’ searching for the historical Jesus in the particularity of his historical context, 
seeking to “go behind the New Testament to the base to which it points and which supports 
 
51 Chalcedonian Christology has, historically, been the most prominent Christological formulation, and has gone 
largely uncriticised. However, Pannenberg has not been the only one to question this formula. The Kenotic 
theology of the nineteenth century challenged the two natures, arguing instead for two ‘movements’: humiliation 
and glorification. Some, such as Adolf Harnack, have argued that the language utilized by the council is 
fundamentally Hellenistic and philosophical, irreconcilable with biblical language (Donald Macleod, “The 
Christology of Wolfhart Pannenberg,” Themelios 25, no. 2 (2000), 41). William Baker has listed criticisms of 
Chalcedonian Christology including its lack of definition of key terms (such as ‘person’ and ‘nature’), of 
articulation of Christ’s pre-existence, of reference to Jesus’ historical or public life, and of specification of how 
the overlapping of natures might actually operate. He further argues, “Two complete and separate natures in Christ 
only works if it is first asserted that God and man have absolutely nothing in common,” yet “humankind is made 
in the image of God,” and thus the Chalcedonian formulation of hypostasis is infeasible (William R. Baker, “The 
Chalcedon Definition, Pauline Christology, and the Postmodern Challenge of ‘From Below’ Christology,” Stone-
Campbell Journal 9, no. 1 (2006), 81-83). John Breck argues that Chalcedonian Christology has been 
characterized, on the one hand, as ‘crypto-monophysitism’ for it presents a Jesus who looks very much like a 
human but underneath is divine, thus making his humanity suspect, and, on the other, as guilty of Docetism for 
Jesus only appears to assume flesh (John Breck, “Reflections on the ‘Problem’ of Chalcedonian Christology,” St 
Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 33, no. 2 (1989), 147). Schleiermacher questioned the internal contradictions 
of the formula, and other nineteenth and twentieth century theologians and philosophers argued that the language 
itself is contradictory to orthodox understandings of the Trinity, and this understanding is dismissive of other 
religions (Mark S. G. Nestlehutt, “Chalcedonian Christology: Modern Criticism and Contemporary Ecumenism,” 
JES 35, no. 2 (1998), 175-76).  
52 McClean, From the Future, 92-93.  
53 Pannenberg, JGM, 329. Bradshaw similarly argues, “The history of the Chalcedonian mode of Christology, 
however remodelled by such theological doctors as Karl Barth, fails to overcome the dilemma of divine-human 
contradiction in Christ. There can be no true integration of the divine in the human under the Chalcedonian model” 
(Bradshaw, Pannenberg, 96).  
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faith in Jesus,”54 without presupposing the divinity of Jesus, but instead “grounding it in the 
activity and fate of Jesus in the past.”55 
A pure Christology from below is, however, methodologically impossible. Attempts at ‘going 
behind’ the New Testament texts to discover the ‘historical’ Jesus as he was within temporal 
time and space is, as has been demonstrated earlier, a contentious issue, and we will see below 
how recent New Testament scholarship has continued to shift and develop its own 
methodological approaches in ways that change the kind of Jesus it is possible to reconstruct. 
The core issue of a Christology from below is the erroneous belief that it is possible to glean 
from our limited source material the mythological, the embellishment, and the theological 
development, and be left with the purely historical, or what ‘actually happened.’ I will return 
to this at a later stage, but for now I will echo Luke Timothy Johnson’s argument that there is 
a ‘resurrection bias’ in the New Testament texts, that they were written post-resurrection and 
thus the resurrection provides the perspective from which these texts were written and 
influences not simply the selection of the stories but the very shaping of these stories.56  
The texts themselves comprise our primary sources regarding the life of Jesus, but these are 
inherently and irreducibly products of the faith of the early church. This is not to say that there 
is no historical value in the texts, but that the New Testament includes the theological 
presuppositions of early Christianity, and thus the intention of a Christology from below to 
avoid presuppositions is unattainable. Donald Macleod argues similarly, that the faith of the 
interpreter precludes the possibility of this methodology which requires initially treating Jesus 
 
54 Pannenberg, JGM, 11.  
55 Ibid., 10. Pannenberg particularly highlights Ritschl, Herrmann, Elert, Althaus, Brunner, Gogarten, and Ebeling 
with developing this Christology ‘from below’ (Pannenberg, JGM, 50). Cf. Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, Christology: 
A Global Introduction (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 156.  
56 Luke Timothy Johnson, “Learning the Human Jesus: Historical Criticism and Literary Criticism,” in The 
Historical Jesus: Five Views, ed. James K. Beilby and Paul Rhodes Eddy (Downers Grove: IVP, 2009), 164-65.  
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as a “mere man” and “without any recourse to the hypothesis of his divinity.”57 However, this 
doesn’t entail recourse to a Christology from above, as Macleod implores.  
Pannenberg himself acknowledges the difficulties of a Christology from below. In the 
postscript to the fifth German edition of Jesus – God and Man, published in 1976 (12 years 
after the first German publication), Pannenberg states, “My own understanding of Christology 
has advanced considerably during this decade,” treating Christology from below as a “general 
framework,” and stressing the provisional character of this method. He particularly notes that 
the presupposition of the reality of God in Christology is a limitation in the ‘from below’ 
approach.58 In conjunction with the development of his anthropology and view of universal 
history in various other publications, his Christology developed, and his Systematic Theology 
reflects a postfoundationalist desire to uphold the need for historical research while 
acknowledging the communal context within which the New Testament was written – 
including, in Johnson’s language, a ‘resurrection bias’ – and the subjective influence of the 
historian’s presuppositions.59 
In Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology, both anthropology and Christology comprise the same 
chapter, reflecting a much closer relationship between the two not present in his earlier 
Christology. He still maintains a Christology from below, arguing, “All Christological 
 
57 Donald Macleod, “The Christology of Wolfhart Pannenberg,” Themelios 25, no. 2 (2000), 20. Of course, one 
might ask whether those without a faith are likewise precluded.  
58 Pannenberg, JGM, 459-60.  
59 Interpretations of this development, and the extent of this development, vary. Commentaries on Pannenberg’s 
methodology following Systematic Theology generally make at least a passing reference to this development, but 
most fail to acknowledge the extent of this development, retaining the language and argument of the earlier JGM 
(Cf. Brian Ebel, A Dialog in the Contrasting Christologies of Anselm of Canterbury and Wolfhart Pannenberg 
(Lexington: Emeth, 2016); Bradshaw, Pannenberg; Kärkkäinen, Christology; McClean, From the Future; Millard 
J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998); Iain Taylor, “How to be a Trinitarian 
Theologian: A Critique of Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology,” SJT 60, no. 2 (2007), 192). Molnar, in 
particular, mentions this development, but argues this development is minimal and, practically and 
methodologically, essentially the same (Molnar, Incarnation & Resurrection, 264-65). Joanna Leidenhag, and 
Stanley Grenz successfully acknowledge this development (Joanna Leidenhag, “Two Accounts of Scientific 
Trinitarian Theology: Comparing Wolfhart Pannenberg’s and T. F. Torrance’s Theological Methodology,” HeyJ 
57, no. 6 (2016), 942; Grenz, Reason for Hope, 797-98). However, F. LeRon Shults’ assessment is the most 
accurate, noting that Pannenberg wants to hold the two movements – a Christology ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ 
– together as mutually conditioning (Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 165-77).  
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statements about Jesus Christ must be vindicated in terms of his historical reality and an 
exposition of it,” and insists that Christology “must begin with the man Jesus and his story and 
consider how he requires and gains our faith.”60 However: 
Only methodologically do we give precedence to arguing from below, presupposing of course, that this 
procedure leads to the conclusion that the concept of incarnation is not a falsification but a pertinent 
development of the meaning implicit in the coming and history of Jesus. In truth, material primacy 
belongs to the eternal Son, who has become man by his incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth.61 
 This is a clear development of the Christology from below presented in Jesus – God and Man, 
further arguing, “We cannot regard a Christology from below as ruling out completely the 
classical Christology of the incarnation,” but that it instead reconstructs and explicates in the 
light of historical research that which this classical Christology presupposed.62 We cannot then 
say that his Christology is either from below or from above, but a postfoundationalist utilization 
of both which he explains is a “real mutual conditioning between an idea of God and a human 
self-understanding.”63  
The point to take from this discussion of Pannenberg’s Christological methodology is the 
reciprocal and postfoundationalist tension between the ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ 
approaches. If we apply this to the question of the resurrection, recalling the above discussion 
of the relationship between history and theology, we can observe two things. First, the 
theological presuppositions held by the witnesses of Jesus’ post-mortem existence, and those 
who communicated this event, significantly influence how this event was interpreted. That is, 
the early Christians remembered and communicated the historical life of Jesus through a 
‘resurrection bias.’ Second, the theological presuppositions held by the contemporary historian 
 
60 Pannenberg, ST, vol. 2, 281-82.  
61 Ibid., vol. 2, 289.  
62 Ibid., vol. 2, 288-89. This is similar to Erickson’s (who downplayed or ignored the development of Pannenberg’s 
Christological methodology) proposal of an “Augustinian” model, where the early church kerygma is the starting 
point, which serves as hypothesis to be assessed by historical-critical methodology (Erickson, Christian Theology, 
690-91). 
63 Pannenberg, ST, vol. 2, 290. Shults is surely correct in his assessment that “from above” and “from below” are 
inseparable (Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 166-68).  
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similarly influences how this event is interpreted. We cannot separate the above from the 
below, and so must not attempt to remove the contextually conditioned categories and 
worldviews from the resurrection narratives, for the former shaped the latter. Further, we will 
see momentarily that the latter then re-shaped the former. This is all to say that the distinction 
between the historical and theological aspects of the resurrection cannot be easily 
distinguished, and we should hold the two in a mutually conditioning tension, as a ‘theologico-
historical’ event of sorts. In the following, we will further explore this relationship between the 
external ‘historical’ event and the internal ‘theological’ presuppositions which frame the 
interpretation of history to consider how an anthropocentric historiography might be applied to 
the resurrection.  
Communal Context 
A PCR approach to history recognizes that the records of historical events are shaped by 
particular humans within particular contexts, and by acknowledging the constructive nature of 
knowledge – that is, prior beliefs, perspectives, prejudices, and worldviews distort and shape 
the experience and interpretation of external reality – we acknowledge that history itself is a 
human construction. The discipline of history is thereby closely related to anthropology and is 
concerned with the forces which acted upon the humans who witnessed, interpreted, and 
communicated these events. Pannenberg and Wright both stress this anthropocentric 
understanding of history, which is analysed in the following section before considering how 
this applies to an exploration of the resurrection within a PCR framework.  
Anthropology is of considerable importance in Pannenberg’s later methodology. It is another 
example of his postfoundationalism, in that knowledge of God begins within human experience 
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but remains irreducibly divine self-revelation.64 There is, for Pannenberg, a reciprocal balance 
between anthropology and systematic theology. He claims that “everybody…works and speaks 
out of his or her own context,”65 and so maintains that “human experience of the world and of 
the individual’s existence…[is] the point of departure for discussing the reality of God.”66 
While anthropology is the methodological starting point, it is not to be understood in a 
foundationalist sense. Neither is the presupposition of the existence of God to function as an 
epistemic foundation. Rather, the relationship between anthropology and systematic theology 
in Pannenberg’s work is one of reciprocity. We saw above how this is reflected in his 
Christology, but he has not allowed this stress upon anthropology to impact his doctrine of 
revelation; though he correctly insists that people interpret experience and speak from within 
their own particular context, his understanding of divine revelation within history retains a 
foundationalist universalism. This was addressed in §4.2. Pannenberg’s model of reciprocity 
is central to PCR, and when turning to history it is vital to treat anthropology, like theology, 
within a mutually conditioning tension with historical inquiry.  
Wright reflects this anthropological concern, insisting that historical research must focus upon 
the worldview which shaped the interpretation, communication, and reception of the event, 
maintaining that history is fundamentally a human construction. Wright’s critical realism 
attempts a mediating position between positivism and phenomenalism, balancing the 
objectivity of external reality with the subjectivity of the interpretation of the experience of that 
reality. Where positivism might stress the historical event divorced from communally 
conditioned values and embellishment, phenomenalism stresses the recording of this event and 
 
64 Shults notes, “Pannenberg’s use of anthropology signals a distinctive attempt to find a way past foundationalism 
without adopting relativism” (Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology, 155).  
65 Wolfhart Pannenberg, “A Response to My American Friends,” in The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, ed. 
Carl E. Braaten and Philip Clayton (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1988), 330.  
66 Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, 11.  
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the reading of this record, without moving beyond this to external reality.67 All history, he 
observes, involves selection, arrangement, and interpretation, and, hence, the ideal of an 
objective history is a myth.68 All history then is “fiction,”69 and it is “chasing after the wind to 
imagine that anyone, ancient or modern, could or can ‘simply record the facts.’”70  
This is not to say that knowledge of past events is impossible, arguing that we “simply can 
write history. We can know things about what has happened in the past.”71 For Wright, though, 
this is not knowing the bruta facta of the past or simply subjective interpretations but “the 
meaningful narrative of events and intentions.”72 Historical inquiry involves the study of 
‘human intentionality,’ to discover why things happened in the way they did and for what 
intended purpose. To do so, the historian must discern the aims, intentions, and motivations of 
those involved.73 This anthropocentricism is an appropriate extension of his critical realism; 
Wright is seeking to understand the events of the past but not in isolation from those who 
 
67 Wright, NTPG, 81-82.  
68 Ibid., 15. David Bebbington states, “Historians are like others in sharing their convictions and prejudices of 
their time and place. …Their basic beliefs about the past, about its shape and meaning, are likely to remain and 
are certain to influence what they write. Objectivity in the sense of detachment is beyond the historian’s power” 
(David Bebbington, Patterns in History: A Christian Perspective on Historical Thought (Leicester: Apollos, 
1991), 16). Cf. E. H. Carr, What is History? 2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 1990), 11; Richard J. Evans, In Defence of 
History, revised ed. (London: Granta, 2000), 224; Ronald A. Wells, History and the Christian Historian (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 1-2. 
69 N. T. Wright, How God Became King: Getting to the Heart of the Gospels (New York: SPCK, 2012), xiii. 
Considering Wright’s quote in the following paragraph that it is possible to write history, this claim that all history 
is ‘fiction’ seems to be a rhetorical overstatement.  
70 Wright, RSG, 85.  
71 Wright, NTPG, 81. This is repeated in his later PFG (p. 50). Cf. N. T. Wright, “Jesus’ Resurrection and Christian 
Origins,” Gregorianum 83, no. 4 (2002), 631-32; O’Collins, Christology, 8. The ancient Roman historian William 
Batstone notes that for many, contra Wright, history simply cannot be done at all; “Having arrived at the 
conclusion that the past does not exist, that we have no access to it and cannot write an objective account of what 
happened, that our linear narratives distort, ahistorically privilege the present, and are inevitably complicit with 
hegemony and violence, why bother to write history at all?” (William W. Batstone, “Postmodern 
Historiographical Theory and the Roman Historians,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Historians, 
ed. Andrew Feldherr (Cambridge: CUP, 2009), 29-30). 
72 Wright, NTPG, 82. Original emphasis. He argues, “There is not, nor can there be, any such thing as a bare 
chronicle of events without a point of view. The great Enlightenment dream of simply recording ‘what actually 
happened’ is just that: a dream. The dreamer is once more the positivist, who, looking at history, believes that it 
is possible to have instant and unadulterated access to ‘events’” (Wright, RSG, 82).  
73 Wright defines ‘aim’ as the broad direction of a person’s life as determined by the mindset or worldview of the 
person, ‘intention’ as the specific application of this aim in any given situation, and ‘motivation’ as the sense that 




enacted, witnessed, or reported these events. However, Wright does not comprehensively 
engage with the well-known difficulties of attempting to determine the ‘intentions’ of an 
author, brought to the fore especially by Wimsatt and Beardsley’s famous essay, “The 
Intentional Fallacy.” They argued that the “design or intention of the author is neither available 
nor desirable as a standard for judging the success of a work of literary art.”74 If meaning is 
found in the intention of the author, a text’s meaning is wholly dependent upon the success of 
the author in communicating that meaning. If the author was unsuccessful, communicating 
something incongruous to what was intended, the meaning of the text is distorted, or, in fact, 
irretrievable. Rather, the text is no longer the property of the author’s or the interpreter’s alone, 
but the public, and has meaning in and of itself.75 This was further professed by poststructuralist 
thinkers, such as Barthes, Derrida, and Foucault, who distrusted the ability of language to 
communicate ‘pure’ meaning; the meaning attached to words is interpreted differently 
according to the various connotations – emotive or cognitive – that the particular person 
attached to that particular word.76  
James Downey presents an interesting argument against the Intentional Fallacy, posing the 
question: what if the author’s intention was (like Salvador Dali) to hide his intention? If the 
author was successful, we would not know, and thus deem it a failure, but if the author was 
unsuccessful, we must again deem it a failure; in either case, the author and text would be 
 
74 W. K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” STRev 54, no. 3 (1946), 468.  
75 Ibid., 468-88. Cf. Robert Wenz’s critical portrayal of the impact of the ‘disease’ of this essay where, as he 
perceives it, words have lost all meaning entirely (Robert Wenz, “‘Truth’ on Two Hills: What Happens when 
Church and Culture Conspire to Ignore the Meaning of Words,” Christianity Today 48, no. 7 (2004), 46-48). This 
is, however, not what the essay claimed. Meaning is not lost entirely, but locus of meaning has shifted from the 
author to the text itself as distinct from the author.  
76 Roland Barthes stated in his 1967 essay, ‘The Death of the Author,’ that “the unity of a text is not in its origin 
but in its destination” and, “In order to restore writing to its future, we must reverse the myth: the birth of the 
reader must be requited by the death of the Author” (Roland Barthes, “The Death of the Author,” in The Rustle of 
Language, trans. Richard Howard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 54-55). Cf. Jacques Derrida, 
“Différance,” in Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 1-
28; Michel Foucault, “What is an Author?” Screen 20, no. 1 (1979), 13-33. Furthermore, Stephen Moore and 
Yvonne Sherwood have claimed that though these critical issues have had a significant impact upon scholarship 
in general, they have largely been avoided within biblical studies (Stephen D. Moore and Yvonne Sherwood, The 
Invention of the Biblical Scholar: A Critical Manifesto (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2011)).  
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considered a failure. Such a response does not entirely dismantle Wimsatt and Beardsley’s 
argument, which Downey was not attempting, but stresses that it cannot be universalized.77 
While it is true that ascertaining the pure intention of the author is neither completely attainable 
nor of primary necessity – what is of utmost importance is what was actually said – a PCR 
framework balances the internal with the external and so acknowledges that the text does 
indeed speak of an external and intelligible event. Indeed, the text may carry unintended 
meaning, or express notions unobserved or uncritiqued by the author (Wright acknowledges 
this78), but this should not mean that what we know of the author or the author’s context does 
not influence the meaning of the text. While we might not rely on discerning the intentions of 
an author we can speak of the broader social and historical forces upon the author which shaped 
the communication of certain events and ideas. In this regard, then, Wright is correct to stress 
the role of worldviews.  
We touched on worldview in §3.4, but it is helpful for a more comprehensive understanding of 
the anthropocentric nature of history as communally conditioned to define this term more 
precisely. For Wright, worldview is defined as “the presuppositional, pre-cognitive stage of a 
culture or society,” comprising “all deep-level human perceptions.”79 Worldviews are 
inescapable and vital, but invisible; “They are that through which, not at which, a society or 
individual normally looks.”80 Wright particularly draws on James Sire, whose definition of 
worldview clarifies Wright’s argument: 
A worldview is a commitment, a fundamental orientation of the heart, that can be expressed as a story 
or in a set of presuppositions (assumptions which may be true, partially true or entirely false) which we 
 
77 James Downey, “A Fallacy in the Intentional Fallacy,” Philosophy and Literature 31, no. 1 (2007): 149-52. Cf. 
Philip Barton Payne, who argued, “In spite of the crucial role the human author’s intention has for the meaning 
of a text his conscious intention does not necessarily exhaust the meaning of his statements, especially in more 
poetic and predictive writings.” His argument, though, that “ultimately God is the author of Scripture, and it is his 
intention alone that exhaustively determines its meaning” is unconvincing, presupposing a strong inerrantist view 
of Scripture (Philip Barton Payne, “Fallacy of Equating Meaning with the Human Author’s Intention,” JETS 20, 
no. 3 (1977), 243.  
78 Wright, NTPG, 66.  
79 Ibid., 122.  
80 Ibid., 125.  
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hold (consciously or subconsciously, consistently or inconsistently) about the basic constitution of 
reality, and that provides the foundation on which we live and move and have our being.81 
Worldviews are underlying perceptions of reality, unique to each individual and culture, which 
influence the stories told, the questions asked, the cultural symbols, and the resultant praxis.82 
A major part of history for Wright is “Seeing with other people’s eyes” worlds which are 
foreign to our own.83 
This sub-section has highlighted the contextually situated nature of any recorded historical 
event, and how the very act of witnessing, interpreting, remembering, and re-telling this event 
is shaped – constructed even – by the communally mediated and socially conditioning prior 
beliefs and worldviews. This is upheld within a PCR approach to the resurrection, which 
highlights both the communal and theological categories that were applied to, and inspired by, 
the event of Jesus’ post-mortem existence, and the event itself which precipitated this 
theological reflection. The following section, building on the discussions of this chapter so far 
– specifically the reciprocal relationship between the disciplines of theology, anthropology, 
and history – offers some particular methodological guidelines championed within PCR for 
interpreting the resurrection as an event that occurred within temporal time and space and 
within its communal and theological context without reducing it to no more than a contingent 
historical event.  
 
81 James W. Sire, Naming the Elephant: Worldview as a Concept (Downers Grove: IVP, 2004). This is repeated 
in Sire’s The Universe Next Door (James W. Sire, The Universe Next Door, 5th ed. (Downers Grove: IVP, 2009), 
20). Cf. David K. Naugle, Worldview: The History of a Concept (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002); Brian Harris, 
The Big Picture: Building Blocks of a Christian Worldview (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2015), 19-20.  
82 Cf. Wright, NTPG, 125-26.  
83 N. T. Wright, Paul and His Recent Interpreters (London: SPCK, 2015), 3-4. James Dunn adopts a similar 
methodology, reappropriating the critical realism of Meyer and Lonergan, noting that “the data themselves are 
never ‘raw’: they have already been ‘selected’ by the historical process; they are ‘selected’ again by the way they 
have been discovered and brought to present notice; they come with a context, or various contexts already 
predisposing interpretation; the interpreter’s framework of understanding or particular thesis causes certain data 
to appear more significant than others; and so on.” Despite this, “The task of seeking to describe and evaluate the 
data and to reach some sort of judgment regarding the facts, which is not merely subjective but may command 




A Postfoundationalist Constructive Realist Method 
So far I have adopted Wright’s critical realism as a basic model and adjusted it to reflect the 
epistemic values of postfoundationalism, resulting in a constructive realism which 
incorporates, on the one hand, the belief in an intelligible external reality and, on the other, the 
constructive nature of knowledge in a reciprocal tension. This chapter has explored how this 
relates to issues of theology and anthropology, arguing that, when approaching the question of 
the historicity of the resurrection one cannot so easily separate theology from history, that the 
preconceived beliefs, prejudices, and contextually conditioned worldviews of the original 
authors, with that of the contemporary scholar interpreting this text, shape how this event is 
understood. Thus, the resurrection cannot be treated as a purely contingent historical event, but 
neither can it be relegated to the subjective realm of faith; preconceived theological notions 
cannot be isolated and divorced from objective inquiry.  
All this is to say that the resurrection cannot be treated purely historically or theologically. 
Rather, we must recognize that the broader category of resurrection, which had enormous 
theological and sociological implications within ancient Jewish eschatology, extends beyond 
an isolated historical event, despite being directly applied to the events surrounding Jesus’ post-
mortem existence. It is a theologico-historical event and to understand it as a historical event 
requires understanding the communally conditioned theological categories and how they were 
utilized and developed by the early witnesses to the resurrection. I return to this in chapter five. 
For now, I assess Wright’s application of critical realism to historical research, which he 
presents as a hypothesis-verification method. I note that, as with his critical realism, his method 
is not critical enough. He treats history as about determining ‘what really happened’ without 
fully integrating the observation – which he himself acknowledges – that history is a human 
construction. A PCR approach re-appropriates his stress upon the narrative characteristic of 
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history while incorporating the contributions of scholars who have engaged in social memory 
research. 
In his NTPG Wright develops a methodology – which he maintains in his later PFG84 – based 
upon his proposal of critical realism which is built around the formulation and verification of 
hypotheses, narratives that explain the accumulated historical data. He describes a critical 
realist historiography as “The application to history of the same overall procedure as is used in 
the hard sciences: not simply the mere assemblage of ‘facts’, but the attempt to make sense of 
them through forming hypotheses and then testing them against the evidence.”85 In this 
description he has distanced himself from other critical realists who argue against a universal 
methodology. It is not immediately clear why a methodology suited to the hard sciences is 
appropriate to the discipline of history. Nevertheless, the notion of hypothesis as an explanatory 
story,86 a narrative which explains the experience of external stimuli, helps locate historical 
knowledge within a provisional and anthropocentric framework. The formulation of a 
hypothesis must follow three rules: it must include all available data without distortion, it must 
convey the simplest and most coherent explanation, and it must also make sense in other areas 
or explain other problems.87 Wright considers a palaeontologist fitting fossils together to 
construct a coherent skeleton: if a few large bones are omitted, the second criterion is favoured 
 
84 Wright, PFG, 52.  
85 Ibid., xviii.  
86 Wright, NTPG, 99. Wright illustrates this with an analogy of seeing a police car speeding down the wrong side 
of a road with its siren blaring. Because this is not a normal sight, evidently something is happening that is out of 
the ordinary. Guesses at what that is can be made: a crime is being committed, or an accident had just occurred. 
Hence, a hypothesis has been formulated, awaiting verification. Next, a fire-engine is heard and a cloud of smoke 
is seen arising from nearby, and thus the hypothesis is modified to incorporate this new data. Of course, the police 
car might have nothing to do with the fire-truck or the cloud of smoke, but it seems more likely to assume the 
simpler explanation, that the police car is heading toward the same location as the fire-truck, to the cloud of smoke 
where an accident has just occurred. Furthermore, this may explain why an explosion was heard five minutes 
earlier.  
87 Licona lists five criteria: explanatory scope, where the hypothesis accounts for all the relevant data; explanatory 
power, where the hypothesis explains the data with as little effort and ambiguity as possible; plausibility, where 
the hypothesis coheres with other accepted truths; less ad hoc, where the hypothesis includes as few assumptions 




at the expense of the first; if all the bones are used, but the skeleton becomes a convoluted 
mess, with seven toes on one foot and eighteen on the other, the first criterion is favoured at 
the expense of the second. Similarly, the historian must not allow either the quest for the 
simplest explanation or the quest for the most data to misconstrue the overall historical task.88 
Where this hypothesis-verification model sets Wright apart from much other Jesus research is 
in this task of formulating a hypothesis before critically examining the minutiae of the data, 
rather than beginning with the determination of the most historically reliable and “critically 
assured” aspects of tradition and building up from this.89 In some sense, this distances him from 
Strauss, Bultmann, Crossan, and the early Pannenberg who all attempt to strip away the 
theological embellishment or mythological elements of the New Testament to ascertain a 
‘purely’ authentic kernel of history. There is possibly some tension here with his reasoning for 
the necessity of historical research, where he insists that the task of history is to ensure that our 
contemporary picture of Jesus reflects the first-century Jesus to “see whether Christianity is not 
based on a mistake.”90 This sounds remarkably like an attempt to separate the ‘historical’ Jesus 
of Nazareth from the Christ of faith in the New Testament kerygma. In line with Käsemann, 
Wright argues, “If we don’t do historical-Jesus research, difficult though it may be, we are 
helpless against the ideology that manufactures a new Jesus to suit its own end.”91 Within a 
PCR framework which balances both the intelligibility of external reality with the subjective 
interpretation of that reality, Wright’s caution against reimaging Jesus for whatever prejudicial 
purpose we may have is to be heeded. However, this is an example of where Wright’s critical 
 
88 Wright, NTPG, 104-05. He maintains this elsewhere: “I construct a hypothesis, and ask that it be judged by the 
regular criteria. Getting in the data with the minimum fuss and bother scores highly; achieving apparent simplicity 
at the cost of leaving data all over the floor, or of inventing extra hypotheses out of thin air, scores poorly. Loose 
ends are a sign of weakness, not of strength” (Wright, “Theology, History and Jesus,” 107).  
89 Cf. Richard Hays, “Knowing Jesus: Story, History and the Question of Truth,” in Jesus, Paul and the People of 
God: A Theological Dialogue with N. T. Wright, ed. Nicholas Perrin and Richard B. Hays (Downers Grove: IVP, 
2011), 46.  
90 Wright, “The Historical Jesus and Christian Theology,” 404.  
91 Wright, PFG, 119-20.  
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realism is not critical enough, for we must acknowledge that the Jesus which the contemporary 
historian pictures, and his portrayal by the New Testament evangelist, will perpetually remain 
manufactured to some degree by presupposed beliefs and worldviews.  
Heilig and Heilig raise a pertinent criticism. An essential element, they argue, is missing from 
Wright’s methodology: not just getting all the information, but selecting the relevant 
information. A person slipping over on a sidewalk might well be explained by the theory of 
gravity (and that would indeed explain why that person fell), but a more relevant explanation 
could be that that person happened to be wearing poor shoes on that particular day.92 With this 
criticism, they argue that Wright has not adequately detailed how this theory of abduction fits 
in his methodology.93 He has missed a step, that of the determination of which data is to be 
included in the formulation of the hypothesis. I would agree to an extent. Though it might seem 
that Wright has flung open the floodgates for an uncontrollably immense accumulation of data 
without an explicit method of determining the reliability of this data, there exists within his 
methodology an implicit process of selection, especially regarding the recognition of the 
worldview of the historian. However, this should be made more explicit for his abductive 
methodology to be more comprehensive. Furthermore, how one determines relevance is 
another example of the constructive nature of knowledge.  
If we are to accept Wright’s method of formulating a hypothesis – a narrative to best explain 
the available historical data that does not discriminate between pure history and theological 
interpretation, and recognizes the historian’s subjective interpretation of the data – one further 
issue to consider is that history is never simply discerning ‘what happened.’ Though Wright 
rejects absolute and universal objectivity, at least in theory, history remains for Wright the 
 
92 Theresa Heilig and Christoph Heilig, “Historical Methodology,” in God and the Faithfulness of Paul, ed. 
Christopher Heilig, J. Thomas Hewitt and Michael F. Bird (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2017), 122-23.  
93 Ibid., 118. They are concerned that Wright’s methodology would essentially introduce yet another historical 
thesis even broader than the one it is supposed to explain. 
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determination of historical ‘fact,’ free of any interpretive elaboration. Wright acknowledges 
the significant role of worldviews, but his purpose is to look through the worldview, not 
dissimilar to the demythologizing project of Strauss. Wright’s methodology does not take 
seriously enough the constructive nature of knowledge, that history is a balance between the 
external event and its interpretation, neither of which can be bypassed.  
This sentiment is similarly expressed by recent biblical scholars who have incorporated new 
understandings of the role and nature of memory into their historical Jesus research. In essence, 
this movement is a response to positivistic historical critical methodologies which attempt to 
distinguish between ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ history, that is, the objective ‘what really 
happened’ from the interpretive embellishment, challenging this dichotomy and instead 
insisting that contingent history is distorted by memory and so all history has elements of both 
objectivity and subjectivity. History is preserved in memory, and how one remembers the past 
is dependent upon the present; the present needs, desires, and context determines what is 
remembered and how that memory is interpreted. This memory is then further preserved within 
a community, and the greater the significance of the historical event within the community, the 
greater this memory is reflected upon and reinterpreted, particularly to suit new and developing 
contexts. I will elaborate upon this momentarily, as it has significance for a PCR approach to 
the resurrection.  
These biblical scholars employing social memory theory, notably Dale Allison, Chris Keith, 
Anthony Le Donne, and Rafael Rodríguez, are specifically responding to the ‘criteria’ 
approach. Within historical criticism, a variety of criteria have developed, methodological tools 
to identify within the NT text which sayings and stories are ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ 
history. Among these criteria include: the criterion of dissimilarity, where a story or saying 
attributed to Jesus is considered authentic if it is dissimilar to either Jewish or early Christian 
tradition, or to both; the criterion of multiple attestation, where authenticity is judged by how 
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many independent streams of tradition that include a particular story or saying; the criterion of 
embarrassment, where a tradition would likely be considered embarrassing or difficult for the 
early church, who might have preferred the particular tradition suppressed, and so its inclusion 
suggests its likely authenticity; the criterion of coherence, according to which a story or saying 
is considered authentic if it coheres with other established traditions.94 A goal of the criteria 
approach was to identify oral traditions within the written texts in order to ‘get behind’ the texts 
to the undistorted historical Jesus, to reconstruct the original oral tradition without the later 
interpretation.95 The assumption here is that it is indeed possible to separate later theological 
interpretation and embellishment from a genuine historical account of ‘what really happened.’ 
In recent decades, the criteria of authenticity have increasingly fallen out of favour. This 
approach is in many respects a remnant of positivistic historiography, and in the words of Chris 
Keith, “Scholars in search of authentic Jesus traditions might as well be in search of unicorns, 
the lost city of Atlantis, and the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.”96 I will not here 
systematically dissect each of the criteria, for that would exceed the scope of this thesis,97 but 
brief comment should be made on two of the more commonly used criteria, that of dissimilarity 
and of embarrassment, as both have been employed by Wright.98 The former exaggerates only 
the aspects which are dissimilar, thereby minimizing the overall significance of Jesus’ 
 
94 Cf. David A. deSilva, An Introduction to the New Testament: Contexts, Methods & Ministry Formation 
(Downers Grove: IVP, 2004), 182-88. This list is by no means exhaustive.  
95 Cf. Chris Keith, “Memory and Authenticity: Jesus Tradition and What Really Happened,” Zeitschrift für die 
Neutestamentliche Wissenchaft und die Kunde der Älteren Kirche 102, no. 2 (2011): 157-65; idem. Jesus Against 
the Scribal Elite: The Origins of the Conflict (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2014), 75-77; Anthony Le Donne, “The Rise 
of the Quest for an Authentic Jesus: An Introduction to the Crumbling Foundations of Jesus Research,” in Jesus, 
Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, ed. Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 3-
5.  
96 Keith, “Memory and Authenticity,” 170.  
97 Cf. Keith and Le Donne (eds.), Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, which includes a selection of 
essays analysing and highlighting the deficiencies of most of the major criteria.  
98 This was mentioned earlier and is an example of how his critical realism has not accounted for the subjective, 
anthropocentric, and constructive nature of knowledge. Wright utilizes the criterion of dissimilarity in JVG to 
argue that Jesus saw himself as the one who would rally Israel and prepare them for the imminent arrival of the 
kingdom of God (JVG, 131-32), and the criterion of embarrassment in RSG to defend the historicity of the empty 
tomb narrative, namely that it would have been embarrassing for the early church to have women as the ones who 
discovered the empty tomb (RSG, 607-08).  
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contextual situatedness,99 and the latter, not particularly distinct from the former, merely 
renders the story or saying as embarrassing and only as such when read within the broader 
historical and literary context, but does not thereby authenticate the material.100 The most 
significant issue with the criteria is the presupposed assumption that the Gospel tradition 
consists of both authentic and inauthentic material and that these can be separated, which in 
the discussions above regarding the distinction between a Christology ‘from below’ and ‘from 
above,’ the perpetually anthropocentric nature of knowledge and of history, and the 
impossibility of separating theology and history, is seen to be impossible.101 In this regard, the 
criteria of authenticity are not themselves the problem per se, and are not necessarily to be 
wholly jettisoned, but the employment of whatever particular methodology to strip the NT 
portrayal of Jesus of any later theological embellishment and interpretation is neither possible 
nor desirable.  
Research into the role and nature of memory demonstrates that memory is neither the recalling 
nor re-experiencing of past events, as though we are simply replaying an old recording, but the 
reinterpretation of the impression that past events had on the individual in light of the needs 
and frameworks of the present. When applied to history, this means that the author of the text 
recounting the contingent historical event is doing so in accordance with their memory of the 
event, that the event in question has been re-interpreted in light of the frameworks and 
categories that have influenced the author’s perception of the event at the time of writing. In 
 
99 “It would be like beginning a biography of Adolf Hitler with emphasis on the fact that he was a vegetarian, 
while obscuring his statement about European politics” (Anthony Le Donne, “The Criterion of Coherence: Its 
Development, Inevitability, and Historiographical Limitations,” in Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, 
ed. Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 108.  
100 Rafael Rodríguez, “The Embarrassing Truth About Jesus: The Criterion of Embarrassment and the Failure of 
Historical Authenticity,” in Jesus, Criteria, and the Demise of Authenticity, ed. Chris Keith and Anthony Le Donne 
(London: T&T Clark, 2012), 137-46.  
101 Cf. Chris Keith, “The Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus: Current Debates, Prior Debates and 
the Goal of Historical Jesus Research,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 38, no. 4 (2016), 428-29; Dale 
C. Allison, “The History of the Interpretation of Matthew: Lessons Learned,” IDS 49, no. 1 (2015), 1; Keith, Jesus 
Against the Scribal Elite, 80.  
185 
 
other words, “All reflection on the past, whether at the level of the individual or the group, is 
an indissoluble mix of the past and present.”102 Or, put differently, memory is not about the 
past, but is about what is happening within our minds in the present, and this ultimately affects 
how we perceive the past.103 However, this is ultimately influenced by historical and communal 
context. Worldviews and categories of understanding remain contextually conditioned, and 
memory relies upon the external environment. For example, memories are often forgotten until 
triggered by a photograph, reimagined in light of similar events,104 and reinforced or 
reinterpreted according to other people’s memories of a particular event.105 The memory of an 
event invariably changes over time especially as a community changes and the categories of 
understanding evolve. By the time the accounts of Jesus were written, the memory of Jesus had 
developed, not least in light of the ‘resurrection bias’ of the early church, to return to Johnson’s 
language, and as Le Donne notes, the more significant the event, the more it is interpreted.106 
This is not to say that Jesus was remembered by the early church as something or someone that 
was radically alternative to the reality, for that is incongruous to the nature of memory.107 
However, and this in particular accords with a PCR understanding on the nature of knowledge, 
memory is impacted – and, to an extent, constructed – by the needs, desires, frameworks, and 
categories of the present. The task of the historian is not the recovery of past events, but the 
interpretation of memories that have evolved within a community situated within a particular 
historical context. This is not to say that the event did not happen, but that how that event is 
 
102 Keith, “The Narratives of the Gospels and the Historical Jesus,” 429. Cf. Anthony Le Donne, Historical Jesus: 
What Can We Know and How Can We Know It? (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 24-25.  
103 Le Donne, Historical Jesus, 25.  
104 I find it difficult to differentiate between memories of previous Christmas lunches; they all seem to blur together 
in my mind. This might be due to their similarities, the traditions that are repeated year after year. But my memory 
of past lunches is enhanced and reinterpreted each new Christmas. It is difficult to remember, for example, what 
Christmas was like without my two young nieces or before I was married. 
105 Cf. Le Donne, Historical Jesus, 32.  
106 Ibid., 37.  
107 Keith notes that Jesus couldn’t possibly be remembered as a sailor or as Caesar or, for that matter, as an 
astronaut. The reality of the past placed parameters upon how he was remembered (Keith, “Memory and 
Authenticity,” 172).   
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understood is inseparable from its interpretation within its original context and how that 
interpretation changed as it was remembered and re-remembered.  
The social memory approach is specifically utilized in a PCR framework in a focus upon how 
a contingent historical event was re-interpreted and communicated in new ways in new 
contexts. In light of this approach, PCR analyses how the theological interpretation of the 
resurrection developed from the earliest testimonies (such as the pre-Pauline material in the 
Pauline literature) through to the later traditions (such as the Johannine literature), rather than 
systematizing a homogenized understanding of the New Testament portrayals of 
resurrection.108 
4.4. A Postfoundationalist Constructive Realist Approach to the Resurrection 
The task of this chapter and the last has been to consider an alternative methodology for 
interpreting the resurrection that moves away from a hard foundationalism and empiricism 
without collapsing into a coherentism, and is capable of balancing antipodal statements of 
reality in a dialectic and mutually-conditioning tension. The framework of Postfoundationalist 
Constructive Realism was proposed and discussed in relation to various epistemological, 
historiographical, and theological concerns. This framework will now be applied to an 
examination of Jesus’ resurrection in the remaining chapters. Though it was noted earlier that 
the PCR framework does not have a prescribed formula or definition, precisely due to its 
inherent suspicion of ‘universal’ methodologies, it will be useful here to distil and re-iterate 
the key concerns reflected in chapters three and four, and clarify how this framework will be 
applied to the interpretation of the resurrection.  
 
108 Wright seems to be guilty of this, providing very little comment on the differences between the unique 
portrayals within the four distinct gospels or with Paul. It is demonstrated in chapter six that the differences in the 
New Testament portrayals of resurrection are significant, albeit subtle, and that there is development of 
resurrection theology within the New Testament. It is this development which is of particular interest. It should 
also be noted that Wright has not as of yet engaged with the social memory approach. 
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PCR balances the objective-subjective dichotomy – the external object and its subjective 
interpretation – recognizing the bilateral direction of knowledge and interpretation. The 
interpreter will always impart their own contextually-conditioned categories of understanding 
upon the observation of an external, intelligible object or event; this constructive aspect of 
knowledge is incorporated into this framework. Importantly, both aspects of the dichotomy are 
upheld in a mutually conditioning reciprocity, neither being prioritized or functioning as 
epistemic foundation. Multiple disciplines and experiences are balanced in a similar 
reciprocity. Consequently, the significant impact of the socially and historically conditioned 
categories of understanding and worldviews upon the interpretation of the event are a central 
point of focus within a PCR framework. Furthermore, another central point is the recognition 
that knowledge is neither the external ‘objective’ event nor the re-telling of this event or the 
categories utilized to describe and interpret this event, but a dynamic interaction between the 
two, both imparting meaning upon the other. Where this concern is essentially epistemological, 
the next is historiographical.  
Turning specifically to history and the examination of the claim that Jesus rose from the dead, 
PCR stresses the anthropocentric nature of historical knowledge on account of the constructive 
nature of all knowledge. Several observations consequently emerge. First, the memory of the 
event within the early communities of the Jesus movement invariably impacts its interpretation 
as the event is reinterpreted in new and evolving contexts. In light of this, a PCR approach to 
the resurrection emphasizes the development of the interpretation of the resurrection within the 
canonical New Testament corpus, from the earliest traditions (such as the Pauline literature) to 
the later traditions (such as the Johannine literature), as opposed to a systematized or 
homogenized understanding. Second, as noted above, the resurrection cannot be relegated to 
the ‘realm of faith,’ removed from historical inquiry. However, the resurrection must not be 
reduced to an ordinary historical event. Hence, this event should be approached alongside a 
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comprehensive analysis of the categories of understanding within which this event is 
ensconced, rather than treating it as either divorced from ordinary history or as 
indistinguishable from ordinary history. By doing so we are avoiding the potential pitfalls of a 
positivistic historiography that would invariably cause this event to become little more than an 
objective event of the past. Third, it is impossible to wrench the supposedly ‘authentic’ history 
from the apparently ‘inauthentic,’ or myth from reality in an attempt to ‘get behind’ the text 
and objectively verify precisely ‘what happened.’ The second and third observations here are 
essentially two sides of the same coin. History is neither the objective reality of past contingent 
events nor its interpretation and retelling, but a dynamic tension between these two poles, a 
tension which must not capitulate one way or the other. A positivistic historiography cannot do 
justice to this tension between history and theology, but is upheld in a PCR approach to the 
resurrection.  
Regarding the resurrection, then, the task now is to understand the language and categories that 
were applied to Jesus’ post-mortem existence, not to wrench these categories away from the 
text to arrive at the pure and unadulterated event of Jesus’ post-mortem existence, but to assess 
the impact that this event had on the early Jesus movement and to discern why this particular 
language was adopted. It is also necessary to trace the development of the interpretation of this 
event as it is remembered and re-remembered, intertwined with the developing theological 
categories and evolving context, for there is no single or universal interpretation of Jesus’ 
resurrection in the New Testament. Finally, to be clear, this method moves beyond approaches 
like Wright’s Critical Realism by merging it with Pannenberg’s postfoundationalism.  
4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed how the resurrection might be interpreted as a historical event within 
temporal time and space without reducing it to an event indistinguishable from any other 
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ordinary contingent event,109 that is, how to treat it historically as an event that is both 
continuous and discontinuous with empirical reality. This has involved a range of issues. 
However, discussion has revolved around the anthropocentric nature of historical knowledge, 
from the initial experience and interpretation of the event through its reinterpretation in new 
contexts to the presuppositions of the contemporary historian who is required to make certain 
decisions regarding the theological significance, or lack thereof, of the recorded event. It has 
been argued that the resurrection cannot be relegated to the realm of faith, entirely removed 
from historical inquiry, but rather that it should be approached with appropriate recognition of 
the categories of understanding within which it is ensconced. PCR is characterised by balancing 
multiple tensions in a mutually conditioning reciprocity, and when applied to the question of 
the historical nature of the resurrection (which must be upheld if it is to retain continuity with 
empirical reality as the renewal of creation, which will be discussed in the remaining chapters), 
this framework balances the external event with its interpretation, balancing faith and reason, 
and history and theology. The very nature of historical knowledge is distorted by memory and 
the prior categories through which it was constructed.  
The following chapters apply this PCR framework to the examination of the proclamation of 
Jesus’ resurrection. The first task is the comprehensive analysis of the category of resurrection 
through which Jesus’ post-mortem existence was interpreted. The second task is to then turn 
directly to Jesus’ resurrection in light of this analysis. There is a developing resurrection 
tradition which can be traced from the earlier interpretations in Paul, through the synoptic 
Gospels, to later texts, such as John. It is important to note that this is not to say that either the 
earlier or later traditions are either correct or incorrect, but to observe how the prior theological 
category of resurrection was adopted to explain and interpret Jesus’ post-mortem existence in 
 




new and developing contexts. It will be seen that within the early church, Jesus’ post-mortem 
existence was interpreted as the fulfilment of the broad spectrum of Jewish eschatological hope 
for the end of history within contingent history, thereby bearing within itself both the renewal 
and transformation of creation, bearing both continuity and discontinuity with empirical reality. 
The ancient Jewish eschatological category of resurrection is explored in chapter five, with 
chapter six analysing how this category was then utilized by the early Christians to explain 
Jesus’ resurrection.   
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5. Tension in Eschatology: of Renewal and Transformation 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters have stressed the role and function of prior categories of understanding 
which shape interpretation of experience of external reality. These categories intertwine with 
experience and memory and may develop as they are re-remembered and re-interpreted in new 
contexts. This chapter turns to the primary category through which Jesus’ post-mortem 
existence was interpreted and which provides the framework for how this event was 
understood: the ancient Jewish eschatological category of ‘resurrection of the dead.’1 This 
should not be understood as a formalized doctrine, for the language of resurrection was utilized 
to stress a diverse array of theological concepts. It was a very malleable notion.2 What this does 
indicate, however, is that the resurrection should not be reduced, as has often been the case (as 
explored in the second chapter), to a mere personal reanimation that fails to uphold and balance 
both the continuity and discontinuity with empirical reality that is implied within its reflection 
of the Jewish eschatological hope for both renewal and transformation of creation. Rather, 
within Jewish eschatology, the resurrection was inseparably connected to the broader spectrum 
of expectations for the end of history.  
The ancient Jewish notion of a post-mortem resurrection from the dead primarily developed 
after the Babylonian exile, demonstrating influences from Zoroastrian, Egyptian, and 
Hellenistic understandings.3 Prior to the exile, Jewish eschatology did not tend to envision a 
 
1 As noted in the introduction, the terminology of ancient Jewish eschatology refers to the eschatological 
frameworks through which Jesus’ post-mortem existence was interpreted. This stretches back to the early prophets 
up to the first century CE.  
2 Cf. C. D. Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead in Early Judaism 200 BCE – CE 200 (Oxford: OUP, 2017), 1-2, 16. 
This malleability is demonstrated by the portrayal of Jesus’ resurrection in the Gospel of Peter, for even though 
this extra-canonical text is written well after the majority of the New Testament texts, the resurrection in the 
Gospel of Peter is decidedly different and does not follow the general trajectory of the development present in the 
New Testament texts. This is returned to in chapter six.  
3 Cf. Markus Vinzent, Christ’s Resurrection in Early Christianity: And the Making of the New Testament 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 31; Robert Martin-Achard, From Death to Life: A Study of the Development of the 
Doctrine of Resurrection in the Old Testament, trans. John Penney Smith (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1960), 
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meaningful afterlife; Sheol was dark and unenjoyable with hope being found not in the promise 
of a post-mortem reward but in the continuing covenant with YHWH. This is what Wright 
labels as the first stage in the development of the belief in a post-mortem resurrection.4 In this 
early theology, God’s judgment occurs within this life, not the next, and the main concern of 
the Israelites was the flourishing of God’s nation, with ‘life after death’ being achieved through 
children.5 This assessment reflects a general academic consensus.6 Though some early passages 
(Ps. 73.17, 21-28) do indeed seem to imply that a belief in a post-mortem existence was 
emerging, it was not until persecution under the Babylonians and then under Antiochus 
Epiphanes that this belief developed.7 
Some scholars, such as Wright, argue that by the first century CE, a developed belief in 
resurrection had become the vastly dominant understanding of the afterlife.8 Casey Elledge has 
recently suggested this ‘myth of dominance’ sees resurrection becoming by the second century 
BCE the universal belief of life after death. Though he acknowledges that resurrection is 
 
205. Of particular significance was the influence of Zoroastrianism upon post-exilic understandings of the 
afterlife. The Zoroastrian document Fragment Westergaard 4.1-3, states, “And the demons [will be] buried in the 
earth, i.e., their bodily forms will be broken. And by it the dead will be redressed. With its help, they give life 
back to the bodies and they will keep (their) souls with the bodies, that is, thereafter, they will not die” (quoted in 
Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead, 47). Daniel’s prophecy, however, restricts resurrection to the Jews, an 
alteration of the Zoroastrian doctrine which suggests the adaptation and alteration of this doctrine to suit the Jewish 
notion of Israel’s unique identity. Elledge suggests that the development of resurrection occurred in the Hellenistic 
era, as Israel was forced to reinterpret her traditions in the face of this new, and occasionally oppressive power, 
and do so in light of ideas borrowed from other cultures, such as Zoroastrianism (Elledge, Resurrection of the 
Dead, 50-53).  
4 Wright, RSG, 89-93. Cf. Ps. 6.5; 115.17; Isa. 38.10-13; 2 Sam. 14.14. The second stage, argues Wright, was the 
development of the belief that YHWH’s love extends beyond the grave, seen especially in Ps. 16.10; 49.15; and 
73.23-26 (Wright, RSG, 107). There are some, albeit few and certainly not the consensus, who present a case for 
an expectation of a more positive post-mortem existence. Cf. T. D. Alexander, “The Old Testament View of Life 
After Death,” Themelios 11, no. 2 (1986), 41-46; R. Mason, “Life Before and After Death in the Old Testament,” 
in Called to One Hope: Perspectives on the Life to Come, ed. J. Coldwell (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2000), 67-82. 
5 Ibid., 94-99. Cf. Exod. 20.12; Job 7.7-10; 14.7-14; Ecc. 3.19-21; Ps. 90.3. 
6 D. S. Russell, Between the Testaments (London: SCM, 1960), 145; McDonald, The Resurrection, 16; Vinzent, 
Christ’s Resurrection in Early Christianity, 31; Joseph Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 1-39: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary (New York: Doubleday, 2000), 371. Blenkinsopp notes that this does, however, 
require some qualifications. Many of the denials of the afterlife (e.g. Ps. 49.10-20; 88.5, 10-12; 115.17) reflect 
arguments against ancestral cults (Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 1-39, 371).  
7 This is particularly evident in Daniel 12.1-3 (Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 1-39, 371).  
8 F. H. Drinkwater, “Jewish Apocalyptic and the Resurrection,” Continuum 6, no. 3 (1968), 434-35; Christopher 
Rowland, The Open Heaven (London: SPCK, 1982), 34; Osborne, “Resurrection,” 674; Wright, Surprised by 
Hope, 37.  
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repeatedly attested in a variety of texts between 200 BCE and 200 CE, distributed over a broad 
geographical area, and that Josephus attested to resurrection being a majority belief (Ag. Ap. 
2.31), the idea that this belief was ubiquitous and universally held is an overgeneralization. 
However, it is practically impossible to determine precisely how widespread this notion was, 
as it is unclear whether the broader population ascribed to resurrection beliefs, as the texts that 
have survived are predominately from the elites. Furthermore, some elites, such as Philo, 
favoured a more Hellenistic immortality. The resurrection was indeed most likely a prominent 
belief, but we must be careful not to overemphasize its widespread subscription.9  
This chapter begins by exploring the development of resurrection theology in Jewish 
eschatology, analysing several Hebrew Bible references (Hos. 6.1-3; Ezek. 37.1-14; Isa. 26.19; 
Dan. 12.1-3) which had a significant influence upon later resurrection theologies found in 
intertestamental Jewish apocalyptic eschatology. In these passages, resurrection is less 
concerned with individuals returning to life than with the broader issues of redemption and re-
creation. A primary concern has to do with the general restoration of Israel’s relationship with 
YHWH. This emphasis upon the restoration of relationship is maintained in the 
intertestamental literature, where resurrection signifies to a much greater extent the 
transformation and re-creation of the cosmos; the entire universe is, in a sense, resurrected, not 
just individual bodies. With this cosmic renewal is an associated hope for the dispensation of 
justice. The second section then turns its attention to the few instances where the Jewish 
eschatological category is evident in the NT. How this category is applied specifically to Jesus’ 
post-mortem existence is the focus of chapter six, whereas the present chapter is analysing the 
category in general. The presupposition of this category and the accompanying belief that 
‘resurrection’ stretches well beyond the reanimation of a personal body is especially evident in 
Jesus’ encounter with the Sadducees who question him about marriage in the resurrection 
 
9 Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead, 9-13.  
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(Mark 12.18-27 // Matt. 22.23-33 // Luke 20.27-40); Paul’s response to the Corinthians’ 
rejection of resurrection (1 Cor. 15.12-58); Jesus’ discussion with Martha prior to her brother’s 
resurrection (John 11.21-27); and the ministry of Peter, John, and Paul as recounted in Acts 
(4.1-2; 17.18).10 The third section discusses the relationship between resurrection and Jewish 
eschatology in terms of the imagery of the new heavens and earth, arguing that this is the 
preeminent analogy for the eschatological hope for the end of history – the renewal and 
transformation of creation – that is encompassed within the language and category of 
resurrection.  
This chapter reflects the PCR framework proposed in §4.4 in, first, its close examination of the 
communal and theological notion of resurrection within ancient Jewish eschatology to 
understand how this presupposed notion was applied to the objective contingent event of Jesus’ 
post-mortem existence and through which this event was subjectively interpreted, and, second, 
how the theological notion of resurrection developed within the new and developing contexts 
of the Jewish community, particularly during times of persecution. By adopting this 
framework, we may avoid the foundationalism that restricted interpreters to understanding 
‘resurrection’ as personal reanimation, inhibited the comprehensive incorporation of 
communally-conditioned theological presuppositions, and the subsequent failure to uphold a 
dialectical tension between the continuity and discontinuity between the present and the future 
eschatological reality.  
5.2. Resurrection and the Restoration of Relationship  
The first section of this chapter analyses the language of resurrection within the Hebrew Bible 
and intertestamental literature. It is necessary to analyse these sources as they illustrate the 
 
10 There is very limited discussion of resurrection in general and of Jesus’ resurrection in particular in the extra-
canonical texts. There are some potential allusions to Jesus’ fate, framed within a Gnostic understanding in the 
Gospel of Thomas, but not enough for any significant analysis in this chapter. The Gospel of Peter includes a 
curious account of Jesus’ resurrection, which I return to in chapter six.  
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theological notions which inform the New Testament conceptions of resurrection that will be 
analysed in the next chapter. It is here argued that the developing category of resurrection was 
diverse, rarely referring to a post-mortem reanimation of a personal body, but was used quite 
malleably to refer to hope for restoration of Israel’s relationship with YHWH, the 
transformation of creation and a return to an Edenic sanctuary, and the dispensation of divine 
justice. The first part of this section analyses the development of the earliest stratum of 
resurrection hope, occurring only minimally in the Hebrew Bible. In these references, 
resurrection is rarely seen as personal reanimation, with Hosea 6.1-3, Ezekiel 37.1-4, Isaiah 
26.19, and Daniel 12.1-3 speaking primarily in terms of the restoration of Israel’s relationship 
with YHWH, a return to covenantal obedience. It is disputed whether Isaiah or Daniel includes 
the first reference to post-mortem life, rather than national redemption, though I contend Isaiah 
likely did not. However, in either case, a personal re-animated body is only a peripheral 
concern. Daniel’s primary concern is the dispensation of justice: reward for the righteous 
martyrs and punishment for the wicked persecutors.  
The resurrection theology of the Hebrew Bible had a significant influence upon the later 
intertestamental literature, which envisioned a similar restoration of relationship, and used the 
language of resurrection in reference to the broader hopes of a transformed cosmos which 
includes bringing justice. Many of the texts include creation motifs to depict a renewed 
creation, transformed by YHWH to its originally intended function. For example, Ezekiel 36.9-
11, 35 depicts fruitful multiplication, 1 Enoch 22 envisions transformation and entrance into 
God’s sanctuary with a central fruit tree, 2 Maccabees 7.11 predicts the creator returning lost 
limbs, and Pseudo-Ezekiel repeats the phrase ‘and it was so’). Resurrection is synonymous with 
transformation, not just of bodies, but of the universe (Dan. 12.3; 4 Ezra 7.31-32). Within this 
newly redeemed and transformed reality, resurrection is also seen as a solution to the problem 
of theodicy, a reversal of fates. However, there is significant ambiguity in how this resurrected 
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reality is portrayed, with some texts implying belief in an immortal soul, rather than bodily 
resurrection (Jub. 23.31; 1 En. 91-104; Ws. 9.15), others making no mention of bodies or 
corpses, but depicting an existence like the stars and angels (Dan. 12.1-3; 2 Bar. 50.2-3; 1 En. 
104.2-6), with still others envisioning a very bodily existence (2 Macc. 7). What is evident, as 
this section will demonstrate, is that the category of resurrection was diverse, flexible in its 
application, and inseparable from the broader eschatological hopes for the end of history, 
depicting far more than a re-animated personal body.  
On Apocalyptic Imagination 
This section does not restrict its analysis of the resurrection to first century Jewish apocalyptic 
literature, but analyses the development of the broader notion of resurrection from its earliest 
inceptions within Jewish prophecy. However, there is significant development of the notion of 
resurrection within apocalyptic literature, and so a brief introduction to this genre is 
necessary.11 Of course, defining what is meant by ‘apocalyptic’ is notoriously difficult and 
contentious. The term ‘apocalyptic’ has been applied to a variety of phenomena, including 
literature, social movements, and eschatological expectations. Recent scholarship generally 
distinguishes between these three uses of the term; ‘Apocalypse’ as literary genre, 
‘Apocalypticism’ as worldview, and ‘Apocalyptic’ as adjective, referring to the related imagery 
and eschatological motifs. As genre, ‘Apocalypse’ was never a formalized genre prior to 
Christianity, until the term was used in Revelation 1.1. However, its use here is ambiguous and 
it is unclear whether it refers to a distinct genre, revelation in general, or simply a description 
of the contents of the text. At around the same time, 2 and 3 Baruch were written, both of which 
are introduced as apocalypses. Though not a formal genre until the first or early second century 
CE, these texts nevertheless exhibit a variety of similarities, and the earliest examples of this 
 
11 In particular I am indebted to the work of Frederick Murphy and John Collins for the following survey.  
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are the Book of Watchers (1 En. 1-36), followed shortly after by Daniel. The emergence of this 
genre occurred within the Hellenistic period following the conquests of Alexander and was a 
way to resist the new imperial context and its accompanying occupation, taxation, and 
submission to foreign powers. Hellenistic myths are inverted, for example, in the Book of 
Watchers which narrates a heavenly journey that depicts an alternative geography and 
cosmology and presents an alternative ideology of dominance.12 
Several aspects which characterise a typical apocalyptic text are pseudonymity, the unseen 
world, the future, dualism (righteous/wicked, dark/light), eschatological timelines, end time 
tribulation, and dissatisfaction with the present. Apocalypses usually narrate divine revelation 
given to a human recipient by a heavenly figure, often disclosing a transcendent reality, 
presenting an alternative reality to empirical reality. Generally, there are two types of 
apocalypses: historical, surveying a broad sweep of history culminating in a final, divine 
judgment; and otherworldly journeys, including visions of heaven and hell. Apocalypses 
usually emerge in times of crisis, presenting the problems of the present within a cosmic, 
supernatural context. For example, the book of Daniel was written during a time of persecution 
under Seleucid reign, depicting a future judgment and veneration of the pious faithful, and 
Revelation portrays an alternative to oppressive Roman rule. The development of Jewish 
apocalyptic is an example of one of the key epistemological thoughts of PCR, of how 
presupposed categories of understanding influence the interpretation of new data and 
phenomena within new and developing contexts. Though Jewish apocalyptic is influenced by 
Israel’s exposure to foreign civilizations (particularly dualisms, heaven and hell, resurrection, 
 
12 Frederick J. Murphy, Apocalypticism in the Bible and Its World (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2012), 3-5; John C. 
Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic Literature, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1984), 2-4. Cf. Anathea, Portier-Young, “Jewish Apocalyptic Literature as Resistance Literature,” in 
The Oxford Handbook of Apocalyptic Literature, ed. John J. Collins (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 145-46; David E. 
Aune, “The Apocalypse of John and Palestinian Jewish Apocalyptic,” Neot 40, no. 1 (2006), 2; D. S. Russell, 
Divine Disclosure: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic (London: SCM, 1992), 6-13.  
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eschatological battles and combat myths, and dream visions coming from Persian, 
Mesopotamian, and Canaanite mythologies), it was also significantly influenced by the 
presupposed Jewish prophetic and wisdom traditions. The result is something entirely unique 
to ancient Jewish eschatology, the interpretation of new phenomena shaped by prior 
categories.13 
The purpose of apocalypses was to console and encourage the people of God amidst difficult 
times. Hope is presented in the form of the faithfulness of God, justice, and reward for those 
who remain faithful, while punishment is promised for the wicked. Other functions include the 
exhortation to continued obedience and the rebuke of the unrighteous.14 Resurrection, as will 
be seen in the following, emerged as a hopeful expectation for the eschaton as vindication for 
those unjustly martyred. Though resurrection is not unique to apocalyptic thought, it did 
flourish and take on new significance within apocalyptic literature. However, it is now 
necessary to analyse the earliest references to resurrection within ancient Jewish eschatology 
– its appearance in Hosea, Ezekiel, Isaiah, and Daniel – to understand the earliest depictions 
from which Jewish apocalyptic (including Daniel) drew inspiration. 
Hope for Restoration 
The earliest occurrences of resurrection in Jewish theology appear in the Hebrew Bible, though 
it is here only a minor, or even peripheral topic. These disparate occurrences are less concerned 
with individuals returning to life than with the broader issues of redemption and re-creation. In 
fact, the imagery of resurrection in these instances does not seem to have a personal after-life 
in mind, but is concerned with the general restoration of Israel’s relationship with YHWH. It 
 
13 Murphy, Apocalypticism, 6-23; Russell, Divine Disclosure, 13; Collins, The Apocalyptic Imagination, 5-8; 
idem., Daniel, 1-2 Maccabees (Delaware: Michael Glazier, 1981), 130-31, 144; idem., “What is Apocalyptic 
Literature?” In The Oxford Handbook of Apocalyptic Literature, ed. John J. Collins (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 2.  




is helpful to analyse these earlier references for two reasons. First, these passages significantly 
influenced later eschatology and framed the developing notion of resurrection in the 
intertestamental period, and so understanding this framework helps understand how 
resurrection was understood in the first century. Second, and importantly, a PCR framework is 
concerned with how ideas, memories, and categories develop over time as they are 
reinterpreted in new contexts. However, these new reinterpretations are not formulated in a 
vacuum but build upon prior frameworks. In the following, I will analyse the four most 
significant resurrection passages of the Hebrew Bible (Hos. 6.1-3; Ezek. 37.1-4; Isa. 26.19; 
Dan. 12.1-3) to show how each is concerned with the restoration of Israel’s relationship with 
YHWH, rather than a personal, individualized re-animated post-mortem existence.  
The earliest resurrection reference is Hosea 6.1-3 (eighth century BCE), with the phrase, “On 
the third day he will raise us up,” (v.2) being of particular interest, especially in light of Jesus’ 
resurrection.15 Generally, this passage is read as a metaphorical reference to a hope in a national 
revival of God’s people.16 However, it has been argued that even if national revival is 
envisaged, it is employing a belief in a post-mortem reanimation of personal bodies on the basis 
that the ‘third day’ motif was taken up in the Gospels and Paul (1 Cor. 15.4) to refer to Jesus’ 
post-mortem existence, suggesting that Hosea was read as a reference to such a resurrection.17 
Wright argues similarly, that this “passage has a claim to be the earliest explicit statement that 
YHWH will give his people a new bodily life the other side of death.”18 However, it is unlikely 
 
15 We will return to the third day motif in §6.5.  
16 Martimus C. de Boer, The Defeat of Death: Apocalyptic Eschatology in 1 Corinthians 15 and Romans 5 
(Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1988), 44; Pryce, “The Resurrection Motif in Hosea 5:8-6:6,” 290; G. R. Osborne, 
“Resurrection,” in Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels, ed. Joel B. Green, Scot McKnight, and I. Howard Marshall 
(Downers Grove: IVP, 1992), 673-74; John C. Collins, Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls (London: 
Routledge, 1997), 111; Mitchell L. Chase, “The Genesis of Resurrection Hope: Exploring Its Early Presence and 
Deep Roots,” JETS 57, no. 3 (2014), 470 n.17. 
17 Martin-Achard, From Death to Life, 80-81. Contra Barre, who argues the passage is speaking about the healing 
of the sick, rather than a resurrection (M. L. Barre, “New Light on the Interpretation of Hosea Vi 2,” VT 28, no. 2 
(1978), 129-41.  
18 Wright, RSG, 118-19.  
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the prophet envisaged a post-mortem re-animated body in this instance; not only is it far less 
explicit than Wright assumes – let alone whether it refers to a ‘bodily’ resurrection – but the 
context is preoccupied with the return of Israel to obedience of YHWH. Especially pertinent to 
the present discussion is the observation that, regardless of whether this is a reference to a 
reanimation existence or not, and regardless of the extent to which this passage was borrowed 
by later authors, from the initial stages of the development of the notion of resurrection it was 
not simply anthropological but was inherently connected to the much larger theme of God’s 
relationship with his people (as a chosen nation). 
The graphic vision in Ezekiel 37.1-14 (sixth century BCE) is the second allusion to resurrection 
in the Hebrew Bible and, like Hosea, must be read metaphorically.19 This is not a doctrinal 
statement on an afterlife, but that, as Janina Hiebel puts it, “It is first and foremost a collective 
body whose death and, later, world-immanent re-creation is announced: the ‘House of Israel’ 
in its identity as the people of YHWH.” Furthermore, “We might also say: what dies and is re-
created is the relationship between God and God’s people.”20 The metaphorical nature is 
explicit in the personification of the bones (v.3) and the statement, “These bones are the whole 
house of Israel” (v.11), and the image of unburied bones suggests a violent death.21 The 
implication is evident: the Israelites are metaphorically dead, separated from the life giver, 
YHWH.22 Hence, as God restores the bodies and breathes his spirit into them, this graphic and 
dramatic portrayal of the giving back of life is symbolic of being in relationship with God 
 
19 Wright argues that this is “the most obviously allegorical or metaphorical” and that “Ezekiel is no more 
envisaging actual bodily resurrection than he envisages, when writing chapter 34, that Israel consisted of sheep 
rather than people” (Wright, RSG, 119-20). 
20 Janina Maria Hiebel, “Visions of Death and Re-Creation: Ezekiel 8-11, 37:1-14 and the Crisis of Identity in the 
Babylonian Exile and Beyond,” Pacifica 28, no. 3 (2015), 244. Cf. Martin-Achard, From Death to Life, 96, 99; 
McDonald, The Resurrection, 7.  
21 Cf. Hiebel, “Visions of Death and Re-Creation,” 248-49; Paul M. Joyce, Ezekiel: A Commentary (New York: 
T&T Clark, 2009), 208-09; Martin-Achard, From Death to Life, 97.  
22 Andrew Mein labels this a ‘social death,’ as the exilic Israelites have had their identity stripped away (Ezekiel 
and the Ethics of Exile (Oxford: OUP, 2001), 70). For Peterson, the bones represent “the curse of Israel’s broken 
covenant with YHWH” (Brian Neil Peterson, Ezekiel in Context: Ezekiel’s Message Understood in Its Historical 
Setting of Covenantal Curses and Ancient Near Eastern Mythological Motifs (Eugene: Pickwick, 2012), 230). Cf. 
Hiebel, “Visions of Death and Re-Creation,” 250.  
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again. This renewal of relationship is expressed in the covenantal formula, “They will be my 
people, and I will be their God” (Ezek. 11.20; 14.11; 37.23, 27; 34.24; 36.28) and represented 
visually in the re-establishment of a united Israel (Ezek. 37.15-28), the renewal of a monarchy 
(Ezek. 34.23-24; 37.22, 24-25), and the construction of a new temple (Ezek. 40-42).23 This 
covenantal implication is reinforced by the later Qumran text, Pseudo-Ezekiel 4Q385, which 
recounts this story with a depiction of a large crowd before the Lord in corporate worship.24 
We should be careful not to read too much into this, but it appears the Qumran community 
could interpret the resurrection, on the rare occasions when it appealed to this notion, without 
depicting a personal reanimation. 
Proto-Isaiah (sixth century BCE) includes two significant passages relating to the issue of 
resurrection: “He will swallow up death forever” (Isa. 25.8)25 and “Your dead shall live, their 
corpses shall rise. O dwellers in the dust, awaken and sing for joy! For your dew is a radiant 
dew, and the earth will give birth to those long dead” (Isa. 26.19). Though the resurrection 
references of Hosea and Ezekiel are generally considered metaphorical – references to the 
restoration of Israel and her relationship with YHWH – interpretations of Isaiah’s resurrection 
vary. Some argue that, as opposed to Hosea and Ezekiel, in this instance a post-mortem 
resurrection of individual bodies is envisaged as a reversal of the injustice shown to them, 
especially to the martyred.26 Accordingly, Wright argues that though the context promises 
 
23 Mein, Ezekiel and the Ethics of Exile, 221; Hiebel, “Visions of Death and Re-Creation,” 249.  
24 Albert L. A. Hogerterp, “Resurrection and Biblical Tradition: Pseudo-Ezekiel Reconsidered,” Biblica 89, no. 1 
(2008), 62-64, 68; Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead in Early Judaism, 76. Cf. Benjamin G. Wold, “Agency and 
Raising the Dead in 4QPseudo-Ezekiel and 4Q521 2 ii” ZNW 103, no. 1 (2012), 8.  
25 There might be some dependence upon Hosea’s proclamation, “O Death, where are your plagues? O Sheol, 
where is your destruction?” (Hos. 13.14) which might have the alternative meaning of “I will be your plagues…I 
will be your destruction.” Paul quotes Isa. 25.8 in his discussion on the resurrection in 1 Cor. 15.54.  
26 E.g. D. S. Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964), 368; 
George W. Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life in Intertestamental Judaism and Early 
Christianity, expanded ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 31-32; Martin-Achard, From Death to 
Life, 130-31; Gerhard F. Hasel, “Resurrection in the Theology of Old Testament Apocalyptic,” ZAW 92, no. 2 
(1980), 275; Stephen L. Cook, “Apocalyptic Prophecy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Apocalyptic Literature, ed. 
John J. Collins (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 28; White, “Resurrection of the Dead,” 1018). Reference is often made to 
25.8 and 26.14, 20-21, which seem to imply physicality. Matthew McAffee argues that Isaiah 26.13-19 is polemic 
against Ugaritic ancestral worship of Rapa’uma (Shades), with bodily resurrection as a much superior hope 
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national restoration, resurrection here refers to an actual, bodily event. His insistence that 
Daniel 12 refers to a physical and bodily resurrection leads him to believe that Isaiah was 
interpreted similarly, as Daniel was reliant upon Isaiah.27 
However, it seems more likely that Isaiah is closer to Hosea and Ezekiel in utilizing the image 
of resurrection as metaphor for national restoration. Isaiah 26.19 is immediately preceded by 
speaking of Israel as a woman in labour (vv.17-18), imagery carried through in v.19: “the earth 
will give birth to those long dead.” So argues Frederick Murphy, that “the reference to 
resurrection may be symbolic, representing restoration of the nation.”28 John Collins highlights 
the contrast between the lords other than YHWH who have ruled over Israel and the nation that 
the Lord has increased (26.13-15), to argue that Isaiah 26 depicts Israel as dead and the 
resurrection as her miraculous restoration.29 This interpretation is strengthened when taking 
into account other instances in Isaiah where Israel is portrayed as dead as a result of her 
neglection of YHWH,30 and the removal of death in 25.8 is simultaneously the removal of her 
shame and disgrace.31 Furthermore, as Joy Hooker argues, chapters 24-26 stress the control 
that YHWH has over nations and empires.32 Isaiah does not have in mind a future, post-mortem 
return to a re-animated bodily life, but like Ezekiel – and perhaps dependent upon Ezekiel – 
views the restoration of Israel, and her relationship with YHWH, as being as miraculous as a 
 
(Matthew McAffee, “Rephaim, Whisperers, and the Dead in Isaiah 26:13-19: A Ugaritic Parallel” Atlanta 135, 
no. 1 (2016), 77-94.  
27 Wright, RSG, 116-17.  
28 Frederick J. Murphy, Apocalypticism in the Bible and Its World (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2012), 44. Cf. Russell, 
Between the Testaments, 146; McDonald, The Resurrection, 7-8; Blenkinsopp, Isaiah 1-39, 371.  
29 Collins, Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 111.  
30 E.g. Isa. 5.13-14; 28.15, 18; 29.4.  
31 This observation is of particular significance in Christopher Hays’ interpretation that Isa. 26.19 is speaking 
metaphorically (Christopher B. Hays, “Isaiah as Colonized Poet: His Rhetoric of Death in Conversation with 
African Postcolonial Writers,” in Isaiah and Imperial Context: The Book of Isaiah in the Times of Empire, ed. 
Andrew T. Abernethy, et al. (Eugene: Pickwick, 2013), 53-55.  
32 Joy Hooker, “Zion as Theological Symbol in Isaiah: Implications for Judah, for the Nations, and for Empire,” 
in Isaiah and Imperial Context: The Book of Isaiah in the Times of Empire, ed. Andrew T. Abernethy, et al. 
(Eugene: Pickwick, 2013), 116.  
203 
 
return to life, and so we again find that this developing resurrection belief had primarily to do 
with the broader eschatological hope for the restoration of Israel’s relationship with YHWH.  
The fourth reference to resurrection in the Hebrew Bible is Daniel 12.1-3 (second century BCE) 
which has a much greater apocalyptic character. It is here that it becomes especially evident 
how resurrection was connected in a substantial way to other eschatological motifs, particularly 
re-creation, with justice and national redemption still present, but cast on a much grander, 
cosmic scale. The resurrection in Daniel 12.2 is most likely speaking about a post-mortem 
return to life, more explicitly than its forebears. Wright overstates this, however, when he 
claims that “virtually all scholars agree that [Daniel 12.2] does indeed speak of bodily 
resurrection, and mean this in a concrete sense,” and that this passage “unquestionably refers 
to physical resurrection.”33 Though many scholars do agree that this is a reference to personal 
resurrection, it is neither universal nor unquestionable that a bodily and physical resurrection 
is depicted.34 What is clear, however, is that this resurrection is not an isolated event, but part 
of a series of events, preceded by a period of anguish and a time of deliverance, and followed 
by judgment and some sort of transformation. Resurrection should not, therefore, be read 
simply in terms of bodily revivification, but as one part of a much larger whole.35 
 
33 Wright, RSG, 109, 322.  
34 Cf. Nickelsburg, who argues that the language is a picture of Israel’s restoration and not of people who are 
literally dead (Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 30-31); Ernest C. Lucas notes that the transformation 
implied by Daniel prohibits an interpretation of a return to earthly life (Daniel (Leicester: Apollos, 2002), 294); 
D. S. Russell argues that this passage believes that upon death, the redeemed are transported to a cosmic realm 
amongst the angels, and, further, this new eschatological life is not merely a future expectation, but available in 
the present (Divine Disclosure: An Introduction to Jewish Apocalyptic (London: SCM, 1992), 96-97; Martin-
Achard does not mention bodies, instead interpreting this as taking part in the glory of YHWH (From Death to 
Life, 140). Evidently, a physical and personal reanimation is not quite so unquestionable and ubiquitous as Wright 
assumes.  
35 This is further complicated by the fact that only a portion of the dead will be raised, as demonstrated by the 
word ‘many.’ Its preposition – ‘of’ – should be understood as having partitive force, thus implying that not all 
will be resurrected. This should not be understood as carrying explicative force, meaning, “many, that is, those 
who sleep.” This does not do justice to the grammar which clearly carries partitive force. This makes it somewhat 
unclear as to precisely what sort of resurrection is envisioned if only the especially righteous and the especially 
wicked awake from death. Cf. Pannenberg, JGM, 71; idem., ST, 348; Gregory Goswell, “Resurrection in the Book 
of Daniel,” ResQ 55, no. 3 (2013), 150; Hasel, “Resurrection in the Theology of Old Testament Apocalyptic,” 
277; Murphy, Apocalypticism, 87; de Boer, The Defeat of Death, 48-50; Martin-Achard, From Death to Life, 144.  
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The main concern for Daniel, whether individual resurrection is envisaged or not, is national 
restoration. Daniel is generally dated to the mid-second century BCE, during a period of 
persecution under the Seleucid reign of Antiochus Epiphanes.36 Accordingly, Daniel’s concern 
is justice for his oppressed nation, and his adoption of language present in Isaiah37 echoes 
Isaiah’s concern for the restoration of relationship.38 This requires the reversal of the pain 
suffered and the one inflicting death to be destroyed. A transformation of the suffering caused 
by this persecution is anticipated, which includes those who died as a result. Hence, 
resurrection of individual bodies is present, but only insofar as to serve Daniel’s grander 
concerns of national restoration.39 
This analysis of these four resurrection passages in the Hebrew Bible reveals that, from its 
conception, resurrection in Jewish eschatology was inseparably connected to, and served, the 
larger issue of God’s relationship with his collective people. Of these four passages, only the 
latest envisioned a personal resurrection of individual bodies, but even here this was a 
secondary feature. What primarily mattered was a concern for justice and the redemption of 
the nation. The Israelites’ separation from YHWH and their unfaithfulness to the covenant 
made them metaphorically dead, and only divine intervention could redeem them, and this 
return to YHWH would bring them back to life. We will see that with this, a cosmic renewal 
was simultaneously envisioned, which Daniel alludes to in his reference to becoming like the 
stars. In order to redeem and perfect this relationship between God and his people, a significant 
 
36 Russel, The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic, 368; Lucas, Daniel, 293; Gowan, Daniel, 152. This 
becomes clear from Daniel’s use of “at that time,” referring to a specific point in history rather than an indefinite 
time in the distant future.  
37 Daniel’s reference to the awakening of those asleep in the dust is borrowing from Isa. 26.19 and the notion that 
the risen wicked will become an abhorrence reflects Isa. 66.24, a description present in the HB only in these two 
verses.  
38 Cf. Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead, 68-70; Martin-Achard, From Death to Life, 142.  
39 Two others who argue that Daniel is primarily speaking of a national restoration are Alison Ruth Gray, 
“Between Text and Sermon,” Int 71, no. 2 (2017), 211, and C. L. Seow, Daniel (Louisville: WJK, 2003), 187-90.  
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transformation, not just of individual bodies but of the entire cosmos, is required, one where 
heaven and earth are united.  
Hope for Transformation 
In the Hebrew Bible and intertestamental period, resurrection was often understood as 
transformation, tied to a broader understanding of the re-creation of the cosmos, where the new 
eschatological creation is presented as an antediluvian paradise where all the risen righteous 
dwell in harmony with one another and with God. Elledge claims that resurrection is often less 
“concerned with the embodiment of the risen than with the new cosmic locale into which the 
dead will be transferred,” and thus “defining resurrection exclusively as a restoration to 
embodied life may be insufficient.”40 It should be stressed that it was not just the individual 
body, or bodies, that were transformed, but the whole universe. Everything is expected to be 
cleansed and purified, and resurrection is a central part of this.41 However, this transformation 
was not a mere discarding or replacement of the present universe but a bringing to perfection 
of what already exists, and with it the unification of heaven and earth, enabling the intended 
relational dynamic between God and his people. The following section highlights the various 
ways this idea of a cosmological transformation is understood, either explicitly or implicitly, 
in several presentations of the resurrection. 
Many of these presentations include creation motifs, alluding to and in some cases directly 
borrowing, language and themes from the creation accounts in the book of Genesis. 
Immediately prior to the vision of the valley of dry bones in Ezekiel 37, for instance, the 
prophet describes the restoration of Israel the language that echoes Genesis 2-3. This renewal 
includes cultivation of the land and will “become like the Garden of Eden,” (Ezek. 36.35), 
 
40 Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead in Early Judaism, 6.  
41 Cf. Russel, The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic, 280.  
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within which the population will multiply and become fruitful (36.9-11). The vision of dry 
bones coming back to life reflects the creation of humanity in Genesis 2: the valley suggests 
an uncultivated, dry earth; bodies are formed but require God to breathe life into them; God 
plants a garden and sets humanity there as he promises to set (the same verb is used in Gen. 
2.15 and Ezek. 37.14) the revivified back in their land.42 Creation language might also be 
present in Isaiah 26.19 and Daniel 12.2, where the dead are described as sleepers in the ‘dust,’ 
which echoes Genesis 2.7 when Adam is formed from the dust.43 We find this motif most 
strongly in the Book of Watchers, 2 Maccabees, and Pseudo Ezekiel, where God’s power is 
asserted. In 1 Enoch 22 (third century BCE), it appears that resurrection is itself transformative, 
an entrance into God’s sanctuary. This new location is described in subsequent chapters, and 
in chapter 25 a paradisiac tree plays a significant role in the very regeneration of the faithful 
(25.4-7). Unlike the tree in Genesis (Gen. 2.15-17, 3.1-7), however, the fruit is not associated 
with sin, but rather with the revitalization and maintenance of this renewed existence.44  
2 Maccabees 7 (second century BCE), a text written in the context of the Antiochian persecution, 
portrays resurrection with graphic physical imagery. Chapter seven recounts a narrative of 
seven brothers and their mother who refuse to disobey their ancestral laws and eat the pork 
their captors were impressing upon them. Upon refusing to eat the pork, each of the sons in 
turn is tortured and executed, while their mother encourages them to stay faithful to God’s 
laws. A major theme in the narrative is justice, which I will return to in the following section. 
 
42 John F. Kutsko, Between Heaven and Earth: Divine Presence and Absence in the Book of Ezekiel (Winona 
Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2000), 129-34. Cf. Ezek. 28.13; 31.9, 16, 18; Job 10.8, 9, 11.  
43 de Boer, The Defeat of Death, 46. The imagery of dust is used elsewhere to describe the eventual location of all 
humanity, who will return to where they originated (Gen. 3.19; Ps. 90.3; 104.29; Ecc. 3.20; Job 10.9). However, 
this imagery is not used exclusively to allude to the creation narratives (Gen. 13.16; Deu. 28.24; 1 Sam. 2.8; Job 
2.12; Isa. 29.5; 49.23; Lam. 2.10), and so it is impossible to discern precisely the extent to which Isa. 26.19 and 
Dan. 12.2 are relying on Gen. Given that apocalyptic literature often include creation motifs, as will be seen, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that Isaiah and Daniel might also be doing so. Furthermore, 4 Ezra 7.70 explicitly 
refers to Adam when discussing the eschatological judgment: “When the Most High made the world and Adam 
and all who have come from him, he first prepared the judgment and the things that pertain to the judgment” (4 
Ezra 7.70). 
44 Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead in Early Judaism, 78-81.  
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Here it is important to note that the brothers and their mother endure torture and maiming in 
the belief that their creator God will return their bodies and their lost limbs. In other words, 
they hope for resurrection, which is understood here as bodily re-creation. Referring to his 
tongue and hands, the third brother states, “I got these from heaven…and from him I hope to 
get them back,” (7.11) and as encouragement to her sons, the mother declares: 
The creator of the world who shaped the beginning of humankind and devised the origin of all things, 
will in his mercy give life and breath back to you again. …I beg you, my child, to look at the heaven 
and the earth and see everything that is in them, and recognize that God did not make them out of 
things that existed. And in the same way the human race came into being. (7.23, 28) 
This God is seen as the creator of the present world and the “lord of life” (cf. 7.9; 14.46), and 
it is precisely as creator that he has power to restore the body.45 This motif is expressed again 
in Pseudo-Ezekiel (second century BCE), which incorporates the language of Genesis 1 into the 
rewriting of Ezekiel 37. The resurrection is here divided into three sections: the joining of 
bones, the covering of the bones with skin, and the breath entering the body. Each section (fr. 
2. 5, 6, 7-9) finishes with the words, ְַֽיִהי־ ן׃ ו   כ    (“And it was so”), alluding to the phrase repeated 
in Genesis 1.7, 9, 11, 15, 24, 30.46 This connection between resurrection and creation may also 
be present in the Messianic Apocalypse, where God’s spirit “hovers” over the poor (4Q521, fr. 
2, line 6). This connected use of ‘hover’ and ‘spirit’ occurs elsewhere only in Genesis 1.2.47 
Resurrection in these instances is connected to new creation, where God’s power to re-create 
is asserted. Resurrection is, hence, synonymous with transformation.  
This new creation is seen, in many resurrection accounts, as a transformation not just of bodies 
but of the world, even encompassing the whole universe. This is implied in Daniel’s 
resurrection account, where “those who are wise shall shine like the brightness of the sky, and 
those who lead many to righteousness, like the stars forever and ever” (12.3). The extent to 
which this rather ambiguous imagery refers to a transformed reality is difficult to determine 
 
45 Ibid., 27, 79. Cf. de Boer, The Defeat of Death, 51.  
46 Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead in Early Judaism, 80; Wold, “Agency and Raising the Dead,” 10-11.  
47 Wold, “Agency and Raising the Dead,” 12.  
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and though Daniel’s primary concern is national redemption, this involves a transformed body 
that is set against a cosmic background. The transition from existing in the dust to inhabiting 
the cosmos suggests a “celestial destiny” for the wise.48 It is important to note that the imagery 
of stars was often used in apocalyptic literature to refer to the angels; the resurrected will not 
literally live in space, but will be transformed in such a way so as to co-exist with the heavenly 
host.49  
However, while presupposing some form of transformation, Daniel’s emphasis here is more 
likely an anticipation of the exaltation of the wise. Precisely what this entails is unclear, as the 
passage is too brief for anything definitive, but these risen righteous have been placed among 
the stars, a strong contrast to Antiochus who desired this for himself (cf. Daniel 8.9-12).50 In 
this sense, Wright’s interpretation is compelling. The reference to the stars, he insists, is not an 
indication of the nature of the resurrected body but of the status of the risen. Referencing 
Numbers 24.17, 1 Samuel 29.9, 2 Samuel 14.17, 20, and Isaiah 9.6, he argues that the imagery 
of stars carries a royal connotation, and so the wise in Daniel 12.3, rather than becoming stars 
or angels, “will be leaders in God’s new creation.”51 The resurrected will be exalted to a 
position of authority and “to a state of glory.”52 Wright’s interpretation of this primarily as a 
 
48 Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead, 32-33. This cosmological background is not unusual for Daniel, who 
includes the images of the “great sea,” the “four winds of heaven,” and a “river of fire,” and then describes the 
“Little Horn” waging war against heaven, where he even managed to trample on some of the stars he sent down 
to earth. This violation of heaven is resolved in chapter twelve.  
49 Collins, Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 112. Cf. 1 Enoch 104. Albert Wolters has argued that the word 
ר ה   which is usually translated as ‘brightness,’ refers to a specific luminary, namely Hayley’s Comet. He argues ,ז ֹ֖
that this word is used elsewhere to describe a specific object rather than an abstract notion or to multiple heavenly 
objects (e.g. Ezek. 8.2; Matt. 13.43; in Aramaic, Arabic, and Ethiopic, various forms of this same noun refer either 
to the moon or to Venus), and that according to astronomical calculations, Halley’s Comet was visible at 
approximately the time of Antiochus’ death in 164 BCE, and might have been interpreted as a warning to all who 
oppose the God of Israel. There might be some validity in this interpretation, as astrology did indeed have a 
significant function in ancient cultic practices, and a comet such as Halley’s Comet would probably have piqued 
considerable interest. However, the poetic parallelism here likens the “brightness of the sky” with “the stars 
forever and ever,” and is thus not speaking of a particular, specific star, but speaking generally, metaphorically, 
of the location where the risen will co-exist with the heavenly host (Albert M. Wolters, “Zōhar Hārāqîa (Daniel 
12:3) and Halley’s Comet,” JSOT 19, no. 61 (1994), 111-20; cf. Lucas, Daniel, 295-96).  
50 Gray, “Between Text and Sermon,” 212. Cf. Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead, 32-34; Collins, Apocalypticism 
in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 112; Lucas, Daniel, 296.  
51 Wright, RSG, 112. Contra Murphy, Apocalypticism, 87.  
52 Ibid., 113. For a further defence of this position, cf. Goswell, “Resurrection in the Book of Daniel,” 151.  
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change in social status rather than a radically transformed human nature does not compel him 
to view ‘resurrection’ as much more than the reanimation of a personal body. Wright’s view, 
to be clear, has eschatological significance and sets resurrection within a wider transformation, 
but the point here is that any transformation in Wright’s vision is largely framed in light of an 
overemphasis upon the personal reanimation of Jesus’ corporeal body. I contend to the 
contrary, that the cumulative weight of evidence, the vast quantity and diversity of examples 
of resurrection referring to a reality much broader than human bodies suggests that the notion 
of resurrection should not be restricted to personal reanimation, and that the notion of bodies 
or personal existence should be interpreted in light of this broader, cosmic transformation. 
Furthermore, one might question precisely who they have authority over, considering Daniel 
does not envisage a universal resurrection. What is clear is that resurrection does not here refer 
simply to the reanimation of a personal body, but to broader social and political issues, and 
bound up within a new vision for reality, one where those who have sought relationship with 
God are rewarded precisely with that for which they were seeking.  
A transformation of the cosmos in connection to resurrection is similarly presupposed or 
explicitly imaged elsewhere, and we again find further diversity amongst the apocalyptic 
literature on what exactly is expected. I will return to this issue later in this chapter when 
discussing the broader eschatological hopes, but it is worth noting several explicit occurrences. 
We have already seen that a transformed cosmic reality is anticipated in 1 Enoch 24-25, but 
elsewhere resurrection is placed within the broader promise of the renewal of creation, where 
mountains dance and hills leap, and the earth itself rejoices (51.1-5). In the Dead Sea Scrolls, 
Pseudo-Ezekiel anticipates a renewed world where the Israelites retake possession of their land, 
and the temple is restored. However, in the Messianic Apocalypse, a vast cosmic landscape is 
depicted, where the righteous inhabit the heavens not a renewed earth, and the wicked are 
confined to a location in the “valley of death” beyond the “bridge of the abyss” (4Q521 fr. 7). 
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Similarly, in 4 Ezra (first to second century CE), the present world will be no more as the entire 
cosmos is renewed, also alluding to the Genesis creation accounts: “And after seven days the 
world, which is not yet awake, will be roused, and that which is corruptible shall perish. And 
the earth shall give up those who are asleep in it” (4 Ezra 7.31-32). Elledge notes two distinct 
beliefs regarding this transformation within which the resurrection will occur emerge. Some, 
such as the Epistle of Enoch, 4 Ezra, 2 Baruch, the Messianic Apocalypse, and Daniel, envision 
a celestial existence, whereas the Book of Watchers, 2 Maccabees, Pseudo-Ezekiel, and Pseudo-
Philo’s Biblical Antiquities suggest that this existence will take place on earth, albeit a 
transformed, renewed earth.53 Despite this diversity, what is evident is that this resurrection is 
again not an isolated event, nor is it simply a return to an embodied existence in an unchanged 
reality, but is inseparably connected to a transformed cosmos. In this sense, resurrection is 
regarded as referencing broader eschatological hopes for this new reality.  
Hope for Justice 
The issue of theodicy and the dispensation of justice is an essential element to the belief and 
development of resurrection, and so this motif is prevalent in many of the passages this chapter 
has already addressed. This is particularly evident in the earlier references in the Hebrew Bible, 
where a a restored relationship with YHWH is desired. This notion develops particularly in the 
context of the Jewish submission to Hellenistic rule, and resurrection is inseparable from this. 
The belief in a transformed creation where the righteous dwell in restored relationship with 
YHWH is a solution to the present problems of pain and servitude. The new context of pain 
and servitude brought the hope for a redeemed afterlife, at least for those who suffered the most 
and unjustly, came to the fore. Wright correctly emphasizes the role of judgment in his 
interpretation of the notion of resurrection, noting that the most prominent resurrection 
 
53 Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead, 37-42.  
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passages of the Hebrew Bible highlight “the common hope of Israel: that YHWH would restore 
[Israel’s] fortunes at last, liberate her from pagan dominion, and resettle her in justice and 
peace,” and that the primary focus was “that of the hope of the nation for national restoration.”54 
This is the same concern of 2 Maccabees, where resurrection, the restoration of life to those 
martyred for the sake of God’s law, speaks to the much more pressing issue of the political 
redemption of Israel.55  
However, the relation between resurrection and justice is not restricted to national redemption, 
but is far more theologically intensive, addressing the issue of evil and being developed as a 
solution to the problem of theodicy in a time of foreign oppression. This is seen in both Daniel 
12 and 2 Maccabees 7, where resurrection is the precursor to the reward and redemption of the 
persecuted.56 Here, as in Pseudo-Ezekiel, the Messianic Apocalypse 4Q521 frs. 2 and 4, Ps. of 
Solomon 3.11-12, 4 Ezra 7.31-34, resurrection hope is “the central expression of God’s 
righteous judgment and mercy for the Jewish people.”57 The extent to which this mercy spreads 
beyond Israel is minimal, however, again demonstrating the focus upon national restoration, 
but this was bound up with the desire to see the liberation and redemption of those who have 
unjustly suffered under persecution, especially those who were martyred for their commitment 
to the laws of their God.  
The final utterances of the seven brothers and their mother in 2 Maccabees 7 demonstrate their 
belief in divine vindication and receiving resurrected and eternal life as reward for their refusal 
 
54 Wright, RSG, 121-22.  
55 Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead, 27. Cf. 2 Macc. 1.24; 2.7, 17-18; 6.12-17; 7.6; 8.5, 27-29; 10.4, 26; 11.9-10; 
13.12. 
56 de Boer, The Defeat of Death, 49-51. This was a significant issue for Pannenberg who argued, “The course of 
the world showed that the righteous suffer and the ungodly prosper. Israel’s faith in the justice of its God had 
come to terms with this. It thus arrived at the idea of future reward or punishment for good or bad deeds that do 
not produce the appropriate fruits in this life. …The Jewish concept of the resurrection arose, then, out of the 
problems of theodicy, the justice of God, and its demonstration in the lives of individuals” (Pannenberg, ST, vol. 
2, 347). 
57 Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead, 84. This is also highlighted in D. S. Russel, Divine Disclosure (London: 
SCM, 1992), 102; David C. Sim, Apocalyptic Eschatology in the Gospel of Matthew (Cambridge: CUP, 1996), 
45-47; Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 41-42.  
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to disobey their ancestral laws.58 This passage was likely originally read allegorically, as 
encouragement for those being persecuted at the time, and, as David deSilva notes, the theme 
of national redemption permeates the book’s eschatology.59 Hence, it is probable that these 
references to resurrection and the receiving of new limbs and bodies should be understood in 
relation to the linking of loyalty to God’s covenant with vindication.60 The author might be 
anticipating a personal and bodily resurrection – and the extreme physicality of the imagery 
might testify to this61 – but the resurrection is of second importance to the larger concern of 
justice. Where Antiochus was attempting to defile their body, and with it their nation and cult, 
they hoped that God would redeem and purify them and their nation. 
Resurrection thus became the permanent end to, and indeed reversal of, injustice. Even from 
the early references to resurrection, such as Isaiah 25-26, death is personified as a being who 
must be defeated and replaced, as in Daniel 12, by the glorified and exalted risen.62 For Daniel, 
the martyrdom of the stalwart leaders of the Jewish cult was a significant problem, incongruous 
with the belief that YHWH is just and sovereign. Chapters seven through eleven insist that the 
time of persecution will end, and the persecutor will be punished, but asks where is the justice 
for those who have already been martyred? The answer is given in chapter twelve, where God’s 
sovereignty over death is asserted – that justice may be afforded to those who had died 
unjustly.63 The brothers and their mother in 2 Maccabees 7 have strength to endure torture 
because of their hope in resurrection, where they will receive back their lost limbs, and in the 
 
58 The second brother declares, “The King of the universe will raise us up to an everlasting renewal of life, because 
we have died for his laws” (7.9); the third brother willingly offers his tongue and hands for dismemberment, 
claiming that he received these from God and will receive them again (7.10-11); the fourth states that one can 
only “cherish the hope God gives of being raised again by him” and promises that his torturer that will receive no 
resurrection (7.14). Finally, the mother encourages them with the promise that God will give life and breath back 
to them (7.23). 
59 David A. deSilva, Introducing the Apocrypha: Message, Context, and Significance (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
2002), 278.  
60 McDonald, The Resurrection, 11; Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 121.   
61 So Wright argues, that this passage “demonstrates again the extremely physical nature of the anticipated 
resurrection,” (Wright, RSG, 323).  
62 de Boer, The Defeat of Death, 45-47.  
63 Gowan, Daniel, 152.  
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Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, 4 Ezra, 2 Baruch, and Wisdom of Solomon, resurrection 
emphasizes the righting of the created order by God, as Wright notes, YHWH “has it in his 
power to overcome it and not only restore the righteous to life but install them as rulers, judges 
and kings.”64 Furthermore, in Pseudo-Ezekiel, resurrection is the response to the prophet’s 
question regarding justice for the righteous.65 
The connection of the notion of resurrection to the issue of justice and the problem of suffering 
is another example of how this motif is inseparably connected to the broader eschatological 
hopes for the end times. According to Elledge, “Resurrection frequently transports the dead 
from and to a variety of spatial realms, in which the deity has already preconfigured justice 
into the very structures of the creation.”66 This is a helpful way of understanding the connection 
between resurrection, justice, and the new eschatological reality. This understanding of justice 
involves not simply rewarding the persecuted with a new, re-animated existence, but by 
providing a solution with a recreated world where injustice is no longer possible. Resurrection 
involves entering into this new reality. Elledge further argues, “Resurrection and divine justice 
came to be so intimately interconnected that they offered mutual, even inseparable, 
corroboration.”67 The connection between resurrection and justice is intensive, and thus 
resurrection once more is a reference to the larger spectrum of eschatological hopes and cannot 
be reduced to a single issue, least of all a personal re-animated body.  
Resurrection in ancient Jewish eschatology is not limited to speaking of a re-animated bodily 
existence, but was inseparably connected to the broader spectrum of eschatological ideas, 
particularly a transformed creation within which justice is made a reality. Resurrection had to 
do with national redemption, the dispensation of divine justice, the redemption of covenantal 
 
64 Wright, RSG, 173.  
65 Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead, 83.  
66 Ibid., 32.  
67 Ibid., 82.  
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relationship, and cosmic redemption. The diversity of presentations of resurrection 
demonstrates the creativity of Jewish theology and the adaptability and malleability of this 
notion of resurrection, and should not be condensed into a homogenised doctrine.68 This very 
diversity reveals that the assumption that resurrection refers to no more than a personal or 
individual reanimation is an unhelpful generalization which overlooks the many shades of 
meaning within this category.  
Ambiguity in Jewish Eschatology 
Ancient Jewish eschatological texts exhibit ambiguity when describing the anticipated 
resurrected reality. The new reality is to be a redeemed reality, not a replaced one. There is 
evidence of a variety of expectations, from a thoroughly physical, bodily existence to a 
spiritual, immaterial one, but generally the nature of the resurrected reality (either of bodies, or 
the cosmos in general) was ambiguous. What was generally expected was an intensive, 
thoroughgoing transformation of the present creation; precisely what that would look like is 
impossible to determine. This ambiguity is reflected in the description of Jesus’ resurrection, 
as will be seen in chapter six. 
Determining the nature of the resurrected reality is complicated by the observation that not all 
accepted bodily resurrection and that the belief in an immortal soul was not uncommon (cf. 
 
68 Ibid., 3, 17-18, 43. Cf. Russell, Divine Disclosure, 100. The diversity of resurrection theology is seen in its 
rejection by the Sadducees, a group we have not touched on (principally because the focus of this chapter is to 
ascertain what resurrection meant, which invariably precludes both the space and necessity of discussing a group 
which did not think it meant anything). It is very difficult to ascertain the reason for why they rejected resurrection, 
as the main sources of information on what they believed are polemic against their beliefs, and hence are 
characterisations and impartial presentations of their theology. It is probable that the reason why they rejected 
resurrection was due to their emphasis upon the sole authority of the Torah, which does not propose a resurrection 
hope. Furthermore, it appears they concentrated on the present life and descendants to carry the family name after 
this present life ended. Reward comes not in a post-mortem existence, but in the present, either in the form of 
blessings or in offspring. Hence, there is no need for resurrection. Wright suggests a possible reason for the 
rejection of resurrection being what he views as an inherently revolutionary character of resurrection, where the 
Sadducees wanted to avoid political unrest. This is, of course, simply speculation, but I am unconvinced by 
Wright’s argument that resurrection was fundamentally a revolutionary doctrine. Cf. Wright, RSG, 129-35; 
deSilva, Introducing the Apocrypha, 190-91; Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead, 101-06; Christopher Bryan, The 
Resurrection of the Messiah (Oxford: OUP, 2011), 10-11; Josephus, J.W. 2.164-66; idem., Ant. 18.16.  
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Jub. 23.31; 1 En. 91-104; Assumption of Moses 10.9; Jewish War 2.154-58).69 In his attempt 
to argue that resurrection almost universally meant a physical re-animated body, Wright 
downplayed the significance and influence of the doctrine of immortality. He argues that often 
the Hellenistic overtones were a translation of a physical understanding of resurrection into 
Hellenistic language, but that a “firmly physical account of resurrection” is maintained.70 In 
one particular instance, he asserts that though Wisdom of Solomon “clearly teaches the 
immortality of the soul,” this is not antithetical to resurrection, that immortality would consist 
of a renewed bodily life.71 However, the verse Wright quotes (Ws. 9.15) seems to imply the 
opposite: “A perishable body weighs down the soul, and this earthly tent burdens the thoughtful 
mind.” Wright’s argument that Wisdom of Solomon taught a compatibility between the 
immortality of the soul and a physical ‘bodily’ resurrection seems unlikely.72 Indeed, the 
Jewish perspective on resurrection is far more diverse than Wright allows. Immortality is, 
however, the exception rather than the norm. Despite this, its presence demonstrates that the 
Jewish expectation of the risen body was diverse and ambiguous, with some envisaging an 
entirely non-bodily post-mortem existence, whether one has been ‘resurrected’ into this 
existence or not.73 
Similar to this, though not maintaining a doctrine of immortality, was the belief in resurrection 
that consisted not of bodies per se, but of some sort of transformation into a glorified, heavenly 
or angelic existence. Daniel 12 avoids the language of ‘corpse,’ suggesting the author’s 
reticence to imply the resurrection of the physical remains, and is rather unclear of what the 
 
69 Cf. Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic, 372; Collins, “The Expectation of the End in the 
Dead Sea Scrolls,” 87; White, “Resurrection of the Dead,” 1018; Wright, RSG, 140.  
70 Wright, NTPG, 324.  
71 Wright, RSG, 163.  
72 McDonald observes that Wisdom of Solomon presupposes the immortality of the soul and has no place for a 
bodily resurrection (cf. Ws. 2.23-24) (McDonald, The Resurrection, 13-14).  
73 Daniel A. Smith, Revisiting the Empty Tomb: The Early History of Easter (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2010), 37; 
Bryan, The Resurrection of the Messiah, 9. According to Russell, “Not the immortality of the soul, but the 
resurrection of the body is the key to the apocalyptic interpretation of the life beyond death,” (Russell, The Method 
and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic, 373).  
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resurrected body will consist. The claim that the resurrected will become like the stars certainly 
implies a non-corporeal resurrection.74 This becoming like the stars is reflected in 2 Baruch 
50.2-3 (late first century to early second century CE). 1 Enoch suggests a transformation into 
an angelic state (1 En. 104.2-6), and Jubilees depicts a resurrection while entirely avoiding 
describing the nature of this resurrection, despite also depicting bones remaining in the ground 
(Jub. 23.30-31).75 Bauckham asserts that what is affirmed is the preservation of personal 
identity, rather than a mere return to the same bodily life. In their post-mortem existence, 
individuals bear their distinctive individuality in a radically transformed embodiment.76 In 
these examples, resurrection entailed a transformation of individuals so comprehensive that, 
though personal identity is retained, it is almost inappropriate to use the language of ‘body.’ 
On the opposite end of the spectrum to the immortality of the soul is the resurrection of bodies, 
which occurs occasionally. However, this is usually a metaphorical description for national 
redemption. This is evident in 2 Maccabees 7, which depicts resurrection hope in the most 
physical language of all Jewish eschatology.77 Similarly, Daniel 12.1-4 has been understood 
by some as a physical, bodily resurrection.78 This might similarly be reflected in the language 
of the dead being raised from the dust in 1QH 14.34, 19.79 Though the author may have a 
physical and personal reanimation in mind (though this is doubtful in the case of Daniel), the 
main concern for these texts is the restoration of Israel, using the language of resurrection as 
metaphor.  
As has been argued in this section, resurrection signified much more than the reanimation of a 
personal body, and entailed a significant transformation. The nature of this resurrected reality, 
 
74 Collins, Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 15, 112; Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead, 68-69.  
75 Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead, 30-31; Collins, Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 23, 113. 
76 Bauckham, “Life, Death, and the Afterlife in Second Temple Judaism,” 92.  
77 Cf. de Boer, The Defeat of Death, 50.  
78 Wright, RSG, 109, 322; Vinzent, Christ’s Resurrection in Early Christianity, 31.  
79 Cf. Collins, Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 121-22; idem., “The Expectation of the End in the Dead 
Sea Scrolls,” 87-88; Sim, Apocalyptic Eschatology in the Gospel of Matthew, 45. 
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however, is unclear, with a vast array of possibilities put forward, all speculation and metaphor. 
There is continuity with the empirical reality, as creation is affirmed, but there is substantial 
difference. How this translates to the existence of the resurrected faithful is extremely 
ambiguous, and as this category of resurrection is applied to Jesus’ post-mortem existence, the 
body of the risen Jesus proves no less ambiguous.  
5.3. Resurrection and Reanimation  
The section above demonstrated within ancient Judaism the diversity of understandings and 
employment of the language of resurrection, and the connection of resurrection to the broader 
eschatological hopes such as national redemption, cosmological re-creation, and the 
dispensation of divine judgment. The notion of resurrection cannot be reduced to the 
reanimation of personal bodies, and so the majority of scholarship on the resurrection, which 
has failed to uphold both the continuity and discontinuity of Jesus’ resurrection, reflecting the 
Jewish hope for both renewal and transformation, assuming a notion of resurrection divorced 
from its Jewish context, is inadequate. Rather, the resurrection refers to a broad spectrum of 
eschatological hopes, largely tied up with the question of God’s relationship with creation. The 
focus in this present section is how the presupposed category of ‘resurrection of the dead’ was 
understood in the first century as especially illustrated in a few particular instances in the New 
Testament (Mark 12.18-27; Matt. 22.23-33; Luke 20.27-40; John 5.28; 11.21-27; Acts 17.18; 
1 Cor. 15), as having to do with the fulfilment of a much broader array of eschatological 
expectations for the end of history. While some of these texts will be revisited in chapter six, 
this discussion lays the groundwork by stressing the category of resurrection and its relation to 
the broader hopes. Chapter six contains an analysis of the application of this category to the 
specific question of Jesus’ post-mortem existence.  
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Jesus’ encounter with the Sadducees as recorded in the Synoptic Gospels, and Paul’s famous 
diatribe from the Corinthian correspondence, are the two most significant passages that suggest 
the presupposition of a Jewish apocalyptic understanding of resurrection within the early 
Christian church to communicate what they believed had happened to the person of Jesus. 
Interestingly, they both respond to a similar misconception about resurrection (at least from the 
perspective of our sources), that it anticipates a return to a physical embodiment comparable 
with empirical reality. Moreover, their respective responses demonstrate a reliance upon a 
Jewish apocalyptic notion of resurrection, extending ‘resurrection’ beyond the individual body 
to embrace eschatological notions of divine justice, cosmological re-creation, transformation, 
and glorification. Though there was a great deal of diversity in first-century Judaism and 
Christianity, resurrection often encompassed a much broader spectrum of eschatological 
conceptions, for which ‘resurrection’ often functioned as metonym.  
The New Testament texts were written after the events of Easter which inevitably influenced 
how the early followers of Jesus understood the resurrection. Nevertheless, similarities with, 
and allusions to, the Jewish understanding of resurrection in the New Testament are prevalent, 
suggesting that there is a great deal of continuity between resurrection in the New Testament 
and the ancient Jewish eschatological category. Easter itself is understood through pre-existing 
frameworks. There is, evidently, a reinterpretation of the broader Jewish category of 
resurrection in light of Jesus’ own resurrection appearance, but it is not an utterly distinct 
innovation. Few have stressed this as strongly as Pannenberg and Wright, both of whom argue 
that Jesus’ resurrection can only be properly understood as a development within its Jewish 
apocalyptic context.80 However, the focus often becomes concentrated upon the question of 
personal or individual reanimation. Though it appears that an embodied resurrected existence 
 
80 Pannenberg, ST, vol. 2, 347-51; Wright, RSG, 30-31, 686. Cf. Joost Holleman, Resurrection & Parousia: A 
Traditio-Historical Study of Paul’s Eschatology in 1 Corinthians 15 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1996), 88-90; Peter 
Stuhlmacher, “The Resurrection of Jesus and the Resurrection of the Dead,” ExAud 9 (1993), 53.  
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was indeed part of the total picture, an isolated and arbitrary focus on Jesus’ ‘individual’ 
resurrection can work as a distraction from the broader notions communicated by this event.  
Here I will highlight the presuppositions of a Jewish eschatological understanding behind the 
New Testament portrayals of resurrection of the dead in order to demonstrate that Jesus’ 
resurrection cannot be limited to the reanimation of a personal body. It will become clear over 
the course of this chapter and the next that a broad spectrum of Jewish eschatological hopes 
were interpreted as being fulfilled in Jesus. The presupposition of this Jewish eschatological 
conception of resurrection is especially evident in the Sadducees’ challenge to Jesus regarding 
marriage at the resurrection (Mark 12.18-27; Matt. 22.23-33; Luke 20.27-40), Paul’s argument 
in 1 Corinthians 15 that the future resurrection of the dead has been confirmed in Jesus’ 
resurrection, and the apostles’ sermons in Acts (17.18), as well as scattered throughout John’s 
Gospel (5.28; 11.21-27).81  
When They Rise from the Dead, They Neither Marry nor are Given in Marriage 
Each of the synoptic Gospels narrate an encounter Jesus had with the Sadducees, who pose a 
hypothetical scenario with the sole intention of demonstrating the absurdity of belief in 
resurrection (Mark 12.18-27 // Matt. 22.23-33 // Luke 20.27-40). Jesus’ response is especially 
illuminating, revealing the influence of the Jewish apocalyptic idea of resurrection upon the 
early Jesus movement. Wright calls this passage “the most important passage about 
resurrection in the whole Gospel tradition,”82 as much can be gleaned from this small 
interaction. Significantly, its almost verbatim reproduction in each of the Synoptics testifies to 
the importance of resurrection belief in early Christianity. The passage is part of a series of 
 
81 Of course, Johannine eschatology is markedly different to the Synoptics and to Paul, as will be analysed in 
detail in chapter six. However, there is evidence that John’s eschatology is nevertheless influenced by a 
presupposed Jewish eschatological framework, and a close examination of the presence of this framework in John 
illuminates how this category was understood and utilized within the first century Jewish community.  
82 Wright, RSG, 415.  
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stories about Jesus being challenged by the Pharisaic and scribal elite (Mark 11.27-12.34 // 
Matt. 21.23-40 // Luke 20.1-40),83 and is not a treatise on Jesus’ understanding of life after 
death.84 Even so, his response to the Sadducees’ question is significant.  
Each of the Synoptics stress that the Sadducees reject the notion of resurrection and recount 
the same hypothetical story of a woman who is being widowed seven times and who dies 
childless.85 The Sadducees then ask, to which of the seven husbands will the woman be married 
in the resurrection?86 Commentators suggest their aim is not to learn, but to embarrass Jesus 
and ridicule the notion of resurrection.87 As mentioned above, the Sadducees did not subscribe 
to the notion of resurrection, as it was a later theological development and thus does not appear 
in the Pentateuch, which they took as supremely authoritative.88 The scenario they present Jesus 
with is based on the Levirate law of Deuteronomy 25.5-10,89 hoping to force Jesus to have to 
choose between the new innovation of resurrection or the law of Moses which surely would 
not have prescribed a law like this if resurrection was envisioned.90  
 
83 These challengers include the chief priests, scribes, and elders questioning his authority, the Pharisees and 
Herodians questioning him about taxes, the Sadducees questioning his understanding of resurrection and the 
Mosaic law, and a scribe (or lawyer in Matthew) questioning him about the greatest commandment. Each are 
attempts at trapping Jesus. Luke does not include the fourth challenge, which he located much earlier in Jesus’ 
ministry (Luke 10.25-28).  
84 Cf. M. Eugene Boring, Mark: A Commentary (Louisville: WJK, 2006), 338.  
85 There might be an allusion to the story of Sarah in the book of Tobit, who had had seven husbands, each of 
whom had been killed by the demon Asmodeus before she could conceive (Tobit 3.7-8). Cf. Donald A. Hagner, 
Matthew 14-28 (Dallas: Word, 1995), 640.  
86 Each of the Synoptics include ἐν τῇ ἀναστάσει, hence referring to the technical category of resurrection, rather 
than the return to life of a specific individual.  
87 W. D. Davies and Dale C. Allison, Matthew: A Shorter Commentary (London: T&T Clark, 2004), 377; Craig 
S. Keener, The Gospel of Matthew: A Socio-Rhetoric Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 527; Douglas 
R. A. Hare, Matthew (Louisville: WJK, 1993), 256; Timothy J. Geddert, Mark (Scottdale: Herald, 2001), 287; 
David L. Turner, Matthew (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 531; Robert H. Stein, Mark (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 
553; James R. Edwards, The Gospel According to Mark (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 367; David E. Garland, 
Luke (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2011), 807.  
88 Davies and Allison note that the Sadducees “were probably not annihilationists but, in harmony with many OT 
texts, rather believed in a shadowy existence in Sheol” (Davies and Allison, Matthew, 377). Cf. Charles H. Talbert, 
Matthew (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010), 254; John J. Kilgallen, “The Sadducees and Resurrection from the Dead: 
Luke 20:27-40,” Biblica 67, no. 4 (1986), 480; Hare, Matthew, 255; Turner, Matthew, 530-31.  
89 Cf. Gen. 38.8; Ruth 3.9-4.10.  
90 Cf. Camille Focant, The Gospel According to Mark: A Commentary, trans. Leslie Robert Keylock (Eugene: 
Pickwick, 2012), 493; Talbert, Matthew, 254.  
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Jesus, however, responds by asserting that these are not the only choices, claiming that the 
Sadducees are fundamentally incorrect in their understanding of resurrection. They know 
neither the Scriptures nor the power of God. Of the three Synoptics, Mark’s version is a 
particularly critical rebuke, beginning and ending with the explicit proclamation that the 
Sadducees are in error, whereas Luke’s is softened, focused on their teaching.91 Jesus’ response 
can be divided into two parts: a statement on the function of marriage, followed by a defence 
of the validity of resurrection belief.  
Jesus responds to the issue of marriage with the assertion that there will be no marriage in the 
resurrected reality, but that the risen will be like angels in heaven.92 One reason for the 
institution of marriage93 was to provide some sort of solution to the problem of death; within 
marriage, life can be perpetuated through children, and provide the means for continuing the 
family name (which in early Judaism was in some sense the equivalent of attaining a post-
mortem existence).94 In the resurrected life, there will be no death, thus making marriage 
redundant. This is made explicit in Luke’s version (20.36). Hence, Jesus’ response is not a 
statement on marriage per se, but that the ‘age to come’ will be characterized by immortality.95 
This is what is meant by the reference to angels, for angels do not die and thus have no need 
for marriage.96 This is not a reference to the gendering or sexuality of angels, but rather their 
 
91 Cf. Kilgallen, “The Sadducees and Resurrection from the Dead,” 481.  
92 Luke adds more detail, contrasting the present function of marriage with that of the future, and implicitly 
rejecting a universal resurrection in the insistence that resurrection is given only to those who are considered 
worthy. This is contrary to John’s interpretation of resurrection in 5.29, where a double resurrection – some to 
reward and some to punishment – is upheld.  
93 It is important here to note that the issue at hand is the social and legal institution of marriage, rather than the 
covenantal relationship between two people. Jesus’ response is primarily an insistence upon the radical 
transformation of social structures.  
94 Wright, RSG, 423; Fred B. Craddock, Luke (Louisville: WJK, 1990), 238.  
95 Wright, RSG, 422.  
96 Though ἄγγελοι is sometimes used to refer to human messengers serving as envoy (1 Macc. 1.44; Jos., Ant. 14, 
451; Matt. 11.10; Mark 1.2; Luke 7.27; 9.52; John 7.24), it is generally used to refer to a transcendent power, 
messengers of God (Matt. 1.20; 2.13, 19; Luke 1.11; 2.9; 12.8f.; Acts 5.19; Gal 4.14; Heb. 1.6; Rev. 14.10). Luke 
20.36 is the only biblical occurrence of ἰσάγγελοι, meaning ‘like an angel’ (used elsewhere by Iamblichus in 
Stobaeus’ Eclogues 1 457, 9 W; Hierocles Carmen Aureum 4, 425; Philo, Sacr. Abel. 5) (BDAG, 8-9). Angels are 
elsewhere described as beings who do not marry or need food (1 En. 15.6; 51.4; 104.4-6; Ws. 5.5, 15-16; 2 Bar. 
222 
 
immortality. To be like angels, therefore, is to not need marriage.97 According to Halvor 
Moxnes, Jesus here envisages a social revolution, directly challenging and subverting the 
patriarchal systems of power: 
The question of levirate marriage in heaven (Mark 12:18-27 par.) receives this response from 
Jesus: life in heaven, in imitation of angels, is a life without sexuality, that is, without marriage. 
…With his sayings Jesus pointed to life in a kingdom that was far from the ideal patriarchal 
household. Those who belonged there, or who entered into the kingdom, were eunuchs, 
children, barren women, and couples who split up to become (sexless) angels. …These texts 
are not social descriptions of life in the group of followers of Jesus. They are all sayings that 
refer to the kingdom, or to life in the resurrection, in the time that will soon come.98 
However, behind Jesus’ understanding of the role of marriage in this resurrected existence is a 
far more intensive transformation. The imagery of becoming like angels is found elsewhere in 
Jewish apocalyptic thought (e.g. 1 Enoch 15.7; 51.4; 104.4; 2 Baruch 51.9-10), indicating that 
this future eschatological life will be transformed and elevated.99 This is what was envisaged 
in Daniel 12.3, to become like heavenly luminaries. Due to the Sadducees’ rejection of the 
existence of angels, and of texts beyond the Pentateuch, Jesus’ reference to angels would not 
have been a particularly convincing argument. Rather, he attempts to correct their 
misconceptions regarding the diverse and extensive notion of resurrection. They had 
incorrectly assumed that resurrection referred to a return to the same earthly life consisting of 
 
51.10; 1QH 3.21-23; 6.13). The comparison to angels in this instance is the stress upon immortality in the new 
eschatological age. 
In the reference to becoming like angels, they each use ‘but’ (alla in Mark and Matthew; de in Luke) rather than 
‘for’ (gar), indicating that their becoming like angels is not necessarily the reason for there being no marriage and 
is, rather, simply an analogy. Cf. Turner, Matthew, 531.  
97 Davies and Allison, Matthew, 378; Garland, Luke, 808; Kilgallen, “The Sadducees and Resurrection from the 
Dead,” 483-86; Geddert, Mark, 288; Hagner, Matthew, 641. Blomberg states, “God is able to transform us into 
creatures who do not engage in sexual relations or procreate” (Craig L. Blomberg, Matthew (Nashville: Broadman, 
1992), 333). However, the point of the passage is not to provide explicit details about what sexuality may or may 
not look like after this present life. Boring, on the other hand, is correct in saying that this passage is simply 
pointing out what resurrection is not, namely that in an existence without death there is need for neither marriage 
nor property or inheritance rights (Boring, Mark, 340). 
98 Halvor Moxnes, Putting Jesus in His Place: A Radical Vision of Household and Kingdom (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 94-95. 
99 Talbert, Matthew, 255; Boring, Mark, 340.  
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the same physical conditions, that it was an extension of the present life.100 Camille Focant 
states: 
At the level of the mode of the resurrection (12:25), the objection of the Sadducees would only be valid 
if the aforesaid resurrection implied the prolongation beyond death of conjugal relations in this world. 
Now, according to Jesus, it isn’t going to be like this. The afterlife is not a simple prolongation of 
present life, but by God’s power something totally new. Such is the profound meaning of the reference 
to the angelic figure to be read as the proof that future reality will be in discontinuity with present 
reality.101  
The Sadducees assumed that the resurrected life would be no different to the present life, social 
institutions included, but Jesus draws on the apocalyptic expectations of a transformed 
existence, which we saw above was an essential element of a Jewish conception of resurrection. 
Turner focusses on the sexuality of the resurrected individuals, arguing that “God’s 
transforming power means that people after resurrection are no longer sexually active.”102 This 
interpretation stretches this passage well beyond its limits. To draw the conclusion that 
resurrected life is invariably an asexual one is to read something into the text that does not 
belong there. This passage is principally envisaging the removal of death and, subsequently, 
the social institutions put in place to deal with the issues associated with death. Jesus is not 
explicating precise details of what this transformed existence will consist, but demonstrating 
familiarity with an apocalyptic worldview, one that inseparably connects resurrection with 
transformation.103 This eschatological future will not be a simple continuation of empirical 
reality, even an idealized version of reality, but “will be less an earthly paradise than something 
transcendent, a time and place in which the boundaries between heaven and earth will become 
indistinct.”104 By using an analogy that makes reference to becoming like angels, Jesus affirms 
the Jewish eschatological tradition of anticipating a transformed life that is discontinuous from 
 
100 Edwards, The Gospel According to Mark, 367; Stein, Mark, 554; Garland, Luke, 808; Turner, Matthew, 531-
32; Geddert, Mark, 288; Blomberg, Matthew, 333.  
101 Focant, The Gospel According to Mark, 493-94.  
102 Turner, Matthew, 532.  
103 Cf. Boring, Mark, 339.  
104 Davies and Allison, Matthew, 379. Rather than Hagner’s claim that Jesus’ knowledge of resurrection “must 
here depend on supernatural knowledge,” (Hagner, Matthew 14-28, 641) I would argue that Jesus is instead relying 
upon apocalyptic tradition.  
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empirical reality, where death has ultimately been conquered and social institutions have been 
transcended.105 
Jesus then turns to the issue of resurrection, but, curiously, does not directly address the topic 
per se, instead highlighting the faithfulness of God to his covenant. Some commentators argue 
that Jesus’ use of Exodus 3.6 suggests that resurrection was implicit in the Pentateuch.106 
However, as we have seen, resurrection developed much later – which is precisely why the 
Sadducees rejected the idea – and so we cannot say that Jesus was attempting to prove the 
resurrection based on this passage, but was rather addressing the presuppositional belief of 
God’s power. Indeed he could have quoted any of the resurrection passages, such as Isaiah 
26.19 or Daniel 12.2, but instead references a passage that the Sadducees would not discredit 
or ignore. Yet, instead of quoting a passage such as Genesis 2.7 or Deuteronomy 32.39 which 
present God as a creative, life-giving deity and which might have been more relevant to the 
topic of resurrection, he quotes Exodus 3.6, which prima facie makes it seem like he is arguing 
for some sort of spiritual immortality, rather than resurrection.107  
On closer inspection, Jesus is stressing the power and covenantal faithfulness of God rather 
than an afterlife, let alone personal reanimation.108 For Wright, the implication that the 
Patriarchs are still alive means an intermediate state where they await resurrection.109 This was 
not an uncommon idea (e.g. 1 Enoch 22, 4 Ezra 4.42, and 2 Baruch 30.1-5), and by the first 
century many Israelites envisaged the Patriarchs as residing somewhere awaiting their 
 
105 Cf. Edwards, The Gospel According to Mark, 368. Stuhlmacher argues, “With this confession, Jesus places 
himself on the side of the Pharisees in this question and directs his followers’ attention to the Holy Scriptures of 
the Old Testament. A closer look at this matter quickly makes evident that the whole Christian expectation of the 
resurrection of the dead and the daring interpretation of the resurrection of Jesus are unthinkable without the 
ancient Jewish confessional tradition” (Stuhlmacher, “The Resurrection of Jesus,” 50). 
106 E.g. Turner, Matthew, 532; Hagner, Matthew, 642. Turner goes so far as to say that Jesus proves the presence 
of resurrection in the Torah from this scriptural reference.  
107 Davies and Allison, Matthew, 379; Wright, RSG, 424; Focant, The Gospel According to Mark, 494; Bradley 
R. Trick, “Death, Covenants, and the Proof of Resurrection in Mark 12:18-27,” NovT 49 (2007), 234; Craddock, 
Luke, 238; Blomberg, Matthew, 334.  
108 Cf. Hare, Matthew, 256; Trick, “Death, Covenants, and the Proof of Resurrection,” 235. 
109 Wright, RSG, 424-25.  
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resurrection.110 However, this does not appear to be the focus of this passage. Rather, by 
referring to the Patriarchs and their relationship to God, the focus is upon the covenant and 
whether the covenantal promises made to the Patriarchs will be kept. If they are dead, God’s 
promises become finite and unfulfilled.111 On the contrary, Jesus proclaims, they are alive, and 
God’s covenant has not been invalidated. By specifically referencing Exodus, Luke makes it 
all the more explicit by providing the context (“in the story about the bush”), the covenantal 
promise of delivering Israel into the land promised to them is implied. If they are still alive, 
God remains obligated to fulfil this promise, and, hence, the Patriarchs would need to be 
resurrected.112  
In this encounter with the Sadducees, a wrong assumption about resurrection becomes 
apparent, and that is that resurrection has strictly to do with the reanimation of a body, and the 
continuation of a life comparable with the present. The correct assertion, on the other hand, is 
that resurrection encompasses a much broader theological horizon, including in it both a 
transformed existence and the fulfilment of God’s covenantal promises. This passage indicates, 
therefore, that the understanding of resurrection among some in the early Christian community 
is in continuity with a Jewish eschatological conception of resurrection, and further indicates 
that this category signified far more than the revivification of individual bodies.113 
Furthermore, resurrection is framed by relationship. The divine covenant is not arbitrary, but a 
 
110 Cf. Turner, Matthew, 532.  
111 Edwards, The Gospel According to Mark, 368-69. Cf. Boring, Mark, 339-40; Keener, The Gospel of Matthew, 
529. As in marriage, a covenant ends upon death. Were the Patriarchs dead, God would be free of his covenantal 
obligations (Trick, “Death, Covenants, and the Proof of Resurrection,” 236-50).  
112 Trick, “Death, Covenants, and the Proof of Resurrection,” 252. 
113 Boring notes, “However the intent of the resurrection of the patriarchs is visualized in this particular text, it is 
important for Mark’s theology as a whole to see its apocalyptic framework, which is concerned not merely with 
the survival of individual souls but with the redemptive act of God for history and the world, and the political 
implications for life in this world” (Boring, Mark, 341). Cf. Pannenberg, ST, 348.  
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commitment to a relationship between Israel and her God, and God is powerful enough to 
maintain this relationship even beyond death.114 
How Can Some of You Say that There is No Resurrection of the Dead? 
The other major resurrection passage, apart from the Passion narratives, is Paul’s discussion of 
resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15. The impetus for Paul’s discussion of resurrection in his letter 
to the Corinthians is their denial of the category of resurrection of the dead despite their 
proclamation that Jesus had risen. The significance of this should not be under-stated: that there 
were some within the early communities of the Jesus movement who rejected the notion of 
resurrection demonstrates that this notion was not a widespread or homogenic notion. Of 
course, this should not be surprising in Greek communities such as Corinth, but it is important 
to note the diversity within the early Jesus communities. This diversity is highlighted by Mark 
Finney when, after an analysis of views on the afterlife in both Hellenistic and Jewish 
traditions, he notes that “Paul and the majority of the Greeks and Romans in the Corinthian 
community have differing conceptual frameworks of the afterlife and, although employing 
similar terminology, are largely talking past each other.”115 It was into this diverse context that 
Paul was writing, and sought to convince the Corinthians that Jesus’ resurrection – and the 
future resurrection of believers – should be understood within an ancient Jewish eschatological 
framework. 
Paul insists that the rejection of the general notion of resurrection despite the claim that Jesus 
rose from the dead is contradictory as the two are essentially inseparable; the belief in 
resurrection of the dead is the presupposed framework through which Jesus’ resurrection is 
 
114 Cf. Hare, Matthew, 257; Edwards, The Gospel According to Mark, 369; Focant, The Gospel According to 
Mark, 494; Trick, “Death, Covenants, and the Proof of Resurrection,” 254; Blomberg, Matthew, 333.  
115 Mark T. Finney, Resurrection, Hell and the Afterlife: Body and Soul in Antiquity, Judaism and Early 
Christianity (New York: Routledge, 2016), 110.  
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interpreted, and Jesus’ resurrection is the confirmation of the doctrine of resurrection.116 There 
are multiple possibilities for their rejection of resurrection, such as their possible belief that 
their experience of the Holy Spirit constituted resurrection, but it is likely that their main 
concern was not with resurrection per se, but with a bodily, corporeal resurrection, influenced 
by their Hellenistic context.117 Hence, Paul devotes a significant section to the character of the 
resurrected reality, which I will address in the following chapter, but it is important to note here 
that resurrection for Paul meant a radical transformation. As with Jesus’ response to the 
Sadducees, Paul corrects the misconception that resurrection meant returning to a physical state 
similar to the present one.  
In this passage there are several themes which indicate a reliance upon the Jewish 
understanding of resurrection including the motifs of transformation, creation, national 
redemption, and glorification. Paul was an apocalyptic thinker and his letters in particular 
convey the eschatological fervour of the early Jesus movement, which will be of particular 
importance in the next chapter. For now, I note that he anticipated an imminent resurrection, 
as implied by his phrase, “We will not all die” (v.51). This anticipation of a resurrection that 
would occur at the end of time shapes his argument.118 Paul interprets Jesus’ post-mortem 
existence through the lens of a Jewish eschatological framework to emphasize the significance 
of this event and continues to do so throughout his argument. When he says, “if there is no 
 
116 Cf. Pannenberg, JGM, 74; L. W. Hurtado, Lord Jesus Christ: Devotion to Jesus in Earliest Christianity (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2003), 168; Joseph Plevnik, What Are They Saying About 
Paul and the End Times? (New York: Paulist Press, 2009), 29.  
117 Cf. George T. Montague, First Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2011), 262; Mark T. Finney, Honour and 
Conflict in the Ancient World: 1 Corinthians in its Greco-Roman Social Setting (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), 
211-12; Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, revised ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 794; 
Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 753-
54. Of course, precisely how the Corinthians understood resurrection is a mystery lost to antiquity as their letters 
to Paul have not been preserved, but it appears, both in the content of Paul’s letter and their Hellenistic context, 
that their core concern was a physical re-animated body.  
118 Finney, Honour and Conflict in the Ancient World, 198-203; Holleman, Resurrection & Parousia, 87; Robert 
Scott Nash, 1 Corinthians (Macon: Smyth & Helwys, 2009), 395; Montague, First Corinthians, 261-62. Kenneth 
Bailey seems to have ignored the presupposition of the broader Jewish conception of resurrection of the dead in 
his analysis of 1 Corinthians 15, despite his emphasis on contextualization (Kenneth E. Bailey, Paul Through 
Mediterranean Eyes: Cultural Studies in 1 Corinthians (Downers Grove: IVP, 2011), 427-40).  
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resurrection of the dead,” he is referring to a specific category, rather than a general claim about 
people rising from the dead. 
Perhaps the most significant example of Paul’s presupposition of the Jewish conception of 
resurrection in this passage is in his insistence that the resurrection involves transformation. In 
verses 36-38 he uses the analogy of a seed that is buried and grows into a plant. What emerges 
from the ground appears very different to what was sown.119 In this, there is both continuity 
and discontinuity; the plant is the same kind as the seed despite being new and different. 
Similarly, there is both continuity and discontinuity between the human body that dies and the 
body that will be resurrected. There is transformation, but not as an utterly new creation.120 It 
is important to stress here both the continuity and discontinuity in order to avoid reverting to 
the binarism of stressing one over the other.121 This continuity despite radical transformation 
was a common motif in discussions of the resurrection, as we saw earlier (e.g. Dan. 12.3; 1 
Enoch 24-25; 51.1-5; Pseudo-Ezekiel; Messianic Apocalypse; 4 Ezra 7.31-32).  
Again, much like Jesus’ response to the Sadducees, Paul does not attempt to detail what this 
resurrected existence will look like but implies a comprehensive, radical transformation of 
reality in general. This new reality is discussed throughout Paul’s corpus, though not a 
systematic way. In differentiating between different types of bodies (vv.38-40) Paul is stressing 
the newness of the future ‘spiritual’ body.122 Yet his affirmation of the defeat of death itself 
 
119 Finney, Honour and Conflict in the Ancient World, 213. Paul was probably aware that the seed does not actually 
die when it is sown, he simply uses this language to stress his point regarding resurrection.  
120 Plevnik, What Are They Saying About Paul and the End Times? 55-56; Finney, Honour and Conflict in the 
Ancient World, 213; Pannenberg, JGM, 67; Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 800; Clinton 
Andrew Johnson, “Turning the World Upside Down in 1 Corinthians 15: Apocalyptic Epistemology, the 
Resurrected Body and the New Creation,” EvQ 75, no. 4 (2003), 296-305.  
121 Finney goes so far as to say, “The resurrected body will have nothing of the earthly in it at all; it will be 
composed, through divine transformation, of man’s immortal and incorruptible aspects” (Finney, Honour and 
Conflict in the Ancient World, 216). Cf. Scott Brodeur, The Holy Spirit’s Agency in the Resurrection of the Dead: 
An Exegetico-Theological Study of 1 Corinthians 15,44b-49 and Romans 8,9-13 (Rome: Gregorian University 
Press, 1994), 17-19.  
122 We will address the σῶμα πνευματικόν (‘spiritual body’) in the following chapter. Cf. Brodeur, The Holy 
Spirit’s Agency in the Resurrection of the Dead, 30-31. Wright suggests that Dan. 12 might be in the background 
of vv.40-41 (Wright, RSG, 344).  
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(cf. Isaiah 25.8) suggests this transformation goes well beyond individual bodies. Joseph 
Plevnik notes that annihilation of death is not a temporary freedom, but “involves eternal life 
in a body that is no longer subject to death. It is a profound change in the present mode of 
existence.”123 This change occurs instantaneously (v.52), implying that resurrection itself is 
transformation.124 Furthermore, bound up in this is the defeat of “every ruler and every 
authority and power” (v.24), connecting resurrection with the concerns of national restoration 
and justice.125 In this, the transformation of societal norms and institutions is connected to the 
defeat of death. Ultimately, the purpose of this transformation is for Paul the enabling of 
unhindered relationship between God and humanity, another central theme in the Jewish 
apocalyptic conception of resurrection. This is seen in verses 50-54 where, according to Paul, 
only imperishable bodies can enter God’s kingdom, and, hence, present physicality must “put 
on” imperishability and immortality, a radical transformation of reality.126 
Two other motifs are present in this passage which imply the presupposition of a Jewish 
eschatological understanding of resurrection of the dead: creation and glorification. We find 
creation language in several instances: in the references to Adam (vv.22, 45); humanity having 
its origin in the dust (vv.47-48) and of being image bearers (v.49); and in highlighting the sun, 
moon, stars, animals, birds, and fish (vv.39-41). As in many of the resurrection passages 
mentioned above (e.g. Ezek. 36.9-11, 35; 37.1-14; Isa. 26.19; Dan. 12.2; 1 En. 25.4-7; 2 Macc. 
7.11, 28; 4Q385; 4Q521), the theme of creation is alluded to in this discussion of resurrection, 
 
123 Plevnik, What Are They Saying About Paul and the End Times? 41. Cf. Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter 
to the Corinthians, 737. For Finney, this transformation “will mean the certain end of perishable, fleshly body. 
But this transformative death does not constitute a defeat, it is a transformation into victory for the new ‘form’ 
that is to come,” (Finney, Resurrection, Hell and the Afterlife, 113).  
124 Bailey, Paul Through Mediterranean Eyes, 472-73. Cf. 1 Enoch 22.  
125 Ciampa and Rosner argue that there is an anti-imperial ideology present here (Ciampa and Rosner, The First 
Letter to the Corinthians, 769), whereas for Montague the concern here is demonic power behind these earthly 
authorities (Montague, First Corinthians, 272-73).  
126 The emphasis upon relationship is further seen in verses 14-19, where it becomes evident that the goal of Jesus’ 
resurrection was communion with him. Cf. Holleman, Resurrection & Parousia, 70-71; Plevnik, What Are They 
Saying About Paul and the End Times? 60.  
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illustrating the belief that resurrection is tied to God’s creative power and symbolizes re-
creation, renewal, and the fulfilment of God’s purposes.127 The final motif is that of 
glorification or exaltation, another common motif among discussion of resurrection (e.g. Dan. 
12.3; 2 Bar. 50-52), particularly evident in verses 40-49. Paul differentiates between different 
types of bodies and glories, the significant point here being the distinction between these 
bodies, not the specific category of body.128 Involved in the transformation inherent in 
resurrection is glorification, an elevation to a higher existence; there is distinction between the 
present σῶμα ψυχικόν (‘physical body’) and the resurrected σῶμα πνευματικόν (‘spiritual 
body’).129 Resurrection means re-creation into a glorified existence.130 
Similar to the Sadducees, some of the Corinthians appear to have thought the language of 
resurrection referred to a re-animated personal body largely comparable with the present, hence 
their rejection of the resurrection of the dead, and like the Synoptics’ Jesus, Paul is arguing that 
resurrection involves a much broader, more intensive transformation, drawing on the Jewish 
eschatological conception. Behind Paul’s portrayal of Jesus’ resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15 
is the belief that resurrection is the transformation, re-creation, and glorification of created 
reality, a reality devoid of death and injustice, where there is both continuity and discontinuity, 
and hence the language of ‘bodies’ is limiting. 
I Know that He Will Rise Again in the Resurrection on the Last Day 
There are several other instances in the New Testament where the notion of resurrection is used 
by the author to suggest an eschatological reality much broader than the reanimation of a 
 
127 Wright, Bailey, and Ciampa and Rosner stress the allusions to the Gen. creation accounts in this passage 
(Wright, RSG, 340; Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 740-41; Bailey, Paul Through 
Mediterranean Eyes, 442).  
128 Cf. Finney, Honour and Conflict in the Ancient World, 214.  
129 The NRSV translates these terms as such, however these translations are probably inadequate. The word 
ψυχικόν, for example, rarely connotes physicality. This will be discussed further in the following chapter.  
130 Wright, RSG, 231; Ciampa and Rosner, The First Letter to the Corinthians, 800; Bailey, Paul Through 
Mediterranean Eyes, 460-67; Plevnik, What Are They Saying About Paul and the End Times? 56-57.  
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personal body. These instances are discussed to reinforce the argument that ‘resurrection’ 
should not be reduced to a personal re-animated body, but refers to the fulfilment of a much 
broader spectrum of Jewish eschatological hope. The first two instances are present in the 
Gospel of John, which demonstrates a much more developed interpretation of resurrection, 
which we will return to in chapter five, and which views the hopes for the end of history that 
are bound up within the notion of resurrection as having already been fulfilled, compared to 
some of the earlier eschatology which viewed these hopes as only beginning to be fulfilled or 
to be fulfilled in the near future. However, I will argue there remains within John an inherited 
reliance upon this Jewish eschatological category of resurrection.  
Two passages in John where this reliance upon Jewish eschatology is evident are 5.28-29 and 
11.21-27. In 5.28-29 Jesus proclaims a universal resurrection of the dead that consists of some 
being raised to reward and others to punishment. Of particular importance here are the obvious 
similarities with Daniel 12.2.131 Within the context of this passage, which is focused on the 
theme of judgment, the reference to resurrection is telling. A focus on the dispensation of 
justice serves this concern, carrying connotations that go well beyond the reanimation of an 
individual body.  
Of course, this does not exclude the possibility of some sort of post-mortem personal life, as 
reflected in the discourse of John 11.21-27. Following the death of Lazarus, Martha expresses 
her frustration and confusion to Jesus, believing he could have prevented this death. In 
response, Jesus tells Martha that her brother would rise from the dead, to which she responds 
 
131 Commentators often highlight these similarities, e.g. Stuhlmacher, “The Resurrection of Jesus and the 
Resurrection of the Dead,” 52; von Wahlde, The Gospel and Letters of John, 235; Harold W. Attridge, “From 
Discord Rises Meaning. Resurrection Motifs in the Fourth Gospel,” in The Resurrection of Jesus in the Gospel of 
John, ed. Craig R. Koester and Reimund Bieringer (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 6-7; Andreas J. 
Köstenberger, John (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2004), 190; idem., A Theology of John’s Gospel and Letters (Grand 
Rapids: Zondervan, 2009), 308.  
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with an affirmation of the belief in a future resurrection of the dead.132 However – perhaps 
similarly to Jesus’ response to the Sadducees and Paul’s response to the Corinthians – 
resurrection stretches beyond the re-animated existence of Lazarus and is connected directly to 
the role and function of the Messiah (notably in the assertion that Jesus is the resurrection), 
indicating the symbiotic relationship between resurrection and national redemption. These two 
brief references to resurrection in John indicate the presupposition of a broader Jewish 
eschatology, specifically connecting resurrection to broader hopes of justice and redemption, 
rather than explicitly describing a post-mortem existence.   
There are several instances in Acts that are worthy of mention, as they further demonstrate how 
Jesus’ resurrection was interpreted in light of a Jewish eschatological understanding of 
resurrection of the dead. Paul is ridiculed by some Athenian Epicurean and Stoic philosophers 
in Acts 17.18 for speaking about the resurrection, being called a “babbler.”133 The plural 
“foreign deities” might suggest that his polytheistic audience interpreted Paul as introducing a 
deity alongside Jesus, named Anastasis.134 That resurrection was a foreign or asinine concept 
to the Hellenistic audience reinforces the Jewish character of the belief,135 but, significantly, 
this broader, general resurrection hope is connected explicitly with Jesus’ own resurrection, 
demonstrating again that this event was interpreted in light of a general theology of 
 
132 On Martha’s response, see Karoline M. Lewis, John (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014),157; Köstenberger, John, 
335; Craig R. Koester, “Jesus’ Resurrection, the Signs, and the Dynamics of Faith in the Gospel of John,” in The 
Resurrection of Jesus in the Gospel of John, ed. Craig R. Koester and Reimund Bieringer (Tübingen: Mohr 
Siebeck, 2008), 64-66.  
133 The phrase ὁ σπερμολόγος refers to small birds who pick at seeds. In this instance it is a derogatory term 
which, according to Bock, “has the connotation of a person who picks up bits of information and passes them off 
as if he knows what he is talking about,” i.e. “foolish babbler” (Darrell L. Bock, Acts (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007), 
561-62. Cf. C. Peter Wagner, The Book of Acts: A Commentary, 3rd ed. (Ventura: Regal, 2008), 399).  
134 Wright, RSG, 453; Eckhard J. Schnabel, Acts (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2012), 726. Bock disagrees, arguing 
that the philosophers are simply concerned with new ideas about a new religion (Bock, Acts, 562).  
135 Of course, simply because it neither originated nor was accepted in Hellenistic culture does not mean it had to 
have developed in Israel. As suggested earlier, the concept of resurrection was influenced to some degree by 
foreign religions, especially Zoroastrianism. However, Paul’s sermon – at least to the extent of Luke’s record (it 
is unhelpful to draw comparisons or distinctions between Paul’s understanding of resurrection in Acts and his 
discussion in 1 Corinthians 15) – likely has a Jewish apocalyptic notion of resurrection in mind, and it is this 
which the philosophers were responding to, further suggesting that the early Christian interpretation of Jesus’ 
resurrection was shaped by Jewish eschatology, rather than Hellenistic notions of the afterlife.  
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resurrection. This is similarly exhibited in 4.1-2 where Peter and John are said to have been 
“proclaiming that in Jesus there is the resurrection of the dead.” This is not merely a reference 
to Jesus’ resurrection136 – though this is certainly in view – but, rather, indicates that the events 
of Easter were interpreted as the fulfilment of these apocalyptic expectations of resurrection.137 
The significance of this will become clear in the following chapter. A third instance in Acts 
where resurrection of the dead is mentioned is in chapter 23, where Paul stands before the 
Jewish council and, noticing the mix of Pharisees and Sadducees on the council, proclaims, 
presumably as a distraction, “Brothers, I am a Pharisee, a son of Pharisees. I am on trial 
concerning the hope of the resurrection of the dead” (23.6).138 Luke connects Paul’s teaching 
with precisely that issue which divided the Pharisees and Sadducees: resurrection of the dead. 
Hence, these three examples in Acts further demonstrate that many early members of the Jesus 
movement interpreted Jesus’ post-mortem existence in light of broader Jewish eschatological 
understandings of resurrection of the dead. 
One final example that demonstrates the presupposition of a Jewish eschatology is the 
Christological hymn of Philippians 2.6-11, despite there being no reference to resurrection in 
this passage. Rather than explicitly referencing resurrection, Paul is stressing the glorification 
and exaltation of Jesus following his humiliating death. Some have argued that early Christians 
made no distinction between Jesus’ resurrection and his ascension.139 With both Wright and 
Dale Allison, I do not believe the evidence supports this,140 for the emphasis here is on 
glorification, which was often associated, as we have already seen, with resurrection (e.g. Dan. 
 
136 This is contrary to Bock, who connects this directly to Jesus’ resurrection (Bock, Acts, 187).  
137 Wagner makes the interesting observation that the Pharisees, in several instances in Acts, seem far less 
concerned with this burgeoning Jesus movement than the Sadducees, perhaps even glad for an ally (Wagner, The 
Book of Acts, 91). Cf. Richard L. Pervo, Acts (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2009), 111; Craig S. Keener, Acts: An 
Exegetical Commentary 3:1-14:28, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2013), 1132.  
138 Cf. Pervo, Acts, 574.  
139 Cf. Barnabas Lindars, “Jesus Risen: Bodily Resurrection But No Empty Tomb,” Theology 89, no. 728 (1986), 
91-92.  
140 Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 286-87; Wright, RSG, 227, 466.  
234 
 
12.1-3; 2 Bar. 50.2-3; 1 En. 104.2-6). Though resurrection is not explicitly mentioned, the 
broader eschatological expectations are.141 Hence, the Easter events were interpreted within the 
context of these eschatological expectations, often described in the language of resurrection, 
but as demonstrated in this passage, could also be described in various other ways. 
From these various New Testament passages, it becomes evident that many of the early 
followers of Jesus, and especially those associated with the proto-orthodox movement who 
later came to define the New Testament canon, initially presupposed a Jewish eschatological 
conception of resurrection, and it was in this framework that the events surrounding Jesus’ 
post-death existence were interpreted. In the New Testament, resurrection is consistently 
connected to much broader eschatological hopes of transformation, justice, and glorification. 
As with the Jewish eschatology analysed above, resurrection here does not simply refer to a re-
animated corporeal body, but often refers, in a metonymic sense, to a spectrum of 
eschatological hopes. Hence, a binarism, a dualistic either/or mentality that has obscured the 
interpretation of Jesus’ resurrection, is inappropriate and restrictive.  
This analysis of these New Testament passages has demonstrated that the presupposed 
framework of resurrection significantly shaped the interpretation of Jesus’ post-mortem 
existence as bearing a character that should not be limited to a personal reanimation but 
signifies a dialectic tension between continuity and discontinuity with empirical reality (which 
will be further detailed in the following chapter).  
5.4. Resurrection and the Unification of Heaven and Earth 
This chapter has thus far argued that the notion of resurrection of the dead was a Jewish 
eschatological category inherently and inseparably connected to broader eschatological hopes 
 
141 Nickelsburg comments, “Although the hymn makes no reference to Jesus’ being “raised,” resurrection’s 
frequent function as exaltation is central” (Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 230).  
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for the end of history, particularly the dispensation of justice and the restoration and 
transformation of creation. This is neither a homogenous doctrine nor a universally accepted 
idea, but there were evident concerns associated with resurrection that went well beyond hope 
for a personal re-animated body. However, as I demonstrated in chapter two, much scholarship 
on the resurrection assumes it was concerned primarily with the return to life of individual 
bodies, and consequently becomes entrapped in discussions concerning whether to interpret 
this personal reanimation literally or metaphorically or emphasizing the continuous or 
discontinuous elements. As seen in the emphasis upon the restoration of relationship in the 
Hebrew Bible, the hope for the transformation of the cosmos, and the dispensation of justice, 
of reward, punishment, and the redemption of the nation of Israel, it is evident that resurrection 
encompasses a much broader spectrum of eschatological hope. This is reinforced in the New 
Testament texts which demonstrate the way in which this Jewish eschatological notion formed 
the presupposition for the interpretation of Jesus’ post-mortem existence. We will see in 
chapter six how this is similarly reflected in the portrayal of Jesus’ resurrection, wherein both 
transformation and renewal are upheld, both continuity and discontinuity with empirical reality. 
This Jewish eschatological hope for both renewal and transformation is expressed most 
poignantly in the imagery of a new heavens and earth. This section will unpack this imagery, 
exploring its occurrences in Isaiah 65.17, 2 Peter 3.13, and Revelation 21.1, demonstrating how 
this relates to the notion of resurrection and to new creation, and how it is a helpful illustration 
for the resurrection hope.  
One of the most significant eschatological expectations (again acknowledging the diversity in 
Jewish and Christian eschatology) was a renewed, or unified, heavens and earth. As seen above, 
a common theme in Jewish eschatology was a redeemed world and universe, many texts 
adopting creation language, envisioning an antediluvian and paradisiacal location, others 
depicting a celestial landscape, for the resurrected righteous to occupy. Central to this was a 
236 
 
tension between this new landscape demonstrating both continuity and discontinuity with 
empirical reality, a tension reflected in the descriptions of resurrection, best seen in Paul’s 
analogy of a seed turning into a plant (1 Corinthians 15.35-41). In some instances, this tension 
is envisaged as a new heavens and earth, a cosmological upheaval of empirical reality, not to 
be understood as a replacement of the present, as though the present can be discarded, but a 
process whereby reality is perfected. This is seen in Ephesians 1.10 where all things in heaven 
and earth are “gathered” up in Christ as the fulfilment of a divine plan. This section explores 
this eschatological hope for the end of contingent history as the fulfilment of God’s intended 
purposes for creation, untainted by death and misery, represented in the illustration of the 
unification of heaven and earth. It is this general eschatological hope for renewal which 
encompassed both continuity and discontinuity with empirical reality, and included the broader 
hopes for justice, redemption, re-creation, and transformation, with which ‘resurrection’ was 
inseparably connected, and the framework within which Jesus’ post-mortem existence was 
interpreted.  
A New Heaven and New Earth 
A prima facie reading of the key passages that deal with a new heaven and earth (Isaiah 65.17, 
2 Peter 3.13, and Revelation 21.1) might lead one to the conclusion that the present world is 
expected to be discarded and replaced by a new instance of creatio ex nihilo. In the following 
I will demonstrate that early Christians did not usually understand it in this way, and that this 
new eschatological reality would instead be characterised by both continuity and discontinuity 
with empirical reality, and as signifying a unification of a transformed heaven and earth. This 
reveals that in Jewish and Christian eschatology the hopes which formed the framework (and 
provided the language) within which Jesus’ resurrection was interpreted envisaged a 
transformation of empirical reality that enables unhindered relationship between God and 
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humanity. The language of resurrection of the dead pointed toward a unification of heaven and 
earth. 
The earliest explicit instance of the anticipation of a new heavens and earth is in Isaiah 65.17: 
“For I am about to create new heavens and a new earth; the former things shall not be 
remembered or come to mind.” Of course, this passage is a much older, pre-Christian 
passage,142 but its image of new creation was especially significant for apocalyptic 
expectations, which the first century Jesus Movement drew from. The context of the passage 
is marked by postexilic optimism, and this verse points to a time that directly contrasts the 
“former troubles” mentioned in the preceding verse.143 Hence, this act of new creation is one 
of salvation. Indeed, the earth itself seems to be saved, as verses 18 through 25 do not illustrate 
a scene of doom or catastrophe; annihilation of the created order is not envisaged.144 According 
to David Russell, “The word “new” while evocative does not contend for a new creation ex 
nihilo but…points to a miraculous transformation in history.”145 This is reflected in 2 
Corinthians 5.17, which appears to echo Isaiah 65.17: those who are “in Christ” and are a “new 
creation” have not been discarded but have been transformed.  
Rather than an annihilation of the created order, the arrival of a new heavens and earth heralds 
a peaceful reality, where there is no distress or death (Isaiah 65.19-20), labour is fruitful (65.21-
22), blessing and prosperity abound (65.23), God and humanity exist in mutual relationship 
(65.24), and peace reigns in the natural world (65.25). God’s work of redemption extends 
 
142 Trito-Isaiah is generally dated to mid to late 6th century BCE, probably around 530BCE, prior to the rebuilding 
of the temple but toward the end of, or soon after, the Babylonian exile. Cf. Claus Westermann, Isaiah 40-66, 
trans. David M. G. Stalker (London: SCM Press, 1969), 296; R. N. Whybray, Isaiah 40-66 (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1975), 42. 
143 Cf. Walter Brueggemann, Isaiah 40-66 (Louisville: WJK, 1998), 245; Tremper Longman III, “Isaiah 65:17-
25,” Int 64, no. 1 (2010), 72; John W. de Gruchy, “A New Heaven and a New Earth: An Exposition of Isaiah 
65:17-25,” JTSA 105 (1999), 66. 
144 On this, see in particular David M. Russell, The “New Heavens and New Earth”: Hope for the Creation in 
Jewish Apocalyptic and the New Testament (Philadelphia: Visionary Press, 1996), 75; Michael J. Svigel, “Extreme 
Makeover: Heaven and Earth Edition – Will God Annihilate the World and Re-Create it Ex Nihilo?” BSac 171, 
no. 684 (2014), 408-09; de Gruchy, “A New Heaven and a New Earth,” 67.  
145 Russell, The “New Heavens and New Earth”, 75.  
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beyond humanity to the entire created order.146 Indeed, an idealized Eden is anticipated (cf. 
Gen. 2), and perfect harmony replaces the chaos of the empirical reality.147 Moreover, central 
to all of this paradisiacal reality is the restoration of relationship, especially in the allusions to 
Genesis, as seen below, where the relationship between humanity and God is one of intimate 
friendship, and between humanity and creation one of harmony. John Oswalt summarizes 
succinctly: “The Creator’s original purpose in creation may be realized. Indeed, heavens and 
earth rejoice.”148 
The second occurrence of this motif appears in the decidedly more apocalyptic 2 Pet. 3.12-13, 
consisting of what might appear to be the Bible’s most explicit reference to the total destruction 
of earth by fire,149 followed by a new heaven and earth. However, rather than an 
annihilationism, this passage is closer in theology to Isaiah 65.17, envisaging renewal rather 
than total destruction.150 Renewal is implied in, first, the allusion to the Noahic flood (2 Pet. 
3.5-6), the purpose of which was renewal (Gen. 6.17-21) and of which were survivors (Gen. 
9.1-29); and, second, the observation that the imagery of fire often implied judgment and 
refinement, rather than annihilation (e.g. Ps. 12.6; Isa. 48.10; Zech. 13.9; Mal. 3.2; 1 Cor. 3.13; 
1 Pet. 1.7; 4.12; Rev. 3.18) which fits the literary context of this passage.151 According to Albert 
Wolters, “The author of 2 Peter…pictures the day of judgement as a smelting process from 
 
146 Ibid., 72-73. Cf. Longman, “Isaiah 65:17-25,” 72; Carol J. Dempsey, Isaiah: God’s Poet of Light (St. Louis: 
Chalice Press, 2010), 191.  
147 Mark Stephens notes, “Isaiah 65 promises that God himself will bring about a new state of affairs for his 
faithful servants, by exercising his sovereign creative power to impart order and harmony where there is now 
presently chaos and discord” (Mark B. Stephens, Annihilation or Renewal?: The Meaning and Function of New 
Creation in the Book of Revelation (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2011), 27). Brueggemann highlights the Isaianic 
tendency towards the new, the redemption of Israel and the reversal of her pain (Brueggemann, Isaiah 40-66, 
246).  
148 John N. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40-66 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 656. Cf. Russell, The 
“New Heavens and New Earth”, 75; Longman, “Isaiah 65:17-25,” 72.  
149 Cf. Russell, The “New Heavens and New Earth”, 186. 
150 John Macarthur has argued for an annihilationist interpretation, stating, “Peter foresaw the disintegration of 
the entire universe in an instant ‘uncreation’” (John MacArthur, 2 Peter and Jude (Chicago: Moody, 2005), 125). 
151 Svigel, “Extreme Makeover,” 410; Paul R. Raabe, “‘Daddy, Will Animals be in Heaven?’: The Future New 
Earth,” Concordia Journal 40, no. 2 (2014), 150; Matthew Y. Emerson, “Does God Own a Death Star? The 
Destruction of the Cosmos in 2 Peter 3:1-3,” SwJT 57, no. 2 (2015), 285-92.  
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which the world will emerge purified.”152 Furthermore, the word παρελεύσονται in reference 
to the heavens ‘passing away’ (2 Pet. 3.10) has a variety of meanings, none of which refer to 
an annihilation. Indeed, the word primarily signifies movement, either of time or of someone 
passing by something or someone.153 Hence, what is envisaged is a global renewal, where the 
future reality is transformed into a new creation following a purifying of the present.154 What 
we have here is creatio ex vetere, not creatio ex nihilo.155 
The final passage for our analysis is Revelation 21.1, which, like 2 Peter, draws on Isaiah 65.17 
to envisage cosmic renewal. The similarities between Revelation 21.1-5 and Isaiah 65.17-25 
include the new heavens and new earth with the old being forgotten (Isa. 65.17; Rev. 21.1, 4), 
a new Jerusalem (Isa. 65.18; Rev. 21.2), communion with God (Isa. 65.24; Rev. 21.3), no more 
crying (Isa. 65.19; Rev. 21.4), long life (Isa. 65.20; Rev. 21.4), and the destruction of evil (Isa. 
65.25; Rev. 21.1).156 In Revelation, however, we find a reference to the absence of the sea. The 
sea was a common image of chaos, evil, and death (e.g. Gen. 1.1-5; Exod. 15.8; Ps. 46.2-3; 
69.2; 77.16; Isa. 57.20; Zech. 10.11; Matt. 8.23-27),157 and so its removal indicates the removal 
of chaos in the new eschatological reality. Its absence should not be interpreted as a destruction 
of the physical oceans on the earth’s surface. Rather, John is anticipating a transformation of 
 
152 Albert M. Wolters, “Worldview and Textual Criticism in 2 Peter 3:10,” WTJ 49, no. 2 (1987), 408. Wolters 
argues that the verb εὑρεθήσεται carries metallurgical connotations, implying a process of refinement.  
153 παρελεύσονται is a cognate of παρέρχομαι (3rd person future middle indicative) which carries the connotations 
of going past a reference point (Sir. 42.20; Mark 6.48; Matt. 8.28), of having to do with time and being no longer 
available (Matt. 14.15; Acts 27.9), of coming to an end (Matt. 5.18; 24.35; Mark 13.31; Luke 16.17; 2 Cor. 5.17; 
Rev. 21.1), of ignoring or neglecting something (1 Macc. 2.22; Jos., Ant. 14, 67; Luke 11.42; 15.29), of passing 
by without touching (Matt. 26.39; Mark 14.35), of passing through an area (1 Macc. 5.48; Acts 16.8), or of 
stopping at a place as one comes by (Luke 12.37; 17.7; Acts 24.6) (BDAG, 775-76).   
154 Cf. Pheme Perkins, First and Second Peter, James, and Jude (Louisville: WJK, 1995), 191; Peter H. Davids, 
The Letters of 2 Peter and Jude (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 291; Robert G. Bratcher, A Translator’s Guide 
to the Letters From James, Peter, and Jude (London: UBS, 1984), 164; Stephens, Annihilation or Renewal? 137. 
Gene Green states it well: “In spite of the destructive forces of the divine judgment (3:7, 10-12), the Christian 
hope is the renovation of creation and not its annihilation” (Gene L. Green, Jude & 2 Peter (Grand Rapids: Baker, 
2008), 334).  
155 Emerson, “Does God Own a Death Star?”, 291.  
156 Russell, The “New Heavens and New Earth”, 206.  
157 Cf. Jonathan Moo, “The Sea That is No More: Rev 21:1 and the Function of Sea Imagery in the Apocalypse 
of John,” NovT 51 (2009), 165-66; Joseph L. Mangina, Revelation (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2010), 238. 
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empirical reality. As with 2 Peter 3, the language of “passing away” does not connote 
annihilation, and, importantly, the heavens and earth are not thrown into the lake of fire with 
death and Hades (20.14). Renewal is envisaged, not total destruction.158 
As with Isaiah 65.17, central to this joining of the heavens and earth is the renewal of 
relationship between God and humanity. In verse three, the author adopts the covenantal 
language of Leviticus 26.12 and Ezekiel 14.11 in the declaration that the people will be God’s 
and God will be theirs, but presents this in a remarkably intimate sense, with God dwelling 
among the people, even wiping away every tear.159 The goal of this eschatological 
transformation is communion with God.160 This is then further demonstrated by the vision of 
the new Jerusalem.161 This is not a reference to a physical structure or city, but is rather 
referring to the people themselves who will be “prepared as a bride for her husband,” again 
implying the intimacy of the relationship between God and humanity. The fact that the new 
Jerusalem never reaches earth suggests that it functions as a threshold between heaven and 
earth, indicating the unification of these two realms, and the absence of a temple suggests that 
humanity can now encounter God directly.162 In Revelation, the new heavens and earth do not 
indicate a defined space or location but refer primarily to the redemption of relationship, the 
 
158 Cf. Ronald L. Farmer, Revelation (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2005), 134; Stephens, Annihilation or Renewal? 
230; Mangina, Revelation, 238; Ian Boxall, The Revelation of Saint John (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 
2006), 293; John R. Yeatts, Revelation (Scottdale: Herald Press, 2003), 399. Raabe makes the helpful point that 
the statements, “The first things passed away,” (21.4) and “I make all things new” (21.5) should be read together. 
God is not making all new things, but is making all things that currently exist new. God will not discard the old, 
but transform it into something new (Raabe, “‘Daddy, Will Animals be in Heaven?’” 153).  
159 There might be a chiastic structure here between verses 1 and 5a, bracketed by something new (“A new heaven 
and a new earth”; “I am making all things new”), the centre being this intimacy between God and humanity with 
the affirmation that death has been defeated (another Isaianic – and possibly resurrection – reference, i.e. Isa. 
25.8).  
160 Raabe, “‘Daddy, Will Animals be in Heaven?’” 153; Mangina, Revelation, 239.  
161 The restored city of Jerusalem has an old tradition, found in various texts, e.g. Isa. 65.18-19; 1 En. 10.16-19; 
90.28-29; Jub. 4.26; 4 Ezra 7.27-30; 10.25-49; 12.32-34; T. Dan. 5.12; Pss.Sol. 17.25, 33; 2 Bar. 4.3; 29, 39-40; 
Gal. 4.26; Heb. 12.22; Rev. 3.12. 
162 Erin Palmer, “Imagining Space in Revelation: The Heavenly Throne Room and New Jerusalem,” Journal of 
Theta Alpha Kappa 39, no. 1 (2015), 41-45. Osborne similarly argues that in this descent of Jerusalem, “heaven 
and earth are finally united. After 21.2, 10 there is never again any “from heaven to earth,” for in the new heaven 
and new earth they are one” (G. R. Osborne, Revelation (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002), 732). Cf. Elledge, 
Resurrection of the Dead, 36.  
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enabling of unhindered communion between God and humanity, seen as the fulfilment of the 
initial purposes for creation. 
We have thus analysed the three most prominent passages concerning a new heaven and earth 
and have found that what is anticipated is a renewal and transformation of empirical reality, 
rather than its disposal and replacement. This is significant for the present thesis as it 
demonstrates that the eschatological hopes which formed the framework within which 
resurrection was understood envisaged an eschatological reality characterised by the 
unification of heaven and earth – thus bearing both continuity and discontinuity with empirical 
reality – and a transformation that enabled unhindered relationship between God and humanity. 
It is this new eschatological reality comprised of a unification of heaven and earth that is 
depicted in the notion of resurrection. Resurrection, then, depicts a reality that extends well 
beyond (and hence cannot be limited within the confines of) the reanimation of a personal 
body.  
The final part of this chapter will continue its exploration of these eschatological hopes to show 
the themes of renewed creation and redeemed relationship were prominent concerns. 
Moreover, it will demonstrate the connection between these eschatological hopes and 
resurrection to further support the argument that resurrection referred not simply to personal or 
individual reanimation but to the fulfilment of the broader spectrum of eschatological hope.   
The Renewal of Creation 
These New Testament expectations for a renewed eschatological reality should not be 
interpreted as an interruption within contingent history, that at some arbitrary and undisclosed 
time in the future God will surprise reality and all within it with a cosmic renewal and the 
arrival of a new heaven and earth. Instead, this act of cosmic redemption was believed to be a 
fulfilment of God’s intended purposes for creation. This renewal of creation was often 
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interpreted as the telos of temporal history, with many writers strongly connecting the end with 
the beginning. This is seen in the description of the eschatological reality as a return to an 
antediluvian paradise. For example, both Hosea 2.18 and Isaiah 11.6-8 and 65.25 envisage a 
reality where all the animals live in harmony, and Ezekiel 34.25-27 and Revelation 22.1-2 
describe a creation that functions productively and fruitfully.163 In the deutero-canonical 1 
Enoch 25.3-7, the tree of life plays a significant role in the very regeneration of the faithful, 
and in 2 Enoch 42.3 (in the longer version) this paradise is analogous to the Garden of Eden, 
despite being located in heaven. There is diversity in how this paradisiacal eschatological 
reality is described, some emphasizing its earthly characteristics (T. Levi 18.10-11; Jub. 2.7; 2 
En. 30.1; 4 Ezra 3.6) and others its transcendental and celestial characteristics (1 En. 61.12; 2 
En. 8.1-8; 2 Bar. 4.3; 4 Ezra 6.26),164 but the intended purpose of returning to an antediluvian 
paradise was to stress that this eschatological reality was a fulfilment of God’s initial purpose 
for creation.165 
The proclamation of a new heavens and earth is a renovation of the present universe.166 This 
eschatological reality, marked by the unification of heaven and earth, is an existence in this 
world, albeit a renewed and transformed one, as Russell maintains: 
The restoration of the community within history or in an entirely transformed new age is still presented 
in this-worldly language and thus serves to affirm God’s original creative intentions. The apocalyptic 
 
163 Cf. Russell, The “New Heavens and New Earth”, 57; Brevard S. Childs, Isaiah (Louisville: WJK, 2001), 537-
38. As Carol Dempsey states, “This new creation will, in some ways, resemble the creation of the first heavens 
and the first earth (Gen. 1:1) in their pristine, peaceful state before transgression entered into the picture (Gen. 3)” 
(Dempsey, Isaiah, 191).   
164 Russell highlights the diversity in opinions regarding the relation between the Beginning and End: analogy of 
the old describing the new (Isa. 65.17, Jub. 1.29, 1 Enoch 91.16, 2 Peter 3.12f., Rev. 21.1, 5), restitution of the 
perfect order of the original (T.Levi 18.10f., Jub. 23.26ff., 1 Enoch 90.37f., Rom. 3.24, Col. 1.15-20, Rev. 20.13), 
transformation of the old (Isa 26.1ff., Dan. 12.3, 1 Enoch 45.4f, 2 Baruch 51, Rev. 21.13), identity of the new with 
the old (1 Enoch 24-25, Rev. 2.7, 21.1), reservation of certain elements of the original (2 Esdras 6.49f., 2 Baruch 
29.4) (Russell, The Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic, 282-83). 
165 Cf. Epistle of Barnabas 6.13; 4 Ezra 6.1-6; 7.30; 2 Baruch 3.7. Elledge argues that “the resurrection life will, 
thus, fulfil the deity’s original plan for the creation (Elledge, Resurrection of the Dead, 81), and according to 
Russell, “Behind this picture of re-creation and redemption, then, is the strong conviction that God’s purpose, 
which embraces the life of the whole created universe, will at last reach its glorious fulfilment” (Russell, The 
Method and Message of Jewish Apocalyptic, 284).  
166 I have here borrowed the language of renovation from Svigel, as it is an apt description (Svigel, “Extreme 
Makeover,” 405).  
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writers did not renounce the created order. It therefore can be stated with confidence that the apocalyptists 
clearly were not disposed toward a spiritual-material dualism. In fact…they viewed God’s creation as 
above all “perfectly good.”167 
This eschatological reality is a transformed and perfected version of God’s intention for 
creation, a reality that enables the unhindered relationship between God and humanity.  
The purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate that the eschatological hopes encompassed 
within the notion of resurrection, and that this future eschatological reality, analogous to 
resurrection, consists of both continuity and discontinuity with empirical reality. When we 
recognize that resurrection was an anticipation of a reality depicted as a new heavens and earth 
– and all that that entails – it follows that the language of resurrection referred to much more 
than simply a re-animated bodily existence. George Montague elucidates: 
The promised destiny is not merely the bodily resurrection of each individual faithful person. It will be 
the heavenly Jerusalem (Rev 21:2), the wedding feast of the Lamb (19:7, 9; 21.9), the banquet of the 
kingdom (Matt 22:1-14), the new heaven and the new earth (Rev 21:1), the consummation of union not 
only with God but also with one another.168  
The eschatological reality portrayed in the various images of resurrection, re-creation, and new 
heavens and earth is characterized by a desire for a redeemed relationship between God and 
humanity. All of reality will be united and marked by harmony.169 There is no longer separation 
between God and humanity, as “heaven and earth will be united into a larger reality,” as God 
dwells among his people.170 When the New Testament makes reference to the resurrection of 
the dead (e.g. Mark 12.24-27; John 11. 23-25; Acts 4.1-2; 1 Cor. 15.12-13), the broader 
eschatological hopes are often evoked, rather than limited to some sort of re-animated body. 
Therefore, when this language is applied to whatever was believed to have happened to Jesus, 
 
167 Russell, The “New Heavens and New Earth”, 132-33. Cf. Jub. 1.29; 1 En. 45.4; 72.1; 91.16-17; 2 Bar. 32.6; 
57.2; 2 En. 65.7.  
168 Montague, First Corinthians, 274.  
169 Dempsey, Isaiah, 186, 191. According to Green, “The expectation of a new world order was not simply a hope 
that revolved around the destiny of the material world; within Jewish reflection this hope also embraced the moral 
order (see, e.g., 1 En. 45.4-5). The new heaven and new earth, in contrast with the present world filled with evil 
deeds…will be one” (Green, Jude & 2 Peter, 335).  
170 Osborne, Revelation, 730. Cf. J. Richard Middleton, A New Heaven and New Earth: Reclaiming Biblical 
Eschatology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2014), 24.  
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it is vital to not reduce this to a mere reanimation but to see within Jesus’ post-mortem existence 
a much grander image of eschatological fulfilment. This fulfilment includes a broad spectrum 
of hopes, including both the transformation and renewal of creation. There is both continuity 
and discontinuity within this event. This is, however, the focus of the next chapter, but for now 
it is important to highlight the inseparable connection between the idea of resurrection and the 
broader hopes for the end times, characterised by the inauguration of the new heavens and 
earth, which as we have seen in this section meant the eradication of the distinction between, 
and the redemption and re-creation, of these two categories.  
5.5. Conclusion 
In following the PCR methodology proposed in §4.4, this chapter has analysed the prior 
theological framework which shaped how Jesus’ post-mortem existence was understood by the 
early Jesus movement (recognizing that knowledge is a bilateral interaction between the 
‘objective’ meaning inherent to the external event and the ‘subjective’ interpretation of that 
event and the meaning imported unto the event by the interpreter), and has analysed how this 
framework developed in new contexts. It has been argued that the category of resurrection in 
ancient Jewish eschatology encompasses a broad spectrum of Jewish eschatological hope for 
the end of contingent history, especially the renewal and transformation of creation and with it 
the dispensation of divine judgment. It was seen in several passages in the Hebrew Bible that 
the language of resurrection had primarily to do with the restoration of relationship with 
YHWH, rather than the reanimation of a personal body. Reanimation may well have been 
anticipated, implied by its use in Daniel 12.1-3, but its principal purpose had to do with the 
return to covenantal obedience of YHWH; disobedience and loss of relationship was 
tantamount to death, and the restoration of this relationship was thus the resurrection of Israel. 
This stress upon restoration of relationship, as well as the connotations of judgment and 
transformation, pervade the later intertestamental and apocalyptic literature. Resurrection is 
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maintained through Jewish eschatology as virtually synonymous with transformation and re-
creation, as seen in Ezekiel 36.9-11, 35, 1 Enoch 22, 2 Maccabees 7.11, Daniel 12.3, and 4 
Ezra 7.31-32, and presents a solution to the problem of theodicy. What this resurrected reality 
looks like is diverse, with some stressing an immortal soul (Jub. 23.31; 1 En. 91-104; Ws. 
9.15), some envisioning transformation into something akin to the stars or angels (Dan. 12.3; 
2 Bar. 50.2-3; 1 En. 104.2-6), of others anticipating a bodily resurrection (2 Macc. 7). What is 
evident, however, is that the diversity and malleability of the category of resurrection prohibits 
it from being reduced to the mere reanimation of a personal, corporeal body.  
This is similarly expressed in much of the New Testament. Jesus corrected the Sadducees’ 
assumption that resurrection (which they rejected) signified a return to a bodily existence 
comparable with the present, claiming that social institutions will be radically altered and 
ultimately unnecessary (Mark 12.18-27; Matt. 22.23-33; Luke 20.27-40). Some of the 
followers of Jesus in Corinth were rejecting the ‘resurrection of the dead’ based on a different 
understanding of a post-mortem embodied existence, which Paul responded to by emphasizing 
the transformative nature of resurrection. In both cases, the assumption that resurrection 
referred only to a personal reanimation was rebuffed. Through Jewish eschatology and the New 
Testament, the category of resurrection encompasses much more than a re-animated body, 
instead balancing, on the one hand, the renewal of creation, returning it to its ideal and original 
purpose of enabling unhindered relationship between God and creation, and, on the other, its 
radical transformation, with justice imbued within the very fabric of this new reality and the 
inhabitants of this transformed creation being elevated and glorified. There is both continuity 
and discontinuity; it is the same creation, yet utterly different. This is expressed best in the 
analogy of the new (and unified) heavens and earth. It is this balance which is seen in the 
description of the risen Jesus, who was described as the personification of the fulfilment of this 






6. Tension in Jesus: of Heaven and Earth 
6.1. Introduction  
Having argued, in the previous chapter, that the ancient Jewish eschatological notion of 
‘resurrection’ encompassed far more than a personal reanimation, but in fact referred to the 
broader spectrum of eschatological hope, incorporating the themes of justice, re-creation, 
transformation, exaltation, the inauguration of God’s sovereign rule, and, of course, the return 
from death of the faithful, we can now turn our attention directly to the resurrection of Jesus. 
This chapter implements the PCR stress upon tracing the dynamic interaction between the 
external event and the communal and historical contextuality of the observer, as depicted in 
the New Testament writings, by analysing the way in which the communal reflection upon, 
and understanding of, Jesus’ post-mortem existence developed and was re-interpreted as it was 
remembered in new and evolving contexts, and how it intertwined with the Jewish category of 
‘resurrection of the dead.’ In so doing we can trace the development of resurrection theology 
in the early Christian communities into a belief that this event constituted the fulfilment of the 
broad spectrum of Jewish eschatological hopes. This event was more than a reanimation of 
Jesus’ personal body, but simultaneously his exaltation and elevation to a position of authority 
in a new reality, the dispensation of justice, and the inauguration of a new eschatological age.  
The New Testament authors’ attempts at describing the risen Jesus fall short, precisely because 
of the fact that Jesus’ resurrection was not simply a return to a re-animated bodily existence, 
but was the personification of the broad spectrum of Jewish eschatological expectation for the 
eschaton, fulfilled within history in and to the person of Jesus. That this event was understood 
as something much broader than his reanimation, but in fact encompassed the fulfilment of an 
array of eschatological expectations, is suggested by the claim that Jesus was raised on or after 
the third day, ‘according to the Scriptures’ (Matt. 16.21; 17.23; 20.19; 27.63; Mark 8.31; 9.31; 
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10.34; Luke 9.22; 13.32; 18.33; 24.7, 46; Acts 2.23-24; 10.40; 1 Cor. 15.4). This phrase, I 
suggest, refers neither to a specific day nor to a specific scriptural prophecy, but rather a broad 
spectrum of eschatological hope.  
That the category of resurrection in particular was utilized by the Jesus movement to interpret 
his post-mortem existence is especially informative. As seen in the narratives of the raising of 
Lazarus (John 11.38-44) and of Jairus’ daughter (Mark 5.21-43; Matt. 9.18-26; Luke 8.40-56), 
some early Christian authors were perfectly capable of describing the event of someone 
returning from the dead without necessarily implying the broader eschatological significance 
that accompanied the notion of ‘resurrection of the dead.’ However, this notion was applied to 
the interpretation of Jesus’ post-mortem existence, marking it as distinct. The use of this notion 
to understand and describe Jesus’ post-mortem existence suggests that this event bears 
incredible eschatological significance that extends well beyond his personal re-animated body.  
The interpretation of Jesus’ resurrection proposed in this chapter, as per PCR, differs from 
those analysed in the second chapter, and of Pannenberg and Wright, in its application of a 
postfoundationalism which enables both the continuous and discontinuous elements of the 
resurrection to be upheld in a dialectic and mutually-conditioning fashion, rather than the 
foundationalism which has led many to prioritize one over the other. Its emphasis upon the 
constructive and bilateral nature of knowledge enables the resurrection to be understood as an 
interaction between the external, ‘objective’ event of Jesus’ post-mortem existence and the 
‘subjective’ presupposed communally-conditioned categories of understanding, namely the 
ancient Jewish eschatological notion of resurrection of the dead. The interpretation of Jesus’ 
post-mortem existence evolves as it is remembered in new and changing contexts, without 
relegating this event to the ambiguous realm of faith and not of history. In short, the 
interpretation proposed in this thesis does not reduce the notion of Jesus’ resurrection to no 
more than his reanimation, but maintains the dialectical tension between the continuous and 
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discontinuous elements of Jesus’ resurrection. That is, in Jesus’ post-mortem existence, those 
elements that reflect empirical reality are elevated and unified with those elements that reflect 
the new eschatological reality; both are equally present and personified in the description of 
the risen Jesus.  
Echoing the role of social memory theory within PCR, this chapter is largely concerned with 
the development of the interpretation of Jesus’ post-mortem existence within the early Christian 
communities (as described in the New Testament corpus), as it was remembered in new 
contexts and as it interacted with prior and developing theological categories. Hence, following 
a discussion on the third day ‘according to Scripture’ motif which frames the New Testament 
portrayals of Jesus’ resurrection, this chapter analyses the resurrection passages within the New 
Testament in a rough chronological order, highlighting not only the way in which 
interpretations of this event develop but also themes that remain consistent. In doing so, we see 
in particular the development of the interpretation of Jesus’ post-mortem existence from an 
event (according to the earlier traditions) that ushered in the eschatological hopes for the 
eschaton, to an event (according to the later traditions) that was the fulfilment of those hopes 
in and of itself. This is reflected to the claim that Jesus’ death and resurrection on the third day 
occurred in accordance with Scripture (Matt. 16.21; 17.23; 20.19; 27.63; Mark 8.31; 9.31; 
10.34; Luke 9.22; 13.32; 18.33; 24.7, 46; Acts 2.23-24; 10.40; 1 Cor. 15.4) and further indicates 
that Jesus’ post-mortem existence encompassed much more than the reanimation of a personal 
body. Here we see the PCR stress on the development of interpretation within communal 
memory as it interacts with evolving categories of understanding and within the new context 
where Jesus’ return is not imminent but indefinite.  
For the present thesis, it is this later tradition of interpreting Jesus’ resurrection as the ultimate 
fulfilment of these hopes for the end of history within history which provides the best 
understanding of Jesus’ post-mortem existence for a systematic interpretation, for it represents 
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the most developed stratum of the biblical resurrection tradition. This is not to prioritize it at 
the expense of earlier traditions, nor is it to claim that the later traditions are the ‘more correct’ 
interpretation, for within a PCR framework it is precisely this development which is 
indispensable. The later traditions were not developed in a vacuum, after all. The argument of 
this thesis is that Jesus’ resurrection cannot be reduced to his personal reanimation, but is the 
fulfilment of the broad spectrum of Jewish eschatological hope, particularly the hope for the 
renewal and transformation (continuity and discontinuity) of creation.  
6.2. “According to the Scriptures” 
A theme that appears in several instances in the early and synoptic traditions is the claim that 
Jesus died and rose from the dead after three days or on the third day (Matt. 16.21; 17.23; 
20.19; 27.63; Mark 8.31; 9.31; 10.34; Luke 9.22; 13.32; 18.33; 24.7; Acts 10.40), according to 
Scripture (Acts 2.23-24), or both (Luke 24.46; 1 Cor. 15.4).1 What makes this theme curious is 
the lack of obvious antecedent. As we have seen, the notion of resurrection was present – albeit 
briefly – in the Hebrew Scriptures and was a common theme in the intertestamental literature. 
However, no particular passage predicts the resurrection of the Messiah, let alone an individual 
in the midst of contingent history. Furthermore, Hosea 6.2 is the only passage which connects 
resurrection with the three day motif, and yet the evidence that it was interpreted as a 
resurrection passage is scant, and it is neither quoted directly, nor utilized elsewhere. All the 
more perplexing is the fact that the Easter narratives do not use the three day motif, rather 
placing the discovery of the empty tomb on the first day of the week, despite the incorporation 
of the resurrection predictions into the narrative of Jesus’ pre-crucifixion life.  
 
1 This is present in the later John (2.19-22; 20.9) but seems to bear much less significance than it did in the earlier 
traditions. The two instances in John could perhaps be explained as the author simply including earlier tradition.  
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In the following, this three day motif, as it applies to the resurrection of Jesus, and the claim 
that this was predicted in the Hebrew Scriptures, will be analysed, and it is argued that rather 
than referring to a specific proof text, the full scope of eschatological hope is in mind. That is, 
Jesus’ resurrection was not interpreted as the fulfilment of one specific eschatological promise, 
but was the fulfilment of a broader spectrum of eschatological hope. Furthermore, the three 
day motif was a common cultural motif that was occasionally used to indicate an event of 
significance. Hence, the claim that Jesus rose from the dead on the third day according to the 
Scriptures does not refer to a specific text, such as Hosea 6.2, but indicates that early witnesses 
interpreted Jesus’ post-mortem existence as significant, fulfilling not one particular promise 
but Scripture in its entirety.  
The most explicit expression of this theme is found in 1 Corinthians 15.3-4: ‘For I handed on 
to you as of first importance what I in turn had received: that Christ died for our sins in 
accordance with the Scriptures, and that he was buried, and that he was raised on the third day 
in accordance with the Scriptures.’ It is generally accepted that verses three through five 
constitute an early, pre-Pauline creedal formulation, though with Pauline additions.2 This 
formula is therefore an early tradition, though determining its provenance is difficult, especially 
considering the formula is reflected in other earlier traditions, such as Mark, and implied in Q, 
and is not used in the empty tomb narratives.3 
The phrase ‘in accordance with the Scriptures’ should not be restricted to ‘he was raised’ – 
where it might be easier to ascertain a particular referent scriptural text – but to the entire 
 
2 James Ware, “The Resurrection of Jesus in the Pre-Pauline Formula of 1 Cor 15.3-5,” NTS 60, no. 4 (2014), 475; 
Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 234-35; Hans Conzelmann, “On the Analysis of the Confessional Formula in 1 
Corinthians 15:3-5,” Int 20, no. 1 (1966), 18-20; John S. Kloppenborg, “Analysis of the Pre-Pauline Formula 1 
Cor 15:3b-5 in Light of Some Recent Literature,” CBQ 40, no. 3 (1978), 351-67. This is against David Garland, 
who argues that Paul articulated this formula (David E. Garland, 1 Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003), 
684).  
3 Cf. Lidija Novakovic, Raised from the Dead According to Scripture: The Role of Israel’s Scripture in the Early 
Christian Interpretations of Jesus’ Resurrection (Bloomsbury: T&T Clark, 2012), 120-22.  
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clause, including ‘on the third day.’4 This third day motif is connected to Jesus’ post-mortem 
existence in several instances elsewhere, most notably in Jesus’ resurrection predictions. 
However, there is some discrepancy as to whether it was predicted to occur on the third day, 
or after the three days. According to each of Mark’s predictions (8.31; 9.31; 10.34), the 
resurrection will occur after three days (μετὰ τρεῖς ἡμέρας); according to Matthew (16.21; 
17.22-23; 20.18-19), it will occur on the third day (τῇ τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ); according to Luke (9.22; 
18.31-33), it will occur on the third day, but he varies his language, using ἐγερθῆναι in 9.22 
and ἀναστήσεται in 18.33.5 The change from after, in the earlier Gospel, to on, in the later, 
demonstrates the development of the tradition, as the later evangelists reconciled the 
discrepancies that emerged when the three day tradition was connected to the empty tomb 
tradition. The fact that this formula was so malleable suggests that it probably did not have a 
concrete chronology in mind.6 
The particular interpretive difficulty of this formula is the claim that this resurrection on the 
third day was prophesied in the Hebrew Scriptures. Several scriptural passages have been 
proposed as antecedent. Joel White argues that this formula has the cultic calendar of Leviticus 
23 in mind, particularly the first fruits offering. According to the earliest Christian tradition, 
the resurrection took place on the day after the Sabbath following Passover, which would have 
been the first day of the Feast of Unleavened Bread, the day of the first fruits offering. Hence, 
Jesus’ resurrection was prefigured by this cultic practice.7 Indeed, Paul connected Jesus’ post-
mortem existence to this festival in the very same chapter (1 Cor. 15.20, 23), and so it is 
certainly possible that Paul had this practice in mind. However, this does not explain the 
 
4 This is especially so considering the three day motif is utilized elsewhere. Cf. Joel R. White, “He was Raised on 
the Third Day According to the Scriptures (1 Corinthians 15:4): A Typological Interpretation Based on the Cultic 
Calendar in Leviticus 23,” TynBul 66, no. 1 (2015), 105.  
5 Cf. Novakovic, Raised from the Dead According to Scripture, 116-18; Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 231-32. Luke 
includes another Passion prediction in 9.44, but does not predict resurrection and doesn’t provide a time frame. 
6 Furthermore, 1 Cor. 15.4 uses on the third day (τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ τρίτῃ), and Matthew elsewhere claims that the Son 
of Man would be in the heart of the earth for three days and three nights.  
7 White, “He was Raised on the Third Day According to the Scriptures (1 Corinthians 15:4),” 106-19.  
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presence of the three day motif, or the claim that Jesus rose from the dead according to 
Scripture, elsewhere; the resurrection prophecies and Q’s allusion to Jonah (discussed in 
following sections) do not allude to cultic practice. It seems that the three day motif is an earlier 
tradition, reflected in Mark and in Q, which was a part of the creedal formulation which Paul 
adapted to his purpose. 
To which scriptural passage does this early formula then refer? The account of Jonah is a 
potential candidate, as such an allusion is present in Q (11.29-32) which Matthew then 
explicitly connects to the three day motif (Matt. 12.40).8 However, this is a fairly obscure 
reference, and there is nothing to suggest that Paul or Mark (14.58; 15.29) were alluding to 
Jonah. Another possibility, suggested by Nicholas Lunn, is day three of creation (Gen. 1.9-13). 
On the third day of creation, dry land appears, comparable to the baptismal theme reflected in 
the story of Jonah. Upon this dry land sprouts vegetation, literally the first fruits of the earth. 
Furthermore, the verb ὤφθη is used four times in 1 Corinthians 15.4-8 and twice in LXX 
Genesis 1.9 and 13 to describe the appearance of the land, and then not appearing elsewhere in 
Genesis with regards to God’s creative activity. The appearance of land in Genesis might be 
analogous to resurrection in that the earth is that from which humanity is created and to which 
humanity returns; Jesus’ return from this earth, his emergence from the tomb, reflects the new 
archetypal creation of the new eschatological humanity. Paul might have had Genesis 1.9-13 
in mind when suggesting that the resurrection on the third day was predicted in the Scriptures.9 
Lunn does not pursue this possibility any further, and for good reason. Though creation 
language is often utilized in the description of Jesus’ post-mortem existence, the connections 
 
8 Cf. Nicholas P. Lunn, ““Raised on the Third Day According to the Scriptures”: Resurrection Typology in the 
Genesis Creation Narrative,” JETS 57, no. 3 (2014), 524-25.  
9 Ibid., 532-34.  
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here are tentative. The emphasis in Genesis 1.9-13 is the initial appearance of land rather than 
its reappearance, and the first fruits reference in 1 Corinthians 15.20 reflects Leviticus 23.9-14.  
Perhaps the most likely candidate for antecedent to which this formula refers, if we assume that 
a specific passage or promise is in mind, is Hosea 6.2, where resurrection is explicitly 
connected to the three day motif. Lidija Novakovic argues that there is evidence in rabbinic 
literature that Hosea 6.2 was interpreted as a resurrection passage, quoting in particular 
Deuteronomy Rabbah 7.6, Jerusalem Talmud 5.2, Genesis Rabbah 56.1, and Esther Rabbah 
9.2. Though the former two seem to connect this passage to resurrection, the commentary on 
Genesis 22.4 is merely listing references to the three day motif – including Hosea 6.2 – rather 
than interpreting this text as a resurrection passage, and the commentary on Esther 5.2 seems 
to be largely speaking of national redemption, of God’s covenantal faithfulness to his people.10 
However, a common objection against assuming that Hosea 6.2 was the intended antecedent 
of the phrase ‘in accordance with the Scriptures’ or the various cognates of this formula is that 
this passage is not referenced anywhere else in the New Testament.11 Of course, this is not 
conclusive, but it does indicate that it is unlikely that the early Christian communities 
interpreted this passage as bearing any eschatological significance, especially considering the 
prevalence of scriptural allusion throughout the New Testament. Furthermore, I think it more 
likely that resurrection was connected to this motif in the later Rabbinic texts because of the 
tradition of connecting resurrection to the broader eschatological hopes, rather than utilizing 
Hosea 6.2 as a proof-text for Jesus’ resurrection.  
The formulaic assertion that Jesus rose from the dead on the third day in accordance with the 
Scriptures shares similarities with several passages in the Hebrew Bible, including the cultic 
 
10 Novakovic, Raised from the Dead According to Scripture, 127-29. Cf. Wright, RSG, 322. 
11 Conzelmann, “On the Analysis of the Confessional Formula in 1 Corinthians 15:3-5,” 21; Garland, 1 
Corinthians, 687; Lunn, “Raised on the Third Day According to the Scriptures,” 525-26.  
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practice of the offering of first fruits and the account of Jonah, both of which are explicitly 
connected to Jesus’ resurrection elsewhere, an allusion to the third day of creation, which 
would not be wholly uncharacteristic as creation language often accompanies accounts of 
Jesus’ post-mortem existence, and Hosea 6.2, which is the only passage to link the third day 
motif to resurrection. Though it is impossible to entirely rule out any of these passages as the 
scriptural antecedent intended by the formula, no single passage seems to fit with any clear 
certainty.12 That is because, I contend, the formula is referring to the full scope of Jewish 
eschatological hope, which will be demonstrated in the following section. 
Rather than attempting to retrofit a passage to function as antecedent to the early tradition that 
Jesus’ resurrection was fulfilment of scriptural prophecy, it makes more sense to interpret this 
tradition as referring to the full scope of eschatological hope rather than one specific passage. 
The three day motif likewise cannot be pinned to a particular passage, but was, rather, a 
common cultural motif that was often used to indicate an event of significance. The 
incorporation of these two traditions (the three day and ‘according to Scripture’ motifs) with 
the language of resurrection in connection to Jesus’ post-mortem existence demonstrates that 
this event was interpreted as bearing considerable significance, functioning as the fulfilment of 
not one particular prophecy but of the full scope of eschatological promise. 
The tradition that Jesus rose according to the Scriptures is usually interpreted as a general 
reference to ancient Scripture, as no individual passage seems to function as a prophecy for the 
resurrection of the Messiah on the third day.13 To be more specific, Jesus’ post-mortem 
 
12 Cf. Roger David Aus’ extensive (though not exhaustive) list of instances of the three day motif in the Hebrew 
Bible and Judaic tradition (Roger David Aus, The Death, Burial, and Resurrection of Jesus, and the Translation 
of Moses in Judaic Tradition (Lanham: University Press of America, 2008), 230-282). 
13 N. T. Wright, “Early Traditions and the Origins of Christianity,” STRev 41, no. 2 (1998), 127; idem., RSG, 320-
21; White, “He was Raised on the Third Day According to the Scriptures (1 Corinthians 15:4),” 106; Lunn, 
“Raised on the Third Day According to the Scriptures,” 524; Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 726-27; 
Ben Witherington III, Conflict & Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 299; Kevin J. Madigan and Jon D. Levenson, Resurrection: The Power of God 
for Christians and Jews (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 26.  
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existence was interpreted as “the culmination of Israel’s history,”14 events which were planned 
by God “in accord with and as a fulfillment of his Word in the OT.”15 This was not victory 
over Roman occupation but over sin and death itself.16 Wright refers to this as the climax of 
the “entire biblical narrative,” that the resurrection was the sign that the full scope of the story 
of Israel, and the demonstration of God’s sovereignty, have found their conclusion, the moment 
to which this story has been building.17 Novakovic questions whether this would have satisfied 
early Christian interpreters or would have been convincing to first century Jews.18 However, I 
contend that resurrection encompassed the broad spectrum of Jewish eschatological hope, and 
so the early communities of the Jesus movement would not have required a specific proof text, 
because a specific prophecy was not in view; hence the relative ease with which the formula 
can refer to ‘the Scriptures.’  
Hosea 6.2 is not the only passage in the Hebrew Bible to adopt a time frame of three days. In 
fact, it is quite a common designation (Gen. 22.4; 30.36; 31.22; 34.25; 40.20; 42.18; Exod. 
3.18; 19.11, 15-16; Lev. 7.17-18; 19.6, 7; Num. 7.24; 9.12; 19.12, 19; 29.20; Josh. 2.16; 3.2; 
9.17; Judg. 20.30; 1 Sam. 20.12; 30.1; 2 Sam. 1.2; 1 Kgs 3.18; 12.5, 12; 2 Kgs 2.17; 10.5; 20.5, 
8; 1 Chr. 12.39; 2 Chr. 10.5, 12; Ezra 6.15; Esth. 4.16; 5.1; Hos. 6.2; Jon. 1.17; 2.1). Apart 
from references to the first or seventh day, both of which bore cultural significance usually in 
reference to either creation or the Sabbath, reference to the third day in the Hebrew Bible is a 
disproportionately recurring time frame, indicating that it bore symbolic significance.19 Martin-
Achard has suggested that this time frame is also found in rural agricultural cults practiced 
around Palestine, as well as being found in Egyptian, Sumerian, and Roman myths of the dying 
 
14 Bailey, Paul Through Mediterranean Eyes, 430.  
15 Witherington III, Conflict & Community in Corinth, 299.  
16 Bailey, Paul Through Mediterranean Eyes, 430.  
17 Wright, RSG, 320-21, 726; Wright, “Early Traditions and the Origins of Christianity,” 127. 
18 Novakovic, Raised from the Dead According to Scripture, 125. Cf. Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection of 
God Incarnate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 171.  
19 There are 74 references to either ‘three days’ or the ‘third day,’ with two/second occurring in 20 instances, 
four/fourth 16, five/fifth 12, six/sixth 22, eight/eighth 19, nine/ninth 8, and ten/tenth 21.  
257 
 
and rising of Osiris, Inanna, and Attis, respectively. Hence, he claims, Hosea borrowed, either 
intentionally or not, from this tradition, supported by the observation that Hosea utilizes 
symbols common in other myths, such as the lion, dawn, and dew.20 The extent to which Hosea 
was influenced by foreign practices is impossible to determine, but it seems likely that the 
‘third day’ motif was not an uncommon reference to an occasion of significance, an 
interpretation that seems more satisfying than merely a short period of time.21 
That this formula had in mind the full scope of scriptural eschatology, rather than a particular 
passage, is further seen in the insistence in the Gospel narratives that the resurrection occurred 
on the first day of the week, with no mention of the third day, despite the prevalence of the 
three day motif throughout their respective narratives. The allusions to Jonah (Matt. 12.38-42 
// Luke 11.29-32), the prophecy of the destruction of the temple and its reconstruction in three 
days (Matt. 27.40 // Mark 14.58 // John 2.19), and the resurrection predictions (Mark 8.31 // 
9.31; 10.34 // Matt. 16.21; 17.22-23; 20.18-19 // Luke 9.22; 18.31-33) demonstrate that the 
evangelists were aware of this tradition and incorporated it into the narrative on several 
occasions. Yet the Easter narratives are entirely devoid of this motif, instead stressing the first 
day. They did not edit the three day motif to be harmonious with the Easter narrative, nor did 
they incorporate the motif into the Easter narrative. The three day motif was, therefore, 
primarily understood symbolically. Furthermore, the Easter narratives include the occasional 
allusion to the Hebrew Bible (especially that of creation),22 and though there are no direct 
 
20 Martin-Achard, From Death to Life, 82-85. Cf. Bertrand Casimis Pryce, “The Resurrection Motif in Hosea 5:8-
6:6: An Exegetical Study,” Ph.D. dissertation, Andrews University (1989), 308-09.  
21 Novakovic, Raised from the Dead According to Scripture, 125-26; Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 232.  
22 Wright emphatically argues that there is a lack of scriptural allusion or theological development in the Easter 
narratives, despite the regular use of the Hebrew Scriptures throughout the Gospel narratives, including the 
crucifixion, and builds on this to stress the distinctiveness of the Christian proclamation of resurrection (Wright, 
“Early Traditions and the Origins of Christianity,” 132-35; RSG, 599-602). I am not entirely convinced. It is true 
that there is not a great deal of scriptural allusion and there is no direct biblical quotations, but allusions are 
certainly present, in the use of the ‘first day,’ the day after Sabbath, sunrise, a garden, the various apocalyptic 
elements, and indeed the very language of resurrection. Furthermore, there are stories in the Gospels which do not 
have biblical quotations. Many of the accounts of miraculous healing, which would surely conjure up images of 
a creative or healing God, have no scriptural quotation (e.g. Matt. 9.2-8, 18-31; 12.9-14; Mark 1.21-34; 5.21-43; 
Luke 4.31-41; 7.1-17; John 5.1-18), nor do many of Jesus’ sayings which could so easily include a commentary 
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biblical quotations, if Hosea 6.2 was truly the intended antecedent to the formula, ‘raised on 
the third in accordance with the Scriptures,’ there would likely be further, and perhaps more 
explicit, allusions to this passage. This motif was understood metaphorically, a reference to an 
occasion of significance, and its combination with the claim that Jesus’ resurrection 
(understood as the broad spectrum of Jewish eschatological hope) had occurred in accordance 
with the Scriptures, demonstrates that in Jesus’ post-mortem existence, the full scope of Jewish 
eschatological hope has found its fulfilment, and a new age has indeed dawned.23 
This section has demonstrated that the prevalence of the claim that Jesus rose from the dead 
either on or after the third day ‘according to Scripture’ does not refer to a specific biblical 
prophecy but refers to the fulfilment of a broad array of Jewish eschatological expectations. 
The resurrection, in light of this, should not therefore be reduced to the reanimation of the 
personal body of Jesus but implies an event of such significance that it extends well beyond 
anthropology and that within this event the hope for the dispensation of justice, the renewal 
and transformation of creation, and the restoration of relationship with YHWH has found 
fulfilment. This event is, then, characterised by bearing both continuity and discontinuity with 
ordinary reality. The three day ‘according to Scripture’ motif frames the interpretation of Jesus’ 
post-mortem existence as the fulfilment of a broad spectrum of eschatological hope, and in the 
following it will be demonstrated how this pervades the New Testament corpus.  
6.3. Pauline Traditions: Resurrection and an Imminent Eschaton  
The earliest interpretations of Jesus’ resurrection, found in the Pauline epistles, demonstrate 
that within the various Christian communities a significant diversity of interpretations existed, 
from those emphasising Jesus’ exaltation, to those explicitly utilizing the category of 
 
on a scriptural passage (e.g. Matt. 10.16-33; Mark 2.18-22; Luke 6.27-49; John 8.12-20). Wright over-emphasizes 
the lack of significant use of the Hebrew Scriptures in the Easter narratives.  
23 Cf. Wright, “Early Traditions and the Origins of Christianity,” 128.  
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‘resurrection of the dead,’ to those – such as the Corinthians – who had some in their 
community who denied resurrection outright. However, Paul’s view of resurrection, which 
seemingly became the predominant view, understood Jesus’ post-mortem existence in terms of 
the broader Jewish eschatological hopes, that it was the inauguration of a new reality to be 
accompanied imminently by the general resurrection and the arrival of the eschaton. The 
resurrection was expected to usher in the end-times immediately.24 Dale Allison argues that 
“Paul interpreted the resurrection of Jesus as part of the general resurrection of the dead” and 
that ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν (‘resurrection of the dead’) was a technical term for the general 
resurrection (Rom. 1.4; 1 Cor. 15.13, 21, 42; Phil. 3.10).25 It is precisely this expectation which 
develops in the later resurrection traditions; for Paul, the Jewish eschatological expectations 
are being fulfilled, where in later developments, particularly John, the Jewish eschatological 
expectations have already been fulfilled. In fact this delay of the Parousia is that which 
precipitated the development of the theological interpretation of Jesus’ resurrection, interacting 
with the communal memory of the event, and the prior theological category of ‘resurrection of 
the dead.’26 
 
24 Cf. Leander E. Keck, “Paul and Apocalyptic Theology,” Int 38, no. 3 (1984), 236. Furthermore, Beale 
comments, “In early Judaism and in the Gospels…resurrection was so linked with the very end of the world that 
it was almost synonymous with the end, since it was the last event to happen togetherwith judgment, after which 
the eternal new creation of the new age to come would commence,” (G. K. Beale, A New Testament Biblical 
Theology: The Unfolding of the Old Testament in the New (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2011), 249).  
25 Dale C. Allison, The End of the Ages Has Come: An Early Interpretation of the Passion and Resurrection of 
Jesus (Wipf & Stock, 1985), 67. Paul’s preferred term was ἐγείρω which appears in reference to Jesus (as opposed 
to the resurrection of believers) and occasionally with νεκρῶν in Rom. 4.24, 25; 6.4, 9; 7.4; 8.11, 34; 10.9; 1 Cor. 
6.14; 15.4, 12, 13, 14, 17, 20; 2 Cor. 4.14; 5.15; Gal. 1.1; 1 Thess. 1.10. He seems to use both terms 
interchangeably as they are both carry eschatological connotations. Cf. Murphy, Apocalypticism, 313. 
26 On the ‘problem’ of the delay of the Parousia see: Paula Fredrickson, When Christians Were Jews: The First 
Generation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018), 99-107; Christopher M. Hays (ed.), When the Son of Man 
Didn’t Come: A Constructive Proposal on the Delay of the Parousia (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2016); David 
L. Mathewson, Where Is the Promise of His Coming? (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 2018); Richard Bauckham, “The 
Delay of the Parousia,” TynBul 31 (1980), 3-36; Stephen S. Smalley, “Delay of the Parousia,” JBL 83, no. 1 
(1964), 41-54; Alexander E. Stewart, “The Temporary Messianic Kingdom in Second Temple Judaism and the 
Delay of the Parousia: Psalm 110:1 and the Development of the Early Christian Inaugurated Eschatology,” JETS 
59, no. 2 (2016), 255-270; Uno Schnelle, Theology of the New Testament, trans. M. Eugene Boring (Grand Rapids: 
Baker, 2009), 574-77; Eduard Schweizer, A Theological Introduction to the New Testament, trans. O. R. Dean Jr. 
(London: SPCK, 1992), 20-21. For alternative perspectives, which question the idea that Paul’s theology 
developed, see: Paul Woodbridge, “Did Paul Change His Mind?: An Examination of Some Aspects of Pauline 
Eschatology,” Themelios 28, no.3 (2002), 5-18; Richard N. Longenecker, “Is There Development in Paul’s 
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Furthermore, for Paul Jesus’ post-mortem existence encompasses more than a re-animated 
body, but reflects the Jewish eschatological notion of resurrection which referred to the broad 
spectrum of eschatological hope. Indeed, the resurrection was Jesus’ exaltation (Phil. 2.6-11; 
Rom. 1.3-4; 1 Thess. 4.13-5.11) and the inauguration of not just the general resurrection but of 
a new, transformed eschatological age. The particular significance that I will draw out from 
Paul is that he interpreted Jesus’ resurrection in light of the broader Jewish eschatological 
understanding of resurrection, that is, in this event, the full spectrum of expectations for the 
eschaton are being fulfilled.  
This section will begin with an analysis of three passages generally considered by 
commentators to derive from pre-Pauline material (Phil. 2.6-11; Rom. 1.3-4; 4.25) and so 
represent some of the earliest resurrection traditions. Paul’s incorporation of these, which 
present a diverse picture of Jesus’ resurrection, suggests his willingness to include within 
‘resurrection’ an array of motifs. Though resurrection is presupposed in the Philippian Christ 
hymn (Phil. 2.6-11), resurrection itself is absent, speaking rather in terms of an exaltation to a 
new, transformed position of authority. This is contrasted by Romans 1.3-4 which similarly 
interprets this event as his elevation to a position of authority, but explicitly connecting this to 
his personal resurrection. Romans 4.25, however, envisages the inauguration of a new 
eschatological reality, wherein justification is now available. In each of these texts, Jesus’ post-
mortem existence, not always expressed as resurrection, implies a transformation and the 
glorification of Jesus. Following this, 1 Thessalonians – probably Paul’s earliest canonical 
letter – incorporates significant apocalyptic metaphors when depicting the broader 
 
Resurrection Thought?” in Life in the Face of Death: The Resurrection Message of the New Testament, ed. Richard 
Longenecker (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 171-202. Woodbridge and Longenecker are among those, albeit 
the minority, who attempt to salvage the ‘disputed’ Pauline texts (Col., Eph., 2 Thess., 1-2 Tim., Titus) as 
authentically Pauline. Cf. Gathercole, who has surveyed a range of scholars who dispute the delay of the Parousia 
theory: Simon J. Gathercole, “The ‘Dela of the Parousia.’” Early Christianity 9, no. 1 (2018), 1-7. This thesis 
follows the more prominent academic consensus that there is theological development within the Pauline corpus, 
particularly with regard to his understanding of Jesus’ Parousia, and that these later deutero-Pauline texts reflect 
a later moment in the development of the early church.  
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eschatological reality, envisaging radical cosmic transformation, a transformation that was 
initiated in Jesus’ death and resurrection (1 Thess. 4.13-5.11, esp. 4.14). This eschatological 
new life is reflected in Galatians 2.19-20 and Romans 5.10, as well as in the themes of 
vindication that suffuse Romans 1-4, the renewed cosmos of Romans 8.18-24, and the 
covenantal connotations of Romans 10.4-10, 11.15, and 15.12. Finally, attention will return to 
Paul’s most famous of resurrection passages, 1 Corinthians 15, where his incorporation of 
eschatological motifs, especially that of ‘first fruits’ and of the Genesis creation accounts again 
indicates the broader eschatological framework within which Jesus’ post-mortem existence has 
been interpreted. This section will address neither the possible pre-Pauline formulation of vv.3-
7, which was addressed in §6.2 when analysing the notion that the resurrection occurred 
according to Scripture, nor the question as to the nature of resurrected reality, which will be 
discussed in §6.6. The important point to note here is the early indications that Jesus’ post-
mortem existence was interpreted as the fulfilment of the notion of ‘resurrection of the dead,’ 
encompassing a broad array of eschatological hopes, which would become increasingly 
prominent in the later biblical traditions as they were remembered and re-interpreted in new 
and evolving contexts, and which enabled the resurrection to be understood as bearing both 
continuity and discontinuity with empirical reality.  
Pre-Pauline Liturgy and the Exaltation of Jesus 
The first passage to analyse is the Christ hymn of Philippians (2.6-11), which makes no mention 
of resurrection, despite detailing his death and Christ’s post-mortem existence, namely his 
vindication and subsequent exaltation. The provenance of this hymn is almost certainly pre-
Pauline, though adapted by Paul to suit the theological needs of the letter.27 That Paul 
 
27 Joseph A. Marchal, “Expecting a Hymn, Encountering an Argument: Introducing the Rhetoric of Philippians 
and Pauline Interpretation,” Int 61, no. 3 (2007), 246; Benjamin A. Edsall, “The Song we Used to Sing?: Hymn 
‘Traditions’ and Reception in Pauline Letters,” Journal for the Study of the New Testament 37, no. 3 (2015), 290-
311. Indicators of it being pre-Pauline include the use of ὃς to introduce the hymn and the presence of four New 
Testament hapax legomena (μορφῇ, ἁρπαγμὸν, ὑπερύψωσεν, and καταχθονίων). The presence of common 
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incorporated this passage approvingly is significant, for he upheld and actively promoted a 
doctrine of resurrection that signified broader eschatological aspects and was not restricted to 
the reanimation of individual bodies. Indeed, that he was comfortable incorporating a hymn 
which made no mention of resurrection as such but spoke purely in terms of exaltation suggests 
he viewed the category of ‘resurrection of the dead’ as encompassing exaltation and 
glorification.  
As seen in the previous chapter, the theme of exaltation was inherently connected to the 
doctrine of resurrection; Jewish eschatology often hoped for the reversal of injustice, pain, and 
shame, with the pious being elevated to positions of glory and honour. This connection between 
exaltation and resurrection is reflected in Philippians 2.6-11, in the shame of Jesus’ death upon 
a cross, and his return to a place of high honour. Nickelsburg observes, “Although the hymn 
makes no reference to Jesus’ being “raised,” resurrection’s frequent function as exaltation is 
central.”28 In contrast to Jesus’ crucifixion (v.8), God ‘highly exalted’ him. The verb used is 
ὑπερύψωσεν, a NT hapax legomenon and a stronger version of the simple ὑψόω, essentially 
meaning to ‘super-exalt.’29 Joseph Hellerman argues that “we may assume that ὑπερύψωσεν 
includes both the resurrection and ascension,”30 and Dennis Hamm argues that this “surely 
 
Pauline language (e.g. ὁμοιώματι, ἄνθρωπος, θανάτου) indicates the probability that Paul adjusted the hymn. 
Significantly, as will be seen momentarily, if we were to remove the possible Pauline insertions, the exaltation 
motif would remain central. On these indicators, cf. Ben Witherington III, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians: A 
Socio-Rhetorical Commentary (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), 139; Mark I. 
Wegener, “Philippians 2:6-11 – Paul’s (Revised) Hymn to Jesus,” Currents in Theology and Mission 25, no. 6 
(1998), 508-15). Some, however, have argued that this hymn is a Pauline composition, including Gordon Fee and 
Adela Yarbro Collins (Gordon D. Fee, “Philippians 2:5-11: Hymn or Exalted Pauline Prose?” BBR 2 (1992), 29-
46; Adela Yarbro Collins, “Psalms, Philippians 2:6-11, and the Origins of Christianity,” BibInt 11, no. 3/4 (2003), 
361-72).  
28 Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 230.  
29 So defined by Todd D. Still, Philippians & Philemon (Macon: Smyth & Helwys, 2011), 71; Joseph H. 
Hellerman, Exegetical Guide to the Greek New Testament: Philippians (Nashville: Broadman & Holman 
Publishing Group, 2015), 119; Witherington III, Paul’s Letter to the Philippians, 151-52; Dennis Hamm SJ., 
Philippians, Colossians, Philemon (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 103. Aside from Phil. 2.8, 
ὑπερύψωσεν is only found in Synesius’ Epistolographi 79 p. 225a and 1 Clem. 14.5, meaning to raise to a height. 
However, it is clear that has much greater significance than ὑψόω, which similarly means to raise high and to 
increase fame, position, power, and fortune (cf. Matt. 11.23; 23.12; Luke 1.52; 10.15; 14.11; 18.14; John 3.14; 
8.28; 12.32; Acts 2.33; 2 Cor. 11.7; 1 Pet. 5.6). The preposition ὑπερ connotes excelling and surpassing (BDAG, 
1030-31, 1034, 1045-46). The translation of ‘super-exalt’ seems fitting.  
30 Hellerman, Philippians, 119.  
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alludes to Jesus’ resurrection.”31 Hence, though speaking primarily in terms of exaltation – a 
motif present elsewhere, particularly in Luke, Q, Hebrews, and much of the Deutero-Pauline 
literature – we know that Paul, on account of his regular reference to the resurrection elsewhere 
(including this very letter – Phil. 3.10-11), would have at least presupposed resurrection in his 
adoption of this hymn, indicating that Paul shared the Jewish tendency to treat resurrection in 
a malleable way and to refer to a range of eschatological themes.  
This hymn could also reflect several other apocalyptic motifs. It could be expressing, according 
to Frederick Murphy, an Adamic Christology if read against Genesis 1-3. Where Adam was 
the ‘image’ of God, Jesus was in the ‘form’ of God; Adam sinned to be equal with God, whereas 
Jesus willingly gave up his equality.32 This is unlikely as the similarities are loose, and there is 
nothing here that explicitly connects Jesus to Adam or to the Genesis accounts. Swinburne 
connects this hymn to Wisdom literature that speaks of God’s Wisdom as an agent in creation.33 
This is possible, as it is found elsewhere in the New Testament,34 but does not account for the 
description of Jesus’ post-mortem existence. It seems likely that this hymn is simply reflecting 
the apocalyptic hope for the exaltation of the faithful dead, despite using language other than 
resurrection. Hence, whatever happened to Jesus was not solely interpreted in terms of 
‘resurrection’ from the very beginning, but Paul’s incorporation of this hymn indicates that the 
category of resurrection enveloped the broader spectrum of Jewish eschatological hope.  
The ‘super’ exaltation of Jesus in this hymn should not be interpreted as his receiving a status 
or nature other than – or higher than – his previous status as bearing ‘equality with God’ (v.6), 
but that, rather, he has been given the highest possible position. David Moessner has 
 
31 Hamm, Philippians, Colossians, Philemon, 103. Hamm is, however, correct in asserting that the emphasis is on 
the status to which Jesus has been elevated.  
32 Murphy, Apocalypticism, 342-43. 
33 Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate, 112. Cf. 1 En. 42.1-2.  
34 John’s prologue utilizes the divine logos, Col. 1.15-20 might be a song of praise to Wisdom, and Q material 
might be drawing on Wisdom literature.  
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highlighted the importance of status for a first century Hellenistic culture, and how radically 
counter-intuitive the notion of Jesus’ ‘emptying’ himself of his status and being reduced to a 
shameful crucifixion would have been. The notion of class and status were then “turned 
completely ‘upside down’” in his exaltation.35 This is further seen in the giving to Jesus the 
name ‘Lord,’ a direct challenge to Caesar.36 The significance in this is that whatever happened 
to Jesus was interpreted as a major transformation of societal norms and practices, a 
transformation which, as was seen in Jesus’ dialogue with the Sadducees regarding marriage, 
was similarly connected to resurrection hope and hence goes well beyond the transformation 
of Jesus himself. More to the point, this passage is not a reference to Jesus’ resurrection per se, 
but is, rather, a reference to the same event to which resurrection also referred, described in 
this instance as the ancient Jewish eschatological expectation for the exaltation and 
glorification of the righteous martyrs. 
Two other instances of pre-Pauline material that locate resurrection under a much wider 
eschatological umbrella, thereby indicating that resurrection cannot be reduced to the 
reanimation of a personal body are found in Romans. Romans 1.3b-4 is a possible pre-Pauline 
liturgical formulation which reflects a similar early tradition of connecting Jesus’ post-mortem 
existence with his exaltation and elevation to a new position of authority, in this instance 
adopting explicit resurrection language. This opening salutation includes the statement, “Who 
was descended from David according to the flesh and was declared to be Son of God with 
power according to the spirit of holiness by resurrection from the dead” (1.3b-4).37 As with the 
 
35 David P. Moessner, “Turning Status ‘Upside Down’ in Philippi: Christ Jesus’ ‘Emptying Himself’ as Forfeiting 
and Acknowledgement of his ‘Equality with God’ (Phil 2:6-11),” HBT 31, no. 2 (2009), 139-42. Cf. Hellerman, 
Philippians, 106-7. 
36 Jeffrey A. Gibbs, “Christ is Risen, Indeed: Good News for Him, and for Us,” Concordia Journal 40, no. 2 
(2014), 119-20; Marchal, “Expecting a Hymn, Encountering an Argument,” 248; Still, Philippians & Philemon, 
72. Furthermore, the use of ‘Lord’ could well be a reference to the Tetragrammaton, the name YHWH which was 
translated as κύριος.  
37 On this being an early Christian creed, see Colin G. Kruse, Paul’s Letter to the Romans (Grand Rapids: William 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012), 41, 47-49; Thomas R. Schreiner, Romans (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 1998), 38-39; Frank J. Matera, Romans (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 29-30; Matthew W. 
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Christ hymn of Philippians, the theme of exaltation is central, as are the accompanying anti-
imperial connotations.38 More specifically, the creed is concerned with Jesus’ status as Son of 
God. Reflecting, perhaps, a similar tradition to Philippians 2.9-11, this creed asserts that Jesus’ 
post-mortem existence elevated him to a position of authority, namely ‘Son of God with 
power.’ Though this declaration has to do with Jesus’ status, that as a result of the resurrection 
he has received a new office or position,39 rather than asserting a form of adoptionism,40 there 
is nevertheless a sense that something has changed.41 Though Murphy says too much in his 
argument that it “is Christ’s resurrection that makes him a Son of God,”42 the eschatological 
tone of the creed (seen particularly in the integration of the reference to the lineage of David, 
the unusual appendage ‘with power,’ and especially the technical ἀναστάσεως νεκρῶν) 
indicates that this new appointment of Jesus is indicative of a new, eschatological age, 
inaugurated by the event to which the language of resurrection has been attributed. 
For Schreiner, the primary indication that this creed envisages a new eschatological age is the 
use of πνεῦμα, which he interprets as a reference to the Holy Spirit, recalling Joel 2.28.43 
However, as is the case in 1 Timothy 3.16, which will be addressed in §6.3, the contrast is 
between the pre-resurrection and post-resurrection Jesus, and not comparing human physicality 
with the Holy Spirit. The stress of this creed is upon the exaltation of Jesus that was 
accomplished in his post-mortem existence. Furthermore, this is not, as has been suggested by 
 
Bates, “A Christology of Incarnation and Enthronement: Romans 1:3-4 as Unified, Nonadoptionist, and 
Nonconciliatory,” The Catholica Biblical Quarterly 77, no. 1 (2015), 108.  
38 Cf. Wright, RSG, 243; Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 230.  
39 On this interpretation, see Bates, “A Christology of Incarnation and Enthronement,” 125-27, and Schreiner, 
Romans, 42. This is repeated in 10.9-10, where the creedal formula, ‘God raised him from the dead,’ is connected 
with the proclamation that ‘Jesus is Lord,’ thereby asserting that in the event described as resurrection, Jesus is 
exalted to the status of Lord (cf. Phil. 2.9-11). Cf. Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 229.  
40 On whether this creed expresses adoptionistic theology, see Jeffrey A. Gibbs, “Christ is Risen, Indeed: Good 
News for Him, and for Us,” Concordia Journal 40, no. 2 (2014), 118; Swinburne, The Resurrection of God 
Incarnate, 113.  
41 Cf. Kruse, Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 46; Gibbs, “Christ is Risen, Indeed,” 118.  
42 Murphy, Apocalypticism, 319.  
43 Schreiner, Romans, 44.  
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some,44 a reference to the general resurrection. There is no indication of any subsequent 
resurrection following Jesus’. Rather, this is strictly referring to whatever happened to Jesus, 
namely resurrection from the dead which I have argued referred to the fulfilment of the broader 
spectrum of Jewish eschatological hope, further supported by the connection to the lineage of 
David and thus the covenantal promises.  
Another pre-Pauline formulation in Romans that demonstrates an early propensity to interpret 
Jesus’ post-mortem existence as an event which extends well beyond Jesus’ personal re-
animated body and functions as the fulfilment of ancient eschatological hopes is 4.25, which 
also explicitly uses resurrection language (in this instance the less technical ἠγέρθη).45 The 
creed echoes Isaiah 53, but the formulation of Jesus’ resurrection serving as the means for our 
justification is curious. It is conceivable that Jesus’ resurrection might be interpreted as his 
vindication, following his shameful crucifixion, but the extension of this to his followers only 
makes sense when understood in light of the broader resurrection hope, encompassing the full 
spectrum of eschatological expectations. In other words, in describing Jesus as having been 
raised, the creed interprets Jesus’ post-mortem existence as the inauguration of the new 
eschatological age, within which justice may be dispensed.46 
We learn from these few pre-Pauline liturgical or hymnal formulations that early traditions 
existed which interpreted Jesus’ post-mortem existence primarily in terms of exaltation, and 
that Paul’s approving incorporation of these formulations – and his lack of inserting explicit 
resurrection language into the Christ hymn of Philippians – indicates that he envisaged 
 
44 Ibid., 44; Matera, Romans, 30.  
45 On this being a pre-Pauline creed, possibly baptismal liturgy, see Michael F. Bird, “‘Raised for our 
Justification’: A Fresh Look at Romans 4:25,” Colloquium 35, no. 1 (2003), 32. Bird highlights its two part 
structure, the use of διὰ instead of Paul’s more commonly used ὑπέρ, δικαίωσιν instead of δικαιοσύνη, and the 
reflection on the Suffering Servant, which is uncommon in Paul (2 Cor. 8.9 and Phil. 2.5-11 being potential 
exceptions, though the latter is probably pre-Pauline also). Also note the presence of ὃς. Cf. Schreiner, Romans, 
243.  
46 Bird argues similarly, that “in the resurrection of Christ the justification of the age to come has dawned” (Bird, 
“‘Raised for our Justification,’” 35-36.  
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resurrection as encompassing far more than a mere reanimation, but included broader themes 
of Jewish eschatological hope, particularly exaltation, the dispensation of justice, and the 
inauguration of a new eschatological reality. As seen in chapter two, these themes are often, in 
many systematic interpretations of the resurrection, either downplayed or ignored outright in 
order to emphasize the continuity of Jesus’ resurrected body with empirical reality, or elevated 
as the discontinuity of the resurrection is emphasized. We will see in the remainder of the 
Pauline corpus, and the Easter narratives in subsequent sections, that Jesus’ post-mortem 
existence, when interpreted through the framework of the ‘resurrection of the dead’ cannot be 
reduced to the reanimation of a personal, corporeal body (even if some sort of post-mortem 
existence is affirmed), upholding both continuity and discontinuity with empirical reality.  
Paul and the Eschatological New Age 
Paul’s understanding of resurrection is the fulfilment of the Jewish eschatological hopes for 
Israel and the cosmos in general. In this, I am in agreement with Wright who notes that the 
redemption of Israel inaugurated “a new, unexpected period of history.”47 Herman Ridderbos 
similarly remarks, “What has taken place in Christ forms the termination and fulfillment of the 
great series of divine redemptive acts in the history of Israel.”48 Wright observes the presence 
in 1 Thessalonians 4.13-5.11 of several apocalyptic metaphors, including the imagery of 
clouds, reflecting Daniel 7.13, and of light and dark, the implied vindication of the covenant 
people, and also the general resurrection, indicating that Jesus’ post-mortem existence initiated 
the installation of a new eschatological reality. Furthermore, the meeting with Jesus in the air, 
coupled with the imagery of childbirth, suggests cosmic transformation and the joining of 
heaven and earth.49 This new eschatological age is reflected in the new life of Galatians 2.19-
 
47 Wright, RSG, 219.  
48 Herman Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline of His Theology, trans. John Richard de Witt (London: SPCK, 1975), 50. 
49 Wright, RSG., 215-19. Lincoln notes, “Because of Christ’s resurrection, heaven has a new significance for Paul; 
its significance can be said to be no longer merely cosmological but Christocentric,” (Andrew T. Lincoln, Paradise 
Now and Not Yet: Studies in the Role of the Heavenly Dimension in Paul’s Thought with Special Reference to his 
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20 and Romans 5.10, the themes of vindication that suffuse Romans 1-4, the renewed cosmos 
in Romans 8.18-24, and the covenantal connotations of Romans 10.4-10, 11.15, and 15.12.50 
For Paul, says Wright, “The resurrection of Jesus, part of the divine plan to usher in ‘the age to 
come’ in place of ‘the present age’, is the beginning of the creator’s ‘new creation’, and gives 
retrospective meaning to Jesus’ death.”51 Wright has highlighted the way in which Paul draws 
together the diverse themes of Jewish eschatology into the framework of ‘resurrection,’ which 
makes it all the more surprising when Wright reduces Jesus’ resurrection to a re-animated body. 
Here, Wright’s critical realism demonstrates a reversion to a foundationalism which is simply 
not critical enough, failing to incorporate the broader eschatological connotations of 
resurrection. To be fair, 1 Thessalonians 4.13-5.11 is describing eschatological events still to 
come, rather than speaking explicitly of Jesus’ resurrection. However, these events are 
anticipated momentarily and connected to Jesus’ dying and rising in 4.13, and so arguably 
encompassed within Jesus’ post-mortem existence, a reality which goes well beyond a re-
animated community of believers and foreshadows a re-created universe.  
Paul’s most extensive treatment of Jesus’ resurrection, and his most explicit use of resurrection 
language, is 1 Corinthians 15 (mid-50’s CE), which we have returned to periodically already 
and to which we will return again in §6.6 when addressing the issue of the nature of the 
resurrected ‘body.’ The previous chapter analysed the way in which Paul was immersed in a 
Jewish eschatological framework which understood Jesus’ post-mortem existence as part and 
parcel of a broader notion of resurrection of the dead. Here, it is worth briefly exploring how 
 
Eschatology (Cambridge: CUP, 1981), 52-53). Significant here is the connection between Christology and 
cosmology. 
50 Wright, RSG, 220-74.  
51 Ibid., 224. Beale says something similar: “The fact that resurrection is a new-creational concept is clear in that 
a resurrected body is a newly created body to pass to the other side of the new creation. The coming new creation 
penetrated back into the old world through the resurrected body of Jesus,” (Beale, A New Testament Biblical 
Theology, 298). However, it is clear from this quote that, for Beale, this ‘new creation’ is interpreted in light of 
Jesus’ personal reanimated body. 
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Paul has utilized two other eschatological motifs in his interpretation of Jesus’ post-mortem 
existence, and how he has integrated these into the category of ‘resurrection.’  
The first of these motifs, that of ‘first fruits’ (15.20, 23), evokes the Levitical cultic practice of 
presenting a sheaf of the first fruits of harvest before the priest who in turn raises the sheaf 
before the Lord (Lev. 23.9-14). By using this imagery, Paul has the general resurrection in 
mind, in that Jesus represented the first of a bountiful harvest.52 Paul might be drawing on the 
same tradition from which the Gospel authors later drew that placed the resurrection on the 
prescribed day for the offering of first fruits, that is, the day after the Sabbath after Passover. 
The second motif has to do with the theme of cosmic re-creation, evident in the reference to 
the animals, the heavenly and the earthly, the sun, moon, and stars, the ‘first man,’ Adam, who 
was from the dust, and the bearing of an image (15.39-41, 45-49). As we have seen, the theme 
of creation was associated with the resurrection of the dead, and so it is not surprising to see 
this motif reflected here. While some commentators avoid the creation motif,53 Wright, to his 
credit, does not, claiming that this chapter is framed by the Genesis creation accounts, “an 
exposition of the renewal of creation.”54 The reference to Adam, the ‘first man,’ suggests that 
the renewal of humanity has come in and through Jesus, the ‘second man.’55 Paul views Jesus’ 
resurrection as the renewal of creation, reminiscent of the Jewish texts which envisage an 
 
52 Lunn, “Raised on the Third Day According to the Scriptures,” 531; Richard B. Gaffin, Jr., “Redemption and 
Resurrection: An Exercise in Biblical-Systematic Theology,” Themelios 27, no. 2 (2002), 18-19; Garland, 1 
Corinthians, 705-06. Lincoln argues, “Heavenly existence has begun with the resurrection of Christ. The 
Corinthians can experience it now through the Spirit, but they are not yet fully heavenly. This will only occur 
when they bear fully the image of the heavenly man, that is, when their bodies share in heavenly existence,” 
(Lincoln, Paradise Now and Not Yet, 54). Though Lincoln highlights how the future resurrection and post-mortem 
existence of believers is characterised by that of Jesus, which is helpful, it is clear from this quote the extent to 
which Lincoln focuses on the personal body, which is unhelpful.  
53 Such as David Garland, who lists the animals and heavenly bodies, and makes a minor reference to Gen. 1.20-
27, but seemingly ignored the creation motif (Garland, 1 Corinthians, 730-31).  
54 Wright, RSG, 313. He goes on to say, “This passage is, indeed, all about new creation as the fulfilment and 
redemption of the old” (p.334).  
55 Felipe de Jesús Legarreta-Castillo argues that this is a deliberate allusion to the Fall. However, there is nothing 
in this passage that says anything explicitly negative about Adam. Paul’s emphasis is upon the contrast between 
the fleshly physicality of the original creation and the transformed glory of the new, renewed creation (Felipe de 
Jesús Legarreta-Castillo, The Figure of Adam in Romans 5 and 1 Corinthians 15: The New Creation and Its 
Ethical and Social Reconfiguration (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014), 148-49). Cf. Wright, RSG, 342-47, 355. 
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antediluvian and paradisiacal reality (Hos. 2.18; Isa. 11.6-8; 65.25; Ezek 34.25-27; 1 En. 25.3-
7; 61.12; 2 En. 8.1-8; 30.1; 42.4; T. Levi 18.10-11; Jub. 2.7; 4 Ezra 3.6; 6.26; 2 Bar. 4.3).  
The use of a variety of images and motifs (including that of transformation, national 
redemption, and glorification, which were discussed in the previous chapter) demonstrates that 
Paul is doing more than focusing on Jesus’ personal reanimation, exaltation, or even upon the 
general resurrection of the faithful, but weaves them together, demonstrating that his 
understanding of ‘resurrection’ encompasses the broad spectrum of Jewish eschatological 
hope, and that this is being fulfilled in Jesus’ post-mortem existence.   
Reflections on the Early Traditions 
In accordance with the PCR framework proposed in §4.4, and its stress (echoing social memory 
theories) upon analysing the development of ideas and interpretations of Jesus’ post-mortem 
existence as they were remembered in new contexts, this section has focused on the earliest 
interpretations of Jesus’ post-mortem existence before moving onto later interpretations to be 
analysed in subsequent sections. We learn that Paul’s understanding of Jesus’ resurrection 
encompassed far more than Jesus’ re-animated body, incorporating within the framework of 
resurrection a variety of eschatological hopes, the fulfilment of which had begun in Jesus’ 
resurrection. Paul interpreted Jesus’ post-mortem existence in terms of Jewish eschatology as 
the inauguration of a new reality to be accompanied imminently by the general resurrection 
and the arrival of the eschaton.  
The Christ hymn of Philippians 2.6-11, which Paul adopted and repurposed, makes no mention 
of Jesus’ resurrection, referring instead to his exaltation, his elevation to a new position of 
authority in a transformed reality that includes all of creation (“every knee…in heaven and on 
earth and under the earth, and every tongue”). This exaltation is similarly reflected in another 
pre-Pauline liturgical formulation, Romans 1.3b-4, but which connects this directly to Jesus’ 
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resurrection. We can assume then that Paul presupposed resurrection in Philippians 2.6-11, but 
understood this to encompass the eschatological hopes for an exalted post-mortem existence 
and the inauguration of a new age, an age characterised by justice (Rom. 4.25; 5.10; 1 Thess. 
4.13-5.11; Gal. 2.19-20). This is again reflected in 1 Corinthians 15, where he envisages a 
transformation of reality and which, as will be seen in §6.5, bears both continuity and 
discontinuity with empirical reality.  
The most significant way that these early resurrection traditions differ from the later more 
developed traditions (found particularly in the Johannine literature, the deutero-Pauline 
epistles, Hebrews, and the Petrine Epistles) is that Paul anticipates the imminent fulfilment of 
the events to accompany the eschaton, not least being the general resurrection. This is 
especially evident in Paul’s claim that “we who are alive, who are left until the coming of the 
Lord, will by no means precede those who have died,” and “we who are alive, who are left, 
will be caught up in the clouds together” (1 Thess. 4.15, 17). Jesus’ resurrection was the 
beginning of the end-time events.56 Furthermore, the messianic community – the church – is a 
unity, indeed united in and as Jesus’ body (1 Cor. 12.12). As a unity, resurrection is expected 
as a corporate event involving the entire people of God. For Paul, the resurrection of a sole 
individual was an impossibility, for such an occurrence would constitute an aberration of his 
Jewish expectations. Jesus’ resurrection is thus inseparable from that of the early Jesus 
followers (seen also in the first fruits analogy of 1 Cor. 15.20, 23), and so their resurrection 
should be occurring within a short time.57 Moreover, for Paul, Jesus’ post-mortem existence is 
ushering in the eschatological expectations for the end of history, whereas the later New 
Testament traditions came to interpret this event as their fulfilment.  
 
56 Other verses that demonstrate an expectation of an imminent Parousia include 1 Thess. 1.10; 1 Cor. 1.7-8; 
15.20; Phil. 3.20. Cf. Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 232; Madigan and Levenson, 
Resurrection, 21, 27.  
57 Madigan and Levenson, Resurrection, 34-35.  
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6.4. Synoptic Traditions: Resurrection and Eschatological Hope 
The synoptic tradition reflects a development in resurrection theology, as various early 
Christian communities reflected upon Jesus’ post-mortem existence and incorporated an even 
broader array of eschatological themes in a narrativized form. The expectation of an imminent 
eschaton is less pronounced than in Paul’s corpus (the Olivet Discourse – Mark 13 // Matt. 24-
25 // Luke 21 – being a possible exception) but has not yet reached the tendency of later 
traditions to view Jesus’ post-mortem existence as constituting the ultimate fulfilment of 
broader eschatological hopes. Within a PCR framework, the focus is upon the reciprocal 
interaction between external event and prior frameworks and how this is re-interpreted as it is 
remembered and recounted in evolving and changing contexts. This begins to become clear 
through the synoptic texts, especially Matthew and Luke, as the Parousia and the events 
expected with the eschaton are gradually understood to have been delayed. There is, of course, 
some development within the Pauline corpus itself, especially seen in 1 Thessalonians 4.13-18 
which addresses the question of why the Parousia has not yet happened and provides 
encouragement that those who have already died will still experience the benefits of 
resurrection. However, this development is less pronounced than the development seen in the 
Synoptics. Hence, the event of Jesus’ post-mortem existence is reinterpreted as memory is 
intertwined with prior eschatological categories, categories which consequently change.  
The following section analyses the synoptic accounts of resurrection and the various traditions 
therein. Mark incorporates the empty tomb tradition (absent in Paul) but curiously does not 
include a risen Jesus, implying a risen body but not describing it, indicating that for Mark, 
resurrection encompasses far more than a personal return to a bodily existence and that Jesus’ 
resurrection is the inauguration of a new age.58 A comparison of Matthew and Luke highlights 
 
58 It has been suggested – particularly by Bultmann – that Mark’s transfiguration account was a displaced 
resurrection narrative. The validity of this suggestion will be assessed in this section. It is argued that though the 
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how they have developed along different paths, demonstrating how interpretation of an event 
develops within different communities as recollection collides with different contexts. Both 
adopt the empty tomb tradition and incorporate the appearance traditions, but Luke is much 
more restrained with regard to eschatological motifs, opting for simpler apocalyptic imagery 
than Matthew, preferring to highlight Jesus’ exaltation as the Son of Man and his elevation to 
a role of authority in a new world order. Matthew, on the other hand, adorns his imagery with 
dramatic elaboration and apocalyptic imagery. In both cases, however, the post-mortem 
existence of Jesus is described in the eschatological language of the ancient Jewish category of 
resurrection, particularly the inauguration of a new eschatological age. Within this new reality, 
the exalted Jesus is Lord. 
Mark  
Assuming the majority position of Markan authority, Mark’s Easter account (late 60’s CE) is 
thought to be the earliest account of the resurrection in narrative form. It is also the shortest 
and least theologically adorned, and reflects the earliest empty tomb tradition. Mark 16 has 
created considerable controversy and debate, particularly surrounding its multiple endings 
which were almost certainly later additions. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to engage in 
debates surrounding the ‘shorter’ or ‘longer’ endings of Mark, and I simply follow the 
conventional position, that the original concluded at v.8.59 Furthermore, the narrative itself is 
 
transfiguration was not a misplaced resurrection narrative, there are definite connections with resurrection and 
provides clues to how Mark’s Easter narrative might be understood.  
59 There are of course issues with ending the chapter at v.8, the major issue being the brevity of the resurrection 
narrative and the absence of Jesus himself, despite the regular foreshadowing of the resurrection throughout the 
Gospel (6.14; 8.31; 9.9, 30-31; 10.33-34; 12.18-27; 14.58). However, this could well be intentional, to leave the 
reader uncomfortable, reflecting the evangelist’s inability to explain with any certainty precisely what actually 
happened to Jesus. The narratives within vv.9-20 seem to be later insertions, probably drawing on other widely 
known, later developed traditions that are present in the other Gospels, perhaps included as a solution to the abrupt 
ending of Mark, or possibly to replace an ending that had been lost. Cf. Moloney’s argument for the shorter ending 
(Francis J. Moloney, The Gospel of Mark: A Commentary (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002), 339-41) and France’s 
argument that the chapter did not end at v.8 (R. T. France, The Gospel of Mark (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 
670-74). There is very little in the extended ending which would be of particular relevance for the topic at hand.  
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rather perplexing: it is unclear who rolls away the stone or how;60 Jesus himself is absent; the 
tone of the narrative is one of confusion and fear; it ends abruptly; and we do not know if the 
women actually told anyone (although presumably they did given the subsequent birth of the 
church). The presence of these baffling elements and the lack of theological adornment may be 
reflective of Mark’s relatively early tradition when compared to subsequent Gospels.61 
Despite the lack of extended theological reflection, this short narrative is not devoid of 
eschatological character. Mark reflects a tradition similar to Paul, that Jesus’ post-mortem 
existence was the inauguration of a new eschatological age. Unlike Paul, Mark has narrativized 
this motif and integrated it with an empty tomb tradition. It is unclear whether the empty tomb 
is a pre-Markan tradition or a Markan innovation, but given the lack of an apologetic character 
(it is not an attempt to prove Jesus’ physicality, for example), it would seem to reflect an earlier 
tradition, albeit one that Paul either did not know about or did not consider relevant. In either 
case, Mark is using the context of the discovery of an empty tomb to present Jesus’ resurrection 
as the start of a new age, signified by the women discovering the tomb “very early on the first 
day of the week, when the sun had risen” (16.2), almost gratuitous detail considering the brevity 
of the passage.62 The reference to the rising sun recalls the darkness that accompanied Jesus’ 
 
60 In this regard Roger David Aus has suggested that the narrative of Jacob rolling the large stone away from the 
well in Genesis 29.1-14 serves as background for Mark 16.1-8 (Aus, The Death, Burial, and Resurrection of Jesus, 
and the Translation of Moses in Judaic Tradition, 176-97). 
61 Dale Allison reflects, “Maybe the odd paucity of clear theological and apologetical features in Mark’s text is a 
hint – not strong evidence but a hint, a fragment of a clue – that there is some history behind it, that it was not 
simply the product of the Christian imagination” (Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 321). 
62 Richard France notes that Mark makes no note of when the resurrection itself actually occurred, only when the 
tomb was discovered to be empty. However, Mark places a great deal of significance upon the time of this event, 
implying that this timing is not trivial (R. T. France, The Gospel of Mark (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 678).  
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death in 15.33,63 and the rising of the sun in 16.2 functions as a metaphor for the rising of Jesus. 
In this event, the new eschatological age has dawned.64 
Furthermore, the narrative might be illustrating an assumption interpretation of Jesus’ fate, that 
is, he was assumed into heaven in a similar manner to Elijah (2 Kgs. 2.11) and Enoch (Gen. 
22-24).65 The absence of either a body or a risen Jesus seems to suggest this interpretation, 
particularly if we connect Mark’s transfiguration account, which mentions Elijah and Moses, 
to Jesus’ resurrection (an idea addressed momentarily). However, there are two elements of 
Mark’s narrative which are incongruous with other assumption narratives: the fact that Jesus 
died and was buried, rather than being taken up into heaven prior to death, and the presence of 
resurrection language, the inclusion of ἠγέρθη (‘to rise’), which is foreign to assumption 
narratives because resurrection would be superfluous. Daniel Smith offers the solution that 
Mark incorporated two traditions, that of assumption and that of resurrection. Jesus’ 
disappearance means that he has been raised.66 The absence of Jesus in the narrative is a 
curiosity, especially as his presence would have been a particularly helpful inclusion if Mark’s 
intention was to frame Jesus’ post-mortem existence as the reanimation of his personal body. 
Jesus’ absence, on the other hand, might suggest that resurrection signified more than a return 
to a bodily existence; Mark is capable of using the language of resurrection without including 
a risen Jesus in his narrative.67 Mark’s Easter narrative is a good example of how, in Dale 
 
63 I am hesitant to connect, as Brendan Byrne does, this darkness to the primordial darkness of Gen. 1, explicitly 
recalling creation (Brendan Byrne, A Costly Freedom: A Theological Reading of Mark’s Gospel (Collegeville: 
Liturgical Press, 2008), 254). There might be a creation motif present, considering the mention of “the first day 
of the week,” but it is not explicit in this narrative, and is not a common motif elsewhere in the Gospel. The later 
Easter narratives – especially John – do, however, incorporate this theme.  
64 Dane Ortlund, “‘Rising’ Language in Mark and the Dawning New Creation,” CTR 13, no. 2 (2016), 27-45. 
Ortlund connects this specifically to Jesus’ bodily resurrection, in light of the emptiness of the tomb (p.42-43). 
However, the lack of Jesus’ actual body casts doubt on this interpretation. 
65 This has been argued by Daniel Smith, who also argues that this is evident in the Q material, which will be 
addressed below. If this is true, there might some connection between the pre-Markan and Q traditions. (Daniel 
A. Smith, The Post-Mortem Vindication of Jesus in the Sayings Gospel Q (London: T&T Clark, 2006), 160-62).  
66 Smith, The Post-Mortem Vindication of Jesus, 171.  
67 Of course, there is always the possibility that the true ending of Mark’s Gospel has indeed been lost, which 
might have included an extended resurrection narrative.  
276 
 
Allison’s words, “historical memories can be pressed down and shaken together with 
mythological motifs.”68  
The absence of an actual body in Mark’s narrative might be explained by Mark’s account of 
the transfiguration (9.2-8) being a misplaced resurrection narrative. Bultmann in particular was 
an advocate for this interpretation of the transfiguration.69 This is suggested by the presence of 
apocalyptic features, such as the two figures of Elijah and Moses, the mountain location, 
shining garments, the presence of supernatural beings, and the demonstration of God’s glory. 
If this is so, the argument that ‘resurrection’ should not be reduced to a personal reanimation 
but functions as the fulfilment of a broad spectrum of ancient Jewish eschatological hope and 
is characterised by both continuity and discontinuity with empirical reality is strengthened. 
Furthermore, according to tradition, Moses never died (cf. Deu. 34.5-6) but was taken up to 
heaven, and Elijah was taken up in whirlwind in 2 Kings 2.11.70 In fact, Roger Aus suggests 
that Moses’ presence in this narrative makes very little sense unless it is understood in 
connection to the Judaic tradition of Moses’ assumption.71 If this transfiguration account is a 
misplaced resurrection narrative, the presence of these two figures might support the argument 
that Mark depicts an assumption of Jesus.72 
 
68 Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 305.  
69 Rudolf Bultmann, The History of the Synoptic Tradition, trans. John Marsh (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), 
259-61. Cf. Helmut Koester, From Jesus to the Gospels: Interpreting the New Testament in Its Context 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2007), 23.  
70 Cf. Mark Healy, The Gospel of Mark (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 174.  
71 Aus, The Death, Burial, and Resurrection of Jesus, and the Death, Burial, and Translation of Moses in Judaic 
Tradition, 216-17.  
72 Some, such as Focant, Smith, and Stein, have suggested that Moses and Elijah here represent the Law and 
Prophets, respectively, and so Jesus is the fulfilment of the Jewish Scriptures. This too would strengthen my thesis 
if this is, in fact, a resurrection account. However, it seems unlikely that these two figures represent the Law and 
the Prophets for several reasons: Elijah was not a writing prophet and was a champion of the law against idolatry, 
and Moses was not just the giver of the Law but was also considered a great prophet. Of course, these are not 
definitive arguments, and the presence of these two figures (especially Elijah, who is connected to the Day of the 
Lord in Malachi 4.5) gives this narrative a markedly eschatological tone. Those who argue for Moses and Elijah 
representing the Law and Prophets: Camille Focant, The Gospel According to Mark: A Commentary, trans. Leslie 
Robert Keylock (Eugene: Pickwick, 2012), 355; Robert H. Stein, Mark (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008), 417; Morton 
Smith, “The Origin and History of the Transfiguration Story,” USQR 36, no. 1 (1980), 42. Those who argue 
against: Dorothy A. Lee, Transfiguration (London: Continuum, 2004), 17-18; David E. Garland, A Theology of 
Mark’s Gospel (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2015), 302.  
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However, it is unlikely that the transfiguration account was a misplaced resurrection narrative, 
and does not seem to have many advocates in contemporary scholarship. For C. Clifton Black, 
this assertion leaves more questions than answers, such as what benefit would Mark have of 
putting this heavenly confirmation of Jesus’ identity here rather than with his resurrection?73 
For Mark L. Strauss, George Aichele and Richard Walsh, and Robert H. Stein, the differences 
between the transfiguration and resurrection narratives are too great: in the transfiguration 
account, Jesus is silent, but speaks in Matthew and Luke’s post-resurrection narratives; in the 
transfiguration Jesus was initially with his disciples before ascending the mountain alone, 
whereas in the resurrection narratives, Jesus is initially absent and then suddenly appears, 
joining the disciples; Jesus is easily recognized in the transfiguration despite the change (which, 
furthermore, is only temporary) but is not in the resurrection; there is no voice from heaven in 
the resurrection narratives; no resurrection narrative has Jesus with Peter, James, and John and 
this trio is not mentioned by Paul 1 Corinthians 15.3-4.74  
Despite these differences, the similarities cannot be ignored. Though we might not be able to 
say with certainty that the transfiguration account is a misplaced resurrection narrative, we can 
say that they are connected, with the transfiguration foreshadowing Jesus’ resurrection.75 In 
particular, this narrative depicts Jesus’ coming glorification and the transformation of his nature 
accordingly. Whiteness and luminous transformation are common descriptions of the righteous 
(Dan. 7.9; 1 En. 104.2; 4 Esd. 7.97), and clouds were symbols of God’s presence and glory 
(Exod. 19.9, 16). Some commentators have extrapolated from this the revelation of Jesus’ 
 
73 C. Clifton Black, Mark (Nashville: Abingdon, 2011), 203.  
74 Mark L. Strauss, Mark (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014), 381-82; George Aichele and Richard Walsh, 
“Metamorphosis, Transfiguration, and the Body,” BibInt 19, no. 3 (2011), 260; Stein, Mark, 90-91; idem. “Is the 
Transfiguration (Mark 9:2-8) a Misplaced Resurrection Account?” JBL 95, no. 1 (1976), 91-94. Cf. Dorothy Lee, 
“On the Holy Mountain: The Transfiguration in Scripture and Theology,” Colloquium 36, no. 2 (2004), 149.  
75 Cf. Focant, The Gospel According to Mark, 357; Lee, Transfiguration, 30; idem., “On the Holy Mountain,” 
150-52; Chris Knight, “Metamorphosis and Obedience: An Interpretation of Mark’s Account of the 
Transfiguration of Jesus,” ExpTim 121, no. 5 (2010), 220.  
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divinity.76 I am less confident in this interpretation, as the imagery primarily depicts 
glorification rather than deification, as that imagery is not always applied to God (e.g. Dan. 
12.3). However, the transfiguration is depicting the exaltation of Jesus, an eschatological theme 
connected to the notion of resurrection and the new eschatological reality. This is accompanied 
by the metamorphosis of Jesus. Mark 9.2 and Matthew 17.2 use the verb μετεμορφώθη 
(‘metamorphosis’) but was translated by William Tyndale, John Wycliffe, and the KJV as 
‘transfigured,’ which Aichele and Walsh argue downplays the transformation of Jesus’ 
physicality. ‘Transfiguration,’ they insist, implies little more than a shift in perspective, 
whereas ‘metamorphosis’ implies a radical change of both body and identity.77 
Even if we don’t view the transfiguration account as a misplaced resurrection narrative, the 
two are connected, with the former providing clues as to how Mark’s Easter narrative should 
be interpreted, namely as one that connects Jesus’ post-mortem existence with the much 
broader spectrum of ancient Jewish eschatological hope, implying that his resurrection entailed 
his glorification and a radical transformation. This transformation includes a considerable 
change of what constitutes a body (echoing Paul’s discussion of the various bodies in 1 
Corinthians 15.35-58), which might be why there is no body in Mark’s Easter narrative.78  
Before continuing, it is worth mentioning Mark 6.14-16, where Elijah is again connected to the 
idea of resurrection.79 In this account, Herod, upon hearing of the success of Jesus’ ministry, 
mistakenly believes Jesus to in fact be John the Baptist returned from the grave. Some others 
believe him to be Elijah while still others suppose him to be one of the prophets. Resurrection 
 
76 E.g. Garland, A Theology of Mark’s Gospel, 301; Byrne, A Costly Freedom, 144-45; Lee, Transfiguration, 16-
17; idem., “On the Holy Mountain,” 152; Strauss, Mark, 379; Smith, “The Origin and History of the 
Transfiguration Story,” 42. 
77 Aichele and Walsh, “Metamorphosis, Transfiguration, and the Body,” 259-73.   
78 Though the main point to take from this is that the empty tomb does not necessarily entail a physical 
reanimation.  
79 For an extensive analysis of John the Baptist functioning as an Elijah figure, cf. Joel Marcus, John the Baptist 
in History and Theology (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2018), 46-61.  
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here seems to be discussed without the larger eschatological connotations and, given the 
graphically physical description of John’s execution, seems to envisage a bodily, material 
resurrection. However, Herod’s assumption is historically problematic, as the careers and lives 
of John and Jesus overlapped; for Jesus to be the risen John, Jesus would need to have appeared 
after John’s death. I interpret this passage then as a narratological tool: John is a precursor to 
Jesus.80 This is of course a common motif in the Synoptics, and so is not out of place here.81 
This passage foreshadows the question of Jesus’ identity and his predictions of his death and 
resurrection (8.27-31) and ultimately the Passion narrative itself.  
As a narratological tool, it is therefore impossible to discern from Mark 6.14-16 anything 
concrete about whether or not anyone did in fact think of ‘resurrection’ without the broader 
eschatological connotations.82 R. T. France claims, “To call Jesus the ‘resurrected John’ is, 
therefore, better seen not as the articulation of a thought-out ‘doctrine’ of resurrection (still less 
involving any idea of reincarnation), but as a rather clumsy but vivid way of expressing a sense 
of continuity.”83 This is strengthened by the possibility, as suggested by Joel Marcus, that John 
the Baptist saw himself as an Elijah figure (strongly implied in John 3.27-30) and so likely saw 
Jesus as Elisha. As Elisha succeeded Elijah (1 Kings 19.16), so Jesus succeeded John the 
Baptist. Of course, this Elijah-Elisha typology is present primarily in the later Gospel traditions, 
but Marcus insists that “it did not come out of nowhere” and that it is historically likely that 
John did in fact see himself as Elijah and his disciple, Jesus, as Elisha.84 
 
80 Cf. Boring, Mark, 177; Robert A. Guelich, Mark 1-8:26 (Dallas: Word, 1989), 327-30.  
81 Cf. Marcus, John the Baptist, 118-19. Each of the Evangelists present John as pointing to Jesus: indirectly in 
the earliest Gospel, Mark; increasingly explicit in Matthew and Luke; most explicit in the later John.  
82 Markus Bockmuehl is certainly correct in his claim that passages such as this allude to the possibility that a first 
century Jew might think of an individual being resurrected (the diversity of beliefs regarding resurrection was 
discussed in the previous chapter). However I maintain that it is very difficult to ascertain significant detail 
regarding a resurrection ‘doctrine’ from this passage alone (Markus N. A. Bockmuehl, “Compleat History of the 
Resurrection: A Dialogue with N. T. Wright,” JSNT 26, no. 4 (2004), 500-501).  
83 France, The Gospel of Mark, 253.  
84 Marcus, John the Baptist, 87-89. 
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However, even if we take this account at face value, it serves only to further distinguish Jesus’ 
resurrection from these other accounts of people returning to life, mistaken or not. The accounts 
of Lazarus, Jairus’ daughter, and Herod’s assumption that John has risen from the dead, are 
devoid of the eschatological connotations that were connected with Jesus’ post-mortem 
existence.85 Rather than indicating that a pervasive understanding of resurrection of the dead 
existed in the first century that was not connected to a broader array of eschatological themes, 
we can learn from passages such as Mark 6.14-16 (if we momentarily set aside the 
narratological function of the passage) that first century Jews had ways of speaking about the 
reanimation of personal bodies. That Jesus’ post-mortem existence was described in a 
dramatically different fashion indicates that it was an event of an entirely different sort.  
Matthew and Luke 
Turning to the Easter narratives in Matthew and Luke (80-90 CE), we see how the two have 
incorporated Jewish eschatological concepts into their retelling of the various traditions 
surrounding Jesus’ resurrection, but do so in quite different ways. Matthew emphasizes the 
apocalyptic character of ‘resurrection,’ whereas Luke emphasizes the exaltation of Jesus. Luke 
continues this emphasis in Acts. Yet both Matthew and Luke incorporate a wide variety of 
traditions: the empty tomb (Matt. 28.1-5 // Luke 24.1-12 // cf. Mark 16.1-8), the presence of 
angels in the tomb (Matt. 28.2-7 // Luke 24.4-7 // cf. Mark 16.5-7), the exaltation and 
glorification of Jesus (Matt. 28.16-20 // Luke 24.30-32, 44, 50-52; Cf. Phil. 2.6-11; 1 Tim. 
3.16; Col. 1.15-20), and the appearances to the disciples (Matt. 28.16-17 // Luke 24.36-43; 1 
Cor. 15.3-8);86 Luke includes Q’s use of Son of Man (Luke 24.7; cf. Q 12.8-9; 17.22-24), the 
 
85 If Mark 6.14-16 were not an account of a mistaken identity we might see some eschatological significance in 
the reference to Elijah and the ‘miraculous powers’ at work in Jesus.  
86 Luke 24.34 might well be an earlier pre-Lukan formula, as there is nothing in Luke’s account that indicates that 
Jesus appeared to Peter (or, apparently, to any other disciple) or that anyone else should know of this appearance. 
Its inclusion reflects the traditional prioritizing of Peter. This demonstrate that the appearance traditions had 
entered communal memory from an early stage.  
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prioritizing of the appearance to Peter (Luke 24.12; cf. Mark 16.7; Luke 24.34; 1 Cor. 15.3), 
and the belief that resurrection fulfilled Scripture (Luke 24.25-27; cf. 1 Cor. 15.4). For the 
present argument, it is important to note how these texts demonstrate propensity for some early 
members of the Jesus movement to seek out and employ a variety of eschatological motifs 
within their interpretation of Jesus’ post-mortem existence, with the category of resurrection 
encompassing an array of eschatological hopes. For both Matthew and Luke, Jesus’ post-
mortem existence is not simply a personal re-animated body, but suggests a new eschatological 
reality has been inaugurated, with the exalted Jesus as ruler.  
Matthew and Luke suggest that the tomb was discovered empty at dawn on the first day of the 
week. Assuming Markan priority, this reflects the prior tradition of contrasting the dawn of 
Jesus’ resurrection with the darkness at his crucifixion, as both Matthew and Luke similarly 
include a reference to darkness covering the land as Jesus died (Matt. 27.45 // Luke 23.44). As 
with Mark, I suggest that this detail evokes connotations of the dawning of a new age. This is 
reinforced in Matthew by the inclusion of several apocalyptic elements. The angels, for 
example, reflect traditional theophanies, particularly Matthew’s description of the ‘angel of the 
Lord,’ whose ‘appearance was like lightning, and his clothing white as snow’ and who inspired 
fear, though Luke’s two87 angels are described more simply, as wearing ‘dazzling clothes.’88 
Matthew’s inclusion of the saints rising from their tombs (27.51-54), the earthquake (28.2) – 
Earthquakes are a common apocalyptic image depicting a tumultuous and destructive end of 
the age (Isa. 26.9; Ezek. 38.18; Zech. 14.5; Hag. 2.6-7; Joel 3.1-2, 9-16; 2 Esdras 9.3; 2 Baruch 
70.8; Rev. 6.12) – and Matthew’s overall focus upon Jesus as Messiah further reinforces the 
 
87 The fact that Luke and John’s accounts includes two angels, rather than one, as in Mark and Matthew, is a 
curiosity, but could be the result of the development of the tradition in communal memory, or it could be that 
Mark and Matthew did not include a second angel which was present in the original tradition. After all, Mark and 
Matthew do not specify the precise number of angels present. There doesn’t appear to be any particular 
significance attached to the number of angels.  
88 On similar theophanies, where the description of lightning, brightness, and white clothing are present, cf. Dan. 
7.9; 10.5-6; 4 Ezra 10.25-27; 1 En. 14.20; 71.1; 3 En. 22.9; T. Levi 8.2; Rev. 10.1. Cf. Keener, The Gospel of 
Matthew, 700; Sim, Apocalyptic Eschatology in the Gospel of Matthew, 143.  
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interpretation that for Matthew, whatever happened to Jesus marked the start of the new 
eschatological age.89  
For Luke, however, though he adopted the first day of the week motif, little is said of this new 
eschatological age coming through Jesus’ resurrection. Allison suggests this could be due to a 
polemic against an over realized eschatology or proto-gnostic theologies held by competing 
groups of Christians.90 However, Luke does see in Jesus’ post-mortem existence the 
inauguration of a new world order and the exaltation of Jesus to a new position of authority. 
As we have seen elsewhere, the exaltation of Jesus involved the receiving of a new name and 
new office (Phil. 2.9-11; Col. 1.15-20; Rom. 1.3-4). This is implied in the titles of Messiah and 
Lord applied to Jesus (Luke 24.26, 34, 46), the repeated claim that what had happened to him 
was the fulfilment of ancient promise (24.6, 27),91 and his ascension into heaven (24.50-53). 
However, it should be noted that a dying Messiah was essentially an oxymoron; though these 
categories were applied to Jesus, they were re-interpreted around him due to, I suggest, the 
eschatological significance attributed to his post-mortem existence. 
The theme of Jesus’ exaltation continues through Acts and is repeatedly connected to the Holy 
Spirit, a prominent motif in Luke-Acts which drives the so-called Christian mission. The most 
common way of referring to the resurrection in Acts is part of the formula: the Jews crucified 
Jesus; God raised him from the dead (Acts 2.23-24; 3.15; 4.10; 5.30; 10.39-40; 13.29-30). This 
formula is significant as it reflects the reversal of injustice, rewarding the righteous martyr, a 
common motif in Jewish apocalyptic and is somewhat ironic that it is used in Acts as an 
indictment against the Jews.92 Further, it recalls the humiliation-exaltation formula that we 
 
89 According to Wright, “With the combined events of Jesus’ death and resurrection the new age, for which Israel 
had been longing, has begun,” (Wright, RSG, 635).  
90 Allison, The End of the Ages Has Come, 74-79. 
91 Jesus teaching the disciples en route to Emmaus reflects the twelve year old Jesus teaching in the temple (2.41-
51), where had been for three days.  
92 Furthermore, it indicates a later dating for Acts, in that the Jews were negatively depicted as opposing Jesus 
and his followers.  
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have already seen in Philippians 2.6-11. One such example of this formula is in Peter’s speech 
following the coming of the Holy Spirit in 2.22-24, and partially repeated in v.32. The 
significance of resurrection in this speech explaining the coming of the Spirit reveals that 
Pentecost was, for Luke, inherently connected to Jesus’ resurrection; Joel’s prophecy (Joel 
2.28) has been applied to the fate of Jesus, and Pentecost has been interpreted in terms of 
resurrection.93 Furthermore, in this event Jesus has been ‘made’ Lord and Messiah (2.36), being 
exalted to a new position of authority. This is particularly significant as it is another instance 
where resurrection encompasses more than the reanimation of a personal body. Whatever 
happened to Jesus was interpreted – at least in the Lukan tradition – as being inherently 
connected to the coming of the Spirit and hence also the inauguration of the new eschatological 
age. 
At this point it is also worth noting the presence of the ascension narrative in Luke-Acts, the 
only explicit recording of this event in the New Testament canon. Some other texts occasionally 
seem to not make a distinction between resurrection and ascension (Rom. 8.34; Eph. 1.19-20; 
Col. 3.1; Phil. 2.9-11; 1 Tim. 3.16; 1 Pet. 3.21-22), but Luke very deliberately separates these 
events. Though a distinction is implied in the post-resurrection narratives of Matthew and 
John,94 it is somewhat curious that they do not explicitly recount Jesus’ being ‘carried up into 
heaven’ (Luke 24.51). However, it makes sense when read in light of Luke’s emphasis upon 
the exaltation of Jesus; the ascension is an extension of the glorification of Jesus present in his 
resurrection. As has been argued above (cf. §5.2), this glorification is an integral theme of the 
 
93 Cf. Schnabel, Acts, 140-41; Luke Timothy Johnson, Prophetic Jesus, Prophetic Church: The Challenge of Luke-
Acts to Contemporary Christians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011), 62. I disagree with Darrell Bock who 
compares 24.32-33 with 1 Cor. 15.3-5, arguing that in both instances resurrection is seen as “a historical fact like 
the death and burial, not an interpretation of an event. The resurrection is not a symbol or a metaphor for anything” 
(Bock, Acts, 130). The apologetic character of these passages indeed demonstrates the authors’ desire to present 
Jesus’ resurrection as occurring within history, but that does not mean that they are not interpreting the event or 
suggesting that it is a metaphor. The very fact that they apply the language of resurrection to this event 
demonstrates that they have, in fact, interpreted it.  
94 As well as the implications present in Jesus’ own words: John 3.13; 6.62; 20.17.  
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notion of resurrection of the dead, and Luke has narrativized this as a way of explaining, as 
Wright understands the ascension, the missing body and empty tomb. The ascension reflects 
the language of Daniel 7, of the Son of Man being exalted to sit beside the Ancient One.95  
Douglas Farrow maintains, “If in the resurrection Jesus is already transfigured and 
transformed…in the ascension he is also translated or relocated,” defining the ascension as “a 
transformative relocation into a time and space and mode of life defined by full participation 
in the trinitarian economy.”96 Farrow thus essentially views the ascension as a second act of 
transformation, reinforced in his claim that, “In the ascension God does something quite new 
with and for the man Jesus.”97 This, I believe, is problematic, as it sets the resurrection and 
ascension in opposition, raising doubts about those passages which speak of Jesus’ exaltation 
without using the explicit language of resurrection. Furthermore, Paul does not speak in terms 
of the future ascension of believers, but of their resurrection.98 The need to see in the ascension 
a new, or second, act of transformation is the result of having to deal with the problem of an 
ascending body, one seen primarily in terms of continuity with the pre-crucifixion body. Hence, 
I contend, the ascension only makes sense if it is seen as an extension of the event that came to 
be described as Jesus’ resurrection, reflecting the unification of continuity and discontinuity. 
Jesus, whose existence is, in some sense, continuous with his pre-cruficixion existence, is 
ascending into heaven. 
 
95 Wright, RSG, 654-56. Wright elsewhere argues, “Part of the point of the resurrection in the New Testament, as 
I understand it, is not that Jesus died and was bodily raised to heaven…That’s precisely not what’s going on. The 
collapsing of resurrection and ascension into one another in a lot of popular New Testament scholarship, I think, 
just misses the point entirely,” (Wright in Robert B. Stewart, ed. The Resurrection of Jesus: John Dominic Crossan 
and N.T. Wright in Dialogue (London: SPCK, 2006), 42).  
96 Douglas Farrow, Ascension Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 44-45.  
97 Ibid., 44.  
98 Furthermore, it would then become difficult to make sense of Paul’s claim that his witness to the risen Jesus 
was of the same sort as the other appearance accounts, in that, in the Luke-Acts narrative, he encountered the risen 




According to the four-source hypothesis, the Q source refers to the material shared by Matthew 
and Luke that is not present in Mark, possibly reflecting an early collection of Jesus’ sayings 
and teachings, and reflects another early tradition recounting the life of Jesus, particularly his 
teachings, and says nothing explicit about Jesus’ death or resurrection. However, there are 
instances in this material that seem to imply his death and resurrection. Accordingly, we might 
treat Q as another, independent, example of an early Christian tradition discussing the post-
mortem existence of Jesus without the use of explicit resurrection language, and while 
maintaining the same connotations that were encompassed by the belief in Jesus’ resurrection. 
It is important not to belabour the point; Jesus’ post-mortem existence is only implied in Q, 
and there is certainly no particular resurrection tradition (though this is not surprising given 
that Q is a sayings source and not narrative).  
Though there is neither a Passion or Easter narrative nor any resurrection prophecies in the Q 
material, several passages seem to indicate a knowledge of Jesus’ death (Q 6.22-23; 11.47-51; 
13.34-35; 14.27),99 framed by the Deuteronomistic tradition of the persecution of the prophets, 
rather than drawing on the tradition of viewing Jesus as righteous sufferer.100 John 
Kloppenborg’s insistence that “there is no reason at all to suppose that those responsible for 
the formation and transmission of Q were unaware of…[Jesus’s] death,”101 is overstating the 
case,102 but it is hard to imagine that members of the early Jesus movement, amongst whom 
multiple Passion and Easter traditions had already circulated, could hear the words, “Whoever 
 
99 I here adopt the convention of using Luke to refer to the Q material.  
100 Cf. John S. Kloppenborg, “‘Easter Faith’ and the Sayings Gospel Q,” Semeia 49 (1990), 81. Kloppenborg 
further observes, “In Q we seem to be at a very primitive stage of theologizing the experience of persecution. 
Jesus’ fate evidently was not yet an issue which required special comment.” 
101 Kloppenborg, “‘Easter Faith’ and the Sayings Gospel Q,” 76. Cf. p. 83.  
102 It is, after all, impossible to determine with certainty what a hypothetical source was either aware or unaware 




does not carry the cross and follow me cannot be my disciple” (Q 14.27), and not be reminded 
of Jesus’ crucifixion.103  
Similarly, there is no explicit reference to resurrection, but it could be implied in various 
passages. Q 11.31-32 concerns judgment but claims that the Queen of the South will be raised 
(ἐγερθήσεται) and the Ninevites will also arise (ἀναστήσονται). Smith argues that this 
envisages the general resurrection, which is not implausible as resurrection was often the 
prelude to, or the means of, judgment.104 Wright sees something similar in Q 3.8, where God 
will raise (ἐγεῖραι) up a chosen family, 12.4-10, where the faithful need not fear the loss of 
body, 13.28-30, where many will come from all over to eat with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, 
17.33, where the challenge to martyrdom could imply the promise of resurrection (reflecting 2 
Macc. 7), and 22.30, where Jesus and all within the 12 tribes are gathered for judgment.105 
However, Wright does tend, once again, to emphasize the personal and individual nature of the 
resurrection here, as with the physicality implied in the act of eating, rather than focusing on 
the larger eschatological motif of divine judgment.  
It should be noted that ἐγείρω (‘to raise’) and its cognates are not used exclusively to refer to a 
subject rising from the dead – it is used to refer to waking from sleep (Matt. 1.24; Mark 4.27), 
getting up to move (Matt. 2.13; Mark 14.41-42; John 11.29; Acts 12.7; Rev. 11.1), nations 
rising against nations (Matt. 24.7), physically standing up (Luke 5.23; John 13.4; Acts 9.8), 
and increasing in quantity (Phil. 1.17) – and so its presence in Q does not necessarily refer to 
resurrection.106 On the other hand, ἀνάστασις is almost exclusively used to refer to the 
 
103 On the implicit references to Jesus’ crucifixion, cf. Smith, The Post-Mortem Vindication of Jesus, 12-14.  
104 Smith, The Post-Mortem Vindication of Jesus, 22.  
105 N. T. Wright, “Resurrection in Q?” in Christology, Controversy, and Community: New Testament Essays in 
Honour of David R. Catchpole, ed. David G. Horrell and Christopher M. Tuckett (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 88-91. Cf. 
idem., RSG, 430-32.  
106 BDAG lists thirteen different definitions of ἐγείρω, including awaking from sleep or causing someone to wake 
(Matt. 1.24; 8.25; Mark 4.27, 38; John 11.12; Acts 12.7; Rom. 13.11), to cause someone to physically stand up 
(Acts 3.7; Mark 1.31; 9.27; Acts 10.26; Matt. 12.11; 1 Clem. 59.4), and to cause to come into existence (T. Levi 
18.2; Luke 1.69; Matt. 3.9; Acts 13.22; Phil. 1.17).  
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resurrection (Luke 2.34 is the one exception), and so Q 11.32 is a probable reference to 
eschatological resurrection. Furthermore, references to the Patriarchs and twelve tribes recalls 
the covenantal promises, as opposed to envisaging a post-mortem existence. However, the 
cumulative effect suggests that Jesus’ teachings were interpreted eschatologically. Again, this 
does not immediately equate to an expectation of resurrection, but the presence of resurrection 
language and the call to martyrdom, framed by divine judgment and covenantal promise 
indicates that Jesus’ teachings were likely interpreted within the framework of the 
eschatological notion of resurrection from the dead. It seems these themes were common in 
resurrection theology, even if resurrection is not been explicitly mentioned in Q.  
The most notable passage in Q to imply resurrection is the sign of Jonah (Q 11.29-30). It is 
especially explicit in Matthew’s version: “For just as Jonah was three days and three nights in 
the belly of the sea monster, so for three days and three nights the Son of Man will be in the 
heart of the earth” (Matt. 12.40). Followed by the saying of the Queen of the South and the 
Ninevites rising to deliver judgment, this sign almost certainly evokes resurrection. Given the 
presence of the three day motif, the similarities between the story of Jonah and Jesus’ descent 
into darkness and subsequent return, and Matthew’s interpretation of the Son of Man residing 
‘in the heart of the earth’ (ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τῆς γῆς), this saying gestures towards Jesus’ 
resurrection.107 Hence, Jesus’ teaching seems to have been interpreted within a pre-existing 
Jewish eschatological framework, where resurrection is connected a broad spectrum of hopes. 
The Risen Saints 
Another distinctly apocalyptic element that Matthew incorporates into his narration of Jesus’ 
death and post-mortem existence is the curious inclusion of a particularly confounding passage 
 
107 Cf. Wright, “Resurrection in Q?” 96; Turner, Matthew, 326; John L. McKenzie, Commentary on the Gospel 
According to Matthew (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2015), 62. Keener argues against this, that the ‘sign’ is not Jesus’ 
resurrection, but his teaching, on the basis that the Ninevites did not witness Jonah’s return (Keener, The Gospel 
of Matthew, 367-68).  
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that recounts Jesus’ death as being accompanied by a number of saints rising from their tombs 
and appearing to people in Jerusalem (Matt. 27.51-54). All the more perplexing is the inclusion 
of a chronological gap between their rising and their coming out of the tombs following Jesus’ 
resurrection. This passage demonstrates the degree to which the interpretation and memory of 
Jesus’ post-mortem existence had become intertwined with apocalyptic thought. In accordance 
with PCR, I highlight here how this apocalyptic thought shaped the resurrection narrative, as 
this event was interpreted through an ancient Jewish eschatological lens which incorporated a 
much broader array of eschatological hopes that extend well beyond a personal reanimation.  
For Wright, Matthew is here articulating a tradition of strange events surrounding Jesus’ 
crucifixion, incorporating biblical allusions into his retelling. The rising of these saints out of 
their tombs did not constitute the general resurrection, but was “a strange semi-anticipation of 
it,” alluding to the opening of graves in Ezekiel 37.12-13, the rising of the corpses in Isaiah 
26.19, and the awakening of those who were asleep in Daniel 12.2. Wright argues that it is 
unlikely that a) it is a Matthean invention, designed to fulfil these verses (and Zech. 14.1-5), 
on the grounds that it would be unlikely for a first century Jew to insist that national redemption, 
or the general resurrection, had occurred, when they clearly had not; b) that Matthew has drawn 
from the Gospel of Peter, where three men walk out of the tomb; and c) that it was Matthew 
interpreting the crucifixion as an apocalyptic act of God.108  
Wright’s interpretation is, however, uncompelling. He is certainly correct in highlighting the 
biblical allusions,109 but the apocalyptic character of the passage attests against it being 
understood as an event within contingent history, and Wright’s interpretation as such reveals 
his assumption of a soft foundationalism. Indeed this is likely a pre-Matthean tradition, on the 
 
108 Wright, RSG, 632-36.  




basis of the presence of ἁγίων, rather than Matthew’s usual δίκαιοι (13.17),110 and the phrase 
‘after his resurrection,’ which seems to be a Matthean amendment, reflecting the tradition of 
Jesus’ priority as ‘first born.’111 It is likely this early tradition, as with the traditions analysed 
above, is simply an attempt at making sense of an event that did not fit neatly within pre-
existing eschatological frameworks. In other words, the inclusion is an attempt to reconcile 
Jesus’ individual resurrection with the broader framework of ancient Jewish apocalyptic beliefs 
and desires.  
Dale Allison argues that this passage draws primarily upon Zechariah 14.4-5, rather than 
Ezekiel 37.1-14, for Matthew makes no mention of bones, and the holy ones entering Jerusalem 
is a tentative parallel to Ezekiel’s exiles returning to Israel. Despite Zechariah 14.4-5 not 
traditionally being a resurrection passage, Allison observes that the north panel of the Dura-
Europos synagogue, dating to the third century CE, portrays the resurrection as occurring on 
the Mount of Olives, which has been split in two, alongside a fallen building which might 
suggest an earthquake. Coupled with the Targum on Zechariah 14.3-5, which introduces the 
text with a reference to resurrection, there appears to be evidence that this passage was indeed 
interpreted as a reference to resurrection.112 Ronald Troxel argues against Zechariah 14.4-5 
being an inspiration behind this story, suggesting that Zechariah merely implies a resurrection 
and that Matthew only has the description of the ‘holy ones’ in common with Zechariah. 
Instead, Troxel suggests that 1 Enoch’s Apocalypse of the Weeks is a more likely source. 1 
Enoch 93.6 mentions a vision of holy ones, who were described in 61.12 as those who are in 
 
110 According to BDAG, ἁγίων appears on only four occasions in Matthew (4.5; 7.6; 24.15; 27.52-53), but δίκαιοι 
at least fourteen times (1.19; 5.45; 9.13; 10.41; 13.17, 43, 49; 23.28, 29, 35; 25.37, 46; 27.4, 19).  
111 Ronald L. Troxel, “Matt 27.51-4 Reconsidered: Its Role in the Passion Narrative, Meaning and Origin,” NTS 
48, no. 1 (2002), 37, 41-41; Allison, The End of the Ages Has Come, 42. There is distinctively Matthean 
vocabulary (ἐσείσθη, πέτραι, ἠγέπθησαν, τὴν ἁγίαν πόλιν) and the use of μετὰ plus an accusative is found 
elsewhere in Matt. (1.12; 25.19; 27.62-63) demonstrates that Matthew adapted the tradition.  
112 Allison, The End of the Ages Has Come, 42-44.  
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heaven, and 51.1-2 then claims that the earth will give back those who had been entrusted to 
it. It is from this that Matthew drew inspiration for the epithet, ‘the holy ones.’113  
Attempts to determine a specific passage from which this tradition consciously draws are 
fruitless. The passage appears as an amalgamation of various eschatological motifs, similar, as 
seen above, to the claim that Jesus was raised ‘in accordance with the Scriptures’ (1 Cor. 15.3). 
Resurrection was inseparably connected to the broader spectrum of eschatological hope, and 
so passages such as Zech. 14.4-5 could be later depicted as a resurrection despite bearing little 
resemblance to other resurrection passages. Matthew’s Easter narrative is imbued with 
apocalyptic elements that neither Mark nor Luke have included, revealing that Matthew’s 
narrative had developed along a different, more apocalyptic, trajectory.114 Considering 
Matthew’s use of Ezekiel, Isaiah, Daniel, and possibly Zechariah, the implied connection to 
the general resurrection, and the amendment, “after his resurrection,” this story was Matthew’s 
incorporation of the broader eschatological hopes into what he believed happened to Jesus.  
Reflections on the Synoptic Traditions 
The most significant aspect of the resurrection as portrayed in the synoptic traditions is the 
development from an expectation of an imminent eschaton that was present in Paul to the 
beginning of the interpretation of Jesus’ post-mortem existence as functioning as the fulfilment 
of a broad spectrum of ancient Jewish eschatological hopes for the eschaton, which becomes 
especially prominent in the later traditions, particularly John. Over time, theological reflection 
on Jesus’ post-mortem existence became increasingly intertwined with the Jewish 
eschatological notion of resurrection of the dead, and so the narrativization of Jesus’ 
resurrection is imbued with apocalyptic motifs and eschatological themes that go well beyond 
 
113 Troxel, “Matt 27.51-4 Reconsidered,” 42-44. Cf. Sim, Apocalyptic Eschatology in the Gospel of Matthew, 110-
11.  
114 On the apocalyptic elements in Matthew’s Gospel, see Murphy, Apocalypticism, 265-66, and Blomberg, 
Matthew, 420-21.  
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a re-animated body, incorporating the eschatological hopes for exaltation, justice, and the 
renewal and transformation of creation. Furthermore, the Synoptics demonstrate a diversity in 
the development of resurrection theology, with Matthew and Luke incorporating diverging 
traditions which were not present in Mark. This is in contrast with the Passion narrative (Matt. 
26-27 // Mark 14-15 // Luke 22-23) which each of the Synoptics presents fairly uniformly.115 
This very fact suggests that the early interpreters of Jesus’ post-mortem existence were able to 
draw from a vast array of motifs to describe this event, suggesting that the notion of 
‘resurrection’ encompasses a broad spectrum of eschatological hopes rather than being 
simplified to a personal reanimation.  
To recap, Mark includes the earliest surviving reference to the empty tomb tradition, utilizing 
this as the context for his narrative. Jesus’ resurrection is regarded as the inauguration of a new 
eschatological age, as seen especially in the mention of the specific time that the tomb was 
discovered: ‘Very early on the first day of the week, when the sun had risen.’ The empty tomb 
is not an apologetical tool, attempting to prove a bodily resurrection. Rather, ‘resurrection,’ for 
Mark, has to do with far more than a re-animated body, an event which includes Jesus’ 
glorification and his transformation (as further suggested by its possible connection with the 
transfiguration narrative). This is similarly reflected in the Q material, where resurrection is 
presupposed, but speaks primarily in terms of Jesus’ exaltation. The common eschatological 
themes of covenantal promise, exaltation, and divine judgment are repeatedly emphasized. The 
‘Sign of Jonah’ also probably has Jesus’ resurrection in mind suggesting that the Q source 
interprets Jesus’ teaching within a pre-existing Jewish eschatological framework, which 
aligned resurrection alongside  an array of hopes much broader than just a personal 
reanimation. 
 
115 McKenzie, Commentary on the Gospel According to Matthew, 148.  
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Turning to Matthew and Luke, we find two distinct narratives which extend the Markan 
tradition and incorporate further Jewish eschatological concepts. Matthew emphasizes the 
apocalyptic character of resurrection, whereas Luke emphasizes the exaltation of Jesus. In their 
retelling of Jesus’ post-mortem existence, they incorporate a variety of eschatological motifs 
within the broader category of resurrection, again demonstrating that resurrection means more 
than a re-animated personal body. The apocalyptic elements of Matthew (and the influence of 
Jewish eschatology upon Matthew is evident in his inclusion of the tradition of the saints rising 
out of their tombs alongside Jesus’ death and resurrection), the titles given to Jesus in Luke, 
and Luke’s connection between the resurrection and Pentecost, suggest that for both Matthew 
and Luke, a new eschatological age has dawned in Jesus’ resurrection.  
This new eschatological age is further seen in the comparison between Jesus’ resurrection and 
the Gospel accounts of other people rising from the dead (for example, Matt. 9.18-26; 10.8; 
Mark 5.21-24, 35-43; Luke 7.11-17; 9.49-56), namely in the way Jesus’ resurrection is unique. 
The core difference between these previous accounts and Jesus’ resurrection is that Jesus’ was 
interpreted as having to do with the fulfilment of the eschatological promises. His post-mortem 
existence was interpreted within the framework of the Jewish eschatological notion of 
resurrection of the dead, and, as such, is markedly different to the others. If early Christian 
communities interpreted Jesus’ resurrection as a mere reanimation, a return to ordinary life, his 
resurrection would have been described much more similarly to these other accounts. Jesus’ 
resurrection, throughout the synoptic tradition, and reflecting the earlier traditions from which 
they drew, was interpreted not as any other miracle, or any other resuscitation, but indeed as 
the dawn of a new eschatological age, the fulfilment of the broad spectrum of Jewish 
eschatological hope. As such, Jesus’ resurrection extends well beyond the reanimation of his 




The PCR framework proposed in §4.4 has shaped this thesis in two primary ways. First, it has 
explored the development of how Jesus’ post-mortem existence was understood in new and 
changing contexts, as this event interacted with the presupposed eschatological category of 
resurrection of the dead – reflecting social memory theories and the epistemological claim that 
knowledge is bilateral. Second, the thesis has maintained a dialectical tension between the 
continuous and discontinuous elements of  Jesus’ pre-Easter and post-Easter existence rather 
than assuming ‘resurrection’ to envisage a re-animated personal body and so emphasizing 
either its continuity or discontinuity with ordinary reality – reflecting a postfoundationalist 
epistemic model. The next section of this chapter traces resurrection within the later traditions, 
exploring the most developed interpretations of Jesus’ post-mortem existence: how this event 
was remembered and interpreted in the Christian communities of the later part of the first 
century and the early-mid second century, where Jesus’ post-mortem existence is finally seen 
not as the beginning of the fulfilment of the broad spectrum of ancient Jewish eschatological 
hope, but as its total fulfilment, in and of itself.  
6.5. Later Traditions: Resurrection and Fulfilment  
By the later traditions, as seen particularly in the canonical New Testament texts John (11.23-
27; 20.1-29; 21.1-14), Hebrews (1.3-4; 2.9; 9.26; 10.12), the deutero-Pauline epistles (Eph. 
1.20; 2.6; Col. 1.15-20; 2.12; 2 Thess. 2.14; 1 Tim. 3.16), and the Petrine epistles (1 Pet. 1.3; 
3.21-22), as well as in the extra-canonical Gospel of Peter (10.39-42), resurrection theology 
bears a markedly less apocalyptic character. Reflection on Jesus’ post-mortem existence 
remains saturated with eschatological connotations, but whereas the earlier traditions viewed 
the resurrection as the initiation of eschatological hopes which were being fulfilled, or would 
be fulfilled within a short time, these later traditions understand Jesus’ post-mortem existence 
as bearing within itself the actual and total fulfilment of these hopes. While the synoptic 
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tradition gestures towards this interpretation of the resurrection as such, it is more prominent 
in John.  
These later traditions reveal the way in which both memory of the event and the category of 
‘resurrection of the dead’ coalesced. This is a central concern of a PCR historiography, that is, 
the dynamic interaction between observed event and the presuppositions and prior frameworks 
– influenced greatly by the communal context – of the observer, as the event is remembered 
and reinterpreted in new contexts. The task of both the theologian and historian in determining 
the meaning of the claim that Jesus rose from the dead is to trace this development to show 
how Jesus’ post-mortem existence was able to express the fulfilment of a broad spectrum of 
Jewish eschatological hopes, not only as expectations for the eschaton, but also as fulfilled 
within the contingency of history.  
John  
Differences between the Gospel of John (90-110 CE) and the Synoptics demonstrate the extent 
to which the Easter narratives had developed within early Christian communities by the late 
first century. The focus shifts in John from a future-oriented resurrection or imminent Parousia 
evident in the early traditions, to Jesus’ resurrection as the fulfilment of eschatological promise. 
Through Jesus’ death and resurrection, salvation and eternal life became available in the 
present. Despite this development, many of the central traditions prior to John are nonetheless 
reflected in John, and indeed developed. This is especially so with regard to the motif of new 
creation. The focus for John is upon the post-mortem existence of Jesus functioning as the 
fulfilment and inauguration of the Jewish eschatological hope for a redeemed creation. 
An example of John presenting the resurrection as the fulfilment of the Jewish category of 
resurrection and encompassing a broad array of eschatological hope is found in the account of 
Jesus’ raising of Lazarus from the dead (John 11.23-27). This passage was touched on in the 
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previous chapter where I argued that when Martha says she will see her brother again ‘at the 
resurrection’ she is not simply referring to the general resurrection, but to the broader 
eschatological category of resurrection, which includes the fulfilment of a broader array of 
eschatological hopes. Jesus’ response is particularly significant, claiming that he is the 
resurrection (ἐγώ εἰμι ἡ ἀνάστασις).116 Considering the context, Jesus seems to be referring, 
not to his own or Lazarus’ future resurrection, or even simply to the general resurrection, but 
to these resurrection hopes, of which Martha spoke, and which had been fulfilled in him. The 
life promised in the eschatological age has already come in and through Jesus, beginning 
anticipatorily in his ministry (particularly the ‘signs’ he performed and especially, for John, in 
his crucifixion; cf. 2.11, 23; 3.2; 4.54; 6.14; 9.16; 12.23-25; 17.1-5) and decisively in  his post-
mortem existence, namely, his resurrection.  
John regularly refers to this life and its arrival in Jesus, and often describes it as αἰώνιον 
(‘eternal’; 3.15, 16, 36; 4.14, 36; 5.24, 39; 6.27, 40, 47, 54, 68; 10.28; 12.25, 50; 17.2, 3). In 
fact, John uses this adjective exclusively in conjunction with ζωή (‘life’). Rather than 
understanding ‘eternal life’ as a long period of time, it is best understood qualitatively, 
functioning as John’s equivalent to “the age to come” (Dan. 12.2).117 Other things similarly 
described as ‘eternal’ include the invisible things (2 Cor. 4.18), the glory which accompanies 
salvation (2 Tim. 2.10), the gospel (Rev. 14.6), and salvation itself (Heb. 5.9), none of which 
are understood quantitatively, indicating that when connected to life, ‘eternal’ was not 
understood as an extended period of time. The life that has come in and through Jesus, 
particularly his post-mortem existence – his resurrection – is the life of the new and promised 
 
116 The use of ἐγώ εἰμι followed by a predicate echoes six other occurrences in the Gospel of John where, following 
this same formula, Jesus is said to be the ‘bread of life’ (6.41, 48, 51), the ‘light of the world’ (8.12), the ‘gate’ 
(10.7, 9), the ‘good shepherd’ (10.11, 14), the ‘way, truth, and life’ (14.6), and the ‘true vine’ (15.1, 5).  
117 αἰώνιον is used in LXX Dan. 12.2.  
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eschatological age.118 Jesus is the resurrection, the fulfilment of the eschatological hopes, and 
through him the future eschatological new age has been made available in the present.119 
Various interpretations of John 11.25 have been proposed, but not all connect Jesus’ claim to 
the Jewish notion of ‘resurrection of the dead,’ or at least not explicitly. Andrew Lincoln does 
not make this connection at all,120 and for Andreas Köstenberger, Jesus’ claim to be the 
resurrection and the life is primarily a matter of trust, that is, “Jesus seeks to shift Martha’s 
focus from an abstract belief in resurrection on the last day to personal trust in the one who 
provides it in the here and now.”121 Wright’s interpretation focuses on the promise for the future 
resurrection of believers following their bodily death; new life – eternal life – is now available, 
meaning physical death need not be the end of the individual (again emphasizing a physical 
reanimation).122 Bruce Milne connects 11.25 to the Jewish eschatological resurrection in his 
assertion that Jesus “is the Resurrection, the embodiment of the promised life and salvation of 
God.”123 While each of these interpretations affirm that eschatological life is available in the 
present, it is crucial to emphasize that Jesus’ resurrection is here not simply seen as the 
reanimation of his personal body or a return to life following death, and that through this eternal 
life has become available for believers, but rather, much more explicitly connected to the 
fulfilment of the broader spectrum of Jewish eschatological hope.  
 
118 Cf. J. W. Roberts, “Some Observations on the Meaning of ‘Eternal Life’ in the Gospel of John,” ResQ 7, no. 
4 (1963), 186-91; Henry A. Gustafson, “The Means to Eternal Life: A Study of John 3:1-18,” The Covenant 
Quarterly 26, no. 1 (1968), 6; J. C. Davis, “The Johannine Concept of Eternal Life as a Present Possession,” ResQ 
27, no. 3 (1984): 161-69. Granted, αἰώνιον can refer to a long period of time, a period of time without beginning 
or end, or a period of unending duration, that is, qualitatively. However, its connection to ‘life’ and, in this case, 
to ‘resurrection,’ suggests eschatological connotations (BDAG, 33).  
119 The claim that Jesus is the resurrection and the life might be an intentional adaptation of the technical 
‘resurrection of the dead,’ replacing ‘dead’ with ‘life.’ If so, this would demonstrate a development of resurrection 
theology within the early Christian community; the ‘resurrection’ – the fulfilment of the broad spectrum of 
eschatological hopes – has already occurred in Jesus, thereby bringing life.  
120 Andrew T. Lincoln, ““I Am the Resurrection and the Life”: The Resurrection Message of the Fourth Gospel,” 
in Life in the Face of Death, ed. Richard Longenecker, 122-44.  
121 Andreas Köstenberger, John (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2004), 335.  
122 Wright, RSG, 447-48.  
123 Bruce Milne, The Message of John (Nottingham: IVP, 1993), 164. 
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The significance of this becomes apparent when the pericope is read in light of John’s recurring 
theme of renewed creation, a theme especially evident in his resurrection narrative. In John, 
the creation motif demonstrates God’s eschatological purposes for the world and what has been 
accomplished in Jesus. Jeannine Brown argues that the use of this creation motif suggests that 
John sees Jesus as the culmination of “the ongoing story of God’s creation.”124 In the prologue, 
the phrase ‘in the beginning’ evokes the Genesis creation account, introducing the themes of 
life and light, both of which are derived from Genesis 1, and the use of the noun λόγος (‘word’) 
reflects God speaking creation into being. Furthermore, the noun ζωή (life) is a frequent 
occurrence (1.4; 3.15; 4.36; 5.40; 6.27; 8.12; 10.10; 11.25; 14.6; 17.2; 20.31), is found in three 
of the ‘I Am’ statements (6.35; 11.25; 14.6), and is even included in the Gospel’s statement of 
purpose (20.30-31). The notion of life is connected directly to resurrection in 11.25.125 As we 
will observe, these themes of life, creation, and the resurrection are interwoven through the 
Gospel, and find their climax in the Easter narrative.126 
The Easter narrative in John 20.1-29 is similarly imbued with creation connotations, and 
functions as the climax to the Gospel’s motifs of creation, life, and fulfilment of eschatological 
hopes. Concerning the allusion to the Genesis creation accounts, John sets the scene in a garden 
(19.41), which is reinforced by Mary mistaking the risen Jesus for the gardener (20.15). Jesus 
then breathes the Holy Spirit (πνεῦμα ἅγιον) upon the disciples (20.22), alluding to God 
breathing the breath of life into Adam.127 For Köstenberger, Jesus’ resurrection signifies the 
climax of John’s creation theology,128 William Brown similarly emphasizes the garden, stating 
 
124 Jeannine Brown, “Creation’s Renewal in the Gospel of John,” CBQ 72, no. 1 (2010), 277.  
125 Ibid., 276-78.  
126 Wright also notes the similarities between John 20 and the prologue, in particular the themes of light and dark, 
reflected in Mary arriving while it was still dark, and Jesus breathing the Spirit upon the disciples (Wright, RSG, 
667; cf. idem., NTPG, 410-17). 
127 Brown, “Creation’s Renewal in the Gospel of John,” 279-83. Brown also suggests that as Jesus is presented to 
the crowds with the words, “Behold, the man!” (19.5) John is contrasting Jesus with Adam, and hence Jesus is the 
antitype of the first gardener. I am, however, not convinced by this particular comparison, which seems to be 
stretching the comparison too far.  
128 Andreas J. Köstenberger, A Theology of John’s Gospel and Letters (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2009), 353.  
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that John has “transported us back to the primordial past of the first garden.”129 However, he 
argues this demonstrates Jesus’ divinity, whereas another perspective would be to see the 
context of the garden as a narratological tool which demonstrates how the eschatological hope 
for the renewal of creation has been fulfilled in the post-mortem existence of Jesus.  
Another significant element which recalls Genesis 1-2 is the stress that John places upon the 
resurrection occurring on the first day of the week. It was noted above that this was a significant 
feature in Mark, which was later adopted by Matthew and Luke, but here John emphasizes this 
further through repetition (20.1, 19).130 Brown emphasizes the creation motif in John’s Easter 
narrative, highlighting that this happened on the first day of the week. Moreover, the stress 
upon the first day of the week might signify an eighth day of creation, supported by Jesus 
appearing to the disciples ‘a week later,’ or literally ‘after eight days’ (μεθ᾿ ἡμέρας ὀκτὼ).131 
Wright agrees, arguing that the resurrection constitutes John’s eighth sign (the other seven 
being 2.1-11; 4.46-54; 5.2-9; 6.1-14; 9.1-7; 11.1-44; 19.1-37). The seven signs reflect the seven 
days of creation, and the eighth sign is the first day of the renewed creation.132 
The resurrection as recounted in John represents significant development in the communal 
memory of Jesus’ post-mortem existence, and the incorporation of Jewish eschatological hope 
has become much more intensive, no longer anticipating an imminent Parousia and general 
resurrection, but viewing these hopes as having been fulfilled in the person of Jesus. This does 
not mean that John no longer envisages a future resurrection for the faithful, however, as this 
hope is still reflected in 5.28-29 and 11.23. In particular, the eschatological hope for a renewed 
creation is central in John’s narrative. John has adapted the empty tomb tradition, but has 
explicitly located it in a garden. Furthermore, John’s motif of light and dark is reflected in 
 
129 William P. Brown, “The Ecology of Resurrection,” Journal of Preachers 36, no. 3 (2013), 20-21.  
130 It might be reinforced even further in placing Jesus’ appearance to Thomas a week later, which would happen 
to be the first day of that particular week (20.26).  
131 Brown, “Creation’s Renewal in the Gospel of John,” 283-88.  
132 Wright, RSG, 668-69. Cf. Brown, “Creation’s Renewal in the Gospel of John,” 283-88.  
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Mary’s arriving while it was still dark, rather than at or after sun rise as in the synoptic tradition. 
The point for John is that Jesus’ post-mortem existence constituted the fulfilment of the broad 
spectrum of Jewish eschatological hope, which stressed the redemption not just of bodies but 
of the cosmos, and has been framed by the motif of resurrection which encompassed these 
hopes.133 In whatever happened to Jesus, the anticipated new creation has arrived. Hence, John 
– and a common theme throughout the New Testament corpus, from the early to the later 
traditions – envisages a resurrection that encompasses far more than personal reanimation and 
is characterized by a dialectical tension between both continuity and discontinuity with 
ordinary reality.  
Later Epistles 
The next texts for analysis are the later New Testament epistles of Hebrews, the Deutero-
Pauline epistles, and 1 Peter, where explicit resurrection language is rare, but similar motifs to 
John are present, particularly of exaltation and new creation. Much of the theology and 
interpretations of Jesus’ post-mortem existence are also found in John, but in some key 
instances there is divergence. It is important to recognize the diversity amongst the various 
developments. Hebrews, for example, does not mention Jesus’ resurrection, though there might 
be some allusions to it, instead focusing on his exaltation. These later traditions reveal that the 
interpretation of Jesus’ post-mortem existence did not develop in a unilateral or uniform 
direction, demonstrating the early church’s capacity to speak of Jesus’ post-mortem existence 
in a variety of ways, presupposing the resurrection, while emphasizing his exaltation. The 
general and broader hopes for a renewed creation and the inauguration of a new eschatological 
 
133 William Brown observes, “Resurrection ultimately cannot be limited to the raising up of our bodies. 




age have been fulfilled in Jesus’ post-mortem existence, stretching well beyond the limitations 
of the reanimation of a personal, corporeal body. 
The focus of Hebrews (late-60’s CE), as with Luke-Acts, Philippians 2.6-11, and 1 Timothy 
3.16, is upon the exaltation of Jesus when interpreting Jesus’ post-mortem existence (Heb. 1.3; 
2.9; 4.14; 5.9; 7.26; 10.12; 12.2; 13.20).134 The prime example is found in the epistle’s opening, 
which might be part of an early confessional hymn:135 “When he had made purification for 
sins, he sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high, having become as much superior to 
angels as the name he has inherited is more excellent than theirs” (1.3b-4). This follows the 
claim that the present time constitutes the ‘last days,’ signalling the eschatological perspective 
of Jesus’ death and the events following.136 The author of Hebrews incorporates the tradition 
of Jesus receiving a new, highly exalted name, and echoes the formula of Philippians 2.6-11, 
that Jesus died in service to humanity, and as a result was exalted high, to a place of authority, 
and given a new name and office.137 This new office is described in Hebrews 4.14-16 as a 
perpetual high priesthood.138 Furthermore, as in the Philippian hymn, there is no explicit 
mention of resurrection, let alone a re-animated body. Though there are references to Jesus’ 
resurrection or the doctrine of resurrection in general (6.2; 11.35; 13.20),139 Jesus’ post-mortem 
existence is interpreted primarily as exaltation and glorification. The imagery of Jesus sitting 
down at the right hand of God (1.3; 8.1; 10.12; 12.2) might envisage Jesus’ reanimated body, 
but it cannot be any less metaphorical than the anthropomorphic notion that God has a right 
 
134 Cf. Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 245.  
135 This has been suggested by Donald A. Hagner, Hebrews (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2011).  
136 Elke Tönges, “The Epistle to the Hebrews as a “Jesus-Midrash,” in Hebrews: Contemporary Methods – New 
Insights, ed. Gabriella Gelardini (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2005), 100; Hagner, Hebrews, 22.  
137 Gibbs similarly makes this connection (Gibbs, “Christ is Risen, Indeed,” 121). The author of Hebrews might 
also be incorporating the tradition reflected in Col. 1.15-20, adopting the phrases, ‘heir of all things,’ ‘through 
whom he also created the worlds,’ and ‘sustains all things.’  
138 Vinzent, Christ’s Resurrection in Early Christianity, 55-56.  
139 The reference to ‘the power of an indestructible life’ in 7.16 might refer to Jesus’ resurrection, though the focus 




hand. It is an honorific description of Jesus’ exaltation, symbolically making use of Psalm 110, 
rather than an explicit description of Jesus’ post-mortem existence. Furthermore, Jesus’ death 
and resurrection constitutes the fulfilment of the law and covenant (2.9; 4.14; 7.23-8.7; 8.13; 
9.26; 10.12, 14, 19-22). Hence, in Jesus’ post-mortem existence, the eschatological hopes for 
exaltation and a new reality have already dawned, not necessarily in a personal reanimation, 
but in the fulfilment of a broader spectrum of ancient Jewish expectations.  
This is similarly evident in the deutero-Pauline epistles, the eschatology of which is markedly 
different to the Pauline texts.140 This is seen in 2 Thessalonians (late first to early second 
century CE), which seems to outright contradict and criticise the eschatology of the original 
letter, focusing salvation upon the possession of the glory of Jesus (2 Thess. 2.14), fulfilled 
rather than as having come through Jesus’ resurrection (cf. 1 Thess. 1.9-10; 4.14). The author 
of Ephesians connects Jesus’ resurrection directly to his exaltation in the claim that God raised 
Jesus ‘and seated him at his right hand in the heavenly places’ (Eph. 1.20), and has similarly 
done so to the faithful in the present (Eph. 2.6). Again, resurrection is presupposed with the 
stress upon exaltation and the believers’ present experience of this exaltation; the broader 
eschatological hopes have been fulfilled.  
 
140 Cf. Vinzent, Christ’s Resurrection in Early Christianity, 44. Though some have recently challenged the validity 
of categorizing some of these epistles – especially 2 Thessalonians – the general academic consensus remains that 
these epistles were written pseudonymously. Examples of scholars who claim authentic Pauline authorship include 
Murray J. Smith, “The Thessalonian Correspondence,” in All Things to All Cultures: Paul Among Jews, Greeks, 
and Romans, edited by Mark Harding and Alanna Nobbs (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), 269-301, esp. 278; 
Paul Foster, “Who Wrote 2 Thessalonians?: A Fresh Look at an Old Problem,” JSNT 35, no. 2 (2012), 150-175. 
This thesis follows the traditional view that 1 and 2 Timothy, Titus, Ephesians, Colossians, and 2 Thessalonians 
were written by someone other than Paul, particularly Bart D. Ehrman, A Brief Introduction to the New Testament, 
4th ed. (New York: OUP, 2017), 268-87; Benjamin L. White, Remembering Paul: Ancient and Modern Contests 
over the Image of the Apostle (Oxford: OUP, 2014); John Dominic Crossan and Jonathan L. Reed, In Search of 
Paul: How Jesus’s Apostle Opposed Rome’s Empire with God’s Kingdom (New York: Harper Collins, 2004); J. 
Christiaan Beker, Heirs of Paul: Paul’s Legacy in the New Testament and in the Church Today (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1991); Bart D. Ehrman, Forgery and Counterforgery: The Use of Literary Deceit in Early 
Christian Polemics (Oxford: OUP, 2013); Charles A. Wanamaker, The Epistles to the Thessalonians: A 
Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990); Earl J. Richard, First and Second Thessalonians 
(Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 1995).  
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Another significant passage, which seems to have been a liturgical hymn adapted and 
incorporated by the author,141 is Colossians 1.15-20 (70’s – 80’s CE), which, as with Philippians 
2.6-11, makes no explicit mention of resurrection, but the imagery bears a great deal of 
similarity to the resurrection motif. Resurrection seems to be presupposed, but spoken of in 
different terms, again demonstrating that resurrection encompassed a range of eschatological 
hopes rather than simply personal reanimation. Throughout Colossians, Jesus’ resurrection is 
discussed exclusively in connection to our present identification with his death and resurrection 
(Col. 2.12; 3.1),142 and this is present in this hymn, in the description of Jesus’ resurrection as 
the ‘first born.’ This hymn possibly reflects Wisdom literature, potentially an adaptation of a 
praise of Wisdom or Logos; Christ is placed in the role of Wisdom as a means through which 
God creates.143 The relation to Wisdom literature only goes so far, however, for Wisdom is 
often described as a created entity (Prov. 8.22-23; Sir. 1.4, 9) and the world is not created for 
Wisdom.144 Regardless, this hymn now has Christ at the centre, around whom creation is 
reborn. The ‘first born’ refers to the eldest child and heir of the estate, indicating priority. 
However, it is important to read this here in connection to ‘of all creation.’ The phrase ‘first 
born from the dead’ indicates Jesus’ post-mortem existence, and so we can surmise that this 
 
141 As with Phil. 2.6-11, the passage begins with ὃς, indicating that it is likely a creedal formulation. James Dunn 
highlights the matching rhythmic units, the clear structure of two strophes with parallel motifs (1.15-18a; 18b-
20), a self-contained meaning that is not dependent upon its immediate context, and the presence of various 
particularly uncommon terms (‘visible,’ ‘thrones,’ ‘beginning’) as indicators of it being an earlier hymn (James 
Dunn, The Epistles to the Colossians and Philemon: A Commentary on the Greek Text (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1996), 83-84). Cf. Paul Foster, Colossians (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 174.  
142 Vinzent, Christ’s Resurrection in Early Christianity, 45.  
143 Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate, 112; Dunn, The Epistles to the Colossians and Philemon, 85; 
Jerry L. Sumney, Colossians: A Commentary (Louisville: WJK, 2008), 65. Cf. Prov. 8.22; Wis. 7.17-24; 9.9.  




hymn has in mind an image of a new, rebirthed creation, over which Christ has authority.145 In 
this new creation, the Son has precedence, and functions as its ‘head.’146  
However, the relation to creation is far more intensive, as all things therein were created ‘in 
him,’ ‘through him,’ and ‘for him.’ The proximity of the words ‘image’ (εἰκὼν) and 
‘beginning’ (ἀρχή) to the motif of creation evidently frames Christ within an interpretation of 
Genesis (both ἀρχή and εἰκών are used in LXX Gen. 1.1 and 1.27), establishing him as a new 
Adam within a renewed eschatological creation.147 Wright argues that in Colossians, “The 
point of resurrection…is the reaffirmation of creation.”148 Paul Foster argues differently, that 
v.15 reflects Prov. 8.22, which admittedly reflects Genesis 1.1, but insists that the connections 
to Genesis are loose.149 The presence of the words ‘image,’ ‘the beginning,’ and ‘heaven and 
earth’ (υὀρανοῖς and γῆς; cf. LXX Gen. 1.1) connected to the creation motif seem to me to 
point undeniably to Genesis 1.150 Yet, this hymn is an interpretation of Jesus’ post-mortem 
existence, and so connects this event to the broader eschatological hopes for the renewal of 
creation – not just of bodies, but of all creation.  
Furthermore, this hymn encompasses more than just the Son, or the church, but indeed ‘all 
creation’ and ‘all things.’ Walsh and Keesmaat conclude from this that there is here an implicit 
ecological ethic. All of creation finds redemption in Christ, and through Christ all things are 
reconciled to God.151 The cosmic significance is evident, again reflecting the apocalyptic 
 
145 Cf. Sumney, Colossians, 65; Bird, Colossians & Philemon, 52; Hamm, Philippians, Colossians, Philemon, 
173; Christopher R. Seitz, Colossians (Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2014), 95-97); Dunn, The Epistles to the Colossians 
and Philemon, 97.  
146 Foster, Colossians, 194; Markus Vinzent, Christ’s Resurrection in Early Christianity: And the Making of the 
New Testament (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2011), 46. Brian Walsh and Sylvia Keesmaat suggest that 
there might be anti-imperial connotations here, that Jesus is Lord, not Caesar. They consider this passage 
“subversive poetry” (Brian J. Walsh, and Sylvia C. Keesmaat, Colossians Remixed: Subverting the Empire 
(Downers Grove: IVP, 2004), 83-90).  
147 Michael Bird makes this argument central to his exegesis of this hymn (Bird, Colossians & Philemon, 49-52). 
This reflects what Paul says in 1 Cor. 15.45-47. Cf. Hamm, Philippians, Colossians, Philemon, 173.  
148 Wright, RSG, 240.  
149 Foster, Colossians, 178.  
150 Christopher Seitz similarly connects this hymn to Gen. (Seitz, Colossians, 94).  
151 Walsh and Keesmaat, Colossians Remixed, 112, 193. Cf. Col. 1.23.  
304 
 
conviction that creation, not restricted to anthropology, will be redeemed at the eschaton. 
Wright similarly interprets the creation theme in this hymn as insisting “that Jesus’ 
resurrection, as a one-off event, is an act not of the abolition of the original creation but of its 
fulfilment,”152 but unfortunately does not seem to see the significance of this as extending 
beyond the realm of anthropology. Jesus is the first born of all creation, not just the creation of 
human bodies. Though resurrection is not explicitly mentioned, it is implied and connected to 
the broader spectrum of Jewish eschatological hopes, especially that of the re-creation of the 
cosmos and the exaltation of Jesus to a position of authority.153  
1 Timothy 3.16 (late first century to mid second century CE) is another probable creedal 
formulation adopted by the author of 1 Timothy, which similarly demonstrates an interest in 
Jesus’ post-mortem existence without using explicit resurrection language while emphasizing 
his exaltation.154 The phrase, “vindicated in spirit,” has been interpreted as a reference to Jesus’ 
resurrection,155 but as with Philippians 2.6-11, this could be adopting the language of exaltation 
common in ancient Jewish eschatological hope. This is strengthened by the translation of 
πνεύματι as Jesus’ human spirit or spiritual nature rather than a reference to the Holy Spirit, as 
argued by Wright.156 Brice Martin argues that the σάρξ/πνεῦμα contrast is often used to 
distinguish between humans and the Holy Spirit (for example, Gen. 6.3; Joel 2.28; John 3.6; 
6.63; Acts 2.17; Rom. 1.3; 8.4-9, 12; Gal. 3.3; 4.29; 5.16; Phil. 3.3) and so it should be here 
understood as referring to the Holy Spirit, as in the NIV translation, “vindicated by the 
Spirit”.157 David MacLeod’s interpretation (and the NRSV translation) is preferred, that in his 
 
152 Wright, RSG, 239.  
153 Dunn also emphasizes the creation theme (Dunn, The Epistles to the Colossians and Philemon, 86, 98).  
154 On this passage as an earlier confession, cf. Robert W. Wall, 1 & 2 Timothy and Titus (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 2012), 114.  
155 David J. MacLeod, “Christology in Six Lines: An Exposition of 1 Timothy 3:16,” BSac 159, no. 635 (2002), 
340; Clay Ham, “The Christ Hymn in 1 Timothy 3:16,” Stone-Campbell Journal 3, no. 2 (2000), 224; Wright, 
RSG, 270.  
156 Wright, RSG, 271.  
157 Brice L. Martin, “1 Timothy 3:16: A New Perspective,” EvQ 85, no. 2 (2013), 114. This might reflect a similar 
tradition to Rom. 1.4. 
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fleshly ‘sphere,’ he was lowly, weak, and murdered, yet in his spiritual ‘sphere,’ he was 
vindicated and his claim to be the Christ was validated.158 The implicit contrast is then between 
Jesus’ humiliation ‘in the flesh’ and his subsequent exaltation ‘in spirit.’ This exaltation is then 
further stressed in his appearance to angels, which seems to suggest the presentation of a 
glorified Christ before the heavenly host.159 We find in these deutero-Pauline epistles the 
interpretation of Jesus’ resurrection as functioning as the fulfilment within contingent history 
of the broad spectrum of Jewish eschatological hopes, particularly that of exaltation and the 
inauguration of a new reality, and believers are invited to experience these fulfilled hopes in 
the present.  
Similarly, 1 Peter speaks of resurrection in terms of Jesus’ exaltation to a position of glory and 
the believers’ experience of this glorification in the present. The author claims that God ‘has 
given us a new birth into a living hope through the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead’ 
(1 Pet. 1.3), a new creation motif found elsewhere in the New Testament (John 3.3, 7; Rom. 
8.14-17; 2 Cor. 5.15; Titus 3.5), demonstrating the transformation that was associated with 
Jesus’ post-mortem existence.160 The transformation signifies the inauguration of a new age, 
which is why the author draws out the saving significance of this event. As Vinzent comments, 
“The Resurrection is the moment when the future is being mediated to us.”161 Put differently, 
through Jesus’ post-mortem existence, a new world order and reality has entered history in 
which the faithful may enter through identifying themselves in Jesus’ death and resurrection 
 
158 MacLeod, “Christology in Six Lines,” 341-42. So argues Ham, “The Christ Hymn in 1 Timothy 3:16,” 224. 
159 Ibid., 342-43; Ham, “The Christ Hymn in 1 Timothy 3:16,” 225-228. Ham argues that the aorist passive ὤφθη 
followed by a dative is often used to refer an appearance of the resurrected Christ (e.g. Luke 24.34; Acts 9.17; 1 
Cor. 14.5), thereby connecting this text to the resurrection motif. However, there are several instances where this 
is used apart from the risen Jesus (e.g. Matt. 17.3; Mark 9.4; Luke 1.11; Acts 7.2; Rev. 11.19) and is, hence, not 
unique to the resurrection tradition.  
160 Joel B. Green, 1 Peter (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2007), 26. Donald Senior 
notes that the verb ἀναγεννήσας, that appears only here and in v.23, places the emphasis on the activity of God 
and so a better translation should be, ‘(God) has begotten us anew’ (Donald P. Senior, 1 Peter (Minnesota: The 
Liturgical Press, 2003), 30).  
161 Vinzent, Christ’s Resurrection in Early Christianity, 47. Cf. Green, 1 Peter, 28.  
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(3.21-22). Jesus has been elevated to a place of authority and privilege within this new reality 
through his resurrection (1.21; 3.21-22), a theme consistent with various other traditions, as we 
have already seen. The author of 1 Peter interprets Jesus’ post-mortem existence in terms of 
exaltation and new creation, extending well beyond the reanimation of his personal body, and 
in which we may participate through identification with Jesus’ death and resurrection.  
Gospel of Peter 
The final text for analysis is the extra-canonical Gospel of Peter (mid second century CE), the 
only text to actually describe the resurrection itself, as opposed to narrating only the empty 
tomb or appearance traditions. Gospel of Peter 10.34-42 demonstrates the malleability of the 
notion of resurrection and the diversity of early interpretations of Jesus’ post-mortem existence. 
It is, furthermore, despite being significantly different to the canonical Easter accounts, another 
good example of how ‘resurrection’ should not be reduced to no more than a personal 
reanimation and how the early Christian communities understood Jesus’ post-mortem existence 
as, in and of itself, the fulfilment of a broad spectrum of ancient Jewish eschatological hopes. 
Hence, there is both continuity and discontinuity with ordinary reality in the description of the 
risen Jesus: it is still the same, recognizable Jesus, emerging from the tomb within which he 
was buried, and yet there are radical transformation and significant eschatological connotations 
that extend well beyond a personal body.  
It is worth quoting this passage in full: 
Early in the morning, when the Sabbath dawned, there came a crowd from Jerusalem and the country 
round about to see the sealed sepulchre. Now in the night in which the Lord’s day dawned, when the 
soldiers were keeping guard, two by two in each watch, there was a loud voice in heaven, and they saw 
the heavens open and two men come down from there in a great brightness and draw near to the 
sepulchre. That stone which had been laid against the entrance to sepulchre started of itself to roll and 
move sidewards, and sepulchre was opened and both young men entered. When those soldiers saw this, 
they awakened the centurion and the elders, for they also were there to mount guard. And while they 
were narrating what they had seen they saw three men come from the sepulchre, two of them 
supporting the other and a cross following them and the heads of the two reaching to heaven, but that 
of him who was being led reached beyond the heavens. And they heard a voice out of the heavens 
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crying, ‘Have you preached to those who sleep?’ and from the cross there was heard the answer, 
‘Yes.’162 
There are several curiosities in this passage, but of particular interest is the depiction of a giant 
Jesus, his head reaching beyond the heavens, and a walking and talking cross which – despite 
there being no mention of it being buried in the tomb – follows Jesus and the heavenly men out 
of the tomb. This rather strange passage is without parallel in early Christian literature, which 
Paul Foster describes as “a popularizing version of the crucifixion and resurrection” and “is 
not theologically sophisticated.”163 In Wright’s attempt to present Jesus’ risen nature as bodily 
and ‘robustly physical,’ he dismisses the resurrection account in the Gospel of Peter, insisting 
that “it is impossible to tell with any precision what precisely the author…believed about the 
nature of Jesus’ resurrection body,” and the Gospel “remains an enigma, but an enigma which 
need not materially affect our assessment of the four major accounts of Jesus’ resurrection.”164 
This is another instance of Wright reverting to a (soft) foundationalist empiricism, essentially 
arguing that if we cannot know what the author of a particular text believed, then it is of very 
little value.165 Both Foster and Wright overstate the case. Indeed the passage is perplexing and 
without parallel, and is all the more curious considering that there are very few instances of the 
miraculous in the rest of the Gospel, but it is worth consideration as it sheds further light on 
the diversity of opinions regarding Jesus’ post-mortem existence in the early Christian 
communities. 
Against Foster, who maintains that the curiosities of this passage (especially the walking, 
talking cross) are creative innovation,166 Deane Galbraith observes that the rest of the Gospel 
is relatively conservative, only building upon miraculous events already introduced by 
 
162 As translated by J. K. Elliott, The Apocryphal New Testament: A Collection of Apocryphal Christian Literature 
in an English Translation (Oxford: OUP, 1993), 156-57.  
163 Paul Foster, “The Gospel of Peter,” ExpTim 118, no. 7 (2007), 323.  
164 Wright, RSG, 596.  
165 One might, furthermore, criticize Wright for ignoring passages which do not fit, or cannot be made to fit, within 
his prior theological convictions regarding the resurrection.  
166 Paul Foster, “Do Crosses Walk and Talk? A Reconsideration of Gospel of Peter 10.39-42,” JTS 64, no. 1 
(2013), 100-01.  
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Matthew.167 Mark Goodacre floated the idea (he is careful to note that this not a concrete 
proposal) that at some point during the process of copying this text, a copyist or scribe 
incorrectly wrote σταυρὸν (‘cross’) where the original was σταυροθεντα (‘crucified’), so that 
originally it was not the cross, but Jesus – the crucified one – who came walking out of the 
tomb. The two men were not physically holding him up, but were simply leading him out.168 
Foster argues against this interpretation, noting that the proposed change would see Jesus being 
present in two places at once – both with and following the other men – and that there are 
examples of inanimate objects being brought into motion earlier in Gospel of Peter (6.21; 
9.37).169 Hans-Josef Klauck argues that the angelic men surely cannot be supporting Jesus for 
he is much taller than they are, and maintains that the cross is a symbol for the crucified 
Jesus.170  
The interpretation which makes the most sense of this passage is that of Galbraith, who argues 
that this passage is a Christocentric interpretation of LXX Psalm 18.1-7. When the Gospel of 
Peter has made changes to the story of Jesus’ life and fate, these changes are subtle and drawn 
from Christocentric interpretations of the Hebrew Bible. For example, Gospel of Peter 2.5 and 
5.15 draw on Deuteronomy 21.23 (that the sun should not set on an executed person), and uses 
Isaiah 59 in Gospel of Peter 3.6, 5.15, and 5.18 (that Jesus’ scourging occurred ‘on the run’ 
rather than stationary as in Matt. 27.26-30). Hence, we can assume that when the author departs 
from the canonical Gospels, such as in the resurrection narrative, it is likely that a passage from 
the Hebrew Bible is being recalled. In this instance, it could well be that the resurrection in 
Gospel of Peter 10.39-42 reflects LXX Psalm 18.1-7, which was interpreted elsewhere as 
 
167 Deane Galbraith, “Whence the Giant Jesus and his Talking Cross? The Resurrection in Gospel of Peter 10.39-
42 as Prophetic Fulfilment of LXX Psalm 18,” NTS 63, no. 3 (2017), 476.  
168 Mark Goodacre, “A Walking, Talking Cross or the Walking, Talking Crucified One?” NT Blog, October 2010 
(http://ntweblog.blogspot.com/2010/10/walking-talking-cross-or-walking.html).  
169 Foster, “Do Crosses Walk and Talk?” 96-102. Cf. idem., “The Gospel of Peter,” 322; John Dominic Crossan, 
Four Other Gospels: Thomas, Egerton, Secret Mark, Peter (Sonoma: Polebridge, 1992), 116-22. 
170 Hans-Josef Klauck, Apocryphal Gospels: An Introduction (London: T&T Clark, 2003), 86.  
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Christocentric prophecy (Rom. 10.18; 1 Apol. 40; Dial. 64; Ref. 8.10). Jesus’ exit from the 
tomb and expansion to heaven is an interpretation of the groom departing his bridal chamber 
and ascending to heaven (LXX Ps. 18.5-7) and the two heavenly speeches, from God and from 
the cross, are an interpretation of the speeches from the heavens and the firmament (LXX Ps. 
18.2).171 
For the present purposes of this thesis, Gospel of Peter illuminates three things in particular. 
First, Jesus’ post-mortem existence is interpreted within an ancient Jewish eschatological 
framework, in this instance probably reflecting a Christocentric interpretation of LXX Psalm 
18.1-7, which had broader cosmic connotations. Hence, second, ‘resurrection’ is again not 
understood simply in terms of a personal re-animated body. Indeed, Jesus comes walking out 
of the tomb, but does so as a giant with his head beyond the clouds. Third, this passage is 
significantly different to the canonical narratives and, as such, demonstrates the diversity of 
interpretations of Jesus’ post-mortem existence. The Gospel of Peter joins the other later 
resurrection traditions of the Gospel of John, Hebrews, the Deutero-Pauline epistles, and 1 
Peter in suggesting that Jesus’ post-mortem existence had developed within the communal 
memory of the early communities of the Jesus movement, interacting with presupposed 
theological categories and frameworks, and was interpreted as the fulfilment of a broad 
spectrum of eschatological hope.  
Reflections on the Later Traditions 
The later texts reveal that interpretation of Jesus’ post-mortem existence had developed 
significantly from the earlier texts, and though there are similarities and common motifs, this 
development was not uniform. This development is significant for a PCR interpretation of the 
resurrection, and I here emphasize the re-interpretation of Jesus’ post-mortem existence within 
 
171 Galbraith, “Whence the Giant Jesus and his Talking Cross?” 478-91. 
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a new context in which the Parousia is delayed (acknowledging the development and re-
interpretation in changing contexts reflects the PCR integration of recent social memory 
theories). A generation or two after the initial – thoroughly apocalyptic – interpretations of the 
resurrection, the Christian community was forced to re-interpret this event which was so 
wrapped up in the coming of the fulfilment of the eschatological hopes in light of the 
observation of this potentially indefinite delay.  Yet they did not postpone these hopes to the 
indefinite future, but insisted that Jesus’ resurrection itself was the fulfilment of these hopes. 
Of particular importance for the present thesis is a) the recognition that though the Jewish 
category of resurrection was presupposed in these traditions, Jesus’ post-mortem existence was 
described in a variety of ways, particularly emphasizing his exaltation, and b) that this event 
constitutes the fulfilment of these eschatological hopes within contingent history and invites 
believers to experience this in the present, as opposed to the earlier traditions of viewing Jesus’ 
resurrection as the initiation of these hopes which were being, or would shortly be, fulfilled. In 
particular, the themes of new creation, justice, and exaltation are encompassed within the 
framework of resurrection, themes that are, notably, present within the traditions that do not 
explicitly adopt resurrection language. This demonstrates that the event was interpreted as 
having to do with a broader spectrum of ancient Jewish eschatology, an event only accessible 
to the historian through the varied frameworks utilized by the early Christians to describe an 
event that they ultimately could not fully comprehend, but which appeared to be the fulfilment 
of eschatological hope.  
These later traditions exhibit a much less apocalyptic character, instead viewing the 
eschatological hopes as having been already fulfilled, becoming increasingly focused upon the 
experience of Jesus’ glorification in the present, and believers’ participation in this glorification 
and in the inaugurated new reality. It was in Jesus’ post-mortem existence, then, that the Jewish 
eschatological hopes found their fulfilment. This is what John meant by Jesus’ claim to be the 
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resurrection and the life, and locating Jesus’ resurrection in a paradisiacal Edenic garden, 
saturated in the creation motif. This new creation is similarly reflected in 1 Peter’s language of 
new birth, connecting this with Jesus’ glorification and our participation in that glorification. 
The author of Hebrews is clearly aware of the tradition that Jesus rose from the dead, 
referencing it once, the general resurrection in another instance, and implying resurrection in 
several other instances, but focuses heavily on Jesus’ exaltation, his elevation to a position of 
honour and authority. The deutero-Pauline epistles make no explicit mention of resurrection, 
speaking of Jesus’ post-mortem existence in terms of exaltation and our participation in that 
glorification. The Gospel of Peter diverges from the canonical gospels but nevertheless 
interprets Jesus’ post-mortem existence in light of a Christocentric interpretation of LXX Psalm 
18.1-7. Hence, the later communities reflect a spread of interpretation very similar to that of 
the early traditions, but in these instances, the fulfilment of eschatological promise has already 
occurred and is available in the immediate present, rather than something that has initiated this 
fulfilment to become available shortly. Within this broader eschatological framework, 
‘resurrection’ should not, therefore, be limited to the reanimation of a personal body, and is 
characterised by both continuity and discontinuity with ordinary reality.  
6.6. The Risen Jesus and the Unification of Heaven and Earth 
This chapter has traced the development of resurrection theology in the early and diverse 
communities of the Jesus movement, and has demonstrated that Jesus’ post-mortem existence 
was described in a variety of ways which were encompassed within the category of 
‘resurrection.’ This presupposed interpretative framework, drawn from ancient Jewish 
eschatology, was intertwined with the communal memory of this event, with two themes 
becoming particularly evident: that Jesus’ post-mortem existence functioned as the fulfilment 
of the ‘resurrection of the dead,’ which encompassed within itself a broad spectrum of 
312 
 
eschatological hopes, and, as such, that the redemption of creation and the inauguration of a 
new reality had arrived, a reality that extends well beyond a personal reanimation.  
This new reality is best characterised by a dialectical tension between continuity and 
discontinuity with empirical reality, for which the image of a new heaven and a new earth – 
understood as a unification of the two – is the most helpful analogy, as explored in chapter five. 
If, therefore, Jesus’ post-mortem existence was described in terms of resurrection of the dead, 
encompassing an extensive array of ancient Jewish eschatological expectations, we can 
subsequently understand this event in terms of the unification of heaven and earth. The 
ambiguity of the attempts at describing Jesus’ risen body in 1 Corinthians 15 and the Easter 
narratives reflect the attempt to narrativize and personify, within the resurrection of Jesus, the 
fulfilment of this broad spectrum of eschatological hope. 
This dialectic tension is particularly evident in the ambiguous description of Jesus’ resurrected 
nature in the Gospels and 1 Corinthians 15. Chapter two explored some of the ways in which 
this ‘body’ has been described by scholars, with a clear dichotomy emerging: some, on the one 
hand, interpret this risen body in terms of a physical re-animated body and an event occurring 
within contingent history, stressing the continuity with empirical reality, whereas others 
interpret it in terms of a ‘spiritual’ and immaterial body, and a suprahistorical event, stressing 
the discontinuity with empirical reality. Neither succeeds in accommodating both the continuity 
and discontinuity with empirical reality evident in the New Testament witness. The following 
will explore the ambiguity of the portrayals of the nature of the risen Jesus, as depicted in the 
New Testament texts (reflecting, in turn, the ambiguity of the resurrected reality in Jewish 
eschatology; cf. §5.2), depicting a risen Jesus who bears both continuity and discontinuity with 
ordinary reality, both of which must be held in dialectical tension. The resurrection of Jesus is 
the fulfilment of a broad spectrum of Jewish eschatological hope, inaugurating a new reality 
that transforms and redeems the present creation without disbanding it.  
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Continuity and Discontinuity in the New Testament 
As noted above, in §6.2, Paul interprets Jesus’ post-mortem existence in 1 Corinthians 15 in 
terms of the Jewish eschatological category of ‘resurrection of the dead,’ viewing this event as 
not solely Jesus’ re-animated body, but as in some way inseparably bound up with the themes 
of creation, justice, and redemption. When addressing the issue of what sort of ‘body’ this 
would entail, his description is confoundingly vague, seemingly scrambling for an appropriate 
analogy and falling short.172 It seems likely that in this risen nature, there is both continuity and 
discontinuity with empirical reality, that creation is re-affirmed yet radically transformed, and 
though Paul uses the language of ‘body,’ he is well aware that this description is only an 
approximation.  
It was mentioned in §5.3 that a central impetus for the Corinthians’ rejection of the resurrection 
is their issue with a physical, bodily resurrection, and yet Paul does not outright or explicitly 
refute this. What he does refute is their assumption that there is no resurrection of the dead, 
that since Jesus has been raised, so too then will the faithful.173 However, despite the insistence 
that Jesus’ risen body was a model of the type of body believers would receive, there is 
considerable ambiguity in Paul’s description of this body.174 If Paul was strictly refuting the 
Corinthians’ disbelief in a physical, bodily resurrection, it is surprising that he has not described 
a physical risen body, or to reassure them that this body is immaterial. As has been argued, 
Paul’s concern, reflecting the Jewish tradition of connecting resurrection with re-creation, is 
 
172 Finney notes, “That [Paul] is struggling to articulate the transition of life to afterlife is evident in the twisted 
changing similes that follow,” (Finney, Resurrection, Hell and the Afterlife, 111). Cf. Carnley, The Structure of 
Resurrection Belief, 115-16.  
173 Cf. Brodeur, The Holy Spirit’s Agency in the Resurrection of the Dead, 17; Montague, First Corinthians, 269.  
174 Smith, Revisiting the Empty Tomb, 32; Bailey, Paul Through Mediterranean Eyes, 465. Bailey does, however, 
insist upon an embodiment not much different to the present body, citing the empty tomb tradition despite Paul 
never referring to an empty tomb.   
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that this eschatological resurrected reality would consist of an entirely new existence and 
therefore entails radical transformation.  
What is important here is that Paul is not arguing that the resurrection is wholly other or 
discontinuous with ordinary reality. The resurrected reality transcends the categories of ‘body,’ 
‘physical,’ or ‘spiritual,’ and has, rather, transformed into something new that nevertheless 
came out of the old, which is the point of the analogy of the seed.175 Hence Paul’s enigmatic 
descriptor, σῶμα πνευματικόν (‘spiritual body’), which is the logical extension of his 
understanding of a transformed reality. On the one hand, this ‘spiritual body’ invariably is not 
something comparable to present physicality, for he says in v.50 that flesh and blood cannot 
inherit the kingdom of God; this body is free from the constraints of material corporeality.176 
Brian Schmisek argues that the term ‘spiritual body’ was an oxymoron, that πνεῦμα and σῶμα 
were contradictory terms. The former is, in Greek parlance, immaterial (cf. 2 Cor. 2.13; Rom. 
1.9) and the latter material. In so doing, “Paul comes closest to speaking of the mystery of the 
resurrection,” that is, the appropriate language to express what Paul had encountered eluded 
him, and so he instead attempted to express the Jewish notion of resurrection in Hellenistic 
terms.177  
On the other hand, what is not envisaged is an immaterial existence. There is continuity 
between the two types of realities, in the same way that there is continuity between the plant 
and the seed.178 If Paul were proposing an entirely immaterial existence, it is surprising that he 
 
175 Habermas and Licona argue that Paul implies a physical, bodily resurrection, that “what goes down in burial, 
comes up in resurrection” (Habermas and Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus, 155). This is drastically 
overstating the case, for Paul’s argument in the analogy of the seed sprouting into a plant is that what comes up is 
precisely not what goes down, but actually comes up significantly different. Granted, there is considerable 
continuity, but the plant remains distinct to the seed. 
176 Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 225. 
177 Brian Schmisek, “The “Spiritual Body” as Oxymoron in 1 Corinthians 15:44,” BTB 45, no. 4 (2015), 230-36. 
Cf. Jerry L. Sumney, “Post-Mortem Existence and Resurrection of the Body in Paul,” HBT 31, no. 1 (2009), 17-
18. 
178 Paul similarly expresses this new type of body in Phil. 3.20-21, where again he does not show contempt for 
the present body, that despite radical transformation, it is the same person which is changed. Cf. Brian Schmisek, 
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compares πνευματικόν with ψυχικόν, which itself does not inherently imply physicality. Surely 
σαρκικός would have been better if this was the comparison he was attempting to make. What 
Paul is contrasting is, in James Ware’s language, two “modes of existence in this same body.”179 
James Dunn understands these adjectives as the body’s life force, ψυχικόν limited to the 
present, physical life.180 For Wright, Paul is speaking about what animates the body, with the 
risen body being animated by the indwelling Spirit of God,181 and that this body remains 
“robustly physical.”182 
However, Paul’s description of Jesus’ post-mortem existence is overly ambiguous to ascertain 
anything definitive, but the transformation that Paul depicts is far too intensive and radical to 
reduce this to simply what animates a ‘physical’ body. Joseph Smith’s critique of Wright’s 
interpretation is accurate, that Wright has not adequately recognized how radical the 
transformation is, that language of physicality is inappropriate, for Paul does not envisage a 
new type of physicality, but an entirely new reality.183 To reduce the risen nature to a physicality 
is to ignore the analogies that Paul has employed to suggest both continuity and discontinuity: 
a seed to the plant (15.37), the many different types of bodies (15.38-41), perishability to 
imperishability (15.42), dishonour to glory, weakness to power (15.43), natural to spiritual 
(15.44), the man of dust and the man from heaven (15.45-49). Paul uses of a variety of imagery 
in his attempt to express a new reality that is essentially sui generis; this transformed reality (a 
reality which exceeds the limitations of present categories, such as the language of ‘body’) is 
 
“The Body of His Glory: Resurrection Imagery in Philippians 3:20-21,” Biblical Theological Bulletin 43, no. 1 
(2013), 26.  
179 James Ware, “Paul’s Understanding of the Resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15:36-54,” JBL 133, no. 4 (2014), 
832. Ware claims that this body is, however, one composed of flesh and bones.  
180 James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 77-78.  
181 Wright, RSG, 352. Cf. C. K. Barrett, A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians (London: 
Hendrickson, 1968), 372; Witherington III, Conflict & Community in Corinth, 308-09.  
182 Wright, RSG, 477-78.  




characterised by the dialectical tension between continuity and discontinuity with empirical 
reality. 
The ambiguity of Jesus’ risen nature is present in the Easter narratives of the Gospels, where it 
is the same person but radically transformed. On the one hand, the risen Jesus can be touched 
and bears the wounds inflicted upon his pre-crucifixion body (Matt. 28.9; Luke 24.39-40; John 
20.20, 27), he could eat fish (Luke 24.43), had breath (John 20.22), and was not a ‘ghost’ (Luke 
24.39). Despite this, there are significant peculiarities about this Jesus. He could ‘suddenly’ 
appear among them, sometimes despite locked doors (Matt. 28.9; Luke 24.36; John 20.19, 26), 
was not immediately recognized (Luke 24.16; John 20.14-15; 21.4, 12), would vanish (Luke 
24.31), some of the witnesses doubted, despite their joy and worship (Matt. 28.17; Luke 24.41), 
was carried into heaven (Luke 24.51; Acts 1.9-10), and his appearance bears similarities with 
theophanies, causing fear and providing reassurance (Matt. 28.10; Luke 24.36-37; John 20.19). 
Jesus’ risen nature is described as being the same and yet entirely different.  
For Pannenberg, “The appearances reported in the Gospels…have such a strongly legendary 
character that one can scarcely find a historical kernel of their own in them.”184 As observed in 
chapter four, this reflects the impossible desire of separating the ‘authentic’ history from the 
myth, but his insistence that these narratives are so infused with legend is persuasive, and one 
of the tasks of this chapter has been to trace the interaction between memory of the event and 
the presupposed eschatological framework of resurrection of the dead. The very description of 
the risen Jesus demonstrates the early propensity to interpret Jesus’ post-mortem existence in 
light of the Jewish eschatological hope for resurrection and the renewal of creation, one where 
creation is simultaneously affirmed and radically transformed.  
 
184 Pannenberg, JGM, 83. 
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I won’t here repeat the arguments outlined in chapter two put forward by those stressing either 
the continuity or discontinuity of the risen body, but will highlight Wright’s solution to this 
ambiguity, which he labels as the ‘strange portrait of Jesus’: 
The stories exhibit…exactly that surface tension which we associate, not with tales artfully told by 
people eager to sustain a fiction and therefore anxious to make everything look right, but with the 
hurried, puzzled accounts of those who have seen with their own eyes something which took them 
horribly by surprise and with which they have not yet fully come to terms.185 
In other words, the Easter stories portray the attempts at narrativizing an event which was not 
fully understood or comprehended, hence the inclusion of seemingly contradictory 
descriptions.186 I would agree, but to a point. Rather than saying that they had no 
comprehension of what occurred and were simply recording history, or at least accounts of 
history that had been circulating in the early Christian community, I would argue that they did 
indeed have some sense of what happened but lacked the language to adequately describe it.187 
Similar to my argument above in §6.2 regarding the notion that this had been predicted in 
Scripture, the fact that the category of ‘resurrection of the dead’ had been applied to Jesus’ 
post-mortem existence indicates that the early Christians were not merely recounting, but 
interpreting, this event. Hence, as in 1 Corinthians 15, the presence of these antithetical 
elements of the risen Jesus reflects attempts at describing this new eschatological reality, 
affirming the same Jesus while asserting his radical transformation; both continuity and 
discontinuity must be upheld. 
 
185 Wright, RSG, 612.  
186 Wright’s argument is bolstered by his emphasis upon the lack of scriptural reflection in these narratives, which 
I contested above in §5.4. Furthermore, for Wright, the presence of the women in the narratives attest to their 
historical reliability, for it is unlikely that a manufactured story would include women, who were deemed 
unreliable witnesses. This is reinforced by Luke’s statement that the women’s retelling of the empty tomb was 
considered an ‘idle tale’ by the disciples (Luke 24.11) (Wright, RSG, 607-08. Cf. David Lyle Jeffrey, Luke (Grand 
Rapids: Brazos, 2012), 283; Smith, “N.T. Wright’s Understanding of the Nature of Jesus’ Risen Body,” 53). There 
is truth to this, but I would add that it was likely not simply because of who was recounting the resurrection that 
caused the incredulous response from the disciples, but the what. The presence of, and response to, the women 
adds to the utter strangeness of the story.  
187 For Joseph Smith, Wright’s assessment is undermined by his failure to appreciate the radical transformation of 
Jesus’ body (Smith, “N.T. Wright’s Understanding of the Nature of Jesus’ Risen Body,” 54).  
318 
 
Though Wright insists that this new nature is “robustly physical,” his proposal of 
‘transphysicality’ is a step in the right direction toward understanding this dialectical tension 
within the risen Jesus. In the neologism, ‘transphysicality,’ Wright refers to transformed 
physicality. He claims that this term “puts a label on the demonstrable fact that the early 
Christians envisaged a body which was still robustly physical but also significantly different 
from the present one.”188 The significant new characteristic of the new resurrected nature, in 
comparison to the old, is that it will no longer be corruptible, and that, furthermore, rather than 
claiming that it is no longer, or any less, physical, it is now indeed more physical, in the sense 
that it finally becomes what it was initially intended at its original creation.189 Indeed, Wright 
should be commended for acknowledging a significant transformation, but his problem remains 
in his retention of the notion of physicality and assuming the reanimation of a personal, 
corporeal body. In so doing, the discontinuity of Jesus’ risen nature from his pre-crucifixion 
body is minimized for, according to Wright, it is merely the same corporeal physical body with 
an upgrade.190 To be fair to Wright, it is precisely here that he comes closer than most to 
upholding both the continuous and discontinuous elements; this ‘transformed physicality’ 
remains the same body but is animated by the Spirit. However, I contend that both Paul and 
the Evangelists envisaged a reality so radically transformed that the category of physicality is 
no longer appropriate, and that the language of ‘body’ is only a limited and approximate 
metaphor; Wright’s ‘transphysicality’ does not allow for how intensive this transformation 
was. The opposite, however, is not true either, that Jesus’ risen nature has become entirely 
immaterial and incorporeal, for such categories are similarly inappropriate. The elements of 
continuity and discontinuity must be upheld in dialectical tension; the resurrection transcends 
 
188 Wright, RSG, 477-78. Christopher Bryan has proposed something similar, that the hope for resurrection was 
“not merely for restored physical life, but for a transfigured physical life” (Bryan, The Resurrection of the 
Messiah, 15). 
189 Ibid., 478. Cf. Wright, “Early Traditions and the Origins of Christianity,” 128.  
190 Cf. Joseph Smith, who argues that Paul remains noncommittal regarding how ‘physical’ the resurrected body 
will be (Smith, “N.T. Wright’s Understanding of the Nature of Jesus’ Risen Body,” 36-37).  
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these categories, functioning not simply as a reanimation, but as the fulfilment of a broad 
spectrum of Jewish eschatological hopes and as such the redemption of creation. This indeed 
would have included Jesus’ body, but only as one part of a much larger eschatological event. 
It is this much larger event which receives less than adequate attention when the language of 
‘resurrection’ is assumed to have primarily to do with the reanimation of a personal body. In 
light of all of this, it seems to me that the analogy of the new heavens and earth, which as seen 
in §5.3 meant the unification of heaven and earth and thus the enabling of unhindered 
relationship between God and his humanity, is the most helpful imagery for the risen Jesus.  
6.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the notion of Jesus’ resurrection in light of the findings of chapter 
five regarding the ancient Jewish eschatological category of ‘resurrection of the dead,’ and I 
have here demonstrated that Jesus’ post-mortem existence was understood as the fulfilment of 
a broad spectrum of eschatological expectations. This is especially evident in the claim that 
Jesus rose from the dead on, or after, the ‘third day’ (a cultural motif implying an event of 
special significance) and in accordance with the Scriptures (not a specific scriptural passage or 
prophecy, but the broader eschatological hope of the Hebrew Scriptures in general). This 
cannot be limited to the reanimation of a personal body but includes the glorification and 
exaltation of the martyred Jesus, a renewal and recreation of reality – not just of Jesus’ body, 
but, in some sense, of the cosmos in general – and the inauguration of a new eschatological age 
where divine justice is prevalent. Accordingly, the various New Testament depictions of Jesus’ 
resurrected reality are profoundly ambiguous, and I have argued from this that this new reality 
is characterised by both continuity and discontinuity with ordinary reality, maintained in a 
dialectical tension. That is, it is still the same Jesus who is recognizable and touchable, and 
who lived within contingent history, but is nevertheless very different and who personifies the 
fulfilment of the eschatological hopes expected at the eschaton. It is precisely this tension that 
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general scholarship has not adequately acknowledged, along with its assumption that 
resurrection solely, or primarily, envisages personal reanimation (as highlighted in chapter 
two). This is the very tension raised by Paul in his analogy of a seed growing into a plant and 
the seemingly confused picture of the risen Christ in the Gospels; it is vital that both the 
continuous and discontinuous elements of Jesus’ post-mortem existence must be upheld. The 
resurrection includes Jesus’ personal body, but is much more than this. 
Following the PCR framework proposed in §4.4, I have here attempted to explore the 
interaction between prior frameworks of understanding (in this instance, of the ancient Jewish 
eschatological category of ‘resurrection’) and the memory and developing interpretation of the 
external event of Jesus’ post-mortem existence in new and evolving contexts (particularly the 
growing realization that the Parousia was indefinitely delayed). Bearing the bilateral nature of 
knowledge in mind, it is necessary to acknowledge this interaction; it is impossible to ascertain 
the brute facts of ‘what happened’ for we only have access to the recording of the interpretation 
of this event, a recording which is invariably clouded by the subjectivity of the author, but we 
can still affirm the intelligibility of the external event which nevertheless has its own inherent 
meaning. It is similarly necessary to understand the categories which were applied to this event 
and through which this event was understood.  
Regarding the interpretation of Jesus’ resurrection, this entails the analysis of the development 
of the interpretation of the resurrection within the evolving contexts of the early communities 
of the Jesus movement, and the interaction between this developing interpretation and the 
presupposed framework of the ancient Jewish eschatological notion of resurrection. We have 
seen in this chapter that from the early traditions to the later, Jesus’ post-mortem existence was 
seen as inseparably connected to a broad array of eschatological expectations, but where the 
early traditions viewed Jesus’ post-mortem existence as part of, or the beginning of, the 
fulfilment of these expectations, the later traditions viewed this event, in and of itself, as the 
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fulfilment of these expectations. Therefore, Jesus’ post-mortem existence should not be reduced 
to no more than personal reanimation and, as the fulfilment of the hope for both the renewal 
and transformation of creation, this event constitutes the unification of both continuity and 
discontinuity with empirical reality, the unification of heaven and earth (reflected in the 
ambiguous description of the nature of the risen Jesus).  
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Excursus: The Future in the Now 
The fact that the eschatological category of ‘resurrection from the dead’ was applied to Jesus’ 
post-mortem existence indicates that the early Christian community considered this event the 
fulfilment of a vast array of eschatological expectations, and of particular significance was the 
belief that in this event, the cosmos has been both renewed and re-created. However, as 
depicted in 1 Corinthians 15 and the Easter narratives of the Gospels, this new creation is not 
the eradication of the old. As with the new heavens and new earth imaged in Isaiah 65.17, 2 
Peter 3.13, and Revelation 21.1, this new creation is characterised by both continuity and 
discontinuity with empirical reality.1 Hence, Jesus’ resurrection is the embodiment of the 
fulfilment of the Jewish eschatological hopes for a renewed creation – the unification of heaven 
and earth – which thereby explains the ambiguity of the descriptions of the risen Jesus.  
The significant problem remains, however, that though this event was interpreted as the 
fulfilment of the hopes that were expected to occur at the eschaton, the contingency of history 
invariably continued. It is for this reason, as explored in chapter two, that many scholars, 
particularly Barth, argued that this event was suprahistorical, that its eschatological character 
inhibited it from being considered an event within contingent history, at least analogous with 
other historical events. As was argued, this overemphasizes the discontinuous nature of Jesus’ 
resurrection at the expense of its continuity with empirical reality. As with the dichotomy 
between ‘physical’ and ‘spiritual,’ as far as such categories can be applied to Jesus’ risen 
nature, it is necessary to balance both continuity and discontinuity, as it pertains to the 
contingent historicity of this event, in dialectical tension. In other words, how can it be possible 
that what is expected at the end of contingent history has already occurred within contingent 
 
1 Wright does not explicitly connect the resurrection with the imagery of the new/unified heavens and earth, but 
he does state, “Heaven and earth, after all, are the twin partners in the creation which, at the heart of the passage 
Paul has in mind throughout [1 Cor. 15], the creator has declared to be ‘very good’” (Wright, RSG, 355).  
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history? It is at this particular junction that Pannenberg’s notion of anticipation is helpful. The 
following will explore this notion, proposing a moderate version of Pannenberg’s anticipation 
as a possible solution to this difficult question.  
It should be noted that this section is a slight digression from the central argument of this thesis 
that the notion of ‘resurrection’ should not be assumed to envisage only the reanimation of a 
personal, corporeal body. However, the question of how we might understand the fulfilment 
within contingent history of hopes expected for the eschaton is nevertheless connected to the 
thesis argument. To ignore this question is to ignore the broader theological implications of 
this thesis. For these reasons, the following discussion is included as an excursus rather than 
being incorporated within a particular chapter. 
For Pannenberg, knowledge is perpetually provisional due to the finitude of humanity, that 
truth is a process (rather than some finished, abstract, product) and is recognized proleptically.2 
Pannenberg’s use of Vorgriff (anticipation) is in contrast to, and a play on the word of Hegel’s 
Begriff (concept), which referred to the full conceptual understanding of all of reality wherein 
all things are known in their interrelatedness to all other things.3 Pannenberg places this Begriff 
in the future, at the eschaton, asserting that this can only be known provisionally, and in 
anticipation of its eventual demonstration in its totality. He argues: 
The meaning that we ascribe to the data of our own individual histories and to the events of social 
history depends on anticipation of the totality which is developing in history, i.e., on its future, and 





2 Pannenberg, “What is Truth?” vol. 2, 7. 
3 Ibid., 24. Cf. Raymond Plant, Hegel (London: Phoenix, 1997), 26; Ronald D. Pasquariello, “Pannenberg’s 
Philosophical Foundations,” JR 56, no. 4 (1976), 341. Begriff transcends vorstellung, which is the mere basis of 
knowledge, understanding things as they are in themselves. 
4 Pannenberg, Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 55. 
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Thus, regarding theological knowledge, “All the statements that we make about [the reality of 
God]…rest on anticipations of the totality of the world and therefore on the as yet non-existent 
future of its uncompleted history.”5  
Some have interpreted Pannenberg’s position as theological Hegelianism,6 such as Steiger, 
who, soon after the publication of Revelation as History, argued that Pannenberg adopted 
Hegel’s universal history uncritically, setting Hegel against the problems he saw in Bultmann 
and Barth without considering the problems with Hegel or the issues of knowledge within 
idealism.7 Though he concedes that some statements in Revelation as History may have implied 
Hegelianism, Pannenberg insists that the emphasis of his argument was to retain a modified 
idealistic view that all of history is the revelation of God, “relating it to biblical eschatology, 
to the end of history as the condition of its totality.”8 Pannenberg appropriated Hegel’s 
understanding of history, but modified it, integrating it with his understanding of biblical 
eschatology and relegating the meaning of history to the eschaton, thereby retaining an 
openness to the unknown future, a modification which for Don Olive decidedly separates him 
from Hegel.9 Clayton observes that “Pannenberg has rejected enough of Hegel and 
incorporated enough of others that the label “Hegelian” will not stick.”10 
 
5 Ibid., vol. 1, 55. Cf. Carlos Blanco, “God, the Future, and the Fundamentum of History in Wolfhart Pannenberg,” 
HeyJ 54, no. 2 (2013), 302.  
6 Cf. Grenz, Reason for Hope, 27; William C. Placher, “The Present Absence of Christ: Some Thoughts on 
Pannenberg and Moltmann,” Encounter 40, no. 2 (1979), 169; Clayton, “Anticipation and Theological Method,” 
132. Clayton claims, “One German introduction to theology…includes a chart of modern theologians, with a 
straight line linking Pannenberg to Hegel as the only influence!”  
7 Steiger, “Revelation-History and Theological Reason,” 87. To some extent, Paul Molnar levels a similar criticism 
against Pannenberg (Paul D. Molnar, Incarnation & Resurrection: Toward a Contemporary Understanding 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 295-97).  
8 Ibid., vol. 1, 229. Pannenberg wanted to return “to the idealistic thesis of all history as the revelation of God, but 
in such a way that the idealistic view of history undergoes decisive correction by the thought of the anticipation 
of the totality of history in the light of its end as we find this in the eschatological thrust of the teaching and work 
of Jesus. …The reshaping of the idealistic view of universal history by relating it to biblical eschatology, to the 
end of history as the condition of its totality, made it possible to abandon the restriction of the historical self-
demonstration of God to exceptional miraculous events.”  
9 Olive, Wolfhart Pannenberg, 44.  
10 Clayton, “Anticipation and Theological Method,” 133.  
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This notion of anticipation was developed early in his career, particularly in his Christology 
and interpretation of Jesus’ resurrection. Pannenberg argues that “the resurrection of Jesus is 
indeed infallibly the dawning of the end of history,” and this end of history has “been 
anticipatorily realized in [Jesus].”11 In other words, in Jesus’ resurrection, the eschaton has 
arrived, and, therefore, the ultimate meaning of history is fundamentally theological. If the 
resurrection constitutes the signalling of the end of contingent history, then the meaning of 
history has been revealed in anticipation of the future consummation, and the promises of God 
are now present. Hence, “All reality is referred to the future and is experienced as 
eschatologically oriented,” as God “leads history into a new future,”12 a future that is “powerful 
in the present.”13 
Here Pannenberg’s dialectic once again comes to the fore, and Mostert relates this concept of 
anticipation to the realized eschatology of the “Christian experience of the already and the not 
yet.”14 The future is still not yet realized, and contingent history is yet to find its ultimate 
meaning; yet the end of history has already dawned in the person of Jesus, and so God’s 
blessings, salvation, and kingdom are presently active and powerful. The notion of anticipation 
and prolepsis affirms that the meaning of individuals, history, and historical events is still 
outstanding, awaiting – and being guided toward –  future confirmation and consummation, 
despite this meaning having already been determined in the future, a meaning that is presently 
accessible, provisionally.15  
 
11 Pannenberg, “What is Truth?” 24.  
12 Wolfhart Pannenberg, “The God of Hope,” In BQT, vol. 2, trans. George H. Kelm (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press2008), 237. 
13 Ibid., 243. Cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Appearance as the Arrival of the Future,” JAAR 35, no. 2 (1967), 107-
18.  
14 Mostert, God and the Future, 113. Cf. Aaron Pyungchoon Park, “Christian Hope According to Bultmann, 
Pannenberg, and Moltmann,” WTJ 33, no. 2 (1971), 159. 
15 “Pannenberg understands the end of history, the ultimate, is present to every moment of history and that every 
moment of history is characterized by its anticipation of the ultimate” (Pasquariello, “Pannenberg’s Philosophical 
Foundations,” 346).  
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Yet this also has an ontological aspect. Drawing on German idealism, particularly the close 
connection between ontology and epistemology, Pannenberg argued that the meaning of a 
being is inseparable from its essence, and if meaning is determined in the future and recognized 
only in anticipation, a being exists anticipatorily, awaiting its ontological determination: “only 
the future decides what something is.”17 He states in Metaphysics and the Idea of God, “As 
long as the future is the source of the possible wholeness of an individual human existence, 
then we must say that its essence, and thus its “what it is,” are determined by its future.”18 
When this future is arrived upon, it bears “retroactive power” to determine what that essence 
had always been.19 
On the basis of this notion of anticipation, he can therefore conclude, “In a restricted but 
important sense, God does not yet exist.”20 This is overstating the case, for if we were to follow 
this logic then we would have no ground to say that anything truly exists. His point, however, 
should be clear: the future is open and unknown, history is incomplete, but is moving toward 
its completion, a completion which will illuminate and thus determine the present.21 There is 
tension between the past and future, but Pannenberg is neither a process theologian nor does 
he advocate for a determinism.22 Todd Labute encapsulates this tension best: “What something 
 
17 Pannenberg, JGM, 136. Cf. Pannenberg, ST, vol. 1, 223. Hiroshi Obayashi noted, “Pannenberg’s entire 
philosophy of history is preoccupied with the end of time as an ontological category” (Obayashi, “Future and 
Responsibility,” 193).  
18 Pannenberg, MIG, 87. Cf. Mostert, God and the Future, 116.  
19 Pannenberg, MIG, 105. Furthermore, “Things would then be what they are, substances, retroactively from the 
outcome of their becoming on the one hand, and on the other in the sense of anticipating the completion of their 
process of becoming, their history” (p. 107). Benjamin Meyers responded to those (such as Brian Walsh and Niels 
Henrik Gregersen) who have argued that Pannenberg’s ontology threatens ‘temporal difference,’ that salvation is 
more than an emancipation from finitude, by arguing that these critics ignored Pannenberg’s understanding of the 
differentiated parts, that his ontology was “was not of a totality that eliminates difference,” and that he sought “to 
articulate the unity between the particular and the whole” (Benjamin W. Meyers, “The Difference Totality Makes: 
Reconsidering Pannenberg’s Eschatological Ontology,” Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und 
Religionsphilosophie 49, no. 2 (2007), 149-51.  
20 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God (Philadelphia: WJK, 1977), 56.  
21 Cf. McClean, From the Future, 85; Olive, Wolfhart Pannenberg, 44.  
22 Todd Labute has effectively argued against the claim that Pannenberg adopts a process theology, arguing that 
process theology generally views the actual event as providing the determination of what it will become or will 
mean, whereas for Pannenberg the opposite is true: the actual events don’t carry the meaning in themselves, but 
receive that meaning from the future (Todd S. Labute, “The Ontological Motif of Anticipation in the Theology of 
Wolfhart Pannenberg,” JETS 37, no. 2 (1994), 279).  
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is now is not what it always will be. But what it ultimately becomes is what it always will have 
been.”23  
This tension was highlighted by Philip Clayton as problematic. Clayton argues that there are 
two senses of anticipation in Pannenberg’s metaphysics: the eschatological future breaking into 
contingent history at a particular point, namely the resurrection, and the openness of history 
which relies upon the contingency of history.24 These two distinct senses of anticipation require 
resolution. He further argues that the idealist framework, the tension between a deterministic 
and a process view of history, and the problems regarding human freedom in light of the end 
of contingent history already being manifest in Jesus’ resurrection, are problematic. While 
Clayton does not reject Pannenberg’s doctrine of anticipation outright, he urges hesitancy 
toward adopting or building upon such a system. Instead of a strong notion of anticipation, 
which presupposes an idealist framework – which “may be difficult to swallow for those not 
sympathetic to the idealist tradition”25 – Clayton advocates for a ‘weaker’ epistemological 
notion of anticipation, wherein the end of contingent history is not a given, but is that which 
makes faith possible, a hope in the coming judgment of God which enables faith in the 
present.26 
These issues raised by Clayton are, however, not particularly problematic when one takes into 
account the postfoundationalist dialectic imbedded within Pannenberg’s methodology.27 It is 
precisely Pannenberg’s reticence toward foundationalism which prohibits his privileging either 
the present or the future over the other, and enables his championing of this tension. 
 
23 Ibid., 281.  
24 Mostert agrees with Clayton (Mostert, God and the Future, 125).  
25 Clayton, “Anticipation and Theological Method,” 138.  
26 Ibid., 137-42. 
27 David Zehnder has argued that the tension between the past (and present) and future in Pannenberg’s 
eschatology “threaten[s] the logical coherence that his system requires as a universal, public theology.” I argue 
the contrary, that this tension is not as incongruent as Zehnder supposes, that Pannenberg’s epistemology leads 
inextricably toward the possibility of upholding this tension (David J. Zehnder, “The Origins and Limitations of 
Pannenberg’s Eschatology,” JETS 53, no. 1 (2010), 126-29.  
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Pannenberg responded to Clayton, arguing that this weaker notion of anticipation is unable “to 
express the truth claim that is inherent in the Christian affirmation that the God whose kingdom 
is still to come has been revealed definitively in the history and person of Jesus.”28 These two 
notions, he argued, belong together.29 Indeed, they must remain together, in tension, to make 
sense of the New Testament’s seemingly paradoxical proclamation that the arrival of God’s 
kingdom – and with it, salvation – was not merely a future event, but one that had come in the 
person of Jesus (i.e. the dialectical tension between continuity and discontinuity with ordinary 
reality).30 
The more significant issue for Pannenberg’s notion of anticipation – which was highlighted by 
Clayton but not given adequate attention – is the reliance upon a strong connection between 
ontology and epistemology. If a being’s essence is only determined by the revelation of its 
historical meaning, which lies in the unforeseen future, and if, therefore, this being does not 
yet, in some sense, exist, there is very little to distinguish between the ontic and noetic nature 
of this being. However, this is incongruous to the epistemology he presents, which was 
analysed in the previous chapter. Though he argues against the possibility of universal, absolute 
objectivity, he does retain a form of realism, seen particularly in his argument for the 
universality of the truth of God. He therefore does not collapse ontology into epistemology, 
and therefore a strong notion of anticipation is an inconsistency.31  
 
28 Wolfhart Pannenberg, “A Response to My American Friends,” in The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, ed. 
Carl E. Braaten and Philip Clayton (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1988), 320. Furthermore, “If this Christian hope will 
come true, our present faith will have been more than pure guesswork. It will presuppose the advent of that future, 
which is still open in our actual experience” (p. 320).  
29 Ibid., 321. Cf. McClean, From the Future, 89.  
30 Matt. 11.5; 12.28-29; Mark 1.15; 2.18-20; Luke 4.21; 7.22; 10.9, 17-20; 17.20-21; 21.31; John 5.25; 18.36; 
Rom. 8.18-30; 2 Cor. 5.17; Gal 1.4; Eph. 2.6; Phil. 3.12, 20-21; Heb. 2.8-9; 1 John 3.2. Cf. Joachim Jeremias, 
New Testament Theology, trans. John Bowden (London: SCM, 1971), 103-08; Grenz, Theology for the Community 
of God, 473-75, 609-12. 
31 This criticism, it should be noted, is slightly different to that of Clayton and Zehnder, who did not take seriously 
enough the dialectic inherent within Pannenberg’s methodology, whereas my concern is the inconsistency 
between his overreliance upon an idealist framework in his notion of anticipation and the development of his 
epistemology, which is markedly distinct to idealism, refusing to collapse ontology into epistemology.  
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To reject an ontological notion of anticipation and resort purely to epistemology, as Clayton 
does, is unnecessary. Rather than a weak notion of anticipation, it is still possible to uphold a 
moderate notion of anticipation. A PCR framework recognizes that knowledge and 
understanding of reality is communally and contextually conditioned, and that there is no clear 
distinction between ‘subjectivity’ and ‘objectivity.’ Knowledge is a perpetual interaction 
between external object and internal interpretation. We can therefore say, in a restricted sense, 
that a being is determined, to some (though not insignificant) sense, by its perception, a 
perception governed by the perceiver’s communal context. This is invariably provisional, as 
this context will change, and thus the perception will also change, and subsequently the being 
itself.  
Pannenberg’s doctrine of the resurrection places significant emphasis upon the belief that in 
Jesus’ resurrection the eschaton was present on account of the resurrection, in the apocalyptic 
tradition, being a general resurrection and thus “the beginning of the events of the end of 
history.”32 He argues: 
The significance of Jesus’ resurrection was originally bound to the fact that it constituted only the 
beginning of the universal resurrection of the dead and the end of the world. Only under this 
presupposition is the end present in Jesus’ resurrection. …All these statements about the meaning of 
Jesus’ resurrection are bound to the connection of this event with the imminent end of the world and 
the general resurrection of the dead.33 
The category of resurrection from the dead was suffused with the expectation of the eschaton. 
That is, the end of contingent history would be marked by the resurrection; that this has 
occurred in Jesus means, in some sense, that the end of contingent history has arrived.34 As I 
have noted, the hope for resurrection encompassed a broad spectrum of eschatological hope 
that extends well beyond the reanimation of a personal body, and hence Jesus’ post-mortem 
 
32 Pannenberg, JGM, 55; idem., ST, vol. 3, 568; Wolfhart Pannenberg, “Jesus’ History and our History,” PRSt 1, 
no. 2 (1974), 145.  
33 Pannenberg, JGM, 104-05. Elsewhere he states, “The meaning of Jesus’ resurrection yields itself to us today: 
in him the end of world history has already come to fulfilment” (Pannenberg, “Jesus’ History and our History,” 
145). Cf. Mostert, God and the Future, 53. 
34 Cf. Bradshaw, Pannenberg, 77.  
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existence was not merely connected to the general resurrection, as Pannenberg here suggests. 
This makes it all the more significant that the hopes for the end of contingent history were 
believed to have occurred within contingent history.  
In this sense, Jesus’ resurrection is a significant development of the Jewish eschatological 
notion. Resurrection was envisaged as a communal event that occurred at the end of contingent 
history. Either all people or a select few were to be resurrected to receive judgment, 
transformation, and entry into the new reality at the end of temporal history; the claim that this 
resurrection has already occurred and only to one person was a radical claim.35  
It is important to note that Jesus’ resurrection wasn’t a partial fulfilment of the eschatological 
hope, for the theological framework of resurrection was inseparable from the hopes for the 
eschaton. This hope was fulfilled in its entirety. This event was the proleptic anticipation of 
the future eschatological resurrection, that is, it is the present actualization of the future 
reality.36 Ted Peters has adopted Pannenberg’s notion of anticipation, arguing similarly that the 
transformative and redemptive power of God “has happened ahead of time, proleptically,” in 
Jesus’ post-mortem existence, and that the “future renewal of all things…has already 
appeared.”37 The resurrection of Jesus became understood within the early communities of the 
Jesus movement as the fulfilment of the ancient Jewish eschatological hopes that were expected 
to occur at the eschaton. A moderate version of Pannenberg’s anticipation helps solve the 
dilemma of an event that constituted the end of contingent history within the contingent history 
without ignoring the eschatological significance of this event or relegating it to supra-history. 
 
35 Cf. Pannenberg, ST, vol. 2, 350; Nickelsburg, Resurrection, Immortality, and Eternal Life, 227. 
36 Pannenberg, ST, vol. 1, 56; vol. 3, 85, 605; Erickson, Christian Theology, 709.  
37 Ted Peters, God – The World’s Future: Systematic Theology for a New Era, 3rd ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress, 
2015), 371, 605. Cf. Lauri Jäntti, “Proleptic Creation,” ST 60, no. 2 (2006), 187; Robert John Russell, 
“Eschatology and Scientific Cosmology: From Deadlock to Interaction,” Zygon 47, no. 4 (2012), 313. Peters also 
states, “The Easter resurrection did occur at one point on the [time]line, to be sure, but it also transcended the 
circumscription of its own historical period. Somehow the everlasting future was collapsed and compressed and 
appeared in seed form within the soil of that temporal moment” (Peters, God – The World’s Future, 606).  
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Within a PCR framework, the tension between external event and internal interpretation, 
conditioned by evolving historical and communal contexts, allows for a moderate form of 
anticipation that upholds the paradoxical tension between the now and the not yet, that the 
resurrection inaugurates within contingent history a new eschatological age in proleptic 




7. Redefining Resurrection: Concluding Remarks 
This thesis has argued, first, that the notion of ‘resurrection’ cannot be reduced to little more 
than the reanimation of a personal, corporeal body but that Jesus’ post-mortem existence is the 
fulfilment of the eschatological hopes for the dispensation of divine justice, the renewal and 
transformation of creation, and the exaltation of the righteous, and, second, that as such the 
resurrection constitutes the unification of present, empirical reality with the future 
eschatological reality.  
As I demonstrated in chapter two, scholarship has generally assumed that the language of 
‘resurrection’ envisages little more than a personal re-animated body and has interpreted Jesus’ 
resurrection accordingly. That is, some have defended a literal, physical reanimation of Jesus’ 
body following his death and burial, while others have insisted that such a claim is entirely 
absurd for a modern audience and so must be metaphorical – either primitive mythical language 
expressing something they didn’t understand or the rise of faith within the disciples – while 
still others maintain that the idea of a person coming back from the dead is of such 
eschatological character that it is removed from ordinary history. In each instance, the assumed 
meaning of the language of ‘resurrection’ is primarily of the reanimation of a personal body 
and is subsequently interpreted in light of this, as literal, metaphorical, or supra-historical.  
Subsequently, it was argued that these interpretations have failed to uphold both the continuous 
and discontinuous elements of the resurrected reality, as expressed in the ancient Jewish 
eschatological notion of resurrection and in the New Testament portrayals of Jesus’ 
resurrection. These scholars have emphasized one at the expense of the other. Those who argue 
for a physical event within contingent history have stressed the continuity of Jesus’ resurrection 
with his pre-crucifixion body and with ordinary reality. In so doing, this event is reduced to 
little more than any other event within contingent history, thereby ignoring the considerable 
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discontinuity and minimizing the eschatological significance of this event.1 Advocates for a 
metaphorical interpretation have similarly assumed the language of ‘resurrection’ to principally 
stress continuity but insist that such a thing – a physical body being reanimated after death – is 
impossible and must, therefore, be a reference to something else, such as an intense emotional 
memory, the continuation of Jesus’ mission, or the rise of faith within the disciples, expressed 
in mythical language. On the other hand, those who argue for an immaterial, ‘spiritual’ 
resurrection have stressed the discontinuous elements of the resurrection. They maintain that 
the descriptions of the risen Jesus which resemble physicality or a personal reanimation are 
either metaphorical depictions of this new immaterial existence or that the risen Jesus merely 
appears in a familiar and recognizable form. Similarly stressing discontinuity are those who 
argue this event constitutes supra-history, that the eschatological nature of this event thereby 
removes it entirely from ordinary contingent history. This thesis has argued that stressing either 
the continuity or discontinuity at the expense of the other is a misunderstanding of the ancient 
Jewish eschatological notion of resurrection, which simultaneously affirmed the renewal of 
present creation (and not its disbandment) as well as its radical transformation. Both must be 
upheld in a dialectical tension.  
Essentially, this thesis has attempted to reframe the assumed understanding of ‘resurrection,’ 
moving away from a singular focus upon a personal re-animated body and toward a much 
broader eschatological act of new creation (which nevertheless invariably includes a body) that 
intensively incorporates and integrates the ancient Jewish eschatological category of 
resurrection with the developing memory and interpretation of Jesus’ post-mortem existence. 
The interpretation of this event was a dynamic interaction between the external, objective event 
of Jesus’ post-mortem existence, and the categories and frameworks of understanding (the 
eschatological category of ‘resurrection of the dead’) which were applied to this event and 
 
1 Cf. Peter Carnley, The Structure of Resurrection Belief (Oxford: OUP, 1987), 145-46.  
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through which this event was understood. This interpretation then developed as this event was 
remembered and re-interpreted in new and developing contexts, particularly the growing 
realization that the Parousia was indefinitely delayed.  
The literature review of chapter two examined the major trends of resurrection theology from 
the pre-Enlightenment period to the present, highlighting how scholarship has so often assumed 
that the language of resurrection primarily envisages a personal reanimation and has 
subsequently emphasized either the continuity or discontinuity of the resurrection with 
empirical reality. The pre-Enlightenment era was characterised by a pre-critical hermeneutic 
and so Christian scholars generally interpreted Jesus’ post-mortem existence as a physical and 
personal reanimation. The continuity of Jesus’ risen nature with ordinary reality was heavily 
emphasized with little or nominal attention given to the discontinuous elements. Though it was 
observed in this chapter that the three-Quest demarcation was ultimately artificial and 
restrictive (though adopted to highlight general trends), mainstream scholarship of the ‘First 
Quest’ generally viewed the Easter narratives in terms of myth. Within the emerging critical 
consciousness of the era, resurrections – understood as the reanimation of personal bodies – 
were seen as aberrations of the natural order and so were interpreted as metaphor. Following 
this, in the early twentieth century, the supposed ‘No Quest’ period was characterised by a 
general aversion to historical research and a focus upon theological interpretation. Scholars in 
this era tended to emphasize an existential reading of resurrection or interpreted this event as 
supra-historical, thereby emphasizing the discontinuous and minimizing the continuous by 
entirely removing this event from ordinary contingent history. Again, the assumption was that 
resurrection primarily envisaged the reanimation of a personal body. 
The ‘New’ or ‘Second’ Quest of the mid twentieth century was marked by a reignited concern 
for historical Jesus research, but viewed the resurrection primarily as a kerygmatic tool. The 
‘historical Jesus’ is important and the New Testament proclamation about Jesus bears 
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significant continuity with the Jesus who lived within contingent history. However, whether or 
not the resurrection occurred within this contingent history is unimportant. Hence, as with the 
previous era, the discontinuous was emphasized at the expense of the continuous and 
‘resurrection’ is similarly assumed to refer to a personal re-animated body. At some point 
toward the end of the twentieth century, this Quest may have evolved into a distinct ‘Third’ 
Quest, and a general characteristic in scholarship was a greater focus upon the Jewish context 
within which Jesus lived and the New Testament (especially the earlier texts) was written. In 
particular, apocalyptic literature became particularly prominent, and Jesus was often viewed as 
a subversive political leader. The resurrection was interpreted accordingly. However, whether 
or not the resurrection occurred within contingent history was again often deemed unimportant 
or remained a supra-historical event, apart from a few not insignificant scholars who 
vehemently argued for a physical, literal event. In the 21st century, particularly following 
Wright’s The Resurrection of the Son of God, interest in the resurrection waned and was largely 
reserved for apologetic debates, where Jesus’ resurrection, as a personal reanimation, was 
defended or ridiculed.  
In questioning the essential meaning of the notion of resurrection and affirming an 
interpretation that seeks to balance antipodal realities in a dialectical tension, a re-evaluation 
of the epistemological and historiographical presuppositions pertaining to the study of Jesus’ 
resurrection was required. This was the task of chapters three and four.  
Following the literature review, chapter three turned to epistemological concerns and proposed 
a postfoundationalist constructive realist epistemic framework. This framework is not a 
definitive or universal methodology (as central to PCR is a rejection of universal methods) but 
rather a guide, providing general epistemic contours. PCR attempts to balance the external 
object and its subjective interpretation as a dynamic tension or interaction with neither 
functioning as foundation or becoming subordinate to the other. There is, hence, a strong 
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emphasis upon reciprocity, with multiple disciplines and experiences functioning without any 
being prioritized. Furthermore, this framework stresses the socially and historically mediated 
categories of understanding and worldviews. Ultimately, knowledge is bilateral, not unilateral, 
that is, knowledge is an interaction between the meaning inherent to the external object and the 
meaning applied to that object by the subjective interpreter. Hence the emendation of ‘critical 
realism’ to ‘constructive realism.’ The value of this framework for interpreting Jesus’ post-
mortem existence, rather than the many foundationalist or empiricist methodologies often used 
to interpret the resurrection, lies in (a) its ability to balance multiple epistemic sources in a 
postfoundationalist reciprocity which aids in the balancing of the antipodal elements of 
continuity and discontinuity present in the resurrected reality, and (b) its emphasis upon the 
significant role that the prior communal and eschatological categories of resurrection had in 
the interpretation of Jesus’ post-mortem existence.  
Chapter four was then concerned with the question of the historical analysis of Jesus’ post-
mortem existence. A PCR approach to historical inquiry into the resurrection stresses the 
anthropocentric nature of history, refusing to allow it to be relegated to the ambiguous realm 
of faith – entirely removed from historical inquiry – and recognizing the categories of 
understanding which were applied to the event and through which this event was understood. 
The interpretation of the external event was understood and shaped by prior categories – 
recognizing that knowledge is a bilateral interaction between the object or event and its witness 
or interpreter – and distorted by memory, which then develops in new and evolving contexts. 
History is a dynamic tension between the objective reality of past events within contingent 
history and the subjective interpretation and memory of the event.  
Applying this PCR framework to Jesus’ resurrection entailed two primary tasks. First, it was 
necessary to analyse the category of resurrection which shaped the interpretation of Jesus’ post-
mortem existence: the ancient Jewish eschatological category of resurrection of the dead. 
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Second, it was then necessary to analyse how this category was specifically applied to Jesus’ 
post-mortem existence and how it interacted with the memory of this event in new and 
developing contexts.  
The first task was the concern of chapter five, which analysed the category of resurrection in 
ancient Jewish eschatology. It was here demonstrated that the notion of resurrection was 
inseparably and intimately connected a broad array of eschatological hopes, particularly the 
restoration of relationship with YHWH, the transformation of the cosmos, and the dispensation 
of divine judgment. In each of these eschatological expectations, resurrection held a central 
role. Hence, the resurrection of the dead was practically synonymous with this broad spectrum 
of eschatological hope. Furthermore, this language depicted a new reality that extended well 
beyond personal bodies. An essential aspect of this new reality that resurrection particularly 
attested to was the simultaneous affirmation and renewal of ordinary reality and its radical 
transformation, imbued with divine justice, enabled unhindered relationship with YHWH, and 
is devoid of death and suffering. This is expressed best by the imagery of the new (and unified) 
heavens and earth. 
Chapter six took up the second task of analysing how this category was applied to Jesus’ post-
mortem existence, and the corollary analysis of how this category developed in light of Jesus’ 
post-mortem existence. This event came to be understood, particularly in the later resurrection 
traditions, as the fulfilment of a broad spectrum of eschatological expectations for the eschaton. 
The claim that Jesus’ resurrection occurred on, or after, the third day, and happened according 
to Scripture suggests as much. This chapter traced the development of the interpretation of 
Jesus’ post-mortem existence as it interacted with eschatological motifs and was remembered 
and re-interpreted in new and evolving contexts. This was not a strictly linear or homogenous 
development, but was generally interpreted within the early traditions as the initiation of, or a 
part of, the eschatological expectations for the eschaton, and in the later traditions as the 
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fulfilment in and of itself of these eschatological expectations. Jesus’ resurrection was 
connected to a broad array of eschatological motifs that exceed the scope of the reanimation of 
a personal, corporeal body, particularly regarding the redemption and transformation of 
creation as a whole (not just of Jesus’ body), the dispensation of divine judgment, the 
glorification and exaltation of Jesus, and the inauguration of a new eschatological age. Hence, 
there is both continuity and discontinuity between Jesus’ post-mortem existence and empirical 
reality, seen especially in the depiction of the risen Jesus in the Easter narratives of the Gospels 
and in Paul’s description in 1 Corinthians 15.  
From this analysis I conclude that Jesus’ post-mortem existence cannot be reduced and 
restricted to a personal re-animated body, and we must be careful not to emphasize either the 
continuous or discontinuous elements of the resurrection but must balance the two in a 
dialectical tension.  
The broader theological implications of this argument are extensive and cannot be addressed 
in this thesis, as they require extended reflection. The claim that Jesus’ post-mortem existence 
constituted the fulfilment of the eschatological hope for the renewal and transformation of 
creation itself touches on a larger creation theology that must be addressed. I suspect that if we 
were to follow this train of thought, the broader scope of reality beyond anthropology would 
constitute a significant and integral aspect of theological thought. In Jesus’ resurrection, it is 
not simply humanity which is being redeemed, but creation in general. If we were to consider 
the relationship between the resurrection and the incarnation, it might not be too much of a 
stretch to say that Jesus’ post-mortem existence was the resurrection of creation. How this 
extends to the non-human world must be considered, and might well be extremely important 
at a time when climate change is becoming increasingly problematic.  
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Another significant theological implication has to do with the anthropological conceptions of 
the self and identity. If the resurrection was more than a personal reanimation, what sort of 
existence is anticipated for people in the new eschatological reality that is to come, without 
ignoring the renewal and redemption of creation? How does this impact upon theological 
anthropology and God’s intensions for humanity? Again, these questions require significant 
further consideration and exceed the scope of this thesis. 
A final – perhaps pastoral – thought concerns the acceptance of this argument. It is a difficult 
task to encourage people to reshape deep-rooted notions, especially the notion of resurrection 
which has a central position within the Christian faith. It should be noted that this thesis is not 
an attempt to deny that something might well have happened to Jesus’ ‘body,’ but that the 
language of ‘body’ is restrictive, too-easily confused with Western and Cartesian notions of 
the individual, and excessively stresses continuity with ordinary reality. Paul uses ‘body’ to 
describe Jesus’ risen nature, but it seems that he saw this language as somewhat inadequate, 
which is precisely why he qualified this description with a variety of illustrations.2 
Nevertheless, as demonstrated in chapter two, the notion of resurrection has become virtually 
synonymous with personal reanimation, and convincing people otherwise will be a slow and 
difficult task, but – I believe – a necessary one.  
If we reframe resurrection to be understood as a broader eschatological event which extends 
well beyond Jesus’ body and upholds both the continuous and discontinuous elements of this 
resurrected reality, an array of theological possibilities is opened to us. In particular, we may 
see Jesus’ post-mortem existence as the dispensation of divine justice, the renewal and 
 
2 Finney remarks, “What [Paul] appears to mean in terms of post-mortem existence was actually a new entity for 
which he (confusingly) uses the term ‘body’ with all its encumbrances of natural flesh and blood,” (Finney, 
Resurrection, Hell and the Afterlife, 112-13).  
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transformation of creation, and the exaltation of the righteous. The hopes for the end of history 
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